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Fluctuations in Islamic Trade with Eastern Europe during the Viking Age*

THOMAS S. NOONAN

It has long been known that during the ninth and tenth centuries, a very lively trade existed between the Islamic world and eastern Europe. Already in the mid-ninth century, Ibn Khurdādhbih described how Rūs merchants from the distant north brought furs and swords to the Black Sea and Caspian, where they paid a tithe to the Byzantine and Khazar rulers of these regions. The merchants could then cross to Jurjān on the southeastern Caspian whence they travelled on camels to Baghdad with their goods.[1] This information was repeated by Ibn al-Faqīh al-Hamadhanī, who wrote around 900. The only difference is that Ibn al-Faqīh has the Rūs journey to al-Rayy/al-Muḥammadiyyah rather than to Baghdad.[2] If the ninth-century trade was pioneered by Viking-Rūs merchants who ventured to Baghdad, then the flourishing tenth-century commerce with eastern Europe was centered in the Khazar and Volga Bulghār lands along the lower and middle Volga. The Khazar and Bulghār rulers provided a safe market where Rūs merchants could bring their furs, slaves, wax, honey, and amber in order to exchange them with Islamic traders from the Near East and central Asia. There was even a multi-ethnic and multi-religious panel of judges who decided disputes among these merchants in Khazaria. This trade is perhaps best known from Ibn Faḍlān's eyewitness account of the Rūs merchants who came to the Bulghār lands to barter their goods with their Islamic counterparts.[3]

The written sources are quite informative about certain aspects of the Islamic trade with eastern Europe; for example, they even give the prices for certain varieties of furs in Bulghār markets. At the same time, the Islamic written sources present major problems. With the exception of Ibn Faḍlān, none of the authors visited the Volga markets themselves or personally saw Rūs merchants on their way to Baghdad. Consequently, all the reports, except Ibn Faḍlān's, rely on second, third, or even fourth-hand information, which was no doubt distorted in the process of transmission. Such distortions were magnified by the fact that the Rūs, East Slavs, Balts, and Finns of eastern Europe were all somewhat indistinguishable barbarians in the eyes of educated Muslims. Our learned authors also found it useful to borrow from earlier works, often without attribution. As a result, material from a ninth-century source could be incorporated into an account written in the mid-eleventh century. This material thus predated information found in a tenth-century work describing contemporaneous events. After our authors had plagiarized outdated information of uncertain validity, they were confronted by divergent and even contradictory reports. This problem was resolved by combining all the data into one, somewhat

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confused, account which was then rendered more confusing by later interpolations. This explains how the Muslim Bulghār ruler along the middle Volga whose people were active in the trade with Khwārizm could suddenly be transformed into the tsar of the Danubian Bulghārs attacking Constantinople with an army of 50,000 horsemen and sending raiding parties to ravage Rome, al-Andalus, and the Frankish lands.[4]

In addition to the many difficulties presented by the Islamic written sources, there is an even more serious historical problem. The written sources are like photographs which illuminate the Islamic trade with eastern Europe at one specific time and place. None of our authors attempted to take the individual pictures and arrange them into a pattern or history. Therefore, there is no discussion of when Islamic trade with eastern Europe began, how it changed from Viking merchants visiting ninth-century Baghdad to Islamic traders journeying to the tenth-century Volga, or what happened to this great commerce after the tenth century. Clearly, we must look elsewhere in attempting to reconstruct even a basic history of the earliest Islamic trade with eastern Europe.

The search for new evidence inevitably leads us to numismatics. During the course of the Viking Age, millions of Islamic silver coins or *dirhams* were exported from the Near East and central Asia to the lands of eastern and northern Europe. Over one hundred and fifty thousand of these dirhams have been uncovered and at least partially identified in just eastern Europe and Sweden. Most of the dirhams are found in hoards, that is, groups of five or more dirhams deposited together at one time and place. Over fifty years ago, the great Russian Islamic numismatist, Richard Vasmer (Fasmer), demonstrated conclusively that the composition of the dirham hoards buried in eastern Europe changed significantly over time. At one time, the hoards might contain dirhams struck by a number of dynasties during a long period. At another time, the hoards were overwhelmingly composed of very new dirhams from one dynasty.[5] The changes in the composition of the dirham hoards reflect historical developments in the Islamic world and in Islamic trade with eastern Europe. The vast quantity of new Sāmānid dirhams in eastern European hoards of the tenth century was, for example, the product of a very active tenth-century trade which went from central Asia to the Volga and from the Volga to all parts of eastern and northern Europe.

Before proceeding further, a few comments are necessary to explain why dirham hoards are considered as evidence of Islamic trade with eastern Europe. This key point has two aspects. First, why were Islamic dirhams brought to eastern Europe in the first place? Second, why did peoples in eastern Europe bury some of these dirhams in the ground? Starting with the first question, commerce is only one possible explanation for the appearance of dirhams in eastern Europe. Vikings, as is well known, acquired substantial booty from their raids or, as in the case of the Danegeld, as payment not to attack certain

areas. Those Vikings serving the Byzantine emperors probably received some compensation in the form of coins. But, whatever may have happened in western Europe or Byzantium, Islamic sources testify unequivocally that the Islamic merchants who travelled to the lands along the Volga used dirhams to obtain furs, slaves, and other goods. Ibn Faḍlān personally visited the Volga Bulghārs in May 922 and described the Rūs merchants who came by boat to the Bulghār market on the Volga and prayed for wealthy Islamic merchants with many dirhams who would come and buy all their slaves and furs. Ibn Faḍlān also noted that for every ten thousand dirhams possessed by one of these Rūs merchants, he had a neckband made for his wife. Some wives had numerous neckbands.[6] Gardīzī reported that dirhams were brought to the Volga Bulghārs from the lands of Islam as the result of trade. He added that the Bulghārs used these dirhams to acquire merchandise from the Rūs and Saqlābs because the latter "will not sell (their) goods except for solid money."[7] There are a number of Islamic sources which describe the active commerce along the Volga. However, the two cited above prove conclusively that Islamic merchants obtained goods in the Volga markets in exchange for dirhams and that Rūs merchants sought Islamic silver coins.

In addition, raiding can be ruled out as a significant source of dirhams. The Vikings could not attack the great dirham-producing areas such as Baghdad and Samarqand, nor could they threaten caravans crossing the steppe from Khwārizm to the Volga. The only area where raiding is attested is the Caspian Sea. Raiding in the Caspian, however, was very dangerous for the Rūs. Shortly after 912/13, one band of Rūs passed down the lower Volga into the Caspian with the permission of the Khazar *khagan*, who was to receive half of the Rūs booty. After devastating a number of coastal areas, the Rūs found their return route blocked by the Muslim auxiliaries of the *khagan*, who killed many ("30,000") of them. The ("5,000") Rūs who abandoned their ships and fled north by land were killed by the Burṭās and the Volga Bulghārs.[8] A similar fate befell other Rūs expeditions into the Caspian: those who raided the southeastern coast between 864 and 884 were "annihilated"; the Rūs attack on the same area around 909/10 ended disastrously.[9] Raiding in the Caspian was far more difficult and much less rewarding than surprise attacks along the French and English rivers, where there was an easy escape into the sea. In short, the dirhams which appeared in eastern Europe were overwhelmingly the consequence of trade.

The next question is why the peoples of eastern Europe would bury *some* of their dirhams in the ground. The word "some" is emphasized because around 55% of the dirhams to reach eastern Europe were re-exported to the Baltic. In examining this problem, several points should be remembered. Almost all the dirham hoards were found in some sort of ceramic, metal, birch-bark, or glass container. In other words, the hoards were deliberately deposited; they were not the result of some chance loss. Furthermore, the dirhams were often deposited

with silver jewelry and other valuables. Dirhams were thus only part of the portable wealth that was buried throughout eastern Europe. Finally, dirhams were especially sought after in eastern Europe and the Baltic because these regions had no indigenous sources of silver in the early Middle Ages.

Specialists usually note a number of reasons for the depositing of coins in medieval and ancient times. Given the existence of seemingly endless civil strife, foreign attacks, and natural catastrophes, those with even very modest wealth sought to preserve it from loss by depositing it in some safe place where only the owner(s) could claim it. Hoards were thus a type of safety deposit box. At the same time, merchants, certain craftsmen, and others needed coins for their business. As we have seen, Islamic merchants had to pay their Volga Bulghār and Rūs counterparts in silver coins for the furs, slaves, and other goods they desired. Jewelers melted down dirhams in order to make silver bracelets, earrings, etc. East Slavic tribes paid part of their tribute in coins, presumably dirhams.[10] Political leaders no doubt found it necessary, at certain times, to pay money for various services, e.g., as gifts to potential enemies or as a down payment to the leaders of prospective auxiliaries. Travelers certainly found it easier to carry hundreds of dirhams in their pockets than cart around bundles of furs. In sum, many people used dirhams. But, all those who used dirhams also had to store them safely in a place where they could be easily retrieved. Today, such money can be deposited in banks. In medieval eastern Europe, such money was usually deposited in the ground. It has also been argued that dirhams were more apt to be buried in those areas where they could not be profitably "invested." The inhabitants of towns with an active commerce and developed economy readily found productive use for their silver coins. From this perspective, dirham hoards are a sign of a more backward economy. In short, there are a number of possible reasons why people in medieval eastern Europe might have collected dirhams and buried them. If the owner(s) died unexpectedly and no one else knew where such treasure was kept, it remained intact until accidentally unearthed at some later time, usually by a peasant plowing the fields. Finally, some dirhams were pierced and converted into pendants on necklaces, a number of which were then buried along with their proud possessors.

The dirhams that entered eastern Europe and were not re-exported to the Baltic were most likely placed in the ground for a variety of reasons. Some were for use by merchants in local, regional, and international trade. Some were kept by jewelers and other craftsmen. Some constituted all or part of a family's portable wealth to be preserved. Some were collected by tributaries to pay their lords. Some were used by rulers to purchase safety or soldiers. Some were deposited for reasons not enumerated above. There is no single explanation for the burying of over 250 dirham hoards in eastern Europe during the course of over two centuries. Whatever the reasons for depositing these hoards may have

been, however, the dirhams themselves initially appeared in eastern Europe as the result of Rūs-Islamic trade.

In this study, I should like to go beyond the works of Fasmer and Valentin L. Ianin[11] on the dynastic and chronological composition of eastern European dirham hoards and to examine the question of the changes in the volume of dirham exports to eastern Europe during the Viking Age. In other words, if we assume that Islamic trade with eastern Europe was not constant during the course of over two centuries, then what can the dirham hoards tell us about the fluctuations in this trade?

In answering this fundamental question, we must never forget that dirham hoards are a very imperfect substitute for written financial records. Customs records, for instance, reveal the quantity and/or monetary value of various goods imported into a given country at a given time. Dirham hoards cannot give us such specific information. The dirham hoards deposited in eastern Europe were overwhelmingly the product of trade with Islam, and the most recent coin in a hoard provides a very good approximation of when the hoard was buried. All we know about the other dirhams in a hoard is that they were in circulation for a certain period of time before being deposited. We do not know how long they circulated within Islam before being brought to eastern Europe by Muslim or Viking merchants, nor do we know how long such dirhams circulated in eastern Europe before they were deposited. Thus, if a hoard contains a hundred dirhams and the most recent dirham is dated to 910/11, all we know about a dirham from the hoard that was struck in 860/61 is that it circulated for a half-century within the Islamic world and eastern Europe before being deposited. It is by no means certain that the coin was brought to eastern Europe ca. 910. Therefore, from a theoretical standpoint, it is misleading to assume that a hoard of a hundred dirhams deposited in 910/11 was the result of a trade which led to the importation of all these dirhams into eastern Europe around 910/11.

Historical numismatics is as much art as science. Since there are no written records on the volume of Islamic trade with eastern Europe in the Viking Age, we must use the dirham hoards. They may not be the best indicator of the fluctuations in commerce, but they are the *only* extant indicator. Furthermore, a hoard of a hundred dirhams deposited shortly after 910/11 may well reflect around a hundred dirhams imported into eastern Europe shortly before 910/11. While some dirhams imported ca. 910/11 may have remained in circulation for some time in eastern Europe, other dirhams imported earlier were presumably being deposited ca. 910/11. Older dirhams finally being buried offset newer dirhams which stayed in circulation. In addition, the depositing of relatively large quantities of dirhams during a given decade indicates the importation of relatively large quantities of dirhams at some point up to and including that decade. Thus, if we err by assuming that the hundred dirhams in our hypothetical hoard were imported in 910/11, it is an error of time; a hundred dirhams were imported into eastern Europe. It is also reasonable to assume that most of the

dirhams were imported within two or three decades of the hoard's burial. Consequently, our error of time is not that great when looking at a period of over two centuries. In sum, while dirham hoards are an imperfect indicator of the volume of trade, they are a reasonably good indicator given the absence of detailed written records.

It should be emphasized that dirhams were only one of the oriental products imported into medieval eastern Europe as the result of trade. Silks, glassware, glazed pottery, and cowrie shells are only a few of the many oriental imports that have turned up in archeological excavations. This study thus deals with the main oriental import during the period from the late eighth to early eleventh century. Unfortunately, the other oriental imports from this period cannot be as easily catalogued or dated. Furthermore, the decline in the importation of dirhams in the early eleventh century does not necessarily mean that the "eastern" trade declined at that time. It may only signify that larger quantities of other oriental products were now exported to eastern Europe to take the place of silver coins.[12]

In the catalogue of the dirham hoards from medieval western Eurasia that I am now completing, I have recorded information on 257 hoards with five or more dirhams deposited in eastern Europe. Of these hoards, the approximate date of deposit for 169 (66%) can be determined, while 88 (34%) can only be dated generally. Among the 88 hoards that cannot be dated to a specific decade, there are some for which no real information exists. We are simply told that a hoard of two hundred dirhams was found or that "many" dirhams from a hoard were preserved. On the other hand, data about other undated hoards is incomplete rather than absent. We learn, for instance, that only a few coins out of several hundred dirhams in a hoard were identified and that the most recent of these surviving dirhams dated to a given year. For purposes of the catalogue, this hoard was dated to the ninth, tenth, eleventh, or ninth-eleventh centuries and not to a specific year. In a study of this type, however, we should seek to maximize our data using reasonable assumptions. Thus, a hypothetical hoard of 250 dirhams has been dated to 821/22 if the most recent of eight identified dirhams dated to 821/22. The error, as before, is one of time at most; in this case, 250 dirhams were brought to eastern Europe by 821/22 at the earliest. In addition, there are a number of mixed hoards containing deniers and dirhams in which the most recent coin was a denier. In this hypothetical situation, twenty-five dirhams may be part of a hoard of two hundred coins, of which the most recent coin is a denier struck ca. 1050. If the most recent of the twenty-five dirhams dates to 995/96, these dirhams have been treated as a hoard with twenty-five dirhams deposited in 995/96. These mixed hoards show that groups of dirhams circulated in eastern Europe for some time after their import there; they do not represent imports dating to the time of the most recent denier. In other words, the basic data on some of our 257 hoards need to be adjusted

in order to maximize the number of dated hoards and arrive at more appropriate dates.

Since some may object to one or more of the assumptions involved in these adjustments, Table 1 gives the basic, unadjusted data for the 257 hoards. In some cases, there are two figures for the number of dirhams deposited in a given decade. The first shows the number of identified dirhams, while the second shows the total number of dirhams. When, for example, eighty-seven of a hundred dirhams in a hoard were identified, the terminal date is reasonably certain. However, eighty-seven is given as the first, "most conservative" figure, while one hundred is listed as the second, "very probable" figure. Purists may wish to recalculate all the subsequent analysis using Table I.

Table II shows the adjusted data on our 257 dirham hoards. One can assign 223 hoards (87%) to specific decades, while only 34 hoards (13%) cannot be more precisely dated. For the sake of consistency, Table II unfortunately contains some misleading data. The single hoard of 150 dirhams from the 740s, for instance, is the estimated size of a hoard from which only nine Umayyad dirhams were preserved. No other hoard consisting entirely of Umayyad dirhams has yet been uncovered in eastern Europe or the Baltic. Furthermore, the earliest unquestionable dirham hoard from all eastern Europe dates to the 780s. The hoard nominally assigned to the 740s probably dates to the 780s or later. This example, as well as the problems involved in our assumptions, demonstrates that the figures in Table II reflect longer-term fluctuations encompassing a generation or more, and should not be seen as the precise data for a given decade.

What then does Table II suggest about the fluctuations in Islamic trade with eastern Europe during the Viking Age? One must first examine the data for each century. These figures confirm what most would intuitively suspect: the high point of the Islamic trade with eastern Europe as measured by dirhams came in the tenth century. Just over 60% of the dirhams, i.e., just over 60% of the trade, can be attributed to this century. By way of contrast, slightly less than 25% of the dirhams come from the ninth-century hoards. The ninth-century commerce was only 38% of the tenth-century commerce. About one seventh of the dirhams come from the eleventh century, while slightly more than 1% can be attributed to the eighth century.

	No. of hoards	No. of dirhams	% of all dirhams	Dirhams per hoard
Eighth c.	7	1156	1.21	165.1
Ninth c.	75	22551	23.58	300.7
Tenth c.	121	58804	61.49	486.0
Eleventh c.	20	13121	13.72	656.1

Table II also suggests a different, two-phase periodization. The first phase extended from the 790s, when the initial large concentration of dirhams is

encountered, till the 880s–890s, when the influx of dirhams appears to have dropped precipitously. During this phase, seventy-seven hoards and 23,356 dirhams (24.4% of the total) were deposited in eastern Europe. For the sake of simplicity, this period can be called the Near Eastern, ʿAbbāsid phase. Some 140 hoards and 68,526 dirhams (71.7%of the total) were buried between the early tenth century, when the influx of Sāmānid coins began, and the 1010s, when the significant importation of dirhams ceased. This period can be called the central Asian, Sāmānid phase. From this perspective, substantive Viking-Age Islamic trade with eastern Europe dates from the 790s to the 1010s, and the central Asian phase (900-1019) was three times (2.9) greater in quantity than the Near Eastern phase.

It is also possible to look at Islamic trade with eastern Europe in a sequential fashion. To assist the reader in visualizing the data in Table II, Graph I has been prepared. It shows the percentage of the total number of dirhams which was deposited each decade. The profile of this graph is the same as that for the number of dirhams deposited each decade; thus, what the reader sees is the volume of dirham imports per decade. Again, we should take care not to over-interpret the data from a single decade.

Despite a few early hoards, the importation of dirhams only assumed substantial proportions in the 790s. In other words, Islamic trade with eastern Europe originated in the late eighth century. This early trade, when put in overall perspective, was modest. It grew slowly in the early ninth century (800s–810s), but then declined for about two decades (820s–830s). Trade over the next sixty years (840s–890s) apparently followed a roller-coaster pattern. After growing in the 840s, it declined sharply in the 850s, grew dramatically in the 860s, dropped by 58% in the 870s although remaining at a substantial level, and then shrank to minimal levels during the 880s and 890s. The redating of a few known hoards and/or the discovery of a few new hoards could easily change the relative position of each decade. Nevertheless, it is clear that Islamic trade did fluctuate significantly from decade to decade during the ninth century. This trade grew erratically until reaching a high point in the 860s, then declined erratically for the rest of the century.

Islamic commerce increased greatly in the first decade of the tenth century, but then declined by over 50% in the 910s. After dropping sharply in the 920s (to 28% of the level of the 910s), trade grew again in the 930s, almost returning to the levels of the 910s. Trade between Islam and eastern Europe reached its zenith in the 940s, accounting for *two-fifths* of all dirhams imported during the entire tenth century. Again, while one need not necessarily insist on the 940s in particular, there is no doubt that the high point of Islamic commerce dated to the mid-tenth century. During the next seventy years, Islamic trade fluctuated, although it never again attained either the heights of the 940s or the depths of the 920s. It is notable that significant quantities of dirhams were imported into eastern Europe in the 950s, 970s, 1000s, and 1010s. For all practical

purposes, Islamic trade as measured by dirham hoards came to an end in the 1010s.

If all the dirhams were imported into eastern Europe at a constant rate between the 790s and 1010s, then 4.3% of the total number would have been deposited each decade. Only two of the twenty-three decades were within 0.5 percent of this average (4.3% ± 0.5%). Fourteen decades were below average, and seven were above average. The Islamic trade with eastern Europe was anything but constant. Continued changes in volume were the rule.

The number of dirhams deposited each decade measures the volume of trade by decade. The number of dirham hoards from each decade, by way of contrast, reflects the intensity of trade. As Deyell puts it, the "number of coin samples (hoards) lost is directly proportional to the volume of exchange transactions...."[13] At certain periods, there may have been many small hoards while, at others, a few, large hoards could have been deposited. In the former case, trade was probably more intensive while, in the latter case, trade was probably greater in volume. The number of hoards thus reflects the degree of commercial activity if not its volume. Graph II shows the number of hoards per decade.

The chart above indicates that 7 hoards (3.1%) were from the eighth century, 75 hoards (33.6%) were from the ninth century, 121 hoards (54.3%) were from the tenth century, and 20 hoards (9.0%) were from the eleventh century. Interestingly, a larger percentage of hoards (33.6%) came from the ninth century than a percentage of dirhams (23.6%). Similarly, a smaller percentage of hoards (54.3%) came from the tenth century than a percentage of dirhams (61.5%). Islamic commerce, using this indicator, was somewhat more active in the ninth century than the number of dirhams would suggest.

Using the two-phase approach, 77 hoards (35.5%) were deposited between the 790s and 890s while 140 hoards (64.5%) date to the period between 900 and the 1010s. Again, the hoards suggest more activity in the earlier phase (35.5% vs. 24.4%) and less in the later phase (64.5% vs. 71.1%) than the number of dirhams would indicate. The number of hoards, as opposed to the number of dirhams, show a more lively ninth-century Islamic commerce with eastern Europe. As before, however, there was clearly a far greater trade in the tenth century.

An examination of the number of hoards from specific decades reveals some interesting developments. The greatest number of dirhams, by far, came from the 940s. There were 2.5 times as many dirhams from the 940s as from any other decade. Yet there were more hoards from the 810s, 860s, 900s, and 970s than from the 940s. Some of these figures might be attributed to the chance or inaccurate dating of a few hoards. Nevertheless, it appears that a high level of commercial activity did not always produce a high level of dirhams imported into eastern Europe. There were a few more hoards from the 810s than the 940s, even though eight times as many dirhams were deposited in the 940s.

During the period from the 790s to 1010s, an average of 9.4 hoards was deposited each decade. Nine decades, give or take two (9±2 hoards) can be considered average, while six were well below average. In general, then, the level of commercial activity associated with the Islamic trade was far more consistent than the volume of dirham imports into eastern Europe.

The sequence of hoarding shows growing activity from the 780s to 810s, a steady decline in activity between the 820s and 850s, and a sharp growth in the 860s followed by a sharp drop in the last three decades of the ninth century. The large influx of new Sāmānid dirhams during the early tenth century produced a marked increase in the level of activity even though this level slowly declined. The mid-tenth century (940s–950s) brought a new upsurge in activity apparently linked with the large volume of imports. Following a surprising drop in the 960s (from sixteen hoards in the 950s to three), which may be more apparent than real, the intensity of the Islamic trade, as measured by dirham hoards, reached its zenith in the 970s. One explanation might be that the highest level of hoarding could only develop *after* the highest level of dirham imports had been achieved (in the 940s). The high level of the 970s dropped about 58% during the 980s–1000s but still remained above average. Finally, the 1010s saw the end of commercial activity in dirhams for all practical purposes. While dirhams were found in coin hoards for almost a century after the 1010s, their presence reflects the circulation of older dirhams within eastern Europe rather than the importation of new dirhams from the Islamic world.

Thus far, we have focused entirely on the fluctuations in Islamic trade as seen in the dirham hoards from eastern Europe. However, large numbers of dirhams were re-exported from eastern Europe into the lands around the Baltic. The dirham hoards from these lands also reflect the Islamic trade with eastern Europe and, consequently, cannot be ignored in this study. Limitations of space prevent us from considering all the dirham hoards from all the lands bordering the Baltic. Nevertheless, it has been possible to include the data on 433 hoards with five or more dirhams deposited in Sweden during the Viking Age. These 433 hoards contained 67,049 dirhams and represent the overwhelming majority of dirhams found in the Baltic.[14] In this way, we can examine most of the relevant data from the Baltic.

As noted above, there is a problem in determining how long dirhams imported into eastern Europe remained in circulation until being deposited there. This problem is compounded when considering the Swedish hoards. Some dirhams may have remained in circulation in Sweden for an unknown time before being buried there. Thus, the Swedish hoards might have been subjected to a double time-lag. Nevertheless, for the purposes of this study, we shall assume that the potential double time-lag did not significantly distort the Swedish data and that it is possible to combine information on contemporaneous hoards from eastern Europe and Sweden in order to better measure the fluctuations in Islamic trade with eastern Europe. After all, some of the best

research in physics rests on the assumption of a perfect vacuum, a state rarely found in nature.

The dirhams from eastern European hoards are also greater in number that those from Sweden (95,632 vs. 64,306). The aggregate data are thus weighted in favor the eastern European profile by a factor of 1.49. Since almost all the dirhams in Swedish hoards came via eastern Europe, however, the Swedish data should improve the accuracy of the eastern European profile rather than distort it. The differences in profiles illuminate Viking-Age trade with eastern Europe and do not vitiate the aggregate data on Islamic imports into eastern Europe.

Table III shows the combined data from Sweden and eastern Europe for the total number of dirhams in these hoards. The data from this table are displayed in Graph III. The breakdown of these data by centuries is as follows.

	No. of hoards	No. of dirhams	% of all dirhams	Dirhams per hoard
Eighth c.	8	1165	.73	145.6
Ninth c.	129	34125	21.34	264.5
Tenth c.	433	108817	68.04	251.3
Eleventh c.	50	15831	9.90	316.6

The Swedish data agree, in general, with the information from eastern Europe, although there are some differences. Eighth-century hoards still contain about 1% of all the dirhams (1.21% vs. .73%). Ninth-century hoards still contain around one-fifth to one-fourth of all dirhams (23.58% vs. 21.34%). Tenth-century hoards still contain around two-thirds of all dirhams (61.49% vs. 68.04%). Eleventh-century hoards still possess approximately one-tenth of all dirhams (13.72% vs. 9.9%). In sum, using this overall breakdown, the massive importation of Islamic dirhams into eastern Europe was confined to the ninth, tenth and early eleventh centuries (99.3% of all dirhams) with the tenth-century trade 3.2 times as large as the ninth-century trade, and with the ninth-century trade 2.2 times as large as the early eleventh-century trade.

In the two-phase approach, 131 hoards with 34,930 dirhams came from the Near Eastern phase (790s-890s), while 342 hoards with 124,249 dirhams came from the central Asian phase (900s-1010s). From this perspective, 77% of all the dirhams imported into eastern Europe were from the central Asian phase and only 22% were from the Near Eastern phase. For the eastern European hoards alone, 72% were from the central Asian phase and 24% were from the Near Eastern phase. Thus, our two-phase measure produces the same basic result as the four-century measure. The volume of Islamic trade with eastern Europe was three times greater in the tenth century (900s-1010s) than in the ninth century (790s-890s).

Using a narrower focus, Islamic trade, as measured by the volume of dirham imports, only began in the early ninth century; the 810s were the first decade

to register over one percent of all dirhams. This puts the start of substantive dirham imports a little later that the 790s suggested by the eastern European hoards alone. Islamic commerce declined from the level of the 810s during the 820s and 830s; this decline was also true of the eastern European hoards. As before, there was a roller-coaster pattern over the next sixty years. For the period from the 840s to the 880s, the trends are similar. Trade rose during the 840s to a level hitherto unknown and then declined sharply in the 850s. The 860s saw the volume of trade reach its highest pre-900 level. The 870s brought a real decline, although trade was still substantial, while the 880s saw the importation of dirhams plummet to its lowest ninth-century numbers. The only real divergence comes in the 890s: in eastern Europe, trade remained at minimal levels while our combined figures, reflecting Swedish hoards, show a real increase. The composite data thus suggest a few refinements in the fluctuations of Islamic trade but no significant changes.

The composite data reveal a major growth in the level of trade starting in the 900s and 910s; this level was roughly twice that of the 890s, about twelve times larger than that of the 880s, and around 1.3 times that of the 870s. The volume of imports dropped significantly in the 920s and then, in the 930s, approached levels from the early tenth century. The patterns from these four decades are similar, although some of the ups and downs are more extreme in the eastern European case.

The patterns of the 940s and 950s are most interesting. In eastern Europe, the quantity of dirham imports reached huge proportions in the 940s, amounting to one-fourth of all imports. In Sweden, the quantity of dirhams reached its highest level in the 950s, constituting 24.5% of all imports. Apparently, many of the dirhams brought to eastern Europe in the 940s reached Sweden in the 950s. Some 32.7% of all dirhams, almost one-third of the total, were imported into eastern Europe in the 940s and 950s. These two decades unquestionably mark the heyday of the Islamic trade with eastern Europe as measured by the dirham hoards.

The general trends for the period from the 960s till the 1010s are in agreement. The composite data show a decline by over 50% in the 960s and a significant revival in trade during the 970s, which was followed by major declines in the 980s and 990s. The 1000s brought a new increase, while the 1010s showed a decline. There was no significant trade after the 1010s. During the 960s to 980s, levels were higher in the composite data due to a greater number of dirhams from Sweden. By way of contrast, these levels were lower in the composite data during the 1000s-1010s due to a smaller number of dirhams from Sweden. Again, the composite data point to refinements in the overall pattern but no real changes.

We can thus conclude that the general fluctuations in the volume of Islamic trade with eastern Europe as measured by the eastern European hoards alone is substantially correct.

Our composite chart above shows that 8 hoards (1.3%) were from the eighth century, 129 hoards (20.8%) were from the ninth century, 433 hoards (69.8%) were from the tenth century, and 50 hoards (8.1%) were from the eleventh century. Comparing these figures with those from eastern Europe alone, we see a little less activity in the eighth century (1.3% vs. 3.1%), much less activity in the ninth century (20.8% vs. 33.6%), much more activity in the tenth century (69.8% vs. 54.3%), and a very similar level of activity in the eleventh century (8.1% vs. 9.0%). The result of including the Swedish hoards is to increase substantially the degree of commercial activity during the tenth century while significantly lowering the degree of ninth-century commercial activity. These differences appear to reflect fluctuations in eastern European-Swedish trade. None the less, the Islamic trade of the tenth century was 3.5 times that of the ninth century.

In the two-phase approach, 131 hoards (21.1%) were deposited between the 790s and 890s, while 482 hoards (77.7%) date from the 900s to 1010s. Again, we see a much lower level of activity during the central Asian phase (77.7% vs. 64.5%) when the Swedish hoards are included.

In discussing the volume of imports into eastern Europe, it was emphasized that the dirhams in hoards from Sweden were imported almost entirely from eastern Europe. These dirhams therefore reflect dirham imports into eastern Europe. On the the other hand, the number of dirham hoards from Sweden reflects economic activity in Sweden; they do not necessarily provide evidence on the level of economic activity in eastern Europe. Consequently, the refinements in the level of activity deriving from our composite data should be used with care.

The data on the eastern European dirham hoards, while not a perfect indicator, do demonstrate that Islamic trade with eastern Europe during the Viking Age was subject to great fluctuations. Far from being constant, this commerce was, if anything, very erratic. Some of the fluctuations would diminish if a relatively few hoards were redated based on new attributions of their most recent dirhams. It seems improbable, however, that better identifications of known hoards or the discovery of new hoards would alter the basic profile greatly. This trade really began in the late eighth to early ninth century, reached a ninth-century peak in the 860s, declined but then revived in the early tenth century, attained maximum levels in the 940s to 950s, and then declined erratically until the 1010s, when it ceased. The numismatic evidence, unlike the written primary sources, reveals a very complex pattern of trade relations which experienced numerous changes.

The next task is to examine Islamic, steppe, eastern European, and Baltic history during the Viking Age to explain why these fluctuations took place. This task shall not be attempted in this study. Nevertheless, in order to stimulate discussion, some brief, preliminary observations can be offered. Islamic trade with eastern Europe began ca. 800, some fifty to seventy-five years before Ibn

Khurdādhbih first described this trade. This means that between ca. 750 and ca. 800, Viking merchants from the emporium of Staraia Ladoga, near modern St. Petersburg, had discovered the routes leading south to the Black Sea, Caspian Sea, and Baghdad. At the same time, the establishment of Baghdad starting in 762 had created a major market for eastern European goods. Somehow Viking and Islamic merchants learned how to satisfy this market for their mutual benefit.[15]

The ninth-century Islamic trade with eastern Europe peaked at about the very time when Ibn Khurdādhbih was writing his report. The marked growth in this commerce during the 860s and 870s could reflect developments within Islam, such as a heightened demand for luxury goods connected with the temporary ᶜAbbāsid capital at Sāmarrā or Surra man ra'ā, an expanded volume of coinage available for use in this trade, or the import of more male slaves for the ᶜAbbāsid armies. Historians of eastern Europe, on the other hand, might be tempted to link this growing commerce with the establishment of the legendary Riurik at Novgorod and the consolidation of Viking control over the major river routes leading to the Caspian Sea. The Vikings may also have sought more scarce silver for use in northern Europe.

In his account of the Rūs trade with the Khazars and Near East, Ibn Khurdādhbih described the route of the Jewish merchants called Rādhāniyyah, who travelled between western Europe and China. One of the routes sometimes used by the Rādhāniyyah led from Byzantium through Khazaria and then, via the Caspian, to central Asia and China.[16] Since the Rādhāniyyah do not appear to have been mentioned in later sources, it is possible that the emergence of the Rūs-Khazar-Islamic trade starting in the late eighth-early ninth centuries somehow disrupted and perhaps even replaced this northern route of the Rādhāniyyah. Be that as it may, the impact of Rūs-Islamic trade upon east-west commerce across the western Eurasian steppe clearly needs further study.

The first two decades of the tenth century were marked by a tremendous growth in trade connected with the shift in the Islamic silver-exporting centers from the Near East to central Asia. This fundamental reorientation in the Islamic side of the trade is often ignored or treated summarily in accounts based upon the written sources. The influx of new Sāmānid dirhams into eastern Europe clearly illuminates this major change. The reasons for this shift, however, are less clear. The Sāmānids may have gained control over key silver mines and exploited them to finance a rapidly expanding trade with eastern Europe. At the same time, the caravan routes from central Asia to Bulghār could bypass the Khazar khaganate and provide direct Islamic access to the markets of the middle Volga. Such direct Volga Bulghār commerce with Khwārizm is specifically confirmed by al-Muqaddasī, who wrote, ca. 985, that "from Khwārizm [there are imported into the Muslim world] sable skins, squirrel skins [or miniver], ermine, weasel, marten, fox, beaver, hares of varied colors, goat skins, wax, arrows, [fur] hats, isinglass, fish-teeth, castor, yellow amber,

prepared horse hides, honey, hazel nuts, falcons, swords, cuirasses, *khalanj* wood, Saqlāb slave girls, sheep, and cattle. All these come from Bulghār...."[17] In other words, the Volga Bulghārs were the eastern European market from which huge quantities of goods originating in the Baltic, northern Russia and elsewhere were transported to central Asia. From there, these goods were sent throughout the Islamic world. Finally, these changes testify to the rise of the Volga Bulghārs as a political-economic force in eastern Europe. Two decades before Ibn Faḍlān's journey, the new central Asian trade signaled the emergence of the Bulghārs as a center potentially rivaling the Khazars.

The massive imports of the mid-tenth century raise many questions. As noted already, it would appear that the huge quantities of dirhams imported into eastern Europe during the 940s led to a tremendous influx of dirhams into Sweden during the 950s. But it is not clear what produced this unprecedented increase in Islamic trade with eastern Europe. Were these dirhams a reflection of greatly increased quantities of silver being minted perhaps due to the discovery of new mines, a growing demand for eastern European goods in central Asia, an escalating demand for Muslim silver by Rūs princes building up their military power, or to the need for Rūs merchants to supply an insatiable appetite for silver in the Baltic? Much work remains to be done in identifying the operative supply and demand factors within eastern Europe, northern Europe, and the Islamic world.

The vastly increased level of trade during the mid-tenth century coincides with the issuance of the first undisputed Bulghār dirhams bearing the names of Bulghār amīrs and mints. The striking of these coins shows that the Volga Bulghārs had become independent of the Khazars by the 940s; twenty years earlier, when Ibn Faḍlān visited the middle Volga, the Bulghārs had been Khazar tributaries. It is therefore pertinent to ask whether the establishment of an independent Bulghhār amīrate during the 940s and 950s was connected in some way with the marked growth in trade with central Asia.

The 970s demonstrate that we must use the data on dirham hoards and total dirhams very carefully. Graph III clearly shows that both eastern European and Swedish imports grew significantly when compared with the 960s. The Swedish figures, however, are in large part illusory. The vast majority of dirhams in the Swedish hoards of the tenth and eleventh century were struck *before* 950. In one tabulation, 80.5% of the dirhams from thirty-nine Swedish hoards of this period were struck prior to 940. In the Swedish hoards of the 960s and 970s over 90% of the dirhams had been issued by 959.[18] The Swedish hoards of the 970s are thus composed primarily of older dirhams which had apparently been circulating in Sweden for some time. Furthermore, Sweden in the 970s differed significantly from eastern Europe, where many new dirhams were appearing in contemporaneous hoards. In sum, the Swedish component for the 970s primarily represents dirham imports from earlier decades when trade was greater than our data would indicate.

The massive importation of Islamic dirhams into eastern Europe came to an end in the first two decades of the eleventh century. We could be even more precise and say that this commerce had ceased for all practical purposes by 1015. Here, again, a complex series of factors in various regions of western Eurasia might explain this development. In central Asia and the Near East, the silver crisis or famine led to the disappearance of silver coinage after ca. 1000. As for central Asia, massive dirham exports to eastern Europe and/or the exhaustion of silver mines may be responsible for the severe debasement of the dirham during the first half of the eleventh century.[19] The conquest of the Sāmānid lands by the Ghaznawids and Qarakhānids may also have disrupted the trade with eastern Europe. On the other hand, the discovery of silver mines in central Europe during the mid-tenth century made large quantities of European silver coins or deniers available for export to northern and eastern Europe by the second half of the tenth century. Rūs merchants may thus have found it more profitable to export a significant part of their furs, wax, honey, and other goods to the Baltic rather than to the Islamic lands, especially if Islamic merchants no longer possessed sufficient quantities of high quality dirhams. The end of significant dirham exports to eastern Europe has not yet been explained satisfactorily.

In conclusion, the data on the fluctuations of Islamic trade with eastern Europe present a major challenge to historians of the medieval Near East, central Asia, the steppe lands, eastern Europe, and the Baltic. At the same time, the resolution of the many questions raised by these data should give us a much better understanding of the economic history of western Eurasia during the Viking Age.

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NOTES

1. Omeljan Pritsak, "An Arabic Text on the Trade Route of the Corporation ar-Rūs in the Second-Half of the Ninth Century," *Folia Orientalia*, 12 (1970): 241–59.

2. Ibid.

3. There is a vast literature on the Islamic sources for this trade. See, for example, T. Lewicki, *Źródła arabskie do dziejów Słowiańszczyzny*, 2 vols. (Wrocław-Cracow, 1956–69); D. M. Dunlop, *The History of the Jewish Khazars* (Princeton, N.J., 1954); B. N. Zakhoder, *Kaspiiskii svod svedenii o Vostochnoi Evrope*, 2 vols. (Moscow, 1962-67); Peter B. Golden, *Khazar Studies:An historical-philogical inquiry into the origins of the Khazars*, vol. 1 (Budapest, 1980), 107–111.

4. al-Masʿūdī, *Murūj al-dhahab*, chap. 17, section 7, trans. in V. Minorsky, *A History of Sharvān and Darband in the 10th-11th Centuries* (Cambridge, 1958), 149–50.

5. R. R. Fasmer (Vasmer), "Ob izdanii novoi topografii nakhodok kuficheskikh monet v Vostochnoi Evrope," *Izvestiia Akademii nauk SSSR, Otdelenie obshchestvennykh nauk*, 1933, no. 6–7:473–84.

6. James E. McKeithen, "The Risālah of Ibn Faḍlān: An Annoted Translation with Introduction," Ph.D. dissertation, Indiana University , 1979, 128–30, 132–33.

7. A. P. Martinez, "Gardīzī's Two Chapters on the Turks," *Archivum Eurasiae Medii Aevi* 2 (1982): 158–59.

8. al-Masʿūdī, *Murūj*, 151–53.

9. Minorsky, *A History of Sharvān*, 111–12; George Vernadsky, *Kievan Russia* (New Haven, Conn., 1948), 34–35.

10. The *Povest' vremennykh let*, s.a. 883, says that the Radimichians paid Oleg a shilling apiece as tribute. Under 956, the *Povest'* reports that the Viatichians paid the Khazars one silver coin per ploughshare. The only coin circulating in the Rus' lands in significant quantitites at this time was the dirham.

11. V. L. Ianin, *Denezhno-vesovye sistemy russkogo srednevekov'ia. Domongol'skii period* (Moscow, 1956).

12. See Thomas S. Noonan, "Russia's Eastern Trade, 1150–1350: The Archaelogical Evidence," *Archivum Eurasiae Medii Aevi* 3 (1983): 201–64.

13. John S. Deyell, *Living Without Silver: The Monetary History of Early Medieval North India* (Delhi, 1990), 34.

14. The data on the Swedish hoards derive from Kenneth Jonsson, *Finds of Viking-Age Coins in Sweden*, in press.

15. See Thomas S. Noonan, "Why Dirhams First Reached Russia: The Role of Arab-Khazar Relations in the Development of the Earliest Islamic Trade with Eastern Europe," *Archivum Eurasiae Medii Aevi* 4 (1984): 151–282; id., "Why the Vikings First Came to Russia," *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* 34 (1986): 321–48.

16. Pritsak, "An Arabic Text"; Golden, *Khazar Studies*, 108–109.

17. al-Muqaddasī, *Aḥsan at-Taqāsīm fī Maʿrifat al-Aqālīm*, ed. M. J. de Goeje, Bibliotheca Geographorum Arabicorum, III (Leiden, 1877; 2nd ed. 1906), 324–25. There are English translations in W. Barthold, *Turkestan Down to the Mongol Invasion*, E. J. W. Gibb Memorial Series, New Series, V (London, 1928; 4th ed. 1977), 235, and Golden, *Khazar Studies*, 108.

18. Thomas S. Noonan, "When did dirham imports into tenth-century Sweden decline?" *Numismatiska meddelanden* 37 (1989): 295–301.

19. See Thomas S. Noonan, "The Onset of the Silver Crisis in Central Asia," *Archivum Eurasiae Medii Aevi* 7 (1987–1991): 221–48.

Table I. Dirham Imports into Eastern Europe (Unadjusted)

Decade	Number of Hoards	Number of Dirhams
740s	1	9/150
780s	1	31
790s	1	5
800s	5	325/625
810s	12	2356/2839
820s	9	1711/2257
830s	5	1319
840s	7	3606/4145
850s	2	69
860s	9	3478/5370
870s	8	2932/3865
880s	1	82
890s	1	76
Indeterm. 9th century	31	1899
900s	7	3272/5904
910s	5	1307/2467
920s	7	661/742
930s	4	1495/2414
940s	7	11776/23420
950s	11	4870/4877
960s	2	2064
970s	16	3242/9283
980s	9	2505/2603
990s	9	709/857
Indeterm. 10th century	52	266
1000s	9	266
1010s	2	4387
1020s	2	341
1030s	2	395/549
1040s	3	105
1050s	5	944/1127
1060s	-	-
1070s	1	5
1080s	3	328/428
1090s	-	-
1100s	1	500
1110s	1	11
1120s	1	13
Indeterm. 9th–12th centuries	5	117


Table II. Dirham Imports into Eastern Europe (Adjusted)

Decade	No. of Hoards	No. of dirhams	% of total dirhams	Dirhams per hoard
740s	1	150	.16	150
750s	-	-	-	-
760s	1	20	.02	20
770s	1	100	.10	100
780s	2	81	.08	40.5
790s	2	805	.84	402.5
800s	8	1045	1.09	130.6
810s	16	2960	3.10	185
820s	9	2257	2.36	250.8
830s	6	1324	1.38	220.7
840s	7	4145	4.33	592.1
850s	3	119	.12	39.7
860s	15	6578	6.88	438.5
870s	8	3865	4.04	483.1
880s	1	82	.09	82
890s	2	176	.18	88
900s	15	6714	7.02	447.6
910s	11	3037	3.18	276.1
920s	10	838	.88	83.8
930s	9	2899	3.03	322.1
940s	14	23961	25.06	1711.5
950s	16	5689	5.95	355.6
960s	3	2114	2.21	704.7
970s	20	9450	9.88	472.5
980s	12	2816	2.94	234.7
990s	11	1286	1.34	116.9
1000s	12	7359	7.7	613.3
1010s	7	5363	5.61	766.1
1020s	-	-	-	-
1030s	1	399	.42	399
Total	233	95632	99.99%	428.8 (average)
Indeterminable	34	5561		
Total	257	101193		


Table III. Dirham Imports into Eastern Europe and Sweden (Adjusted)

Decade	No. of Hoards	No. of dirhams	% of total dirhams
740s	1	150	.09
750s	-	-	-
760s	1	20	.01
770s	1	100	.06
780s	3	90	.06
790s	2	805	.50
800s	11	1068	.68
810s	20	3029	1.89
820s	12	2832	1.77
830s	10	1474	.92
840s	9	4641	2.90
850s	7	853	.53
860s	30	10738	6.71
870s	14	5329	3.33
880s	5	578	.36
890s	1	3583	2.24
900s	25	7531	4.71
910s	32	6488	4.06
920s	34	2952	1.85
930s	43	6004	3.75
940s	46	30805	19.26
950s	100	21463	13.42
960s	40	8912	5.57
970s	55	19269	12.05
980s	13	2894	1.81
990s	45	2499	1.56
1000s	40	9919	6.20
1010s	9	5513	3.45
1020s	-	-	-
1030s	1	399	.25
Total	620	159938	99.99%


Graph I. Dirham Imports into Eastern Europe (as a percentage of total imports)



Graph II. The Number of Dirham Hoards Deposited each Decade in Eastern Europe



Graph III. Dirham Imports into Eastern Europe and Sweden (as a percentage of total imports)



A Hungarian-Galician Marriage at the Beginning of the Fourteenth Century?

STANISŁAW SROKA

In 1988 the Hungarian historian Gyula Kristó published an article entitled "The First Wife of Charles Robert" ("Károly Róbert első felesége"), in which he sought to prove that the first representative of the Angevin dynasty to sit upon the Hungarian throne married a Galician princess in 1306.[1] In this, Kristó contradicted the entire previous historiography, which is unanimous in its opinion that Charles Robert's first wife, whom he indeed wedded in 1306, was Mary of the Silesian Piast dynasty, the daughter of Prince Casimir of Bytom.[2] Kristó based his opinion on records found in fourteenth-century Hungarian chronicles, which described the Silesian Piast princess as "prima consors domini regis."[3] In formulating his thesis, the Hungarian historian relied on two particular sources. The first is a document issued by King Charles Robert on 7 February 1326 on behalf of Stefan Apród extolling Stefan's military excellence in the battle at Košice, which had taken place at the beginning of the century during the Hungarian-Czech rivalry following the extinction of the Árpád dynasty. During the battle, Stefan had led his detachment in a brave attack that captured the Czech king's standard, a crucial moment for the ensuing victory. He had had the captured standard sent to Charles Robert, who, as he himself mentions in a document issued some years later, was not at that time in the country. He had gone to Rus′ to bring back his first wife: "in Rutheniam, quo cum quibusdam baronibus regni nostri fidelibus pro adducenda prima consorte nostra accesseramus."[4] Kristó found an additional independent supporting reference among the same source documents, in a description of Eastern Europe by an anonymous author that dates—as established by the editor—from the first part of 1308. In the chapter devoted to Rus′, the writer discusses a powerful ruler named Leo, whose daughter married Charles, the king of Hungary: "loco imperatoris habet vnum ducem permaximum virorum, qui vocatur dux Leo, filiam huius Leonis duxit nunc in vxorem rex Vngarie Karulus."[5]

These sources lead to the premise that at the beginning of the fourteenth century Charles concluded a Hungarian-Rus′, or more precisely a Hungarian-Galician, marriage: the unknown daughter of the Rus′ prince Leo is identified with the daughter of the last Romanovych, the Galician prince Leo II, who was the son of George I and the grandson of Prince Leo I.[6] Gyula Kristó has recently devoted another article to Charles Robert's family relationships, in which he supplements his previous work on the subject with new detail.[7] First, on the basis of a recently published document of Charles Robert dating from 12 December 1323,[8] he concludes that the king's first spouse—in Kristó's

opinion a Galician princess—was named Mary.[9] Kristó dates the conjectured Hungarian-Galician marriage to a period before 23 June 1306, when the first document of Mary, the queen of Hungary, was issued.[10] This view of the marriage has already become imbedded in Hungarian historiography.[11]

One cannot concur with Gyula Kristó's hypothesis, however. The Hungarian historian asserts that Charles Robert's first bride, by his marriage of 1306, was the daughter of Leo II, who (together with his brother Andrew) was the last prince of the Galician-Lodomerian line of the Rurikids. This assertion can be tested by applying a careful analysis of the royal genealogy. The supposed father of Charles Robert's first wife, Leo II, was the son of George I.[12] Euphemia, Leo II's mother, was George I's second wife.[13] Besides Leo, the offspring of this marriage was another son, Andrew, and a daughter, Mary.[14] George I's first marriage, in 1282 to a daughter of the Tver' prince Iaroslav whose name is unknown to us, produced a son, Michael, who died as early as 1286.[15] George I's second marriage to the Cujavian princess Euphemia, which produced Leo, is convincingly dated by Włodarski at 1291.[16] Thus, the earliest date on which Leo could have been born was 1292; in 1306, he would have been at most fourteen years old. While he was of an age at which he could properly have been married, under no circumstances could he have been the father of a daughter of marriageable age. To be eligible, his daughter would have had to be at least twelve, the age at which girls were considered mature in the Middle Ages. The hypothesis that Leo I's daughter was the wife of Charles Robert, based upon the premises described above, is not correct. Prince Leo II died without offspring, probably from a poisoning in 1323.[17] Similarly, and contemporaneously, his brother the Lodomerian prince left this world.[18] Nor can it be asserted that a daughter of George I was the first wife of Louis the Great's father, since George already had a daughter named Mary, whose genealogical data are well established; he would not have had two daughters with the same name living at the same time. His only daughter Mary married the Mazovian prince Trojden, and this union produced Boleslas George II Troidenovych, the later ruler of Rus'.[19] If we rely upon the anonymous author of a description of Eastern Europe, who thought "permaximus vir...Leo" was the future father of the wife of the Hungarian king Charles, we must consider the proposition that Prince Leo I was the father of the Angevin's wife. All the source literature so far dates Leo I's death at 1300 or 1301.[20] He was born in 1228 and married Constance, a daughter of the Hungarian king Béla IV, around 1251 or 1252.[21] Thus, his daughters—the sources prove the existence of Sviatoslava, a Poor Clare in Stary Sącz, and Anastasia, the wife of Siemowit of Dobrzyń—had long been either married or in the cloister at the beginning of the fourteenth century. These reasons make it impossible for Charles Robert to have married the daughter of Leo I.

From this analysis the inescapable conclusion arises that Charles Robert's first wife could not have been a representative of the Galician-Lodomerian line

of the Rurikids, and that the origin of his spouse is not to be found in Rus′. It is my opinion that Charles Robert, the first Angevin to sit on the Hungarian throne, took as his first bride, in 1306, the Silesian Piast princess Mary, daughter of Prince Casimir of Bytom; in this regard, the previous historiography is entirely correct.

The two sources Gyula Kristó meticulously employs to take issue with established academic opinion and formulate his own counter-thesis must therefore be reconsidered. To begin with, Gyula Kristó relies upon the passage quoted above from an anonymous author's description of Eastern Europe, without noticing that it is precisely the passage determined by the editor, Olgierd Górka, to have been wrong.[22] Moreover, one of the first corrections Górka proposes relates to this very description: he maintains that the word *filiam* should be replaced with the word *neptem*. This would indicate that Leo's granddaughter, not his daughter, married the Hungarian king.[23] In clumsy Medieval Latin terminology, the word *neptis* was employed to denote different levels of family relations and connections—a granddaugther, a daughter-in-law, a niece—but the word's primary meaning remained the same as in Classical Latin, "a granddaughter," and this usage was maintained throughout medieval Europe.[24] Charles Robert's wife, the Silesian Piast Mary, was very likely the granddaughter of Leo I, the prince of Halych. As mentioned above, Mary's father was Casimir, prince of Bytom, but all that is known of her mother is that her name was Helena.[25] According to Kazimierz Jasiński, undoubtedly the best contemporary expert on Piast genealogy, the marriage of Casimir and Helena is among "the most enigmatic of the Piast marriages."[26] This results primarily from a lack of source materials to provide information about Helena's origins, and from the erroneous information provided by L. C. Dedek in the introduction to the third volume of *Monumenta Ecclesiae Strigoniensis* to the effect that Helena was a Lithuanian princess.[27] If, however, we consider the names of Casimir and Helena's three children—Siemowit, George, and Mary, names frequently used by the Rus′ dynasties—and the name of Casimir's wife herself, it follows that we should look for Helena's origins in Rus′ or, even more specifically, consider her as the daughter of Leo I and Constance, Béla IV's daughter.[28] In terms of age, the daughter of Leo, prince of Halych, would be an appropriate wife for Casimir. As Jasiński has correctly pointed out, "Mary, Casimir's daughter and the Hungarian king Charles Robert's first wife, would have been the great-granddaughter of Béla IV, thereby strengthening Charles Robert's right to succeed the Árpáds, if her mother had been Leo's daughter."[29] The use of the word *filiam* in place of *neptem* in the aforementioned fragmentary passage from the description of Eastern Europe seems the most logical explanation of the evident mistake in the source record. The passage should read as follows: "Loco imperatoris habet vnum ducem permaximum virorum, qui vocatur dux Leo, neptem huius Leonis duxit nunc in vxorem rex Vngarie Karulus." It can be added as well that the phrase *permaximus vir* in the other

source mentioned can only refer to Leo I, the powerful Galician Rus′ ruler, not to Leo II, who played no significant role in the history of Galician-Lodomerian Rus′.

Let us then analyze the document of Charles Robert dating from 7 February 1326, part of which was quoted at the beginning of this article, and which Gyula Kristó uses to take issue with widespread and long-standing historiographical opinion to formulate his own view. As a collection of information about many different countries, the anonymous author's description of Eastern Europe may well contain numerous distortions and mistakes; this is characteristic of this genre of historiography. On the other hand, a Hungarian king's authenticated diploma, issued by his court, is a much more substantial source. We should recall that the document mentions the king's journey to Rus′ at the beginning of the fourteenth century to bring his first wife ("in Rutheniam, quo...pro adducenda prima consorte nostra accesseramus"). There are several possible ways to explain how this passage does not conflict with my thesis that Charles Robert's first marriage was to a Piast. First, it should be pointed out that the formulation "pro adducenda prima consorte nostra accesseramus" does not necessarily mean "to marry someone." The phrase "pro adducenda consorte" refers only to an intention to marry, not to an accomplished fact, that is, that the marriage had already taken place.

One also cannot exclude the possibility that the scribe who prepared the king's 1326 document made a mistake, writing *Rutheniam* in place of *Poloniam* as the area to which young Charles Robert would travel for his bride. Such a mistake is possible because the document was written in 1326 and the events discussed, the Hungarian-Czech struggles following the decline of the Árpád dynasty, had taken place some twenty years earlier, at the beginning of the century.

Jasiński has drawn to my attention another possible explanation for the passage relating to Charles Roberts journey to Rus′ for a wife. According to Jasiński, "If we assume that Mary's mother, Helena, was the daughter of Leo I, Mary may well have been brought up at the court of her uncle George I. Poorer relatives were often raised, or stayed, at the courts of their richer kinsmen."[30] If this were the case, Charles Robert would have had to travel to Rus′ to claim his Piast wife.

The year 1306 is consistent with the source material as the date of Charles Robert's first marriage. This assertion is supported by a document of Mary, queen of Hungary, dated 23 June 1306.[31] Scholars agree that, because this document was sealed with the queen's signet rather than with the *sigillum authenticum*, the Angevin's first marriage must have taken place shortly before 23 June 1306, at a time when the queen had not yet established her own chancery.[32] In 1306, therefore, Charles Robert would already have had a wife named Mary.[33] Moreover, it is my opinion that three additional factors support the Piast pedigree of Charles Robert's first bride. First, in approximately 1305

Mary's father, Prince Casimir of Bytom, borrowed the sum of one hundred forty *grzywnas* in silver *groszes*, which in all probability served to cover the costs of the wedding, for the prince may not have been able to manage such a great expenditure.[34] Second, 1306 is supported as the date of the Silesian princess's marriage to the king of Hungary by Długosz's report of Mary's marriage to Charles Robert in precisely that year.[35] Last, and in my opinion most convincing, is the lack of any mention in the fourteenth-century chronicles of the Galician princess, the supposed wife of Charles Robert. These chronicles clearly refer to the Silesian Piast Mary as the Hungarian king's first wife ("prima consors domini regis").[36] It is implausible that Charles Robert's marriage to a Rus′ princess would have escaped the notice of the very chroniclers who had so scrupulously recorded that the king maintained relations with a concubine from Csepel Island and that she had given him a son named Coloman, who went on to become the bishop of Györ.[37]

In conclusion, the political context of Charles Robert's first marriage should be noted. As is well known, in the Middle Ages dynastic marriages usually served to strengthen political alliances; above all, they were used by monarchs in difficult moments to shore up their positions, with respect to either international or domestic relations. As noted above, the ruler of Hungary married for the first time in 1306. This was a period when Charles Robert was embroiled in the struggle for the crown of St. Stephen, when after the death of the Czech king Wenceslas (Václav) II (whose son Wenceslas III was king of Hungary in 1301–1305), the Bavarian prince Otto took possession of the Hungarian throne (1305–1307).[38] It is entirely logical that this was a moment when Charles Robert needed a strong ally on the international scene, which makes it unlikely that he would have affiliated himself with the Galician prince Leo II, who was of little importance. By contrast, a marriage to the Silesian Piast Mary, a relative of Władysław Łokietek,[39] in addition to strengthening his position (as Długosz emphasizes[40]), would have consolidated the Hungarian ruler's already amicable relations with the Polish prince.

The results of the foregoing analysis can be summarized as follows:

1. Gyula Kristó's opinion, in that it introduces a hitherto unknown Hungarian-Galician intermarriage at the beginning of the fourteenth century, is without justification.

2. In the fragment concerning a Hungarian-Galician intermarriage that appears in an anonymous author's description of Eastern Europe, the word *filiam* should be *neptem*. Leo I's granddaughter was most probably the Silesian Piast Mary, daughter of Casimir of Bytom.

3. In Charles Robert's document of 7 February 1326, either the reference to the country to which he traveled for his wife is mistaken (it should have *Poloniam* instead of *Rutheniam*), or Charles went to Rus′ rather than to Poland because his wife, the Silesian Piast Mary, had been raised there, at the court of her uncle George I.

4. Charles Robert was in dire political straits in 1306, and needed an ally in the international arena. This certainly would not have been the weak Galician prince. Much better suited for the role was Władysław Łokietek, with whom Charles Robert already maintained friendly relations.

5. Both the sources and these indirect deductions lead one to conclude that Charles Robert's first wife must have been the Silesian Piast Mary, daughter of Casimir of Bytom. This marriage was concluded in 1306 (before 23 June).

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Translated from the Polish by Lidia Stefanowska

NOTES

1. Gyula Kristó, "Károly Róbert első felesége," *Acta Universitatis Szegediensis de Attila József nominatae, Acta Historica* 86 (1988): 27–30.

2. A. Pór, *Nagy Lajos 1326–1382* (Budapest, 1892), 5; id., "Magyar-lengyel érintkezés a XIV-ik században, *Századok* 37 (1903): 308–12; J. Dąbrowski, *Elżbieta Łokietkówna 1305–1380* (Cracow, 1914), 25; id., *Ostatnie lata Ludwika Wielkiego 1370–1382* (Cracow, 1918), 23; K. Jasiński, *Rodowód Piastów śląskich* 3 (Wrocław, 1977): 73; J. Spěváček, *Král diplomat (Jan Lucemburský 1296–1346)* (Prague, 1982), 117; *Magyarország történeti kronológiája a kezdetektől 1970-ig*, ed. K. Benda, 1 (Budapest, 1986): 190, 195, 196.

3. *Chronicon Budense* and *Chronicon Pictum Vindobonense*, ed. A. Domanovszky, in *Scriptores Rerum Hungaricarum* (hereinafter SHR), vol. 1 (Budapest, 1937), p. 489: "Anno Domini MCCCXVII domina Maria prima consors domini regis, natione Polona, filia ducis Kasmerii tertio die post festum Sancte Lucie in Themeswar vite cursum feliciter terminavit et in Alba Regali in ecclesia Beatae Virginis terre gremio commendatur"; Chronicon Monacense, ed. A. Domanovszky, in SHR 2:49; Chronicon Dubnicense, in *Historiae Hungaricae Fontes Domestici*, ed. D. Florianus, 3 (Pécs [Quinque ecclesiis], 1884): 118.

4. Hungarian State Archive, DF 265464. The original can be found in Štátny Archív Levoča, in the Andrassy family collection, part 1, 66-J. It has also been published, but only in Hungarian translation, in the publication *Károly Róbert emlékezete*, ed. Gy. Kristó, F. Makk, E. Marosi (Budapest, 1988), 144–47.

5. *Anonymi Descriptio Europae Orientalis*, ed. Olgierd Górka (Cracow, 1916), 40.

6. Kristó, "Károly Róbert első felesége," 29.

7. Gyula Kristó, "Aba Sámuel és Károly Róbert családi kapcsolatairól," *Acta Universitatis Szegediensis de Attila József nominatae, Acta Historica* 96 (1992): 25–30.

8. *Documenta res Hungaricas tempore regum Andegavensium illustrantia* vol.VII, 1323, ed. L. Blazovich, L. Géczi (Budapest-Szeged, 1991), no. 625, p. 300.

9. Kristó, *Aba Samuel es Károly Róbert*, 28.

10. Ibid. The document of Mary, queen of Hungary, dating from 23 June 1306 has been published in *A zichy és vásenkeői gróf Zichy-család idősb ágának okmánytára. Codex diplomaticus domus senioris comitum Zichy de Zich et Vasenkeo* 1 (Pest, 1871), no. 126, pp. 112–13.

11. Pál Engel, "Temetkezések a középkori székesfehérvári bazilikában," *Századok* 121 (1987), no. 4:622 n. 53; id., "Az ország újraegyesítése. I. Károly küzdelmei az oligarchák ellen (1310–1323)," *Századok* 122 (1988), no. 1–2:125 n. 157.

12. N. de Baumgarten, "Généalogies et mariages occidentaux des Rurikides russes du X^e au XIII^e siècle," *Orientalia Christiana* 9-1, no. 35 (Rome, 1927), tabl. XI, p. 47.

13. Ibid.; J. Forsseman, *Die Beziehungen altrussischer Fürstengeschlechter zu Westeuropa* (Bern, 1970), table VI.

14. de Baumgarten, "Généalogies et mariages occidentaux des Rurikides russes du X^{e} au XIII^{e} siècle," table XI, p. 47.

15. *Polnoe sobranie russkikh letopisei* (St. Petersburg, 1856) 7:176, 2:213; de Baumgarten, table XI, p. 47.

16. B. Włodarski, *Polska i Ruś 1194–1340* (Warsaw, 1966), 223.

17. Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi, *Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy* 3 (L'viv, 1905): 120; A. Sobolevskii, "Russkoe izvestie o poslednikh galitskikh Riurikovichakh," in *Sbornik statei v chest' Matveia Kuz'mina Liubavskogo* (Petrograd, 1917), 214–15; W. Dworzaczek, *Genealogia. Tablice* (Warsaw, 1959), table 27; Włodarski, 255.

18. I. Rezhabek, "Iurii II, poslednii kniaz' vsiei Maloi Rusi," in *Boleslav-Iurii II, kniaz' vsiei Maloi Rusi. Sbornik materialov i issledovanii* (St. Petersburg, 1907), 67; M. Korduba, *Boleslav-Iurii II, ostannii samostiinyi volodar Halyts'ko-Volyns'koi derzhavy* (Cracow, 1940), 3, 28. [=*Mynule i suchasne*, pt. 7].

19. de Baumgarten, table XI, p. 47.

20. Hrushevs'kyi 3:520; de Baumgarten, table XI, p. 47; Włodarski, 225; D. Isaevich, *Galitsko-Volynskoe kniazhestvo v kontse XIII-nachale XIV v.*, in *Drevneishie gosudarstva i territorii SSSR. Materialy i issledovaniia 1987 g.*, ed. A. P. Novosel'tseva (Moscow, 1989), 72. .

21. M. Wertner, *Az Árpádok családi története* (Nagy-Becskerek, 1892), 485–88; Włodarski, 298.

22. *Anonymi Descriptio*, p. xxxv: "in toto tractatu solum duas notitias simpliciter falsas inveniamus, scil. supra commemoratam notam de Trapezunte et Sinopi, quas penes Genuenses fuisse dicit, et notitiam de matrimonio 'nunc' facto Caroli Roberti cum filia 'magni ducis' Ruthenie Leonis."

23. *Anonymi Descriptio*, p. xxxvi.

24. M. Koczerska, "Uwagi o terminologii pokrewieństwa i powinowactwa w polskich źródłach średniowiecznych," in *Genealogia—problemy metodyczne w badaniach nad polskim społeczeństwem średnowiecznym na tle porównawczym*, ed. J. Hertel (Toruń, 1982), 38; B. Wyrozumska, "Terminologia pokrewieństw i powinowactw," *Rocznik Lubelski* 23/24 (1981/1982)[1985], 39, 43.

25. *Codex diplomaticus Silesiae* 2:17 n. 20.

26. Jasiński 3:36.

27. *Monumenta Ecclesiae Strigoniensis*, ed. L. C. Dedek, 3 (Esztergom [Strigonii], 1924), p. x.

28. Jasiński 3:36.

29. Ibid.

30. Letter to the author, 2 April 1993.

31. See n. 10.

32. A. Pór, "Az Anjou ház és örökösei 1301–1439," in *A Magyar Nemzet Története* 3 (Budapest, 1895): 24; Kristó, *Aba Sámuel és Károly Róbert*, 28. A. Gárdonyi firmly opposes Pór's supposition, "A magyar királyné udvari kanczelláriaja az Anjouk alatt," *Turul* 33 (1915): 69, and asserts that the document fragment in question ("Et quia sigillo attentico presens carebamus, nostro sigillo annulari consignavimus, promittentes literas presentes privilegiari, cum nostrum sigillum presentem fuerit attenticum") does not at all demonstrate that the queen did not have at her disposal the authenticating seal, but simply that at the moment of drawing up the document no secretary with a seal was present. This also explains the absence of her name on the prepared document. In addition to having a different point of view on Charles Robert's first wife's chancery, Gárdonyi does not try to determine the time and circumstances of the king's marriage.

33. This date confirms as an important factor the appearance of the queen's clerks just after 1306. See *Documenta res Hungaricas tempore regum Andegavensium illustrantia* 2 (1306–1310), ed. Gyula Kristó (Budapest-Szeged, 1992), nos. 589, 793, 794.

34. J. Horwat, Z. Jedynak, "Córka Kazimierza, księcia bytomskiego, Maria, królową Węgier," *Magazyn Bytomski* 6 (1984): 91.

35. *Roczniki czyli kroniki sławnego Królestwa Polskiego*, bk. 9 (Warsaw, 1975): 53: "Karol też w celu wzmocnienia swojego stanowiska pojął za żonę bardzo piękną dziewczynę, Marię, córkę księcia cieszyńskiego Kazimierza."

36. See n. 3.

37. SHR 1:490: "eodem anno rex habuit de concubina sua, quam acceperat de magna insula Danubii, filium quem appelavit Colomanum." SHR 2:217: "In demselbem jar hat der kunig einen sun pey seinen ammen und nante den Coloman und macht in pischoff tzu Rab." Cf. Pór, *Kálmán, györi püspök* (1317–1375), *Századok* 23 (1889): 368–84. The great island in the Danube is Csepel.

38. B. Hóman, Gy. Szekfű, *Magyar Történet*, 2 (Budapest, 1930): 252; *Magyarország történeti kronológiája*, 190.

39. Jasiński 3:54 n. 1.

40. See n. 35.

Archbishop Gennadii and the Heresy of the "Judaizers"*

ANDREI PLIGUZOV

The Novgorodian "heretics" known to scholars as the *Judaizers*[1] never referred to themselves by this name, or, for that matter, by any other name. They considered themselves to be true Orthodox Christians who received Holy Communion and served in Orthodox churches. The Novgorodian archbishop Gennadii (1484–1504) and Abbot Iosif of the Volokolamsk Monastery (1470–1515) were the first to accuse the heretics of being "жидовская мудръствующе" (i.e., adhering to Jewish teachings) and of conversion to Judaism ("стали в жидовскую веру"). The term *Judaizers* (жидовствующие) seems to have been coined by Dimitrii of Rostov (Dmytro Tuptalo), almost two hundred years after the "heresy" had occurred and been condemned.[2] In Russian legal documents of the first half of the nineteenth century, the term *Judaizers* was used to describe молоканские субботнические sects.[3]

The earliest description of the heretics' "crimes," though not an entirely reliable one, comes from the writings of Archbishop Gennadii. In particular, Gennadii is our source of information on the arrival in Novgorod in November 1470 of a certain "heretical Jew," a member of the retinue of the Kievan prince Mykhail.[4] According to Gennadii's report, this heretic converted some Orthodox priests, who secretly began to profess Jewish beliefs while maintaining the appearance of continued loyalty to Christianity.

The exposure of the heresy took place in 1487, seven years after the subjugation of Novgorod by the Muscovite troops of Ivan the Third (1480) and the elevation of Gennadii, archimandrite of the Chudov Monastery in Moscow, to the Novgorodian see. Gennadii arrived in Novgorod in January 1485, but it was two years before he began his investigation into the heresy, which might have been provoked by the monk Zakhar, who called him a "heretic."[5]

Gennadii discovered Zakhar's heresy in the simplest possible way: he summoned Zakhar in order to investigate a complaint by some monks of the Nemchinov Monastery, to whom Zakhar had allegedly refused to give Communion. Under questioning by the Archbishop, Zakhar admitted that he did not trust any of the church bishops since they had been installed "по мзде," i.e., uncanonically by having paid money for their installation.[6] Gennadii immediately identified Zakhar's heresy as that of the *strigol'niki*, heretics who had

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lived in Pskov at the beginning of the fifteenth century, and dispatched Zakhar to the hermitage of Gornechno to do penance. Later on, probably after the autumn of 1488, Ivan the Third tried to intercede on Zakhar's behalf. The grand prince allowed the newly-unmasked *strigol'nik* to return to the Nemchinov Monastery. But Zakhar, unwilling to test his luck in Gennadii's sphere of power, immediately left Nemchinov for Moscow.[7]

In Moscow, Zakhar received support from certain powerful patrons and continued to oppose Gennadii by sending letters to his acquaintances in Novgorod and territories under Muscovite control. Archbishop Gennadii intercepted one of Zakhar's letters in September or early October 1490, and submitted a copy of it to Metropolitan Zosima.[8]

The next significant discovery of the heresy occurred in September–December of 1487.[9] In the course of his pastoral duties, the Novgorodian archbishop learned of drunken conversations among Novgorodian priests, who secretly praised the Jewish heresy.[10] Without delay the archbishop began an investigation, ordering that the testimony (подлинник речеи) of the priest Naum, who had repented and voluntarily given Gennadii evidence of his own heresy, be written down. Naum's testimony appears to have been the first and most reliable evidence of the heresy, but it has not survived. We know from letters written by Gennadii that Naum's testimony consisted of no fewer than nineteen chapters. Chapter Twelve argued that the heretics celebrated the Divine Liturgy in an unworthy way, and would swear without fear, i.e., could easily break their oath. Along with the written testimony, Gennadii sent some copybooks, which may have been taken from Naum, to Moscow. These copybooks contained Jewish prayers that were in use among the heretics.[11]

Gennadii called this newly-discovered heresy the heresy of the "жидовская мудръствующих." The origin of this term is not quite clear. The form жидовствоующе renders the word ἰουδαΐσται in Canon 29 of the Council of Laodicea.[12] In the Slavonic translation of the *Chronicle* of Georgios Hamartolos one could find the word жидовьцеѹмьць, which corresponds to the Greek ἰουδαιόφρονος.[13] The *Pandektai* by Nikon of the Black Mountain cites Canon 29 of the Council of Laodicea: "како не подобает кр(с)тьıаном жидовьствити [corresponds to the Greek ἰουδαΐζεῖν], и в соуботоу празновати."[14] B. Melioranskii noticed a similarity between the Novgorodian "жидовская мудръствующие" and the Greek definition ἰουδαϊκὰ φρονῶν, which appeared in the Canons of the Council of Constantinople in 1336.[15]

While Gennadii did not pay much attention to the heretical teachings, in his letter to Bishop Prokhor he wrote about an astronomical treatise by Immanuel ben-Yaakov, a Jew from Tarascon. It remains unknown whether Gennadii found ben-Yaakov's treatise "Six Wings" (*Шестокрыл*) among the papers of the heretics, or whether he received it from a different source. This treatise, containing calculations to determine the phases of the moon, was originally

compiled in the fourteenth century. But the Slavonic version of "Six Wings," the version found by Gennadii, began its calculations from the year 1389.[16]

We know that Gennadii willingly used ben-Yaakov's treatise in his own calendar calculations, and a citation from it appears in the margin of the calendar tables of Gennadii's Bible of 1499. The page containing the marginal gloss at the bottom of the table of lunar cycles says: А по Шестокрилȣ круг лȣнный починаетсѧ ѿ семтѧбрѧ после рȣског(о), а по рȣсскомȣ ѿ марта, а златое число починаетсѧ с генварѧ преж(е) ѡбѣих.[17]

However, Gennadii's goal of opposing the heretics' propaganda required that he condemn literary works of Jewish tradition. Therefore, after closer inspection, he discovered a huge discrepancy: the heretics, in the archbishop's words, had "stolen" 1,747 years from the Christian calendar. Eager to prove the existence of these years, Gennadii carefully searched the Scriptures for the lifespan of each Old Testament king. With these calculations he was able to restore the calendar of Christian history. The difference between the Jewish and Christian calendars was not due to any malicious intention on the part the heretics, but a result of the Byzantine tradition, which Georgios Hamartolos's *Chronicle* had introduced to Rus'. Hamartolos held that the Creation took place in 5508 B.C. By contrast, the Jewish calendar began in 3761 B.C.

The calendar dispute with the heretics was to become even sharper, for this was a period of increasing eschatological expectations. In the summer of 1492 the Orthodox calendars, which contained calculations of moveable Christian feasts, were to expire. The year 7000 of the Byzantine calendar would end in August 1492. At the same time, Slavic ecclesiastical scribes had among their books certain theological writings that interpreted the expiration of the seventh millennium from the Creation as the end of Christian history, which would ultimately be heralded by the Second Coming of Christ.

Such rumors bothered Gennadii, who had embraced a completely different idea about the end of the world. The Novgorodian archbishop was adamant in his expectation not of the expiration of the seventh millennium, but of the "fulfillment of the Divine Dispensation" (наполнения горнего мира), whereupon "the ages would perish" (времена погыбнут).[18] In order to find confirmation for his quite orthodox idea, Gennadii sent a letter to the erudite Greek Demetrios Trachaniotes. In a letter written some time between September 1488 and March 1489, the latter reassured Gennadii with the statement, "The seventh . . . millennium one has to remember, but not believe in."[19] Gennadii sent a similar written request to Paisii Iaroslavov and Nil Sorskii, monks of the Monastery of St. Cyril of Beloe Ozero.[20]

The first letters sent by Gennadii to Moscow between September and December 1487 did not provoke a "thorough interrogation" of the heretics, as Gennadii demanded. Consequently, in January 1488 the Novgorodian archbishop was obliged to send new entreaties, containing a description of heretical offenses, to Nifont, bishop of Suzdal', and Filofei, bishop of Perm'. According

to Gennadii, many citizens of Novgorod had seen crosses tied to crows, and even a pectoral cross ("нательныи крест") with a picture of "the privy parts of a woman and a man" (an example not of Jewish religious influences, but of popular beliefs, even pagan notions). The bearer of such a cross, according to Gennadii's report, "began to wither, was ill for a while, and died."[21] In the church at Il'ina Street, Gennadii discovered that the icon of the Transfiguration contained, along its border, an image of Basil the Great "cutting off Christ's hand and foot, with the inscription: The Circumcision of Our Lord Jesus Christ."[22] This baffled not only Archbishop Gennadii, who presented the icon as an obvious example of the Jewish heresy, but also all modern scholars until very recently, when N. Goleizovskii interpreted the image as a curious attempt to struggle *against* Jewish influence (but not necessarily the Judaizers' heresy).[23]

While Gennadii was waiting for the grand prince and the metropolitan to initiate some action in this matter, a lesser council of the metropolitanate gathered in Moscow (some time before 13 February 1488) with Ivan III in attendance. The council condemned three men— Grigorii, a priest of St. Simon's Church; Eresim, a priest of St. Nicholas' Church; and the clerk Samsonko, the son of the priest Grigorii. All three received punishments, unspecified in our source, and were sent to Novgorod. The fourth defendant, Gridia, the priest of the SS. Boris and Gleb Church, was returned unpunished to the Novgorodian archbishop for further investigation, because only one witness, the priest Naum, had given evidence against him (for a conviction, the law required that at least two witnesses testify against the defendant). The epistles on the council's decision, written by Ivan III and Metropolitan Gerontii to Gennadii, approved futher investigation of the heretics in Novgorod.[24]

Upon their return to Novgorod, the accused priests were whipped in the market place. The Moscow chronicle gives an explanation of the priests' crime: "Being in a drunken state, they profaned the holy icons."[25]

Scholars, like critics of the heresy, usually view the development of the Novgorodian heresy in a manner disproportionate to its historical significance. Like their predecessors, the ecclesiastical investigators, they expand the facts concerning the history of the heresy to enormous proportions. They regard each fact as laden with a specific meaning, reflecting not only a single event but an entire constellation of similar events. Each attempt to apprehend the heresy's origin leads to a kind of hall of mirrors where each object is multiplied, so that a few facts acquire the appearance of a vast multitude, and a virtual historiographic reality is formed.

Unlike modern scholars, the witnesses of the first Novgorodian heretics' punishment had no such illusions: their attention was more likely occupied not by the whipping of the guilty priests, but by the cruel punitive actions taken by the Muscovite authorities in Novgorod in March 1488 (at the latest). On the order of Ivan III, Muscovite troops forcibly transferred more than seven

thousand people (житьих людей) who allegedly had tried to kill the grand prince's *namestnik*, Iakov Zakhar'ich, from Novgorod to Moscow. The Muscovite chronicle adds coldly: "Iakov did not spare the whip, and hanged many other members of the Duma."[26]

Meanwhile, for reasons of his own, Archbishop Gennadii seems to have cared less about the fate of the thousands of Novgorodian citizens expelled by Muscovite forces than about those priests who continued to propound the "Jewish" heresy. Some time in July or August 1488, Gennadii enlisted the help of the former archbishop of Rostov and Iaroslavl', Ioasaf, who had abandonded his see in June 1488.[27] Beginning with a verbatim copy of his letter to Prokhor of Sarai and Podon'e, the Novgorodian archbishop provided Ioasaf with an account of the most serious crimes committed by the heretics. The fact that after five months Gennadii included no new information indicates that he had been unable to elucidate the obscure teaching of the heretics. This was an indisputable failure, the reason for which Gennadii explained thus: the heretics shamefacedly lie under oath "lacking fear [of God]," and renounce their teachings without hesitation.

Before compiling his letter to Ioasaf, Gennadii had been able to examine the sources of the heretics' teachings. It appeared that the heretics had picked up some of their theological "delusions" from Christian *anti-heretical* compilations. The Novgorodian archbishop provided Ioasaf with a report on twelve books in use among the heretics. Two of the books mentioned by Gennadii were in fact taken from the Bible (I and II Samuel and Kings [*Книги Царств* in the Slavonic tradition], and the Book of Joshua). One book appeared to be a kind of chronological compilation, or the Book of Genesis (*Бытие*), while two others could be recognized as traditional collections of edifying aphorisms (*Притчи*, perhaps the biblical Book of Proverbs, and *Menandr*, i.e., the so-called Wisdom of Menander), and three were polemical writings against Arianism, the Bogomils, and the like (i.e. the *Sermons* of Athanasius of Alexandria, the *Sermon* of Cosmas the Priest, and the *Letter* of Patriarch Photios to Prince Michael of Bulgaria). Gennadii's list of heretical books also includes dogmatic writings of Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite and the *Vita* of Pope Sylvester.[28] The only book on the list connected with the medieval Jewish tradition is the *Logika*, which appears to be a Slavic translation of either the *Logic* of Moses Maimonides or the *Logic* of al-Ghazali, or perhaps a combination of these two works.[29]

Gennadii's examination of these twelve books gave him no new evidence of the heretics' apostasy. Thus foiled, Gennadii fell back on the old proven methods. With support from the grand prince's lieutenants, the archbishop began a new investigation of the heretics. We do not know the precise date of this action. One can only suggest that the investigation presumably would have begun after the compilation of Gennadii's epistle to Ioasaf (that of July–August 1488), but before the death of Metropolitan Gerontii (27 May 1489), because

the latter received Gennadii's report concerning the new investigation.[30] Gennadii gave those heretics who had repented of their sins and confessed them in written form with their own hands permission to stand outside the church during divine worship. Nonetheless, Gennadii prohibited even these heretics from entering churches and receiving Holy Communion. Those heretics who did not confess and, according to Gennadii's report, continued to "praise the Jewish belief" were handed over to the grand prince's lieutenants, Iakov and Iurii Zakhar'ich, and punished in such a way as to make an example of them. Some of the heretics who had confessed prudently fled to Moscow. One priest, Gavrilko of Mikhailova Street, received a position at a Moscow church, and another, Denis, began to serve at the grand princely Dormition Cathedral in the Kremlin.[31]

Obvious success in the second investigation of the heretics would not have satisfied Gennadii. The Novgorodian archbishop was apparently made nervous by the activity of those confessed heretics (like Denis) who passed under the jurisdiction of Metropolitan Gerontii, served in Moscow, and could carry on an intrigue against their former master. According to normal procedure, an action by one bishop in a territory under the control of another bishop required a direct appeal to the head of the diocese. Gennadii sent Gerontii materials concerning his second investigation in order to ask for continuation of the punitive action.[32] Meanwhile, on 27 May 1489 Gerontii had died. Since the metropolitan see was vacant, Gennadii was compelled to wait for the nomination of a new metropolitan.

During this time of compulsory idleness, Gennadii made an inquiry concerning the service of the Novgorodian heretics in Moscow. Unknown well-wishers informed the archbishop that Denis had allegedly danced behind the altar during the Liturgy, and "blasphemed the cross" (кресту ся наругал).[33]

At the same time, rumors had been spread in Moscow about the Jew from Venice, *мистро*[34] Leon. Doctor Leon arrived in Rus' with members of the retinue of Andrew Palaeologue, and offered, or was forced, to treat the terminal illness of the grand prince Ivan Ivanovich, the heir of Ivan the Third. Prince Ivan died on 7 March 1490. The foreign—Jewish—doctor was blamed for his death, and was decapitated at the Bolvanovskii field on 22 April.[35]

On 12 September 1490 Zosima Bradatyi, archimandrite of the Moscow Simonov Monastery,[36] was nominated (возведен на двор) metropolitan of "all Rus'." Gennadii was willing to come to Moscow for the consecration of Zosima, but Ivan the Third prudently prohibited the Novgorodian archbishop from showing up in the capital. Gennadii thus was forced to confirm the elevation of Zosima by correspondence, and sent his charter of trust to Moscow.[37] Zosima was consecrated metropolitan on 26 September.[38]

After Zosima's consecration, Gennadii sent an epistle to the new metropolitan (the letter was written after 26 September and before the 17 October council meetings on the heretics). The Novgorodian archbishop demanded immediate

punishment for the heretics Denis and Gavrilko, and an announcement of the council's damnation of the heretics who had already died (Aleksei, Istoma and Ivashko Chernyi) and of those individuals who had been investigated during the second investigation, whose names had been written down in the "original" acts (подлинник). At the same time Gennadii cited the Apostolic Canon that prohibits, under threat of excommunication, participation in church services celebrated by heretics. Gennadii could expect opposition to the proposed punitive actions and hence singled out the heretics' principal supporter (печальник) Feodor Kuritsyn, the clerk (*d'iak*) of the grand prince.[39] According to Gennadii, the heretics Aleksei, Istoma, Sverchek, Denis and others had come to Kuritsyn several times seeking advice.

In his letter Gennadii paraphrased the speeches of Georg von Turn, the ambassador of the Holy Roman Empire, written down in Novgorod shortly after 19 August 1490.[40] The ambassador related to the archbishop a story about the king of Spain (Ferdinand the Catholic) who had "purged" his country, presumably of the Jewish heresy.[41] The Inquisition's troops in Spain had investigated about four thousand people, young and old, and subsequently had burned them, and "the glory... and the praise... of the king of Spain have spread throughout all the countries of the Latin belief, because [the king] is adamantly opposed to criminals."[42]

When repeated by Gennadii, the ambassador's story clearly sounded like a call to begin mass executions of heretics. Gennadii could not have been unaware, however, that the very practice of execution of heretics, which was known in the Byzantine Empire, had never been in use in Rus', and that such an innovation would touch the roots of powerful social institutions and provoke negative reactions from many sides.

Before September 1490 some individuals lodged a complaint against Gennadii's investigation because of his alleged abuse of power. Arguing against this accusation, the archbishop related to the council of bishops the interrogation of a certain Samsonka, who named the clerk Feodor Kuritsyn as chief patron of the heretics.[43] Hence, one might speculate, Gennadii expected resistance from the clerk of the grand prince.

Gennadii gave his colleagues in Moscow a fresh account of the newly-discovered crimes of the heretics concerning the act of the scrivener (*pod'iachii*) Alekseika, who "had poured dirty water" on an icon of the Dormition of the Mother of God, and "turned some other icons upside down."[44] Gennadii's demand to convoke a council against the heretics without delay was accompanied by a concealed threat to the Muscovite clergy: those "archimandrites and abbots, and archpriests, and council priests who have served with the heretics," even if they did not commit the same heresy, should be excommunicated and deprived of holy orders.[45]

The Novgorodian archbishop had warned his colleagues not to turn the anti-heretical council into a council on confessional matters. Gennadii expressed

the point thus: "Our people are simple, they do not understand even ordinary books, so do not allow any speeches with the heretics. A council should be called only for one purpose: to punish the heretics, that is, to burn them, and hang them."[46]

The hearing of the heretics' case took place in Moscow on 17 October 1490. A day earlier, on 16 October, the heretic Denis was expelled with dishonor from the Cathedral of the Archangel as he was preparing to celebrate the liturgy together with the bishops. The next morning Archbishop Tikhon of Rostov, Bishop Nifont of Suzdal', Bishop Semion of Riazan', as well as archmandrites, abbots, archpriests, and "honored elders" gathered at the chamber of the metropolitan. The council of prelates had informed Ivan the Third about the case, and Ivan, acting like a Byzantine emperor, ordered an investigation of the heresy. Shortly after, perhaps on the same day, the bishops gathered once more and began a session in the presence of boyars and the clerk of the grand prince. Nine heretics had been presented to the council—the monk Zakhar, the "head of the heresies"; the Novgorodian archpriest Gavriil; the priests Denis, Maksim, and Vasilii; the deacon Makar; the clerks Gridia, Vasiuk, Samukha; and "their collaborators."[47]

Metropolitan Zosima specified the main accusations against the heretics in his speech to the council. According to the investigators' report, the heretics did not venerate the icons of Christ and of the Mother of God and of the Cross, paid no respect to other icons, broke and burned icons, bit into a cross made from an aloe tree,[48] and threw icons and crosses to the ground and into a washtub. After such heinous actions, some heretics had begun to verbally abuse even Christ and the Mother of God, refused to acknowledge Christ as the Son of God, blasphemed against many saints and the seven Ecumenical Councils, and ate forbidden food during the fast days of Wednesday and Friday. Futhermore, all the heretics respected Saturday more than Sunday, and some of them did not believe in the Resurrection of Christ. Summing up, Metropolitan Zosima gave a short description of the heretics' crimes: "They have carried out all these following the Jewish custom, in violation of God's law and the Christian belief."[49]

After Zosima's speech, the epistles of Gennadii and lists containing the descriptions of the heretics' crimes were read to the defendants. They denied all charges.[50] Thereupon Zakhar, who had been known earlier as a *strigol'nik*, not as a heretic seduced by Jews, was questioned. The Metropolitan accused Zakhar of refusing to prostrate himself before holy icons. According to the report made by the court, Zakhar in his reply allegedly "blasphemed against Jesus Christ our Lord, and his Immaculate Mother, and all the great hierarchs—the miracle workers Peter, Alexis, and Leontius, and all the saintly fathers of the seven Councils."[51] There then followed a confrontation in which "many people" gave evidence about the heretics' crimes and "abuses of holy icons." New lists of depositions were immediately sent to Ivan the Third. The grand

prince appeared in person in the chamber of the metropolitan and gave an order to read aloud Gennadii's letters and copies (списки) of the Novgorod materials. He heard oral testimony of "Muscovite people" as well.

Following Ivan the Third's order, Metropolitan Zosima "looked at the Book of Canons of the Holy Fathers" and determined that the heretics, because of their sins, deserved deposition from holy orders. They were also to be excommunicated and consigned to ecclesiastical perdition. The *Procheiros Nomos* (градские законы), which traditionally was copied alongside the traditional Book of Canons, called for the public punishment (казнити) of such heretics, and their imprisonment.[52]

The ecclesiastical laws found by the metropolitan appeared to be more humane than any plans of the Novgorodian archbishop himself (i.e., "burn and hang," жечи и вешати), and the council of the metropolitanate followed the directions of the Book of Canons. The heretics were consigned to ecclesiastical punishment and sent to Novgorod.[53]

The council obviously did not fulfill the expectations of the Novgorodian archbishop, and not only because of the relatively humane verdict. The accusations had been deliberately organized in such a way that Zakhar—a *strigol'nik*, who had never been accused of Jewish heresy—would be proclaimed the head of the heresy. The homily by Zosima and the description of the council very cautiously used Gennadii's characterization of the heresy as being due to Jewish influence. In Zosima's speech, one could find a detailed account of the heretics' iconoclastic crimes, and only at the end of the verdict were the actions of the newly-discovered iconoclasts explained as a deviation toward the Jewish religion ("то чинили есте по обычаю жидовскому"). In the homily of Zosima the only reference to the Jewish inspiration of the heretics could be found in the preamble ("жидовскую веру хвалят"). These two accusations do not draw one's attention; the accusations of Jewish heresy were almost completely obscured by the description of the other, non-Jewish deviations.

More importantly, even Gennadii himself, passionate exposer of heretics that he was, gradually changed his attitude toward the newly-discovered heresy. The first letters sent by Gennadii in September 1487–August 1488 had accused the heretics of being "жидовская мудръствующие" (adherents to Jewish teachings). The above-mentioned definition scarcely reflected the character of the heresy, and at the same time was not intelligible to the Novgorodian archbishop's addressees. This is why Gennadii was obliged to give a more detailed explanation of the heresy: "That the heretics be excommunicated like Marcionites and Messalians" (покрыты ... суть онех еретик клятвою укоризною маркианскиа глаголю и месалианскиа)[54], "And they use every Messalian heresy that there is for their false wisdom, but they deceive people [by calling it] the Jewish Ten Commandments, so that they might think themselves virtuous" (да что есть ересеи месалианских, то все они

мудръствуют, толко то жидовскым десятословием людеи прельщают...),[55] and further: "This is not only Judaism; it is mixed with Messalian heresy" (ино то в них не одно июдеиство, смешано с месалианскою ересью).[56] Gennadii did not specify the source of his theoretical knowledge of Messalianism, but one could speculate that he was thinking about the Bogomils, according to the description of this heresy given in the *Merilo Pravednoe*.[57] The heresy of Marcionitism was known to Gennadii from the Book of Canons: "Those chapters about the Marcionites," wrote Gennadii to Prokhor of Sarai, "you would find in your Book of Canons."[58] The Book of Canons that belonged to Bishop Prokhor was discovered in the Library of the Perm′ Pedagogical Institute. It appears to be a Book of Canons in an original Muscovite version, associated with the *Merilo pravednoe* (hitherto the oldest and only copy of that version was the well-known *Chudovskaia kormchaia* of 1499[59]), approximately from the third quarter of the fifteenth century.[60] Gennadii mentioned "Marcionites," and it is difficult to guess what kind of heresy he had in mind. Canon 1 of the Second Ecumenical Council treats the heresy of "Marcellianites,"[61] while Canon 95 of the Sixth Ecumenical Council[62] and Canon 47 of Basil the Great discourse on the heresy of the "Marcionites." We know very little about the Marcellianites, and somewhat more about the Marcionites. The latter, according to Basil the Great, did not accept marriage, prohibited the drinking of wine, called God's creation "dirty" (скверное), and represented God as creator of all evil on earth.[63]

The mention of the Book of Canons does not at all clarify the nature of the heresy. Rather, it raises some new questions. For instance, why did Gennadii not refer to those regulations of the Book of Canons that applied more precisely to the heresy under examination, if it really was the Jewish heresy? He might, for example, have referred to Canon 8 of the Seventh Council, on certain Jews who "pretend to convert to Christianity, although they secretly reject Christianity, keep the custom of honoring Saturday, and follow other Jewish traditions."[64] A similar example can be found in Canon 29 of the Council of Laodicea.[65]

After February 1488, the Novgorodian archbishop had abundant time and opportunity to confirm his preliminary hypothesis concerning the Jewish character of the heresy. Gennadii launched two investigations, involving many interrogations and cross-examinations of various suspects, but he was not able to find any new information that would shed light on the heretical teaching. In September 1490, Gennadii did not repeat his previous characterization of the heretics as "adherents of Jewish teachings" (жидовская мудръствующие) in terms of their doctrines, but rather emphasized the "Jewish custom" that they followed.[66]

It was not until September 1490 that the Novgorodian archbishop finally pointed out the main perpetrator of the crime—an anonymous "heretical Jew" (жидовин еретик) who had arrived from Kiev twenty years earlier, on 8

November 1470, with the retinue of the Kievan prince Mykhail Olel'kovych.[67] Such a belated and scarcely trustworthy discovery by Gennadii would attach a political significance to the heresy, and would have led to the immediate intervention of the grand prince, for the heresy was to be explained as the result of intrigues of hostile Lithuania. In September 1490 the Novgorodian archbishop began to refer to the heresy as the "accursed Lithuanian affair" (литовские окаянные дела).[68]

As more accusations against the heretics were brought forward, the resistance to the Novgorodian archbishop grew. Some enemies cast aspersions ("сшивали ложь") on Gennadii, and doubted the impartiality of the investigation.[69] Thus, Gennadii was forced to attack in order to defend himself from his enemies. In his attempt to find new evidence of the Jewish heresy, Gennadii enlarged the circle of suspects. At the same time, lacking the sound support of Moscow, the archbishop became more and more dependent on priests of his own eparchy—the very priests Gennadii suspected of the heresy. It must be remembered that Gennadii was the second Muscovite protégé in the history of Novgorod to occupy the archepiscopal see. Gennadii's predecessor, Sergii, could not keep his position for even a year (4 September 1483 to 26 June 1484),[70] because "the citizens of Novgorod did not want to bend to his will."[71] In his attempt to overcome the resistance of the Novgorod citizens, Gennadii looked for help from Muscovite officials. Gennadii could obtain such support in only one eventuality: if his accusations against the Novgorodians were to grow to a certain extent, so that Gennadii's fate would become part of the sphere of Ivan the Third's political interests (for instance, accusations of treason, or of a "Lithuanian affair," literally, "литовские дела").[72] As one might speculate, Gennadii's intervention in the field of interest of the Muscovite political elite would not be accepted as appropriate conduct. One of the heads of Ivan the Third's foreign office, the clerk Feodor Kuritsyn, certainly did not readily take on trust the accusations of the Novgorodian priests. After the first investigation of the heretics, after July–August 1488, the Novgorodian priest Denis, who was proclaimed a heretic in Novgorod and soon escaped from Gennadii, was appointed to serve at the grand princely Archangel's Cathedral. Gennadii's struggle against the heresy gradually developed into a struggle for Gennadii's own future: in attacking the heretics, the Novgorodian archbishop was defending himself.

The virtue one can least expect from one in such a situation is impartiality. Moreover, Gennadii not infrequently received information secondhand. Therefore, a historian cannot find conclusive evidence in his reports, but rather a reflection of certain events as seen through the wide-open eyes of medieval spectators who were scarcely able to understand what they saw.

Like any Christian society, the medieval Orthodox world was not indifferent to the Jewish issue. One of the strongest preoccupations of the Christian mind kept obstinately tearing away at the Jewish roots of historical Christianity.[73]

One could expect a great deal of misunderstanding: even a distant historical similarity of phenomena could be treated by medieval writers as a complete and undisputable identity. Accordingly, of all the accusations that had been brought forward against the heretics at the trial of 1490, the only accusation that bears evidence of Jewish customs maintained by the heretics was, as Constantine Zuckerman has pointed out,[74] their reverence for Saturday "more than for Sunday" (паче воскресения Христова). However, the same "Jewish" sin, according to medieval Orthodox writings, plagued even the Catholic Church. The earliest East Slavic polemical work, the epistle of Metropolitan Ioann II to the anti-Pope Clement III (1088–1089), explicates the Catholic tradition of feasting on Saturday, as well as some other Catholic "deviations," as an imitation of the "Jewish custom and belief."[75] This problem was seen in a similar manner in the late fifteenth century, when the *posadnik* of Pskov Filipp Petrov[76] wrote to his archbishop (perhaps in 1485–1487), "The grey monks, my lord, came from the Germans to Pskov, and began to argue about faith...." Later on, Filipp called "Latins" those monks who had tried to induce the citizens of Pskov to recognize the decisions of the Council of Florence; thus, one could not question the confessional allegiance of the "grey monks." The development of a discussion between priests from Pskov and some uninvited guests merits attention. The Catholics said, "Our pope united the faith with your [representatives] at the Eighth Council, and you as well as we are Christians, we believe (they say) in the Son of God." The Pskovian priests answered, "Not everyone's faith is right; God is right; if you trust in the Son of God, then why do you follow the Jews, who killed God; why do you revere and keep a fast on Saturday, and why do you eat unleavened bread, and therefore keep Jewish customs [жидовствуете] against the will of God...[?][77] Thus, as a consequence of the Pskovian perception of the 1480s, the teachings of pious Catholic monks could be easily called by Russians "the Jewish teachings." How should one treat the "trustworthy" evidence in the case of the Novgorodian heretics?

As the discussion of Gennadii's letters has shown, the archbishop does not provide sufficient evidence of the heretics' deviation toward the Jewish belief. Numerous bodies of evidence that had been found during the course of the first investigation (the copybooks of priest Naum) probably could not endure closer examination, and were struck off a list of questions disputed with the "Judaizers." A general accusation of the heretics of abuse of the Orthodox faith could not prove anything, for any innovation and any deviation from the customary rite could be seen in Rus' as an "abuse" (похуление) of the faith. Such an accusation was made against Maksim the Greek and Vassian Patrikeev in 1531,[78] and against the elder Artemii in 1554.[79] Those heretics who, according to Gennadii's report, beyond any doubt had "converted to the Jewish religion" (встали в жидовскую веру) could not be questioned in public, for they had died before the council of 1490.[80] The heretics Denis and Gavrilko

miraculously survived all the persecutions, continued acting as Orthodox Christians, celebrated the liturgy, and gave and received Holy Communion.

The inquisitive Gennadii, who (as one can speculate on the basis of his writings) could easily communicate with "Latins" and Muslims,[81] knew almost nothing about the real life and traditions of the Jewish communities in Lithuania and Kiev. The latter was called by some Jewish writers "God's great city of sages and writers." It was there that Gennadii tried to trace the roots of the "Jewish heresy." In Kiev, Rabbinic and Karaite communities interpreted the Torah in varied ways;[82] the latter followed the Babylonian rite of the Gaonim, while the former held to the Roman rite transplanted from France and the German lands, and struggled against each other. It was also in Kiev that Moses ben Yaakov ha-Goleh (Rabbi Moses the Exiled), the master of the Masorah, wrote his commentaries on the Pentateuch, on the Book of Ecclesiastes, on a calendar and cabalistic writings.[83] But Gennadii, like the Novgorodian heretics, seems to have had absolutely no idea of any of these facets of the life of the Jewish communities.

History has seen to it that Gennadii's frightened but unconvincing account, which treated heretics as Judaizers, survived the contemporary testimonies of the heresy and became part of many historical writings in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.[84] Nevertheless, as we have seen, Gennadii's interpretation of the heresy was based on his own preconceptions, and his idea of the Jewish character of the heresy is not supported by an examination of the various sources.

Gennadii's view prevailed because of the polemical writings of the Novgorodian archbishop's correspondent, the abbot of the Volokolamsk Monastery Iosif Sanin—especially his *Book against Heretics* (the book is known as the Просветитель, "Enlightener"; the short version of this book in ten chapters was compiled in 1492–1494).[85] Iosif was not himself involved in the first period of the anti-heretical polemic and could receive only circumstantial evidence about the heresy. He began to dispute with the alleged heretics after the council of 1490 and, without any hesitation, called their belief the "Jewish faith." While he remained far from Novgorodian events, Iosif was able to determine the name of the "heretical Jew" (Skharia) who allegedly had taught the heresy to the Novgorodian priests.[86] For the first time, Iosif mentions names of other Jews who came to Novgorod from Lithuania (Iosif Shmoilo Skariavei,[87] Moses Khanush).[88] And "the head and teacher" of the heretics, according to Iosif's report, paradoxically appeared to be the head of the Russian Orthodox church, Metropolitan Zosima. Such a sharp turn in the course of the investigation led to the beginning of a new period of discussion on the origin and nature of the Novgorodian-Muscovite heresy.

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ABBREVIATIONS

AAE *Akty, sobrannye v bibliotekakh i arkhivakh Rossiiskoi imperii Arkheograficheskoiu ekspeditsieiu Imperatorskoi Akademii nauk.* Vol. 1 (St. Petersburg, 1836)

AFED N. A. Kazakova and Ia. S. Lur'e, *Antifeodal'nyeereticheskie dvizheniia na Rusi XIV– nachala XVI veka* (Moscow and Leningrad, 1955)

AI *Akty istoricheskie, sobrannye i izdannye Arkheograficheskoiu komissieiu.* Vol. 1 (St. Petersburg, 1841)

ChOIDR *Chteniia v Moskovskom obshchestve istorii i drevnostei rossiiskikh*

DRV N. Novikov, ed. *Drevniaia rossiiskaia vivliofika....* Vol. 14 (Moscow, 1790)

Eparkh Eparkhial'noe sobranie, GIM

GBL Gosudarstvennaia biblioteka im. V. I. Lenina, now Rossiiskaia Gosudarstvennaia biblioteka (Moscow)

GIM Gosudarstvennyi istoricheskii muzei (Moscow)

GPB Gosudarstvennaia publichnaia biblioteka im. M. E. Saltykova-Shchedrina, now Rossiiskaia Natsional'naia biblioteka (St. Petersburg)

HUS *Harvard Ukrainian Studies*

PL A. N. Nasonov, ed. *Pskovskie letopisi.* Vol. 2 (Moscow, 1955)

PSRL *Polnoe sobranie russkikh letopisei.* Vol. 12 (St. Petersburg, 1901); vol. 13, pt. 1 (St. Petersburg, 1906); vol. 20, pt. 1 (St. Petersburg, 1910);.vol. 26 (Moscow and Leningrad, 1959); vol. 28 (Moscow and Leningrad, 1962)

RFA A. I. Pliguzov et al., eds. *Russkii feodal'nyi arkhiv XIV–pervoi treti XVI veka.* 5 vols. to date (Moscow, 1986–)

RIB A. S. Pavlov, ed. *Russkaia istoricheskaia biblioteka, izdavaemaia Arkheograficheskoiu komissieiu.* Vol. 6 (St. Petersburg, 1880)

Sinod Sinodal'noe sobranie, GIM

Solov Solovetskoe sobranie, GPB

TODRL *Trudy Otdela drevnerusskoi literatury.* 48 vols. to date (Leningrad / St. Petersburg, 1934–)

Troitsk Troitskoe sobranie, GBL

ZhMNP *Zhurnal Ministerstva narodnogo prosveshcheniia* (St. Petersburg, 1834–1917)

NOTES

1. Even the most comprehensive descriptions of the medieval *European* heresies never consider the heresy of "Judaizers" as a part of European (or Byzantine) religious dissent, and have never mentioned the Novgorodian-Muscovite heretical sect among those heretics. See N. G. Garsoïan, "Byzantine Heresy: A Reinterpretation," *Dumbarton Oaks Papers* 25 (1971): 85-113; R.I. Moore, *The Origin of European Dissent* (New York, 1977); M. Lambert, *Medieval Heresy: Popular Movements from Bogomil to Hus* (New York, 1977), etc.

2. W. Strojev, "Zur Herkunftsfrage der 'Judaisierenden'," *Zeitschrift für Slawische Philologie* 11 (1934): 345; cf. Ia. S. Lur'e, *Ideologicheskaia bor'ba v russkoi publitsistike kontsa XV - nachala XVI veka* (Moscow-Leningrad, 1960), p. 77.

3. I. Berlin, "Zhidovstvuiushchie," *Evreiskaia entsiklopediia*, vol. 8 (St. Petersburg, n.d.), col. 582–87.

4. AFED 375; on the date of Mykhail Olel'kovych's arrival in Novgorod see PL, pt. 2, p. 172, cf. p. 175.

5. AFED p. 378

6. Contrary to Zakhar's accusation, the obligation to pay money for installation appeared to be the routine practice of the Christian Church. See R. J. Macrides, "Simony," *The Oxford Dictionary of Byzantium*, vol. 3 (New York, Oxford, 1991), pp. 1901–1902; V. Preobrazhenskii, *Sv. Tarasii patriarkh tsaregradskii i VII Vselenskii sobor* (St. Petersburg, 1893), pp. 115-18; A. P. Dobroklonskii, *Prep. Feodor, ispovednik i igumen studiiskii* (Odessa, 1913), pp. 160-163; A. I. Pliguzov, "Protivostoianie mitropolich'ei i vassianovskoi kormchikh nakanune sudebnykh zasedanii 1531 goda," in *Issledovaniia po istochnikovedeniiu istorii SSSR dooktiabr'skogo perioda* (Moscow, 1985), pp. 32, 50.

7. AFED p. 380.

8. Ibid., p. 379.

9. For the date of the beginning of the investigation of the heretics, see the direct evidence in Gennadii's letter to Metropolitan Zosima. Between 26 September and 16 October 1490, Gennadii wrote about the date of the discovery of the heresy, "Three years have passed, and now the fourth has come," AFED p. 378.

10. Ibid., p. 375.

11. Ibid., p. 310. Some scholars identify the copybooks of Naum with the well-known Psalter of the newly converted Fedor the Jew, preserved in manuscript codices of the scribe Efrosin from the Kirillov-Beloozerskii Monastery. See the edition: M. N. Speranskii, ed., "Psaltyr' zhidovstvuiushchikh v perevode Fedora Evreia," *ChOIDR*, bk. 2 (221) (1907), pt. 2, pp. 1–72, and analysis: Constantine Zuckerman, "The 'Psalter' of Feodor and the Heresy of the 'Judaizers' in the Last Quarter of the Fifteenth Century," *HUS* 11 no. 1/2 (June 1987): 77–99. The most recent scholar of the Psalter does not speculate on the connections between the heresy and Fedor's literary work. See E. B. Rogachevskaia, "Iz nabliudenii nad 'Psaltir'iu' Fedora evreia," *Slaviane i ikh sosedi. Evreiskoe naselenie tsentral'noi, vostochnoi i iugo-vostochnoi Evropy. srednie veka – nachalo novogo vremeni* (Moscow, 1993), pp. 76–78. Henceforth the correspondence of the heretics does not mention the "Jewish" psalms; therefore, additional investigation could not discover any heretical deviations in Naum's copybooks.

12. *Slovar' drevnerusskogo iazyka (XI–XIV vv.)*, vol. 3 (Moscow, 1990), p. 260.

13. I. I. Sreznevskii, *Materialy dlia slovaria drevne-russkogo iazyka po pis'mennym pamiatnikam*, vol. 1 (St. Petersburg, 1893), col. 871.

14. *Slovar' drevnerusskogo iazyka*, p. 260.

15. B. Melioranskii, "K istorii protivotserkovnykh dvizhenii v Makedonii v XIV veke," in *Στέφανος. Sbornik statei v chest' F. F. Sokolova* (St. Petersburg, 1895), pp. 71–72, cf. G. M. Prokhorov, "Prenie Grigoriia Palamy 's khiony i turki' i problema 'zhidovskaia mudrstvuiushchikh'," TODRL 27 (1972): 331.

16. See A.I. Pliguzov and I.A. Tikhoniuk, "Poslanie Dmitriia Trakhaniota novgorodskomu arkhiepiskopu Gennadiiu Gonzovu o sedmerichnosti schisleniia let," in *Estestvennonauchnye predstavleniia Drevnei Rusi* (Moscow, 1988), pp. 53–55. For publication of the Slavonic translation of "Six Wings" (the copy compiled in 1503–1522), see A. I. Sobolevskii, *Perevodnaia literatura Moskovskoi Rusi XIV-XVII vekov. Bibliogr. materialy* (St. Petersburg, 1903), pp. 413–17, and plates; cf. M. Steinschneider, *Mathematik bei den Juden* (Frankfurt a. M, 1901), pp. 79–84.

17. GIM, Sinod. 915, f. 907.

18. AFED pp. 311–12.

19. Pliguzov and Tikhoniuk, "Poslanie," p. 74.

20. See proposed text of the letter by Paisii and Nil published on the basis of the August volume of Makarii's *Velikie chetii minei*: RFA 3:695–96.

21. AFED p. 313.

22. Ibid, pp. 312–13.

23. N. K. Goleizovskii, "Dva epizoda iz deiatel'nosti novgorodskogo arkhiepiskopa Gennadiia," *Vizantiiskii vremennik* 41 (1980):127–30.

24. AFED pp. 313–15.

25. PSRL vol. 28, p. 319.

26. Ibid. For more information see A. A. Zimin, *Rossiia na rubezhe XV-XVI stoletii* (Moscow, 1982), pp. 78–79, 285. The number of persons punished, as Edward L. Keenan has pointed out to me, seems exaggerated.

27. The Compilation of 1497 (PSRL vol. 28, p. 154) reports that Ioasaf left his see during the Apostles' Fast (*zagovenie*) in 1488. The Apostles' Fast in 1488 began on 30 May and ended 28 June. Gennadii's letter to Ioasaf usually has been dated from February 1489, on the basis of the scribe's remark, "In the year 6997, February 23, 24, 25, I copied this letter; in the letter are ninety and five lines" (AFED p. 320). However, this remark does not inform us of the time of composition of the letter, but only indicates the time when the only copy of Gennadii's letter (which indeed contains ninety-five lines) was made. All the chronological calculations one could find in the letter to Ioasaf coincide with the calculations in the letter to Prokhor of Sarai (from the end of 1487, i.e., the beginning of 6996). Therefore, the letter to Ioasaf should be dated the same year (6996: September 1487–August 1488). Since Gennadii's epistle to Ioasaf was compiled after Ioasaf had left his see (June 1488), the only possible time of composition of the letter to Ioasaf would have been July–August 1488.

28. AFED p. 320.

29. Moshe Taube has pointed out to me that by the end of the fifteenth century both treatises had been translated into Slavonic and circulated in manuscript copies. See Sobolevskii, *Perevodnaia literatura*, 401–409; P. Kokovtsev, "K voprosu o 'Logike Aviasafa'," *ZhMNP* no. 5 (1912); Lur'e, *Ideologicheskaia bor'ba*, pp. 194–97.

30. PSRL, vol. 20, pt. 1, p. 354; cf. vol. 28, pp. 154, 319.

31. AFED p. 375.

32. Ibid.

33. Ibid.

34. Cf "мистръ веницеискии Аристотель," PSRL, vol. 25, p. 303 (1475); vol. 28, p. 309 (1475), and A. Zoltan, "Zapadnorussko-velikorusskie iazykovye kontakty v oblasti leksiki v XV v. (K voprosu o zapadnoi traditsii v delovoi pis'mennosti Moskovskoi Rusi)," diss. abstract (Moscow, 1984), p. 22.

35. PSRL, vol. 28, pp. 154–55, 320.

36. From the beginning the Simonov Monastery maintained strong relations with the court of the grand prince. See L. I. Ivina, *Krupnaia votchina Severo-Vostochnoi Rusi kontsa XIV–pervoi poloviny XVI v.* (Leningrad, 1979). One can speculate that the Simonov Monastery was in opposition to the Chudov Monastery, whence Gennadii was elevated to the Novgorodian see.

37. Gennadii's charter of trust (повольная грамота) had been partly cited by the compiler of the Vologda-Perm' Chronicle: PSRL, vol. 26, pp. 280–81. It was from this chronicle that the text of the charter was derived by the compiler of the Nikon Chronicle: PSRL, vol. 12, p. 224.

38. PSRL, vol. 28, p. 320.

39. AFED p. 377. The editors of AFED published Gennadii's letter according to the MS. GPB, Q.XVII.15, with variants from the MS. GPB, Solov. 962/852, but they were unable to discover the copy of the letter that was published in 1836 in *Akty arkheograficheskoi ekspeditsii* (A. S. Pavlov cited the variants of the 1836 publication in RIB, vol. 6, no. 115.I). I have managed to find the copy published in AAE—it is GIM, Eparkh. 416.

40. The ambassador Georg von Turn must have arrived in Novgorod directly from Moscow; he left Moscow on 19 August 1490 (PSRL, vol. 26, p. 280), accompanied by Georgios Trakhaniotes (the author of the letter to Gennadii on the chronological matters and the interpreter of von Turn's "Speeches"), and by the grand prince's clerk Vasilii Kuleshin.

41. AFED p. 378.

42. See GBL, Muz. 3271, f. 4v.–5v. and the publication in A. D. Sedel'nikov, "Rasskaz 1490 g. ob inkvizitsii," *Trudy Komissii po drevne-russkoi literature Akademii nauk SSSR*, vol. 1 (Leningrad, 1934), p. 50: "Сказывал посол цесаревъ Юрью про шпанског(о) королѧ, а имени ємꙋ не помнит.

Тот деи корол(ь) очистил свою землю ѡт ересеи жидовскыих, а за тѣм королем шес(ть) земел(ь): Шпанскаѧ, Католонїа, Биско, Кастелїа, Серденїа, Корсига, а тѣ шес(ть) земел(ь) всѣ великїе, а том имъ корол(ь) шпанскои всѣм г(о)с(у)д(а)рь. И в тои єг(о) земли на Шпанїе тѣ жидовскїе єреси почѧли прозѧбат[и]. И том корол(ь) шпанскои, избрав великог(о) ч(е)л(ове)ка из своих велмож, да послал послом к папѣ римскомꙋ, что тои еретич(ь)ство въ єго землѧх в великих людех в бискꙋпѣх и въ архимандритѣх и в попѣх и въ ц(е)рковных людех и в мирѧнех въ многых почало прозѧбати.

И папа римскыи с тѣм єг(о) послѡм послал двꙋ писков великих людеи к томꙋ шпанскомꙋ королю въ єго землѧх тог(о) лиха искати. И как ѡт папы два бискꙋпа пришли и корол(ь) шпанскои к папиным биском избрав своих два бискꙋпа великї[е], да два боѧрина болших своих, кои под тѣм корелем всѣ тѣ земли держат, да велѣл имъ с папиными бискꙋп[ы] того лиха обыскивати. И папины бискꙋпы и королевы, и королевы боѧре обыскали в нач(а)лѣ двꙋ бискꙋпов королевых, да их казнили многыми казнми и многыми ранами, да и сожгли. Да после тог(о) ѡбыскали шес(ть) архимандритов и попов и игꙋменов, а по тамошнемꙋ зовѫт ихъ обаты, да тѣх казнили нем(и)л(о)стиво, да и сожгли. Да после тог(о) боѧръ ѡбыскали и земледержьсцев и попов, и мирских людїи и ц(е)рковных людїи многых, да мꙋчили их многымї розными мꙋками, да и пережгли всѣх.

А *всѣх тѣх ѡбыскали в тои ереси бискꙋпов и боѧръ и архимандритов и попов и* земледержьцов, и мирскыих людеи и малых и великых с четыре тысѧщи, да тѣ всѣ съжжены, а животы их [и и]мѣнїа на королѧ поимали. А иные лихїе ко[их н]е поспѣли поимати, и тѣ стꙋпили из земли вонъ без вѣсти, а животы их и имѣнїа на королѧ поимали. А ꙋже томꙋ четвертои год как тѣх лихих обыскали да и пережгли. А и н(ы)нѣ и сег(о) дни тѣ папины два бискꙋпа ꙋ королѧ живѫт и папа ѣздити к себѣ не велѣл, а корол(ь) ихъ проч(ь) ѡт себе не ѡтпꙋстит, а лихых так и ѡбыскивают, да хотѧт ихъ искоренити, чтобы то лихо в тѣх землѧх не было.

А вѣра ꙋ тог(о) королѧ латинскаѧ, а бискꙋпы папины тѣх живот не емлют, а корол(ь) деи имъ хочет дати многое множ(ь)ство, как их станет проч(ь) ѡтпꙋщати. А тѣ деи земли на запад за Вфрѧнцовским королевствомъ сшелсѧ рꙋбеж с рꙋбежом.

А слава деи и хвала тог(о) шпанског(о) королѧ пошла по всѣм землѧм по латиньскои вѣрѣ, что на лихих крѣпко стоит, да ꙋже деи въ єго землѧх лихих мало чюти."

For a detailed description of the Jewish communities in Spain prosecuted by the Inquisition in Castile in 1483–1485, see H. Beinart, ed., *Records of the Trials of the Spanish Inquisition in Ciudad Real*, vol. 1 (Jerusalem, 1974), vol. 2 (Jerusalem, 1985), esp. Index of Subjects, pp. 632–56. Cf. H. Ch. Lea, *A History of the Inquisition of Spain*, vol. 2 (London, 1906), pp. 11–12ff.

43. AFED p. 380–81.

44. Ibid, p. 380.

45. Ibid, p. 381.

46. "Да еще люди у нас простые, не умеют по обычным книгам говорити: таки бы о вере никаких речеи с ними [еретиками — Author] не плодили; токмо того для учинили собор, что их казнити—жечи да вешати!"; see AFED p. 381. Compare the attempt of the elder Artemii to dispute confessional questions with the German (Catholic) dwellers of Novyi Gorodok (Navahrudak), and the decisions made by the council of the Metropolitanate of Moscow in January 1554, when the Russian bishops rejected any plan to dispute with Catholics for the simple reason of the obvious superiority of the true Orthodox belief, AAE 1:251–52.

47. AFED p. 383.

48. Силолоен крест in the Slavonic original. I. I. Sreznevskii pointed out the same word in the epistle of Vasilii Kalika to Feodor Dobryi (1344–1352), see Sreznevskii, *Materialy dlia slovaria,* vol. 3 (1891), col. 352.

49. AFED p. 383.

50. Ibid., p. 385.

51. Ibid.

52. Ibid.; *Kormchaia* (Moscow, 1649–1653), f. 486v–487; I. Žužek, *Kormčaja Kniga: Studies on the Chief Code of Russian Canon Law*, Orientalia Christiana Analecta, 168 (Rome, 1964), pp. 88–89.

53. In Novgorod the same heretics were punished by Gennadii according to the Byzantine model, which could be known in Rus', for instance, from the text of the anonymous *Vita* of Amphilochius of Ikonion (see GBL, Troitsk. 670, f. 563). Compare the description of the punishment in Amphilochius's *Vita* (Emperor Theodosius ordered the heretic Eunomius to be seated on an unsaddled camel and conveyed through the city for humiliation, and commanded the public to say, "He is an enemy of God!" Gennadii, like his Byzantine predecessors, ordered the heretics to be put on a horse and conveyed through the city, and ordered those who met the procession to spit upon the heretics and say, "They are enemies of God and abusers of Christ." See AFED p. 472 (publication of Iosif's "Skazanie o novoiavivsheisia eresi," 1492–1494).

54. Ibid, p. 310.

55. Ibid.

56. Ibid, p. 316. On Messalianism see N. Garsoïan, *The Paulician Heresy : A Study of the Origin and Development of Paulicianism in Armenia and the Eastern Provinces of the Byzantine Empire* (The Hague-Paris, 1967), pp. 207–209; R. Staats, *Gregor von Nyssa und die Messalianer* (Berlin, 1968); A. Louth, "Messalianism and Pelagianism," *Studia Patristica* 17.1 (1982), pp. 127–35.

57. Lur'e, *Ideologicheskaia bor'ba*, p. 155. On the heresy of the Bogomils see D. Obolensky, *The Bogomils* (Cambridge, 1948); M. Loos, *Dualist Heresy in the Middle Ages* (Prague, 1974); Lambert, *Medieval Heresy*, pp. 12–23.

58. AFED pp. 310. Despite such direct evidence, G. M. Prokhorov speculates that the source of Gennadii's knowledge of the Marcionite heresy appeared to be the treatise "On Heresies" by John of Damascus: see Prokhorov, "Prenie Grigoriia Palamy," pp. 355–56. J. R. Howlett in her unpublished article "Svidetel'stvo arkhiepiskopa Gennadiia o eresi 'novgorodskikh eretikov zhidovskaia mudrstvuiushchikh'" points out the direct source of some of Gennadii's canonical knowledge of the history of heresies. Gennadii cited (AFED p. 310) *A Treatise of Timothy, a Priest of Constantinople, on the Reception of Heretics into the Church.* For publication of the original Greek version see Migne, *Patrologiae cursus completus...* Series Graeca Posterior, vol. 86 (Paris, 1860), col. 11–74. For the Slavonic text, see *Spomenik*, Srpska Akademija Nauka i umetnosti, 202, Odeljenje Društvenih Nauka, Nova Serija, 4 (1952), pp. 91–92. On the heresy of Marcionitism see A. Harnack, *Marcion: Das Evangelium vom fremden Gott* (Leipzig, 1921); H. Jonas, *The Gnostic Religion: The Message of the Alien God and the Beginning of Christianity*, 2nd ed. (Boston, 1963), pp. 130–46; Garsoïan, *The Paulician Heresy*, p. 205.

59. R. G. Pikhoia, "Permskaia kormchaia (o predystorii poiavleniia Chudovskoi kormchei 1499 g.)," in *Obshchestvennoe soznanie, knizhnost' i literatura perioda feodalizma* (Novosibirsk, 1990), pp. 171–75; N. S. Demkova and S. A. Iakunina, "Kormchaia XV v. iz sobraniia Permskogo pedagogicheskogo instituta," TODRL 43 (1990): 330–37. M. N. Tikhomirov, and later Ia. N. Shchapov dated the redaction of the Book of Canons shortly after 1326 (Ia. N. Shchapov, *Kniazheskie ustavy i tserkov' v Drevnei Rusi XI-XIV vv.* [Moscow, 1972], p. 242), although the proposed date seems to me not well grounded; see RFA 5:961–62.

60. For the facsimile edition of this literary work see *Merilo pravednoe po rukopisi XIV veka* (Moscow, 1961).

61. Migne, *Patrologiae cursus completus...* Series Graeca Posterior, vol. 137 (Paris, 1865), col. 312; on the Second Council see J. N. D. Kelly, *Early Christian Creeds* (New York, 1981), pp. 296–331.

62. Migne, *Patrologiae*, col. 841; on the Sixth Council see E. X. Murphy and P. Sherwood, *Constantinople II et III* (Paris, 1974), pp. 133–260.

63. *Kanony ili kniga pravil...* 2nd ed. (Montreal, 1974), pp. 43, 94, 252.

64. Migne, *Patrologiae*, col. 913; *Kanony*, p. 102.

65. Migne, *Patrologiae*, col. 1376; *Kanony*, p. 136.

66. AFED pp. 376, 377, 381.

67. Ibid., p. 375. Cf. note 4.

68. Ibid.

69. Ibid., p. 380.

70. PSRL, vol. 25, p. 330; RFA, vol. 2, no. 70.

71. PSRL, vol. 28, p. 152; cf. Sedel'nikov, "Rasskaz 1490 g.," p. 52.

72. This question is considered in the unpublished dissertation of J. R. Howlett, "The Heresy of the Judaizers and the Problem of the Russian Reformation" (Oxford, 1976).

73. For more information on the history of Jewish-Christian relations in the Slavic medieval world see B. D. Weinryb, "The Beginnings of East-European Jewry in Legend and Historiography," in *Studies and Essays in Honor of Abraham A. Newman* (Leiden, 1962), pp. 445–502; C. J. Halperin, "Judaizers and the Image of the Jew in Medieval Russia: A Polemic Revisited and a Question Posed," *Canadian-American Slavic Studies*, 9, no. 2 (Summer 1975): 141–55; H. Birnbaum, "On Jewish Life and Anti-Jewish Sentiments in Medieval Russia," in *Essays in Early Slavic Civilization* (Munich, 1981), pp. 215–55. For more general observations from a European perspective see G. Kisch, *The Jews in Medieval Germany: A Study of Their Legal and Social Status* (Chicago, 1949), pp. 305–41; E. A. Synan, *The Popes and the Jews in the Middle Ages* (New York and London, 1965); W. Seiferth, *Synagoge und Kirche im Mittelalter* (Munich, 1964), pp. 71–97; G. I. Langmuir, *Toward a Definition of Antisemitism* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and Oxford, 1990), pp. 57–310.

74. Zuckerman, "The 'Psalter' of Feodor," p. 98.

75. RFA 2:380.

76. Cf. PL, vol. 2, p. 213, where in the entry for 1477 there is mention of Filipp Andreevich, *posadnik* of Pskov.

77. "Прислали, г(о)с(поди)не, къ мнѣ из Юр(ь)ева серїи [херїи, in the manuscript copy.—Author] черници грамоту о ѡсмом съборѣ, что въ ѳларензѣ с папою Евгеном патрїархъ греческои Іосиѳ и рȣскои митрополит Исидор и иныа митрополиты и еп(и)ск(о)пи, и тую грамотȣ кн(я)зю и посадником есми ꙗвил. И кнꙗз(ь) себѣ взꙗл. И пришли, г(о)с(поди)не, серїи черници из немец во Псков, да ȣчали молви о вирѣ. И были ȣ с(вя)щ(е)нников, и ꙗ ту же был. А к тебѣ, г(осу)д(а)рь, не похотѣли они ити, и с(вя)щ(е)нники мног(и) их поизтꙗзал. И преприли их ѡт б(о)ж(е)ств(е)ных писанїи.

И рѣч(ь) их такова: Съединил деи вѣрȣ наш папа с вашими на ѡсмом собѡрѣ, да и мы деи и вы хр(и)стїане, а вѣрȣем деи въ С(ы)на Б(о)жїа. И ѡтвѣщали н(а)шї с(вя)щ(е)нники к ним: Не всѣм вѣра права, вѣрен есть Бѡг, аще вѣрȣете въ С(ы)на Б(о)жїа, то почто б(о)гоȣбївцом жидом послѣдȣете сȣбѡтствȣете постꙗщес(я) в ню, ї опрѣ[с]нок жрете, и тѣх ради б(о)гопротивно жидовствȣете и еще г(лаго)лете и в Д(у)ха С(вя)т(о)го животворꙗща ѡт О(т)ца и ѡт С(ы)на исходꙗщаг(о), и два д(у)ха беѕаконно въводите. И тог(о) ради во двѣ началѣ сходите в Македон(и)ꙗ д(у)хоборца пропасть низ влачитес(я), и ина многа ѡ вас извон б(о)ж(е)ств(е)ных правил съборъ дѣиствȣю[т]сѧ. А еж(е) г(лаго)л(е)те нам о ѡсмом съимищи иж(е) во Италїи скверного събора латынскаг(о), съ Евгеном папом събраннȣю кȣстȣдїю въ ѳларентїи, тое нам добрѣ свѣдомо, тое съборище окаꙗнное на н(а)шеи памети было, и едва ȣтек гардинал Исидор ѡт н(а)шег(о) г(о)с(у)д(а)рꙗ великаг(о) кн(я)зꙗ Васил(ь)ꙗ Васил(ь)евича, ц(а)ра всеꙗ Рȣсїи, и злѣ в Римѣ живот скончал." See GPB, Q. XVII. 50, f. 93v. The letter by Filipp Petrov has been published in DRV 14:216–17 (without date), and in AI, vol. 1, no. 286 (in this publication the letter was dated "around 1491"). Evidently, Metropolitan Zosima accused the heretics in 1490 because they revered "a Saturday more than a Sunday, that is, the day of Christ's resurrection"; see AFED p. 383.

78. RFA 4:801–803; N. N. Pokrovskii, ed. *Sudnye spiski Maksima Greka i Isaka Sobaki* (Moscow, 1971); N. A. Kazakova, *Vassian Patrikeev i ego sovremenniki* (Moscow and Leningrad, 1960); A. I. Pliguzov, "Sudnyi spisok Maksima Greka," *Arkhiv russkoi istorii* 1 (1992): 50–79.

79. PSRL, vol. 13, pt. 1, p. 233; AAE 1:251–52.

80. AFED p. 376.

81. Ibid., pp. 319–20.

82. G. M. Prokhorov ("Prenie Grigoriia Palamy") considers the heresy of the Judaizers as a reflection of the teaching of Karaite (not Rabbinic) communities, but his arguments are based on selective citation of Gennadii's letters and Iosif's *Book on Heretics*, and are not convincing.

83. See I. Berlin, *Istoricheskie sud'by evreiskogo naroda na territorii Russkogo gosudarstva* (Petrograd, 1919), pp. 122, 179–92; S. A. Bershadskii, *Litovskie evrei. Istoriia ikh iuridicheskogo i obshchestvennogo polozheniia v Litve ot Vitovta do Liublinskoi unii, 1388–1569 gg.* (St. Petersburg, 1883); O. Pritsak, "The Pre-Ashkenazic Jews of Eastern Europe in Relation to the Khazars, the Rus' and the Lithuanians," in *Ukrainian-Jewish Relations in Historical Perspective*, ed. P. J. Potichnyj and H. Aster (Edmonton, 1988), pp. 14–16; B. D. Weinryb, *The Jews of Poland: A Social and Economic History of the Jewish Community in Poland from 1100 to 1800* (Philadelphia, 1973).

84. For a survey of the literature, see Lur'e, *Ideologicheskaia bor'ba*, pp. 75–95; Prokhorov, "Prenie Grigoriia Palamy," pp. 329–69; Howlett, "The Heresy of the Judaizers."

85. See my paper "'Kniga na eretikov' Iosifa Volotskogo," in *Istoriia i paleografiia* (Moscow, 1993), pp. 90–139. In sixteenth-century literature the description of the Novgorodian-Muscovite heresy usually repeated Iosif's *Book against Heretics*; see A. I. Pliguzov, "Vtoraia redaktsiia mineinogo zhitiia Iosifa Volotskogo," in *Issledovaniia po istochnikovedeniiu istorii SSSR dooktiabr'skogo perioda* (Moscow, 1984), pp. 44–46, 55.

86. Skharia could be Zakhar'a Skara Guil Gursis, the correspondent of Ivan the Third, who could have visited Novgorod in 1470; in that year, however, having just turned twenty, he was too young to be an experienced teacher for the heretics. For more information see Lur'e, *Ideologicheskaia bor'ba*, pp. 130–34; Prokhorov, "Prenie Grigoriia Palamy," p. 354; F. Brun, *Chernomor'e. Sbornik issledovanii po istoricheskoi geografii*, pt. 1 (Odessa, 1877), pp. 213–15; Iu. Brutskus, "Zakhariia, kniaz' tamanskii," *Evreiskaia starina* 10 (Petrograd, 1918): 140–41.

87. Skariavei is probably Skaria-bey, as Constantine Zuckerman thinks; see Zuckerman, "The 'Psalter' of Feodor," p. 78.

88. AFED p. 469.

The First Old Believers in Ukraine: Observations about Their Social Profile and Behavior

GEORG MICHELS

It is relatively well known that Ukrainian religious texts had a strong influence on the intellectual formation of the Russian Old Belief. For example, Russian translations of polemical miscellanies compiled as attacks upon the Union of Brest, the so-called *Kniga o vere* and *Kirillova kniga*, were frequently cited by the first Old Believers in their polemics against the seventeenth-century Muscovite church. Important spokesmen for the Old Belief, such as Avvakum and Avraamii, quoted passages from the Ostroh Bible and repeatedly expressed their admiration for publications that had originated in the various centers of Ukrainian Orthodox book printing. Andrei Denisov, founder of the famous Vyg community, travelled to Kiev and brought copies of the *Palinodiia* and other Ukrainian polemical texts to his native northern Russia. Finally, many texts attributed to the important Ukrainian religious writer Ivan Vyshens'kyi have survived in Old Believer manuscripts. In short, there was a strong influence of Ukrainian religious culture on the Russian Old Belief.[1]

This essay focuses on another, much less thoroughly explored chapter in the relations between the Old Belief and Ukrainian culture: the settlement of the first Russian Old Believers on Ukrainian territory during the late seventeenth century. My intention is to identify the Old Believer pioneers who ventured beyond the boundaries of Russian Orthodox culture and to reconstruct their religious and secular behavior. Most important, I attempt to understand why these Old Believers came to Ukraine and why they chose to stay there. Was there a strong affinity of religious ideas between Ukrainian religious culture and Russian Old Belief? Or were there more profane reasons for leaving the Muscovite heartlands and settling in Ukraine?

It is no easy task to reconstruct the actual behavior and aspirations of the first Old Believers. Historical evidence dating from the periods during which these individuals were active is very scarce. Even such important personalities as Archpriest Avvakum (1620–1682) and Bishop Pavel of Kolomna (?–1656), glorified as the principal prophets of the Old Belief, received little attention from their contemporaries.[2] The Muscovite offices investigating religious dissent during the second half of the seventeenth century apparently did not consider these first Old Believers a threat, and largely ignored them. Foreigners travelling in Russia gave little indication that they had ever heard about the Old Believers.[3]

As a result, we know about the "founding fathers" of the Old Belief primarily through their own writings and *Vitae*. However, such sources are inherently biased because they tend to glorify the spiritual achievements of a

few exceptional individuals. Information about the actual behavior of such figures and, in particular, about the behavior of the ordinary men and women whom these self-styled prophets allegedly influenced, can be retrieved only from sources that originated outside the culture of the Old Belief.[4]

The necessity of distinguishing between historical fiction and reality is especially relevant to the emergence of the great Old Belief communities of the eighteenth century. Each of these centers generated panegyrical stories about its founders. Competing for prestige and leadership all over Russia, Old Believer sects had a strong interest in presenting their forebears as superior beings and saintlike figures; historical accuracy was not the primary goal. A good example of such mythmaking is the work of the historians and chroniclers of the Vyg community in northern Russia, who recast the rebellious monks of the Solovki Monastery into heroes of the early Old Belief. Gerasim Firsov, Gennadii Kalachov, and other leaders of the Solovki revolt, whose main documented occupations had been robbery, murder, and intrigue, were recast as holy men and defenders of the old Muscovite faith.[5]

The early history of the Old Belief in Ukraine must be understood in a similar context. The sectarian communities of Starodub and Vetka (Vitka) in northern Ukraine were among the principal centers of the eighteenth-century Old Belief. Their legendary fame extended from Poland to the distant reaches of Siberia. Texts written by the spiritual leaders of these communities soon became mainstays of Old Believer culture and were circulated and copied in the most distant reaches of the Russian Empire. Old Believers from various regions of Russia made long and arduous pilgrimages to spend time with the "holy men" of northern Ukraine. Liturgical books, hosts, crosses, and other sacred objects produced in local workshops became highly popular items sold throughout Russia to the highest bidder.[6]

To the outside world, the Old Believers of Ukraine were known as highly successful merchants and artisans. They had customers not only in Moscow, St. Petersburg, Kiev and various other Ukrainian towns, but also in major centers of commerce in Poland and Germany. Their presence at marketplaces in Warsaw, Gdańsk, Riga, and Königsberg is documented in various eighteenth-century sources.[7] And the distant echoes of this flourishing culture of the eighteenth century can still be heard today more than two hundred years later. Recent archeographic expeditions into northern Ukraine have located a significant number of texts and liturgical books from this vanished world in contemporary peasant households.[8] Thus, the eighteenth-century Old Belief in Starodub and Vetka, having acquired a highly visible profile, can be reconstructed from a great variety of sources.

By contrast, there is very little information about the seventeenth-century origins of the Old Belief in northern Ukraine. The principal chronicler of the early history of these communities was Ivan Alekseev from Starodub, a famous writer of the eighteenth-century Priestless movement within the Old Belief. His

history of the Ukrainian Old Belief was compiled in 1755 and has been widely disseminated ever since in Old Believer miscellanies.[9] Alekseev's account was adopted by the first official history of the Old Belief, by the Orthodox archpriest Andrei Zhuravlev—a book which exists in numerous printed editions from 1794, 1795, 1799 and later years. Historians of subsequent periods, most importantly Afanasii Prokop'evich Shchapov (1830–1876) and Pavel Ivanovich Mel'nikov (1819–1883), accepted Zhuravlev's version without much criticism.[10] Indeed, one of the greatest authorities on the history of the Old Belief, N. I. Subbotin, praised Alekseev for the great accuracy of his account. However, Subbotin relied exclusively on eighteenth-century documents to verify Alekseev's information about the Petrine and post-Petrine years. The question of Alekseev's accuracy in reporting on seventeenth-century events requires closer examination.[11]

Alekseev derived his information primarily from oral sources. He listened to stories circulating among the monks, novices, and lay members of eighteenth-century Old Belief communities in northern Ukraine. He also conducted numerous interviews with Old Believers, a task requiring "considerable work" (*ne mal trud*) and industry which kept the author "as busy as a bee" (*aki pchela*). Many talked with great fervor about their seventeenth-century predecessors.[12] But did Alekseev's informants—who included several "ancient priests" (*drevnie sviashchenniki*) claiming to have a good memory—remember the seventeenth-century founders of their communities as they had actually been?

Alekseev himself seems to have doubted the reliability of his sources. In what appears to be a critical afterthought to his own history, he encouraged readers to come forth with any information that might be more accurate than his own.[13] Despite his own doubts, however, Alekseev attributed considerable educational value to his history:

> How many precious boons would perish at our hands if the famous deeds of honorable men were not underscored by their stories .... The zealous will further mature in strength, the weak will greatly improve and the lazy will notice their own neglect. I daresay: To know the histories of ancient deeds, especially righteous ones and those conducive to morality, is to improve the morals of men and to bring those who listen closer to God.[14]

Alekseev clearly saw his own accomplishment in terms of the contribution he made to the edification of his Old Believer friends and followers and not in terms of historical accuracy.

How much do we know about the pioneering individuals whom Alekseev identified as the first Old Believers and whom he called "honest ... and God-loving men shining like candles in the world [of darkness]?" Were they really saintlike figures who constantly engaged in "blessed endeavors and most miraculous deeds?"[15] To answer these questions we turn to a source of information to which Ivan Alekseev had no access: the archives of those

seventeenth-century church and state institutions that regularly investigated incidents of religious dissent. In particular, we will look at the data collected by clerks of the Little Russian Office (*Malorossiiskii prikaz*), the Moscow-based agency in charge of Ukrainian affairs after the Muscovite annexation of Left-bank Ukraine from Poland in 1654.[16]

According to Alekseev, a Moscow cleric named Koz'ma was the founding father of the Old Belief in Ukraine.[17] Who was Koz'ma? Alekseev relates that Koz'ma served as parish priest at the Church of All Saints (*Tserkov' Vsekh Sviatykh*) in the Kulichki district of the Muscovite capital. When the well-known Church Council of 1666 suddenly called for the persecution and imprisonment of all Russians who refused to accept Nikon's liturgical reforms, Koz'ma and his parishioners became the targets of great "pressures" (*nalezhaniia*) and "horrible reproaches" (*strashnye preshcheniia*). After "consulting with his spiritual children," Koz'ma decided to leave Moscow and seek refuge across the Russo-Ukrainian border. By 1669, the Moscow priest and twenty of his parishioners had arrived in Starodub in northern Ukraine, where they founded the first Old Belief settlement. Their example quickly attracted other Old Believers who established similar religious communities in surrounding villages.[18]

Alekseev's account, compiled almost a century after the events related, must be read with caution. A look at information from the patriarchal archives in Moscow reveals a significantly different scenario. While it is true there was a parish priest Koz'ma who served at All Saints Church in Kulichki, there is no evidence that Koz'ma headed the Kulichki parish during the 1660s or that he departed from Moscow soon after the Church Council of 1666.[19] In fact, Koz'ma served as parish priest of All Saints Church much later, for a short while during the years 1676 and 1677. This means that we must postpone the date of Koz'ma's arrival in Ukraine to the late 1670s.[20]

There is an even more important discrepancy between Alekseev's history and documentary evidence found in the patriarchal archives. By the time Koz'ma became parish priest at All Saints Church in late 1676, the new liturgical practices introduced by Patriarch Nikon had long been established in Moscow parishes. Indeed, during the 1650s and early 1660s parish priests from all sections of town had come to the patriarchal court to acquire the new Service Books and Psalters. A few parishes may have continued to celebrate the Liturgy according to the old books, but All Saints Church was not among them.[21] Entries in the sales books of the patriarchal printing press document irrefutably that Koz'ma's predecessor, the priest Sem ën Grigor'ev, paid several rubles to obtain three new liturgical books in July 1658 and again in March 1660. Priests from other parishes of the Kulichki area acquired Nikon's liturgical books as early as February 1656. Thus, there is no reason to assume that Koz'ma left Moscow because of the introduction of new liturgical books.[22]

Indeed, it would have been impossible for a priest to be appointed to a parish directly under the nose of the patriarch unless the candidate had long ago accepted the new liturgies. We know, for example, that during the 1650s Patriarch Nikon had introduced the practice of giving a new Service Book to every newly-appointed priest. Patriarch Ioakim, who ruled the Russian church in the 1670s, insisted that all newly ordained priests know how to celebrate the Liturgy according to the new books. Shortly before Koz′ma's appointment, Ioakim had eradicated the last vestiges of the old rituals in Moscow parishes. In other words, Koz′ma would have to have been a loyal executor of official liturgical policies.[23]

Why then did Koz′ma leave Moscow? The fate of other parish priests who left their parishes during this same period suggests that Koz′ma fell victim to conflicts that had nothing to do with liturgical issues. During the second half of the seventeenth century, very few priests left their parishes because they wanted to adhere to the old rite. Typically, parish priests had accepted the new liturgical order without much opposition. But many were banished from their parishes because they had clashed with their parishioners over property, or because their ecclesiastical superiors had punished them for drunkenness, neglect of spiritual duties, or failure to obey authority.[24]

Since Koz′ma paid the church tithes, he probably had little to fear from the official church. The unusual shortness of his tenure suggests that he was driven out by his parishioners. Koz′ma's appointment lasted a few months and was much shorter than those of other priests who served at the same parish church. His immediate predecessor, Semën Grigor′ev, had served almost twenty years and his successor, Mikita Manuilov, remained at All Saints Church at least eight years. There is thus little reason to assume that Koz′ma was a popular figure who attracted a considerable number of his parishioners to Ukraine.[25]

Why did Koz′ma seek refuge in Ukraine? The answer may simply be that he suddenly found himself without a parish and was forced to find a new position. Large numbers of unemployed priests in Moscow were beseeching the Russian patriarch to provide them with parishes. Koz′ma must have learned that it was very difficult, if not impossible, to procure a new parish unless one was able to pay considerable bribes or enjoyed the tutelage of a powerful man. Most likely he faced poverty and the fate of many seventeenth-century priests whose wives and children "were wandering from door to door [*mezh dvor*] of Moscow" to look for food. He fled Moscow and made his way into the southern steppe regions of Russia in search of a new income. While most runaway priests found employment among the Don Cossacks, Koz′ma moved farther and sought the support of the Cossack officers of the Ukrainian Hetmanate.[26]

Koz′ma was certainly not the first, nor the last Muscovite priest to seek refuge in Ukraine. A Ukrainian annalist living in the vicinity of Starodub recorded the arrival of fugitive priests from Russia during the year 1676. We know that the search for runaway Muscovite priests was one reason for the

opening of a new eparchy in Belgorod. There were also official plans to set up additional bishoprics along the Russo-Ukrainian frontier in Voronezh, Kursk and Briansk.[27]

Koz'ma's decision to move to the town of Starodub was fortuitous. First, he found himself in a territory that was beyond the institutional control of the Muscovite patriarch. Second, he was welcomed with open arms by the Cossack officers of the Starodub Regiment who were pursuing their own colonization without the sanction of the Ukrainian hetman. Since the emergence of the Old Belief in northern Ukraine was inconceivable without these external circumstances, we need to pay closer attention to the social world in which Koz'ma found himself.

Starodub was subordinated to the archbishopric of Chernihiv and was thus subject to the authority of Lazar' Baranovich, one of the most powerful Ukrainian hierarchs. Lazar' is known to posterity for his fervent support of Orthodox Christianity. Among his principal acts, for example, was the closing of Uniate and Roman Catholic religious houses in towns such as Starodub. He was also one of the few Ukrainian hierarchs who fully enjoyed the trust of the Muscovite patriarch and tsar, whose court officials asked Lazar' to send learned clerics, cantors and musicians to Moscow from his household. However, Lazar''s Muscovite connections may also explain why he alienated powerful members of the ecclesiastical and Cossack elites in his diocese. Indeed, one of the striking features of Ukrainian religious life of this period was the inability of the archbishop of Chernihiv to control ecclesiastical affairs in the town of Starodub.[28]

When Koz'ma arrived in Starodub during the late 1670s, the town was in turmoil. A Ukrainian chronicle from the period, the so-called *Eyewitness Chronicle* (*Litopys samovydtsia*), recorded the hostile refusal of many Cossacks and other residents to entrust themselves to the care of parish priests who had been appointed by Lazar' Baranovich:

> They lived completely without spiritual [fathers] and refused to take the least pride in their parish churches, claiming that their lives would not be made difficult by their priests. If reprimanded, they did not listen; instead they turned away with anger from those who tried to make them confess criminal acts. Cherishing their freedom, they went about looking for spiritual pastors on their own, not showing the least remorse for their sins.[29]

In August 1677, the tension in the town of Starodub had been unleashed in a spectacular mob attack on Lazar''s personal envoy, Iakov Khapchinskii. According to the *Eyewitness Chronicle*, a frenzied mob "dragged [Iakov] from the altar after he had finished the liturgy and brutally beat him. They would have killed him if the acting colonel [*nakaznyi polkovnyk*] had not come to his defense with his Cossacks."[30]

The reason for Lazar′ Baranovich's lack of influence in Starodub must be sought in the unruliness of Cossack leaders. It is probably no coincidence that the priest Koz′ma settled in a village belonging to one of the most powerful men in the Starodub Regiment, Full Colonel (*polkovnyk*) Petro Roslavets′.[31] Roslavets′ was notorious for his disobedience to any official authority, and throughout the 1670s was engaged in a bitter feud with the archbishop of Chernihiv. In July 1676, for example, Lazar′ Baranovich denounced Petro Roslavets′ to the tsar as the principal troublemaker in the Starodub region. According to Lazar′, Roslavets′ was single-handedly responsible for inciting the rabble against the episcopal protégé Iakov Khapchinskii. Shortly thereafter Stefan Shuba, the archbishop's appointee to the regiment church at Starodub, publicly proclaimed the curse of excommunication against Roslavets′ and his men.

In return, Roslavets′ complained to the tsar and asked that the town of Starodub be protected by the patriarchal court against Archbishop Lazar′'s random interference in local spiritual matters. When Roslavets′ did not receive any response, he appears to have formed an alliance with the archpriest of the neighboring town of Nizhen, Simeon Adamovich, an ambitious cleric thirsting for an increase in power at the expense of the archbishop of Chernihiv.[32]

Koz′ma became part of a local microcosm which had developed its own religious patterns, independent of Muscovite authority. When did the use of the old Muscovite liturgical rite—the crucial marker of Old Belief dissent—begin to play a role in this local context? Was it Koz′ma who brought old liturgical books from Moscow? Except for Alekseev's assertion, we have little evidence about Koz′ma's preference for the old rite. In fact, as is discussed above, it is much more likely that Koz′ma adhered to the new liturgical books when he arrived at Starodub.

There is evidence that the use of the old liturgical books acquired significance for other reasons. In July 1677, during the aforementioned troubles at Starodub, Archbishop Lazar′ had attempted to confiscate liturgical books and other religious artifacts from Russian settlers living under the tutelage of a Cossack officer named Mykhailo Rubets. The incident received considerable attention, since Rubets belonged to an influential local family and demanded the immediate return of all confiscated items. Lazar′ reluctantly complied, but his attempted intervention in liturgical matters indicates that he expected compliance with the new liturgical order introduced in Muscovy. It appears that Lazar′'s action gave significance to the books, which had previously been of no particular concern to local residents.[33]

That Lazar′ made special efforts to punish local adherents of the old liturgy can be inferred from several other facts. For one thing, he was the only Ukrainian hierarch officially to endorse the patriarchal decrees on Nikon's liturgical reforms. Also, he spoke very highly of Simiaon Połacki's *Staff of Rulership* (*Zhezl pravleniia*), the principal polemical tract against the seventeenth-century Old Belief. Thus, the actions of the archbishop of Chernihiv had

the effect of turning liturgical practices into sensitive markers of loyalty to Moscow. By the late 1670s, ownership of an old Psalter or Service Book by Russian settlers living under the tutelage of the Starodub Regiment was interpreted as failure to obey the Muscovite church.[34]

There is no documentary evidence pertaining to Koz′ma's activities in the Starodub area, and we do not know to what degree he resented Lazar′'s liturgical policies. However, we do know that other refugees from Muscovy who arrived in Starodub during the 1670s eventually became Old Believers. Among the first Old Believers was the family of one Timosha Pavlovich, who in 1670 had been granted the right "to live [for five years] free from any taxes and after this period to recognize only the authority of the Starodub magistrate."[35] The subsequent fate of this family is unknown, but we are well informed about the history of another family, the Stepanov clan, which lived in the town of Starodub during Petro Roslavets′'s tenure as full colonel (1673–1676).

Stepan Galaktionovich Stepanov had been living in the small village of Boginaia outside Iaroslavl′ on lands belonging to the boyar Fëdor Vasil′evich Saltykov. During the early 1670s, possibly as early as 1671, he had fled with his entire family to Starodub, where he immediately obtained the protection of Colonel Petro Roslavets′. Roslavets′ had amassed a small fortune by exerting tight control over local trade routes, and the Stepanovs quickly became involved in his business operations. After settling in a nearby village, they became known as merchants who regularly traded at the Starodub market and even travelled as far as Moscow to sell oil and tin (*zhest′*). There is little doubt that Stepanov's son Fëdor had become a rich and respected man by the year 1690. His trading associates were respected local residents, among them the father-in-law of Ihnatii Rubets of the powerful Cossack family. However, the Stepanovs' great economic success was suddenly thrown into question when Fëdor was arrested for having organized armed robberies.[36]

The investigation of Fëdor and his accomplices sheds an interesting light on the first Old Believers of Starodub. Stepanov and three others were accused of breaking into the house of a wealthy musketeer officer in Moscow during the Lenten period of 1700. They vehemently denied their involvement, but the evidence against them was irrefutable: a large crate with booty from the musketeer's home had been discovered in Stepanov's home village.

Soon other evidence emerged, connecting Stepanov and his friends with an earlier ambush on a shipment of saltpeter en route to Moscow. Stepanov and his friends were widely suspected of having committed other robberies as well. The investigation revealed, for example, that they had frequently (*ne poedinokratne*) met in secret in a mill belonging to the head of the Starodub Regiment, Full Colonel Mykhailo Myklashevs′kyi (1689–1706). Officials of the Little Russian Office were convinced that they had finally tracked down a dangerous gang of "bandits and robbers."[37]

Fëdor desperately tried to extricate himself from the investigation. He did not deny that he had been on the site of the Moscow break-in. But he claimed that he had been tricked by his friends. They had lured him into a tavern of the German Quarter (*Nemetskaia sloboda*) to drink beer, and when he got completely drunk they had taken him along against his will:

> When I was drunk they grabbed me and put me into their sled: I quickly fell asleep and don't remember anything. When we arrived at the courtyard where the robbery took place I was still asleep and they left me asleep on the sled while they committed the robbery by themselves. I woke up suddenly when I heard a scream from the house and my companions told me: 'Don't move! Don't yell! This is a collection of property, not a robbery.' I wanted to run away, but was afraid that they would kill me.[38]

Fëdor admitted that he had taken money stolen from the victim's house, but he insisted that he had done so entirely out of fear for his life and that he had immediately distributed the money to the poor. Fëdor's story was quickly discarded as untrue by his investigators since his friends testified that he had voluntarily participated in all of their crimes from the very beginning.[39]

Even if we accept Fëdor's testimony as true, the behavior of Stepanov and his companions clearly does not correspond to the idealistic picture of the Old Belief painted by Ivan Alekseev. Fëdor and his friends frequented taverns and drank to excess, a form of behavior associated with the devil in texts circulating in eighteenth-century Old Belief communities.[40] Also, they resorted to brutal violence, including murder, behavior deplored by the Old Belief prophets whose texts have survived from the seventeenth century. Only Fëdor's insistence that he gave the stolen money to the poor might be interpreted as a bizarre application of the Christian ideals of apostolic poverty and almsgiving practiced by some Old Believer zealots during this period. Still, it is apparent that Fedor Stepanov had little in common with the ascetic Old Believer peasants and merchants of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.[41]

The documents of the Little Russian Office do not give any indication why the Stepanovs became known as Old Believers. In fact, there is no evidence that they left Russia because they rejected the new liturgical order.[42] Their flight coincided with the escape of other Russian peasants from serfdom and various socio-economic hardships. Bitter complaints from Russian landlords to officials of the Little Russian Office indicate that peasant rebels and troublemakers who rejected their authority had fled to the annexed Ukrainian territories. In a petition to Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich, for example, angry landlords spoke of "men ... who have committed many crimes, who have beaten and burnt their landlords before they fled across the border into Little Russian towns .... As if they had gone directly from the gallows to [the Cossacks] [*priamo s viselitsy*]."[43] It was futile to try to retrieve these peasants because Ukrainian strongmen, among them the Cossacks of Starodub, "physically abuse and rob us, have beaten many to death and set others into the water [*v vodu sazhaiut*]."[44] Thus,

there is good reason to assume that the Stepanovs were not religious refugees, but peasants seeking to escape the power of their landlord.

Several of the peasants who settled in the vicinity of Starodub were from the Iaroslavl' district. Most noticeable was the presence of peasants from the village of Danilovskoe, a settlement which had repeatedly attracted the attention of Moscow officials for its instability and rebelliousness. In 1650, for example, investigators descended upon the village to capture and interrogate local "bandits and robbers" who had used threats to gain access to money and alcohol (*z grozami prosit' deneg i pit'ia*).[45]

Of course, not all of the peasants who arrived in northern Ukraine were escaped rebels. In 1674, for example, peasants complained to Patriarch Ioakim that they had left Russia because their wives had repeatedly been raped by their landlord. They even came to Moscow to press their case. When the patriarch showed no interest in helping them, they returned to northern Ukraine. Nevertheless, it appears that an unknown number of peasant families from the Muscovite heartlands fled to Ukrainian territory to establish a more secure existence.[46]

Old Believer "bandits and robbers" such as Fëdor Stepanov were common during the late seventeenth century. We can observe their activities and exploits in the frontier regions of the Muscovite state, such as the distant reaches of the Pomor'e and Siberia.[47] The presence of such bands in northern Ukraine is therefore not surprising. In 1676, Hetman Samoilovych observed with great frustration that the worst "scoundrels and adventurers" (*pluty i svoevol'niki*) of Muscovy had made their way to the Dnieper region.[48] He accused Cossack officers such as Petro Roslavets' of having encouraged them to come. After the crushing of a rebellion in Moscow in 1682, instructions were sent to Ukraine to be on the lookout for dangerous "schismatics" trying to cross the border. During the early 1680s, "schismatics" were repeatedly sighted in Russian towns not far from Starodub.[49]

The biography of another fugitive from the Muscovite heartlands further illustrates the culture of the seventeenth-century Old Belief in northern Ukraine. In 1700 a general military court (*sud voiskovyi general'nyi*) conducted an investigation against Nikita M. Shelkovnikov.[50] Nikita was accused of being a "supporter of Kapiton" (*kapiton*), a common accusation against Old Believers deriving from earlier church polemics against one of the principal schismatics of the seventeenth century, the monk Kapiton from the Kostroma area. However, the protocols of the hetman's investigation uncovered entirely secular motivations behind Nikita's behavior and came to the conclusion that "Nikita's life was full of malice and without any faith and Christian concerns."[51]

Nikita had come to the Starodub area as a child with his mother, a widow who left Moscow shortly after the death of her husband. They arrived "in abject poverty" (*v nishchete poslednei*) and settled in the same village which had

given refuge to the aforementioned priest Koz'ma. Like other settlers, they were given a land grant by the Starodub Regiment. During the 1680s, Hetman Samoilovych attempted to retrieve Muscovite runaways in the region, and the Shelkovnikovs crossed the border into Poland. They settled temporarily on the lands of a local nobleman, Pan Kazimierz Chalecki. It was during this stay that Nikita's mother died and his brother met a premature death in a shooting accident.[52] Soon afterwards, Nikita became known in the area as a horse thief and highway robber. His victims included travellers, merchants, local peasants, and wagon-drivers (*podvodniki*). On one occasion Nikita appears to have obtained the exorbitant sum of 3,000 rubles as ransom for two merchants he had abducted on the road to Kaluga.[53]

One cannot rule out the possibility that Nikita's mother was a genuinely pious woman whose flight from Moscow was inspired by religious motivations. But she certainly did not have much influence over her son. It appears that Nikita followed the example of local Cossack leaders such as the aforementioned Roslavets', who was known for waylaying merchants and other similarly lawless acts. Nikita seems to have been obsessed with money and booty, and to have left no trick untried in order to obtain wealth. In January 1689, for example, he forged a document, allegedly the testament of his deceased mother, bequeathing him a large fortune. Between 1689 and 1700, Nikita sent many petitions to Hetman Mazepa and Tsar Peter complaining that he had been deprived of his lawful inheritance. In particular, he accused one Pavel Fedorov, his mother's brother-in-law, of having stolen the fortune left him by his father. Fedorov had accompanied the Shelkovnikovs during their flight from Moscow. Now living across the Polish border, he had become a wealthy merchant who frequented the Starodub market. When Nikita failed to convince official authorities, he took the law into his own hands: first, he raided Fedorov's home and murdered (*mordoval*) his wife. Then, he abducted Fedorov and subjected him to sadistic forms of torture. Nevertheless he failed to gain access to Fedorov's fortune, and continued to complain to the authorities.[54]

Nikita, the "supporter of Kapiton," was finally exposed as a notorious liar and criminal (*vor*) for trying to rob respected residents of Starodub of their property.[55] However, he was not put into jail and apparently continued to enjoy the protection of powerful Cossack officers. While we do not know what ultimately became of Nikita, there is no reason to believe that his behavior made him a social outcast in the area. In fact, Nikita carried out most of his "crimes" with the help and support of the men and women with whom he lived. For example, a local resident named Marfa, known to be both literate and a good writer (*pisati umeiuchaia*), had forged Nikita's mother's testament at his request. Marfa is also mentioned in documents as the daughter of the Old Believer priest Stepan, a man whom Ivan Alekseev called a respectable man and whom later Old Believers glorified for his holy acts. Curiously enough, the

forged testament of Nikita's mother carries Stepan's signature, a fact which indicates Stepan's support for Nikita's actions.[56]

The officers of the Starodub regiment on whose land Nikita lived appear to have helped him accomplish his crimes in several ways. For example, during the 1680s he was given the assignment of guarding a ferry crossing (*perevoz*) over the remote Iput' River, a location that turned out to be ideal for robberies.[57] In July 1691, the regimental court (*sud*) decided in his favor, and Nikita was given the property of a rich widow who owned a tavern in Starodub.[58] Finally, Nikita had no difficulty in hiring (*nanial*) his neighbors (*sozhiteli*) to carry out the brutal torture of his mother's brother-in-law, Pavel Fedorov. The torture sessions continued for forty weeks and the residents of Nikita's home village participated with great enthusiasm, a fact which inspired bitter complaints by Fedorov's protector, Pan Chalecki.[59]

Thus, the Old Belief culture of northern Ukraine was characterized by the brutal use of violence, deceit, and banditry for personal gain. One is reminded of the lawlessness of the American Wild West with its adventurers and fugitives from justice. There is no evidence of the deeply internalized religiosity that characterized many Old Believers during the eighteenth century, and which obviously inspired Ivan Alekseev's history. Indeed, the first Old Believers of northern Ukraine were not unlike the many other outcasts and misfits who sought refuge on the periphery of Muscovy during the later seventeenth century.

Why did fugitives such as Shelkovnikov become Old Believers? Why did they cling to the old rite? These questions are not easily answered, because the "supporters of Kapiton and [other] schismatics" interrogated by the Little Russian Office did not say anything about their religious beliefs. In fact, it appears that these Old Believers switched easily back and forth between the old and new rites, and that they were poorly educated about the questions that had so deeply moved the minds and hearts of Old Believer prophets such as Avvakum and Epifanii. The "supporter of Kapiton" Shelkovnikov, for example, presented himself as a harmless Orthodox peasant whenever that role served him well.[60] There is evidence that both old and new rites continued to be used in the Old Believer settlements of Starodub even as late as the early eighteenth century.[61]

Many early Ukrainian Old Believers knew little, if anything, about liturgical books. According to one bizarre episode recorded by an eighteenth-century church historian, residents of a local village who considered themselves adherents of the Old Russian faith, rejected an *old* hymn book (*Oktoikh*) that had been printed in Moscow during the first half of the seventeenth century.[62] Since liturgical books from this early period were considered to be holy artifacts by eighteenth-century Old Believer communities throughout Russia, such behavior is truly stunning when viewed from a later vantage point, and

reveals a lack of religious sophistication among adherents of the Starodub Old Belief.

The use of Old Belief symbols and rituals by Russian settlers in the Starodub region can hardly be explained by the secular concerns of figures such as Nikita Shelkovnikov. The formative influence must have come from Muscovite priests and monks whose clerical profession demanded familiarity with liturgical practices. We must therefore take a closer look at these clerics and their lasting contribution to the establishment of the Old Belief on Ukrainian territory. There is no documentary evidence about the influence of Ivan Alekseev's legendary hero, the Moscow priest Koz′ma. But there is some evidence about several other clerics who made their way to Starodub and Vetka during the late seventeenth century. These clerics were responsible for transplanting elements from various Old Believer circles already established in other areas of Muscovy, to Ukraine.

In September 1684 Semen Samoilovych, the leader of the Starodub Regiment, wrote to his father, Hetman Ivan Samoilovych, that he had discovered a hidden hermitage in the forests outside Starodub. According to Semen, the hermitage had become a hiding place for "Muscovites of the cursed faith of Kapiton" and a dangerous "nest of pagans" (*pahanoe hnizdo*) which needed to be wiped out immediately.[63] The existence of other "small monasteries, sketes, and simple monastic living quarters" in the forests around Starodub repeatedly came to the attention of local administrators during this period, and census records from the eighteenth century attest to the existence of numerous such communities.[64]

While we do not know much about the activity of these monastic communities during the late seventeenth century, it is clear that by the early eighteenth century they were exerting a strong cultural influence on surrounding settlements. They set up several schools where the children of neighboring settlers were instructed in reading and writing. The monasteries were repositories for liturgical books, icons, crosses, altar cloths, and other sacred objects from pre-Nikonian times. Among the nuns and monks were excellent icon painters, copiers of books and manuscripts, bakers of prosphora, and artisans who specialized in the production of liturgical vessels and vestments. In short, the monastic communities in the Starodub and Vetka areas acted as carriers and transmitters of the old liturgical culture which had been officially abolished by the Muscovite patriarchate.[65]

Who were these monks and nuns? There is evidence that the first monastic fugitives who settled in northern Ukraine had connections with Old Belief subcultures in the capital of Moscow. In 1684, for example, Hetman Ivan Samoilovych received orders from the archimandrite of the Simonov Monastery to capture several monks who had fled to Ukraine. Monks of the Simonov Monastery were known to be sympathetic toward one of the most eminent and

outspoken critics of the new liturgical books, Abbot Spiridon (Potemkin), a man with connections to Ukraine and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.[66]

The Ukrainian community also had contacts with the Novodevich'ii Monastery, which was suspected by the patriarch of adhering to the Old Belief. In 1676, for example, when Petro Roslavets' got into some trouble while he was in Moscow, he sought refuge at the nunnery. And Spiridon Potemkin's mother lived at the Novodevich'ii Monastery during this period.[67] After the execution of the well-known boyar nun Feodos'ia Morozova in November 1675, her intimate friend and teacher, the nun Melaniia, escaped from Moscow and found refuge in northern Ukraine. She brought along an old antimension (*antimins*) which was used in the consecration of the first Old Believer church in Ukraine.[68]

One of the principal sources of religious orientation for Muscovite settlers in northern Ukraine was the boyarina Elena Khrushcheva, who had been supervisor of ceremonies (*ustavshchitsa*) at the Voznesenskii Convent in the Kremlin during the early 1660s. In 1666, Elena was suddenly exiled to the town of Kaluga, an important center of commerce frequented by Russian traders from the Starodub and Vetka areas. The reason for Elena's sudden removal from Moscow was her stubborn adherence to the old liturgical rite. To the dismay of Muscovite officials, Elena immediately became a powerful figure in Kaluga religious affairs, probably due to her personal prestige and religious charisma. In 1669, a few years after her arrival, the abbess of the Kaluga convent where Elena was living complained to Moscow that she had no power to restrain Elena, and that Elena had taken command and converted many of the nuns to the Old Belief.[69]

Elena apparently filled an ecclesiastical vacuum. Kaluga was a town without a bishop and only loosely controlled by the metropolitan of Krutitsy—titular head of the elusive eparchy of Sarai and Podon'e—who resided in faraway Moscow.[70] At the turn of the century, the Old Believer Archimandrite Karion of the Lavrent'ev Monastery was the most powerful religious leader in the town of Kaluga. He ruled autocratically over local church affairs. Anyone who attempted to dissent or send denunciations to Moscow was intimidated by beatings and strict warnings. Under Karion's firm control, the ecclesiastical life of Kaluga remained beyond the reach of Muscovite church officials well into the first quarter of the eighteenth century. According to evidence gathered by agents of the Holy Synod in the early eighteenth century, local priests and archpriests celebrated the Liturgy according to the old rite, "a heresy unheard of in the Russian state." Kaluga appears to have been the only Russian town where parish priests continued openly to practice the old liturgies.[71]

Several of the clerics who came to northern Ukraine had connections with Kaluga or had lived some time in unofficial monastic communities in the surrounding forests. Under the tutelage of Kaluga's monastic elite, they appear to have enjoyed absolute freedom to do as they pleased. Moving back and forth

between Kaluga and northern Ukraine, they transported old liturgical books, prosphora, crosses, and other religious artifacts. Among these was a miracle-working icon of the Pokrovskaia Bogomater' of Kaluga, which became a major focus of worship for the Old Believers of Starodub and Vetka. At least twelve Old Believer families from Kaluga moved to the vicinity of Starodub, a fact which must very likely be attributed to the influence of these clerics.[72] Thus, Kaluga Old Belief culture exerted a strong missionary influence on the communities of Russian fugitives in northern Ukraine.

The most important of these clerics was the monk Feodosii, who found refuge in Kaluga after leading an adventurous life on the Don River and in northern Russia. There is no doubt that Feodosii left a profound imprint on the Old Belief culture of Starodub and Vetka. Among his legacies was the foundation of the Pokrov Monastery at Vetka in 1695, and the erection of a church building with an iconostasis and royal doors taken from a popular Kaluga parish church that had been built during the reign of Ivan the Terrible. Feodosii's personal charisma attracted several priests to the area, including his brother Aleksandr and the parish priest Boris from Kaluga, both of whom became well-known disseminators of the Old Belief during the eighteenth century.[73]

Feodosii was a student of the legendary Old Believer monk Iov, who had once been a Polish nobleman and whom Patriarch Filaret had brought to Russia during the 1620s. Feodosii mastered the old liturgy at Iov's monastery outside Tver'. When Iov was forced to flee into the southern steppe region during the late 1660s, Feodosii followed him.[74] Feodosii soon emancipated himself from his mentor and became known as the founder of several hermitages on the Don and Donets' Rivers during the early 1680s. According to eyewitness reports, these communities were marked by great hostility toward the Muscovite dynasty. Feodosii and his followers refused to pray for the well-being of the tsar and used "indecent words" (*nepristoinye slova*) when speaking about him.[75] A search warrant issued by the Muscovite Foreign Office (*Posol'skii prikaz*) in March 1688 accused Feodosii together with several Cossack leaders of plotting a rebellion (*miatezh*) against the Muscovite state. If men like Feodosii had their way—so the writer of the document warned—the specter of the executed Cossack rebel Stepan Razin would be resurrected. Thus to official observers, Feodosii seemed to have much in common with the disaffected monks and nuns who fought and killed alongside Razin, whose actions had greatly frightened Moscow during the early 1670s.[76]

Indeed, there is evidence that Feodosii used violence to control his flock. During his travels along the Don and Donets' Rivers he was usually accompanied by a Cossack detachment. These armed warriors served not only to protect Feodosii from Muscovite spies trying to abduct him; they also helped to enforce Feodosii's demand that all Cossacks convert to the Old Belief. Whenever Feodosii descended upon a Cossack village (*stanitsa*), he proceeded to rebap-

tize local families according to the old rite. Then he gave a sermon warning everyone to use the two-fingered sign of the cross instead of the three-fingered sign prescribed by the official church.

Cossacks who did not comply with Feodosii were chased out of their settlements, and there is evidence that at least some of those who remained disobedient were executed by hanging. One Cossack officer who accompanied Feodosii on his missionary tours later justified such executions by insisting that he and Feodosii had hung only "criminals" (*vory*). The lives of "good men" had been spared even if they insisted on adherence to the new rite of the Muscovite church. Whatever may have been the truth, it is clear that Feodosii not only considered the use of violence legitimate, but had integrated violence into his daily behavior.[77]

Thus, Feodosii was a very different figure from Archpriest Avvakum and the other Old Belief prophets of central Muscovy who advocated ancient Christian ideals such as self-sacrifice and apostolic succession. He had much more in common with the Russian secular fugitives in northern Ukraine identified by Muscovite officialdom as "supporters of Kapiton" and "schismatics" during the late seventeenth century. Feodosii must have felt at home in the Starodub region. But why did he leave the Don to settle in Ukraine?

During the late 1680s, Feodosii's influence among the Don Cossacks came to an abrupt end. Several Muscovite military campaigns managed to subdue the Cossack rebels, and Feodosii was eventually captured and imprisoned at the Kirillov Monastery in northern Russia. Soon after escaping from his monastic dungeon, Feodosii moved to Kaluga. The move can probably be attributed to the fact that his former protector on the Don River, Ataman Samoilo Lavrent'ev, was a native of Kaluga. The Russian settlers of northern Ukraine, who often came to the Kaluga marketplace, offered him an ideal audience: he was given the task of instructing a more or less ignorant flock of Russian outcasts in the basic rituals of the pre-Nikonian church.[78]

Other monks also contributed to the formation of an Old Belief culture in northern Ukraine. However, it appears that the arrival of Feodosii during the early 1690s marked the growth of the Old Belief's religious identity.[79] This is indicated by the fact that when Fedor Stepanov and his men broke into a Moscow home in 1700 (see above), they stole not only money and other items of monetary value, but also polemical works by Simiaon Połacki and Patriarch Ioakim against the Old Belief.[80] While it is not clear whether Stepanov himself knew why he took these books, there can be no doubt that they were of significance to a few ordinary men and women at Starodub.

One of these educated Old Believers was the artisan Ivan Podpruzhnik, who had left Moscow with his entire family "in the hope of a better income ... because his business in the Tanners' Quarter [*Syromiatnaia sloboda*] had become impoverished." Prior to his flight to Ukraine, Podpruzhnik had regularly attended church, gone to confession and taken communion; that is, he

had practiced the Orthodox faith according to the new rite. At Starodub and Vetka, Podpruzhnik quickly came under the influence of Feodosii and his brother Aleksandr. They taught him the two-fingered sign of the cross and had him read portions of the Ostroh Bible. By the time Podpruzhnik was arrested in February 1723, he had become quite a learned man and an outspoken preacher of Old Belief dissent who caused great anxiety among official churchmen.[81]

During the early 1720s, officials of the Holy Synod expressed their amazement about the high level of religious education among Russian settlers of the Starodub area. They attributed this to local Old Believer monks and nuns who were indeed so erudite "that it was impossible to find sufficiently educated (*iskusnye*) clerics in Moscow" to oppose them.[82] Thus, the monk Feodosii's pioneering educational work was crowned by the successes of those who followed in his footsteps.

Unlike other Old Believer communities, which exerted rigorous controls over the secular behavior of their members, Feodosii's followers were free to behave as they pleased as long as they abided by the old rite.[83] This leniency may explain why the Old Belief of northern Ukraine maintained some of its original seventeenth-century features, most distinctive among which was the frequent use of violence, into the eighteenth century.

During the early 1720s, for example, Old Believer settlers broke into church buildings at Starodub, profaned crosses with their feet (*popranie rugatel'ne nogami*) and beat up priests. Efforts by the Holy Synod to force these Old Believers back into the official Muscovite religion failed miserably.[84] The same men and women were repeatedly accused of aggressively taking over the lands and assets of settlers who did not adhere to their faith. In 1732, for example, the family of the peasant Timofei Maksimovich became known for forcing non-Old Belief neighbors from local fishing grounds and fields. Another Old Believer was blamed for cutting timber that belonged to a neighboring village.[85] At about the same time monks and nuns from Vetka, armed with rifles and hunting spears, were dispensing communion and other sacraments in Russian villages and towns including Moscow.[86] In short, many Old Believers in northern Ukraine continued to behave like outcasts and rebels. They were certainly a far cry from the saintly figures whom Ivan Alekseev glorified in his history.

The Old Belief communities in northern Ukraine appear to have grown rapidly during the reign of Peter I. In 1729, census takers counted 610 Old Believer families living in seven settlements (*slobody*) not far from Starodub. A military commando responsible for burning down the Old Believer communities of Vetka in 1735 estimated that it had chased away 40,000 local residents.[87] One reason for this rapid growth was a renewed influx of fugitives from Russia due to the dramatic increase in fiscal and other demands of the Petrine state. For example, in February 1719, Hetman Skoropads'kyi com-

plained that many Russian peasants, artisans and traders had joined local Old Belief communities to evade taxes (*ukhilivshis' ot podatei*).[88]

Land resources, which had been freely available during the seventeenth century were soon exhausted, a fact which probably explains why the Cossacks of Starodub began to withdraw their support from local settlers. In August 1717, for example, the leader of the Starodub Regiment complained to the tsar that he could no longer control local Old Believers:

> If more of these schismatics are allowed to spread out in our regiment many of our officers can no longer live in their own homes due to their pressure tactics. The [schismatics] are arbitrary, do what they want and nobody is able to seek justice from them.[89]

Thus, the Old Belief in northern Ukraine was shaped well into the eighteenth century by the unruly behavior and secular aspirations of fugitives from the Russian heartlands.

Contrary to the assertions of the Old Belief writer Ivan Alekseev and later historians, the first Old Believers in Starodub and Vetka were not saintly figures; the "supporters of Kapiton" and "schismatics" of our sources were violent men who lived according to the code of the Ukrainian frontier. Under the protection of Cossack officers, they engaged in banditry, highway robbery, forgery and murder in order to procure a living. While they appeared to the outside world to be respectable merchants frequenting towns such as Kaluga and Moscow, they used every opportunity to prey upon their trading partners and neighbors.

These men were beyond the reach of the archbishop of Chernihiv, Lazar' Baranovich, who attempted in vain to take away old liturgical books which they had brought to Ukraine from Russia. Due to Lazar''s intervention, old liturgical books became an important sign of dissent which marked the ecclesiastical extraterritoriality of Russian settlements under the control of the Starodub Regiment. The typical Old Believer, however, did not know much about the religious issues that were at stake when he opted to use the old rite. These first settlers did not show firm religious convictions; their motivations appear to have been entirely secular.

This relatively primitive Old Belief culture later became more conscious of itself under the influence of Muscovite monastic dissenters. A few charismatic nuns who had once played a major role in the religious affairs of the capital of Moscow, suddenly found themselves deprived of a livelihood and fled Muscovy to settle on the Ukrainian frontier. Melaniia, the teacher of the boyarina Morozova, made her way to Vetka after Morozova's execution during the late 1670s. The boyarina Elena Khrushcheva, who had formerly wielded powerful influence at a Kremlin convent, established a vibrant Old Belief culture in the trading town of Kaluga and made the Kaluga Old Belief a model that would

eventually be followed by Russian settlers in Starodub and Vetka. But the man who almost single-handedly gave the Old Belief of Starodub and Vetka its lasting religious identity was the monk Feodosii, who had fled to northern Ukraine after long years of missionary work among the Don Cossacks.

Muscovite monastic influences led to the "confessionalization," but not to the "christianization" of the Old Belief in Ukraine.[90] The Old Believers of Starodub and Vetka received basic instruction in the rites and books that distinguished the Muscovite church prior to 1652 from its later manifestations. However, they were not required to alter their secular behavior, a fact which is not surprising if we consider that Feodosii had participated in the violence perpetrated by Cossack rebels on the Don River. The Old Believers of Starodub and Vetka maintained a readiness to defend their interests with violent means well into the eighteenth century. Humility, self-sacrifice, purity and other Christian ideals advocated by Old Believer prophets such as Avvakum influenced only a small minority at best.

I conclude that the genesis of the Old Belief in Starodub and Vetka was a much more complicated process than has traditionally been thought. Initially, there was a primitive Old Belief culture which hardly distinguished itself from the surrounding Cossack culture. One might speak of a non-religious protoculture dominated by the concerns and priorities of secular fugitives from Muscovy. During the 1680s and 1690s, this culture was transformed under the religious influence of fugitive Muscovite monks and nuns who educated Russian settlers about the old rite.

The examples of Starodub and Vetka illustrate that seventeenth-century Old Belief cultures followed rules different from those of later Old Belief communities. They remained closely intertwined with the social and religious environments in which they had originated. The separation process was slow, and early Old Believers shared the secular values and norms of their immediate neighbors, be they Ukrainian, Cossack or Russian.

Historians must read the ex post facto writings of eighteenth-century Old Belief historians about the Old Belief's legendary seventeenth-century beginnings with considerable caution. Unless historical scholarship relies on seventeenth-century documentary records preserved outside Old Belief culture, the myth of the glorious and sacred origins of the Old Belief will persist. It is important to recognize that this powerful myth served as an inspirational model for eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Old Believers, but it had little in common with the historical reality of the early Old Belief in Ukraine.

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NOTES

1. T. A. Oparina, "Prosvetitel' litovskii—neizvestnyi pamiatnik ideologicheskoi bor'by XVII veka," in *Arkheografiia i istochnikovedenie Sibiri* (Novosibirsk, 1987), pp. 43–57; I. P. Eremin, "K voprosu o russko-ukrainskikh literaturnykh sviaziakh v XVII veke," *Trudy Otdela drevnerusskoi literatury* 9 (1953), pp. 291–296; K. V. Kharlampovich, "K voprosu o sushchnosti russkogo raskola staroobriadchestva," *Uchenye zapiski Kazanskogo universiteta* 67, no. 12 (1900): 133–52; H. P. Niess, *Kirche in Russland zwischen Tradition und Glaube? Eine Untersuchung der Kirillova kniga und der Kniga o vere aus der 1. Hälfte des 17. Jahrhunderts*, vol. 13 of *Kirche im Osten* (Göttingen, 1977), passim.

2. According to Semen Denisov, Pavel refused to sign the Acts of the 1654 Church Council, which provided the blueprint for Patriarch Nikon's liturgical reforms. He was immediately deposed by Nikon and exiled to the Russian north. Avvakum Petrovich was exiled to Siberia in 1653 after clashing with some of Nikon's protégés in the Kazan' Cathedral. He was accused of schism at the 1666 church council. See P. Pascal, *Avvakum et les débuts du raskol. La crise religieuse au XVIIe siècle en Russie* (Paris, 1938), pp. 219–27, 250, 294, 373–81.

3. See, for example, the silence about the Old Belief of usually well-informed Scandinavian diplomats, in H. Ellersiek, "Russia under Aleksei Mikhailovich and Fiodor Alekseevich, 1645–1682: The Scandinavian sources," Ph.D. dissertation, University of California at Los Angeles, 1955, passim. Križanić's encounters with a few Old Believer exiles in Tobol'sk remains an exception, in S. A. Belokurov, *Iurii Krizhanich v Rossii (po novym dokumentam)* (Moscow, 1901), pp. 11–12, 113–14.

4. See, for example, contrasts between the *Vita* of Avvakum and archival information, in V. I. Malyshev, "Neizvestnye i maloizvestnye materialy o protopope Avvakume," *Trudy Otdela drevnerusskoi literatury* 9 (1953): 387–404.

5. The popular appeal of such historical mythologies can be illustrated by the fact that stories about the Solovki heroes entered into Russian folklore. See G. Michels, "The Solovki Uprising: Religion and Revolt in Northern Russia," *The Russian Review* 51 (January 1992): 1–15.

6. For general information about these communities during the 18th century, see M. Hildermeier, "Alter Glaube und neue Welt: Zur Sozialgeschichte des Raskol im 18. und 19. Jahrhundert," *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* 38 (1990) 3:372–98, esp. 385–86.

7. A. M. Lazarevskii, *Opisanie staroi Malorossii*, vol. 1 (Kiev, 1888–89), pp. 447–50, 452, 464.

8. See, for example, M. V. Bogomolova and N. A. Kobiak, "Opisanie pevcheskikh rukopisei XVII–XX vv. Vetko-starodubskogo sobraniia MGU," in *Russkie pis'mennye i ustnye traditsii i dukhovnaia kul'tura (Po materialam arkheograficheskikh ekspeditsii MGU 1966–1980)* (Moscow, 1982), pp. 162–227.

9. I have relied here on I. Alekseev, "Istoriia o begstvuiushchem sviashchenstve," in N. S. Tikhonravov, ed., *Letopisi russkoi literatury i drevnosti* 4 (1862), pt. 3, pp. 53–69 [hereafter "Istoriia"]. For Russian manuscript miscellanies containing Alekseev's history, see N. Iu. Bubnov, ed., *Sochineniia pisatelei-staroobriadtsev XVII veka*, vol. 7, pt. 1 of *Opisanie Rukopisnogo otdela Biblioteki Akademii nauk SSSR* (Leningrad, 1984), pp. 147, 167, and V. G. Druzhinin, *Pisaniia russkikh staroobriadtsev. Perechen' spiskov* (St. Peterburg, 1912), pp. 36–37. On Alekseev's role in the evolution of the 18th-century Old Belief, see S. Bolshakoff, *Russian Nonconformity: The Story of "Unofficial" Religion in Russia* (Philadelphia, 1950), pp. 74–77.

10. A. I. Zhuravlev, *Polnoe istoricheskoe izvestie o drevnikh strigol'nikakh i novykh raskol'nikakh tak nazyvaemykh staroobriadtsev*, 8th edition (Moscow, 1890), pp. 69–70, 79–82, 168, 273. On previous editions of Zhuravlev's work, see A. S. Prugavin, *Raskol-sektantstvo. Materialy dlia izucheniia religiozno-bytovykh dvizhenii russkogo naroda* (Moscow, 1887), pp. 41–42. See also

P. I. Mel'nikov, *Istoricheskie ocherki popovshchiny* (Moscow, 1864), pp. 61–62; A. P. Shchapov, *Russkii raskol staroobriadchestva* (Kazan', 1859), p. 532.

11. N. I. Subbotin, "Proshenie vetkovskikh staroobriadtsev o episkope, podannoe patriarkhu konstantinopol'skomu v 1731 godu," *Dushepoleznoe chtenie*, 1870, no. 1:26, 44.

12. "Istoriia," pp. 53–54.

13. "Ashche li kto bolee sego vest', da prilozhit; ashche li ni, to za blago siia da priimet, o chem zde predlagaem" (ibid., p. 54).

14. "Kolikiia by drazhaishiia pol'zy khoteli pogibnuti ot nas, ashche by preslavnyia dela chestnykh muzhei istoriiami ne podtverdilisia! .... revnostnii preuspevaiut v sile, nemoshchnii ispravliaiutsia i k luchshemu preuspevaiut, a lenivii chuvstvo svoego nebrezheniia vospriemliut. Derznuzhe glagolati: istorii drevnikh del, pachezhe nravouchitel'nykh i pravil'nykh, vest' chelovecheskie nravy ispravliati i k Bogu privoditi vnimaiushchikh" ("Istoriia," p. 53).

15. Ibid., p. 53.

16. Many of the documents interpreted here have been published in M. I. Lileev, ed., *Novye materialy dlia istorii raskola na Vetke i v Starodub'e XVII–XVIII vv.* (Kiev, 1893) [hereafter cited as *Novye materialy*]. Other sources are cited or paraphrased in M. I. Lileev, *Iz istorii raskola na Vetke i v Starodub'e XVII–XVIII vv.* (Kiev, 1895). Additional materials are scattered over a wide range of publications and archival repositories, which will be identified in later footnotes.

17. "Istoriia," p. 57.

18. Ibid.

19. Surviving parish records suggest that the parish was headed by a priest named Ivan until 1658, and then by the priest Semen Grigor'ev. See I. E. Zabelin, ed., *Materialy dlia istorii, arkheologii i statistiki goroda Moskvy*, pt. 1 (Moscow, 1884), p. 142. See also fn. 22.

20. A clerk recorded under the year 7185 that Koz'ma had payed the church tithe to the patriarchal treasury, Zabelin, *Materialy dlia istorii goroda Moskvy*, pt. 1, p. 493. According to a census register of the parish from 1679, Koz'ma had been replaced by one Mikita Manuilov, ibid., pt. 2 (Moscow, 1891), pp. 343–44.

21. On the persistence of the old rite in some parishes see fn. 23.

22. TsGADA (Central State Archive of Ancient Acts), fond 1182, Patriarchal Printing Press, book 57, folios 74, 80, 462v; book 59, folio 292.

23. TsGADA, fond 1182, book 57, folios 464v–465, Sluzhebniki piatogo vykhoda na rozdachu popom i d'iakonom novostavlennym (11–12 July, 1658); BAN (Library of the Academy of Sciences, St. Petersburg), Collection of V. G. Druzhinin, no. 1091, Oath to Patriarch Ioakim (1679). See Ioakim's order dated 25 October 1676 to confiscate old liturgical books from suburban parishes under the control of the Novospasskii Monastery, in Zabelin, *Materialy dlia istorii goroda Moskvy*, pt. 1, p. 845.

24. P. Smirnov, *Patriarkh Ioakim moskovskii* (Moscow, 1881), pp. 30–45.

25. Zabelin, *Materialy dlia istorii goroda Moskvy*, pt. 1, p. 493; pt. 2, pp. 343–44.

26. On the plight of Moscow priests, see TsGADA, fond 27, Secret Chancellery, delo 558, Letter circulating among Kremlin priests (1668). On Muscovite priests who lived among the Don Cossacks, see V. G. Druzhinin, *Raskol na Donu v kontse XVII veka* (St. Petersburg, 1889), pp. 85–87, 136–43, 250–59, etc.

27. O. Levitskii, ed., *Letopis' samovidtsa po novootkrytym spiskam s prilozheniem* (Kiev, 1878), reprinted as Samovydets', pseud., *The Eyewitness Chronicle* (Munich, 1972), p. 132 [=Harvard Library of Early Ukrainian Literature vol. 7, I]; P. F. Nikolaevskii, *Patriarshaia oblast' i russkie eparkhii v XVII veke* (St. Petersburg, 1888), pp. 8–9, 35; I. M. Pokrovskii, *Russkie eparkhii v XVI–XIX vv. Ikh otkrytie, sostav i predely*, vol. 1 (Kazan', 1897), pp. 374–79; K. V. Kharlampovich, *Malorossiiskoe vliianie na velikorusskuiu tserkovnuiu zhizn'* (Kazan', 1914; reprint, The Hague/Paris, 1968), p. 193. While bishops never resided at Kursk or Briansk, the bishops of Voronezh soon became known in Moscow for their missionary efforts among the Cossacks, Druzhinin, *Raskol na Donu*, pp. 219–20.

28. On Lazar' Baranovich and religious affairs in the eparchy of Chernihiv, see Archbishop Filaret (Gumilevskii), *Istoriko-statisticheskoe opisanie Chernigovskoi eparkhii*, vol. 1 (Chernihiv [Chernigov], 1861), pp. 33–44. On Lazar''s connections with the Muscovite church, see Kharlampovich, *Malorossiiskoe vliianie*, pp. 234–38, 348–51, 421–27, etc.

29. "... dukhovnykh [ottsov] ne za shcho ne meli, khliubiachisia ozdoboiu tserkvei Bozhiikh, otkazuiuchi, zhe 'nam ne trudno o[t] popov i sviashchennikov'; liubo napominali, ne slukhali, ale ot takovykh, kotorye ikh za zbrodne do pokuti privodili, z gnevom otkhodili i po svoikh voliakh sobe dukhovnykh shukali, ne zhaluiuchi za grekhi" (Levitskii, *Letopis' samovidtsa*, p. 135).

30. Ibid., pp. 136–37. Iakov Khapchinskii had served in the household of the archbishop of Chernihiv before being assigned his position in Starodub, and had been sent on missions to the Muscovite patriarchal court. See Kharlampovich, *Malorossiiskoe vliianie*, p. 351.

31. Petro Roslavets' held the office of full colonel on three occasions between 1663 and 1676. See G. Gajecky, *The Cossack Administration of the Hetmanate*, 2 vols. (Cambridge, Mass., 1978), 1:17–19. See also *Letopis' samovidtsa*, pp. 132, 136, 146, 154.

32. "Delo starodubskogo polkovnika Petra Roslavtsa i nezhinskogo protopopa Simeona Adamovicha," *Vestnik Evropy*, 1880, no. 8:417–30. Roslavets' complained to Moscow that due to the excommunication of entire Cossack families "many die without any spiritual assistance and are buried without liturgical services; infants remain unbaptized and women give birth without prayer [*bez naputstviia i pogrebeny bez otpevaniia, mladentsy ostaiutsia bez kreshcheniia, rodil'nitsy bez molitvy*]" (ibid., p. 420). See also Filaret, *Opisanie Chernigovskoi eparkhii*, vol. 7 (Chernihiv [Chernigov], 1873), p. 25; Lazarevskii, *Opisanie staroi Malorossii*, 1:180.

33. Letter by Lazar' Baranovich cited in Lileev, *Iz istorii raskola*, pp. 24–25 and Lazarevskii, *Opisanie staroi Malorossii*, 1:180. On the Rubets' clan, see Gajecky, 1:18–19, 22, 24, 29, 63–64.

34. Kharlampovich, *Malorossiiskoe vliianie*, p. 202; AI, 5:491–92; Filaret, *Opisanie Chernigovskoi eparkhii*, 1:37. Lazar' bragged that he regarded Połacki's work "kak palka, stoit u menia v uglu na storozhe" (ibid.).

35. Cited in Lileev, *Iz istorii raskola*, p. 29.

36. *Novye materialy*, pp. 96–98; "Delo starodubskogo polkovnika Roslavtsa," pp. 425, 429; Gajecky, 1:63.

37. *Novye materialy*, pp. 99–104; Gajecky, 1:21.

38. "... menia p'ianogo vziavshi na sani polozhili, na kotorykh ia usnul i ni o chem ne vedal; a kak privezli menia sonnogo na dvor, gde razboi uchinili, tak menia sonnogo na sankakh pokinuli, a sami poshli rozboi chiniti. A kak krik tam na dvore uchinilsia, v to vremia ia obudilsia, a tovarishchi moi skazali: stoi, ne krichi; to vyemka delaetsia, a ne razboi. I khotel ikh pokinuti, no boialsia, chtob menia ne ubili" (*Novye materialy*, p. 101).

39. Ibid., p. 102.

40. See, for example, an illustrated homily from the Sammlung des Heidelberger Seminars für Slawische Philologie, described and published in Dmitrii Chizhevskii, *Paradies und Hölle. Russische Buchmalerei* (Recklinghausen, 1960), p. 32, nos. 31–32.

41. On the ascetic piety of 19th-century Old Believers, see Hildermeier, pp. 519–20. These Old Believers modelled themselves after certain 17th-century prophets whose ascetism was legendary. See, for example, Ivan Neronov's polemic against the drunkenness of monks in the town of Vologda, in N. I. Subbotin, ed., *Materialy dlia istorii raskola za pervoe vremia ego sushchestvovaniia*, vol. 1 (Moscow, 1875), pp. 117–18.

42. There is no evidence that the region around Iaroslavl' was subjected to any form of religious persecution during the 1670s. It was the subject of two isolated investigations during the late 1650s and early 1660s, which targeted the Old Believers Ivan Neronov and Sergei of the Tolgskii Monastery. See, for example, TsGADA, fond 235, Patriarchal Office, opis' 2, book 38, folio 614r–v, Search for Ivan Neronov (August, 1655); V. S. Rumiantseva, *Dokumenty Prikaza tainykh del o raskol'nikakh 1665–1667 gg.* (Moscow, 1986), p. 53.

43. Cited after Lileev, *Iz istorii raskola*, pp. 38–39.

44. Ibid., p. 39.

45. TsGADA, fond 141, Prikaznye dela starykh let, delo 122, folios 1–57, O vorakh i razboinikakh, kotorye poimany v Kostromskom uezde. On settlers from Danilovskoe, see Lileev, *Iz istorii raskola*, pp. 39, 54–55, 58.

46. *Akty, otnosiashchiesia k istorii iuzhnoi i zapadnoi Rossii*, vol. 9 (St. Petersburg, 1877; reprint, The Hague/Paris, 1970), pp. 855–59; Lileev, *Iz istorii raskola*, pp. 22–23.

47. G. Michels, "Myths and Realities of the Russian Schism: The Church and its Dissenters in Seventeenth-Century Muscovy," Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1991), chap. 6.2.

48. "Delo starodubskogo polkovnika Roslavtsa," p. 424.

49. AI, vol. 5, nos. 75, 100; DAI, vol. 12, no. 17.

50. *Novye materialy*, pp. 71–87.

51. Ibid., p. 77. On the monk Kapiton, see Rumiantseva, *Dokumenty*, pp. 7–16.

52. *Novye materialy*, pp. 60–61, 72–73.

53. Ibid., p. 64.

54. Ibid., pp. 61, 75.

55. See, for example, a sworn statement by the Cossack Afanasii Zenchenko, ibid., pp. 84–85. On Nikita's questionable acquisition of a Starodub home, see ibid., pp. 48–49, 64, 68.

56. Ibid., pp. 46, 73–74. Alekseev admired Stepan for his great religious integrity (*muzh velikoi revnosti blagochestivoi ispolnen*), in "Istoriia," p. 57.

57. *Novye materialy*, p. 61.

58. Ibid., pp. 48–49.

59. "... urazitsia i na slobozhan, shcho dopustili Mikittse takovogo tiranstva; ..." (ibid., p. 75).

60. *Novye materialy*, p. 76.

61. "... krestilsia razno krest slagaia: i pervye tri persti i pervye da poslednye dva persti, kak i prochie raskol'niki ..." (*Novye materialy*, p. 137). See also the following statement by a peasant: "... on, Maksim, krestitsia dvumia perstami, no ne raskol'nik ... v tserkov' khodit, ispovedyvat'sia i prichashchat'sia zhelaet, da popy togo ne dopuskaiut ...." (ibid., p. 227).

62. "... podnialas' neskazannaia kramola i smushchenie: 'Chto eto za kniga' krichali oni; 'Na chto ona zdes'? eto po novoi vere.'... 'Chto v nei za kolesa, da Faraon napisany, v pech' ee, da szhech'" (Zhuravlev, p. 277). Scholarship knows of four pre-Nikonian editions of the *Oktoikh* issued by the patriarchal printing press in 1618, 1631, 1638, 1649. See A. S. Zernova, *Knigi kirillovskoi pechati izdannye v Moskve v XVI–XVII vekakh* (Moscow, 1958), nos. 33, 86, 142, 214.

63. *Novye materialy*, p. 40; Gajecky, 1:16, 19–20, 133–34; 2:660–61, 697, 703.

64. Lazarevskii, 1:447, 452, 456, 463; Lileev, *Iz istorii raskola*, p. 271.

65. See especially reports by the Petrine missionary Iosif Reshilov, in *Opisanie dokumentov i del, khraniashchikhsia v arkhive sviateishego Sinoda*, vol. 1 (St. Petersburg, 1868), pp. 571–88. See also P. S. Smirnov, *Spory i razdeleniia v russkom raskole v pervoi chetverti XVIII veka* (St. Petersburg, 1909), pp. 46, 48–49, 52; Lileev, *Iz istorii raskola*, pp. 265–66, 280–82.

66. Lileev, *Iz istorii raskola*, p. 271; Rumiantseva, *Dokumenty Prikaza tainykh del o raskol'nikakh*, pp. 53–54; Subbotin, *Materialy dlia istorii raskola*, 1:426–31. On the connections of Spiridon Potemkin with Ukraine, see J. Billington, "Neglected Figures and Features in the Rise of the Raskol," in *Russia and Orthodoxy. Essays in Honor of Georges Florovsky* (The Hague, 1975), 2:189–206, esp. 193–95.

67. "Delo polkovnika starodubskogo Roslavtsa," p. 423; TsGADA, fond 210, Razriadnyi prikaz, Prikaznyi stol, delo 985, folios 589–94, Pozhalovanie novoispravlennykh knig v Novodevich'i monastyr'. On Irina Potemkina, see Subbotin, *Materialy dlia istorii raskola*, 2:103.

68. "Istoriia," p. 63. On Feodos'ia Morozova and Melaniia, see Ia. L. Barskov, *Pamiatniki pervykh let russkogo staroobriadchestva* (St. Petersburg, 1912), pp. 309–13.

69. "Chelobitnaia igumen'i Marem'iany," *Kaluzhskie eparkhial'nye vedomosti*, 1862, no. 9:142–44; N. F. Kapterev, *Patriarkh Nikon i tsar' Aleksei Mikhailovich*, vol. 1 (Sergiev Posad, 1910), pp. 507–508; Barskov, *Pamiatniki*, pp. 301, 312–13; P. S. Smirnov, *Vnutrennie voprosy v raskole v XVII veke* (St. Petersburg, 1898), pp. 170–72, 055. On trading connections between

Kaluga and Ukrainian Old Belief settlements during the early 18th century, see Lileev, *Iz istorii raskola*, p. 83, n. 1.

70. This eparchy was founded in 1261, and the bishops resided in Sarai under the auspices of the khan. When the power of the Golden Horde weakened during the late 15th century, the hierarchs moved to Moscow and became important players in church politics who were greatly feared by the patriarch. See I. M. Pokrovskii, *Russkie eparkhii v XVI–XIX vv. Ikh otkrytie, sostav i predely*, vol. 1 (Kazan', 1897), pp. 232–33.

71. *Opisanie dokumentov i del sviateishego pravitel'stvuiushchego Sinoda*, 1:332–33, 343–44, 395; CCLXVI–CCLXXIV; *Polnoe sobranie postanovlenii i razporiazhenii po vedomosti pravoslavnogo ispovedaniia*, vol. 1 (St. Petersburg, 1869), pp. 56–59, 73–75.

72. Lileev, *Iz istorii raskola*, pp. 80, 244–55; Hildermeier, p. 385.

73. "Istoriia," pp. 62–64. Boris, for example, became known as one of the principal opponents of Iosif Reshilov, the envoy of the Holy Synod who tried to eradicate the Old Belief in northern Ukraine during the 1720s. See Smirnov, *Spory i razdeleniia*, p. 53; *Opisanie dokumentov i del sviatogo Sinoda*, 1:585. On Aleksandr the Deacon and his role in the evolution of the so-called Priestist movement, see Bolshakoff, *Russian nonconformity*, pp. 60–62.

74. On Iov, see D. Skvortsov, *Ocherki tverskogo raskola sektantstva* (Moscow, 1895), pp. 11–16.

75. Druzhinin, *Raskol na Donu*, pp. 80–81, 287.

76. Druzhinin, *Raskol na Donu*, pp. 172, 176. Such monks became widely known as dangerous outlaws when they approached the exiled Patriarch Nikon in order to convince him to join Razin's revolt. See P. F. Nikolaevskii, "Zhizn' patriarkha Nikona v ssylke," *Khristianskoe chtenie*, 1888, nos. 1–2:76.

77. DAI, 12:185, 207–208.

78. Druzhinin, *Raskol na Donu*, p. 120. On Feodosii's missionary activity, see Lileev, *Iz istorii raskola*, pp. 184–206.

79. Among them was, for example, the monk Ioasaf. Before resettling in Ukraine, Ioasaf had also lived not far from the Don River in a large unofficial monastic community, the Chirskaia pustyn', which was destroyed by Muscovite authority during the summer of 1688. See *Istoriia*, pp. 59–62, 67; Zhuravlev, pp. 80–81; Druzhinin, *Raskol na Donu*, pp. 78–79, 192; Skvortsov, p. 17.

80. A separate investigation by the Preobrazhenskii prikaz produced this evidence. See Lileev, *Iz istorii raskola*, pp. 221–23.

81. *Opisanie dokumentov i del sviateishego Sinoda*, 1:587–88; Lileev, *Iz istorii raskola*, p. 226. Podpruzhnik's insistence that he had always been an Old Believer is contradicted by his own testimony. See also the story of the musketeer Gavriil Ageev, who deserted his military post in Kiev in 1710, ibid., pp. 339–42. Another Russian settler, Mikhail Tepikin, recalled several decades later that monks had taught him the two-fingered sign of the cross and the Creed, *Novye materialy*, p. 167. On the Ostroh Bible and its significance in Ukrainian cultural history, see K. V. Kharlampovich, "Ostrozhskaia pravoslavnaia shkola," *Kievskaia starina* 57, no. 5 (May 1897): 177–207; no. 6 (June 1897): 363–65, and Maksym Boiko, ed., *Ostrohian and Dermanian Printingshops* (Bloomington, Ind., 1980).

82. *Opisanie dokumentov i del sviateishego Sinoda*, 1:572; Filaret, *Opisanie Chernigovskoi eparkhii*, 7:218; Lileev, *Iz istorii raskola*, p. 265.

83. Note, by contrast, the rigorous disciplinary authority exercised by the Denisov brothers at Vyg in northern Russia. See, for example, the attacks on Ivan Kruglyi, who became a drunkard and disobeyed the Denisovs (*samovolie tvoril*), I. Filippov, *Istoriia Vygovskoi staroobriadcheskoi pustyni* (St. Petersburg, 1862), pp. 367–90.

84. *Polnoe sobranie postanovlenii i rasporiazhenii po vedomosti pravoslavnogo ispovedaniia*, vol. 4 (St. Petersburg, 1876), pp. 166–67.

85. Lazarevskii, *Opisanie staroi Malorossii*, 1:452–54.

86. Lileev, *Iz istorii raskola*, pp. 152–53.

87. Ibid., pp. 79–80; Hildermeier, p. 386.

88. *Novye materialy*, p. 113.

89. "... esli raskol'shchikam, iako teper' razshiriatisia v polku nashem dopushcheno budet, mnogo z polchan ot utisku ikh churatisia zhilishch svoikh musiat, ponevazh oni samovolne, shcho khotiat, chiniat, a spravedlivosti nikhto na ikh poiskati ne mozhet, ..." (E. V. Barsov, "Opisanie aktov arkhiva Markevicha, otnosiashchikhsia k istorii starodubskikh skitov," *Chteniia*, 1884, bk. 2, pt. 2, p. 2).

90. These terms are used by historians of the Western Reformation and Counter-Reformation in order to gauge the impact of Christian preaching on local religious cultures. See, for example, G. Strauss, *Luther's House of Learning* (Baltimore, 1978); R. Po-chia Hsia, *Social Discipline in the Reformation* (London, 1989); L. Chatellier, *Europe of the Devout* (Cambridge, 1989).

Baudouin de Courtenay and the Ukrainian Question*

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The great Polish linguist Jan Ignacy Niecisław Baudouin de Courtenay is known today as one of the founders of modern linguistics. In his own day (1845–1929), however, he was known as well as a controversial publicist who kept up a running battle against religious and national intolerance.[1] His consistent defense of oppressed minorities won him the reputation as "the most just Pole" (Nitsch 1935, 362), and when the Polish parliament began the process of electing the first president of independent Poland in 1922, the National Minorities Bloc (representing Ukrainians, Jews, Belarusians, and Germans) demonstratively proposed his candidacy. Baudouin received nearly 20% of the votes on the first ballot against four other candidates (Jędruszczak 1984, 163–67; Topolski 1976, 673–74).

At Baudouin's funeral seven years later the rector of Warsaw University, Tadeusz Brzeski, ended his remarks by saying, "The light of justice has gone out." Such was the view of Baudouin held by "the elite of our society," according to his student, the linguist Henryk Ułaszyn (1934, 34). "Unfortunately," Ułaszyn continued, paraphrasing Virgil and Horace, "they are *rari nantes in gurgite vasto—profani vulgi...* (rare swimmers in the vast depths of the unenlightened crowd)." Indeed, when Baudouin was finally able to return to Poland from Russia in 1918, his colleagues at Warsaw University (where he was an "honorary professor") voted 13–11 to deny him a seat on the faculty council. As Baudouin wrote to the Croatian linguist Vatroslav Jagić, they considered him a "bad Pole" and "an enemy of Poland who had worked all his life against her interests" (Hamm 1951, 176). Between these two extremes is the view of the Yiddish writer Yitzkhok Leybush Peretz, for whom Baudouin seemed sometimes like the Persian king who tried to quiet the sea by having his soldiers flog it and sometimes like a songbird trying to calm a disputatious marketplace with its song (Peretz 1947, 252).[2]

Baudouin was born near Warsaw and studied at the Szkoła Główna in that city. After further study in Prague, Jena, Berlin, and St. Petersburg, he received his doctorate in Leipzig. As a Pole, he was not allowed to teach at the Russian university in Warsaw; instead, he spent most of the period from 1870 to 1918 teaching at various Russian universities: St. Petersburg, Kazan', Dorpat (now Tartu, Estonia). He taught at the Jagiellonian University in Cracow from 1894 to 1899, but was forced to return to Russia when his contract was not renewed. (His outspokenness provoked conflict in conservative Galicia, and his dialectological field work made the Austro-Hungarian authorities suspicious

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of his supposed "pan-Slavist" activities.) Following the rebirth of the Polish state, he was able to return to Warsaw.

Baudouin lived long enough to encounter "the Ukrainian question" in various historical-geographical contexts (Austro-Hungarian Galicia, tsarist Russia, independent Poland) and to deal with various of its aspects. These included the status of the Ukrainian language and nationality, the appropriate terminology for referring to both, the organization of educational institutions, and the question of autonomy and/or independence for Ukrainians. He spoke about these issues in public lectures and wrote about them in Polish and Russian.[3] This was the case even though he said in response to a survey by the St. Petersburg journal *Ukrainskaja žizn'* in 1913 that he had never had any special interest in the Ukrainian question. He explained, however, that the Ukrainian question interested him "like all other such questions, i.e., questions concerning the peaceful coexistence of differently named human collectives [*mirnoe sožitel'stvo raznoimennyx čelovečeskix kollektivov*]; questions of human dignity; questions of personal, individual self-determination" (BdC 1913, 37).

In the same response Baudouin wrote that he had first become acquainted with Ukrainian life during his student days (at the Warsaw Szkoła Główna) or even earlier. He owed this knowledge, he said, to his reading of Polish Romantic poetry and to contacts with "Ukrainian colleagues," by which he meant Polish students from the so-called "Southwestern Provinces" of tsarist Russia. His knowledge of the Ukrainian language, he continued, was that of a Slavic linguist, not of someone familiar with Ukrainian literature or with the periodical press in that language (BdC 1913, 37).

As a linguist, Baudouin took it to be obvious that Ukrainian was a language like other Slavic languages. In a relatively early work, his review of Malinowski's Polish grammar, written in 1874, Baudouin refers in one place to the "Czech and Ukrainian languages" (*w języku czeskim i małoruskim...*, BdC 1875/1974, 520) and in another calls Russian (*wielkoruski*) and Ukrainian (*małoruski*) "two Slavic dialects [*narzecza*, 523]." Years later, commenting on an international congress of Slavists that was to be held in St. Petersburg in 1904, he pointed out that the organizing committee intended to permit the use of any existing Slavic literary language, and "therefore, of course, Ukrainian [*rusiński czyli małoruski*—BdC 1903/1983, 110] as well." (We shall return shortly to the various names translated here as "Ukrainian.") It might seem strange that Baudouin would bother to mention Ukrainian explicitly, but this was in the context of a controversy about the proposed congress. Some Poles, including the linguist Stanisław Stroński, viewed it as a Russian pan-Slavist propaganda effort. Baudouin reported that the organizers finally decided on the formula "all Slavic dialects" instead of "all Slavic languages" because of

"patriots" of a certain kind, who sniffed the document with their noses and wanted immediately to protest, except that they were not allowed to make a scene. It was not Polish that was at issue—no one intended to question its status as a language—but rather another language, against which not only the rector, Father Fijałek, would protest, but also "patriots" of another kind, namely, Mr. Stroński and his political coreligionists. (BdC 1904a/1983, 138)

(Father Jan Nepomucen Fijałek, rector of the university in L'viv in 1903–1904, refused to accept documents from Ukrainian students if they were written in Ukrainian [BdC 1916b/1983, 170].)

In his most explicit statement on the distinctiveness of the Ukrainian language (BdC 1925, 6–13), Baudouin lists the features that distinguish Ukrainian from the rest of East Slavic (Russian and Belarusian) and from the other Slavic languages. Chief among them is the pattern of palatalization of consonants in the contemporary Ukrainian dialects and its historical development. Roughly speaking, this amounts to the preservation of palatalization before back vowels, zero, and secondary /i/ and loss of palatalization before other front vowels. Concomitant to this is the absence of any trace of the Common Slavic distinction of /i/ and /y/ (e.g., Ukrainian *syn* 'son', *synij* '(dark) blue' vs. Russian *syn, sinij*) as well as the presence of paired consonants resulting from the historical velar palatalizations (/c'/, /z'/, /č'/, /ž'/ vs. /c/, /z/, /č/, /ž/). Another distinctive characteristic of Ukrainian is the reflex of compensatory lengthening in pairs like *mid/medu* 'honey' or *nič/noči* 'night'. Baudouin also mentions the preservation of the vocative (merged with the nominative in Russian) and the presence of verbal forms like the 1p. pl. in *-mo* and the synthetic imperfective future.[4]

As we can see from comments quoted earlier, Baudouin initially used the traditional terms *małoruski* 'Little Russian' or *rusiński* 'Ruthenian' when writing about Ukrainian matters in Polish, and he used the traditional Russian term *malorossijskij* 'Little Russian' when writing in Russian. Around 1905, however, he switched to the terms *ukraiński* in Polish and *ukrainskij* in Russian, apparently because those names were preferred by Ukrainians themselves. Twenty years later he argued that Ukrainians should not object to use of the older terms, as long as they were not used in a deprecatory manner (like Russian *žid* for *evrej*). Many ethnonyms, after all, have different forms in different languages, e.g., *deutsch, German, allemand, niemiecki, tedesco*, etc. (BdC 1925, 3). Although Baudouin was incensed at reports that Polish Ministry of Education officials were threatening to fire Ukrainian schoolteachers for using the term *ukraiński*, he ultimately accepted the terminological suggestions put forward by his fellow linguist Kazimierz Nitsch (Nitsch 1927; BdC 1927). Nitsch argued that Ukrainians should be free to call themselves whatever they pleased, but for Poles the traditional terms were more appropriate since for them the names *Ukraina, ukraiński* and even *Ukrainiec* had a geographical

meaning rather than an ethnographic one. (Recall Baudouin's reference to his "Ukrainian colleagues," i.e., Polish colleagues from Ukraine.)

Baudouin saw language as the central objective criterion for identifying the Ukrainians or any other group. No political conclusions follow from such an identification, since people are not cattle that can be categorized by objective criteria: "the free human being has the right of self-determination" (BdC 1913, 39–40). Thus we identify a Ukrainian "tribe" (*plemię*) on objective (i.e., linguistic) grounds, and the presence of a common national consciousness among a significant number of its members forces us to recognize a Ukrainian nation (*naród*) on subjective grounds (BdC 1925, 2, 5–6). The (objectively defined) Ukrainian linguistic collectivity gave rise to the literary Ukrainian language of nationally conscious Ukrainians. Their "love for their native tongue" is directed toward that language, which cannot be replaced by any other state language (BdC 1925, 11). It is true that the differences among the Slavic languages are no greater than among some French or German dialects; therefore, there could have been one common Slavic literary language. History, however, decided otherwise. If Ukrainians want their own literary language, neither the Polish gentry (*szlachta*) nor the Russian bureaucracy (*činovničestvo*) has the right to interfere (BdC 1913, 40).

Of course both Poles and Russians did try to interfere. Baudouin compared those Russians who loudly asserted that they recognized no Ukrainian nationality to Saltykov-Ščedrin's character Ugrjum-Burčeev, the mayor of Glupov (in *Istorija odnogo goroda*), whose urban design required filling in a river. If they wanted to follow his example in ignoring the flow of the river and in trying to fill it in, it would wash away all dams and flow triumphantly along its own channel (BdC 1923, 189).

Baudouin saw the anti-Ukrainian attitudes of some of his fellow Poles as deriving in part from their "archeological psychology," which he characterized as a "Romantic orientation, colored with nostalgia, drawn from the cemetery of history, resuscitating corpses that are surrounded by a halo of sacred memories" (BdC 1920, 6, quoted by Białokozowicz 1968, 155). He insisted that the concept of "historical rights" be abandoned and with it the "archeological approach to politics" (BdC 1906a, 13). He criticized both Poles and Russians for viewing Ukrainians simply as "ethnographic material" to be polonized or russified (BdC 1903/1983, 116). Forced denationalization only provoked "national hyperesthesia" (*nacional'naja giperèstezija*—an abnormal sensitivity to the national question), stubborn opposition and hatred (BdC 1913, 43). In a kind of paraphrase of Einstein's demonstration of the relatedness of energy and mass, Baudouin pointed out that the very existence of something constituted a form of energy that provoked further consequences; Poles and Russians had to deal with the consequences of the existence of a Ukrainian linguistic community and of Ukrainian national consciousness (BdC 1925, 15).

A major source of mistaken and even potentially fatal policies was the widespread tendency toward what Baudouin called the "statification of nationality" *(upaństwowienie narodowości)* and the "nationalization of statehood" *(unarodowienie państwowości*—BdC 1926, 11). The former referred to the desire to make national consciousness the constituent principle of state formation, while the latter meant the wish to have each state belong exclusively to its dominant nation. This identification of state and nation was reflected in such slogans as "Russia for the Russians" and "Poland for the Poles" (BdC 1906a, 21). Baudouin argued that, on the contrary, Poland existed for all its citizens, and that identifying the state with a nationality was an example of "thinking in words" (or "allowing words to dominate thoughts"—*myślenie wyrazowe*). Poles would have to give up the "nonsensical and dangerous illusion" that the country was owned by "native" *(rdzenni)* Poles and that all others were their subjects (BdC 1925, 17). The illusion was dangerous because the best defense of a country's borders is not bayonets, but a feeling of solidarity with the whole state that is deeply held by its multinational population. That feeling could best be achieved in the case of Poland by equal treatment of all nationalities and elimination of any discrimination; by increasing the living standard of minorities (e.g., through land reform); and by the spread of education in minority languages (BdC 1926, 31). (The term "minority" is perhaps too contemporary; Baudouin spoke of "nationalities.")

Baudouin argued that Poland should provide Ukrainian-language schools where the local population desired them, just as he supported the principle of establishing Russian-language schools for "Ruthenian" citizens of Poland who asserted a Russian identity. (This assumed only that their numbers were sufficient in a given school district; otherwise, they would have to pay for their own schools). While he did not personally feel the need for Ukrainian-language universities (*v sozdanii drugix tipov nacional'noj školy vplot' do universiteta dlja menja lično net nikakoj nuždy*), Baudouin recognized that a Ukrainian demand for such institutions constituted proof that they were needed. Such a university should be established in L'viv, the capital of Galician Ukraine. One model might be Prague, where Czech and German universities coexisted, but a better model would be Helsinki, with its "utraquist" (Finnish and Swedish) university.[5] The Ukrainian language should likewise have full rights in courts and government offices, since as the Polish proverb has it, "the nose is not for the snuffbox; the snuffbox is for the nose," i.e., the tail should not wag the dog (BdC 1913, 42, 48).[6]

In all of his proposals Baudouin's goal was not, he told *Ukrainskaja žizn'*, to bring together Poles and Ukrainians, but rather to foster their "peaceful and benevolent coexistence" (*ne sbliženie poljakov s ukraincami, a tol'ko ix mirnoe i dobroželatel'noe sožitel'stvo*) under the principle "live and let live" (BdC 1913, 47–48). He had earlier told a meeting of representatives of nationalities:

> We have gathered here not because of a sudden passionate fraternal love. Declarations of love should be put away once and for all. We do not have any reason to love one another. But even if we do not have mutual love, we can have common interests. (BdC 1906a, 10)

The image of "peaceful and benevolent coexistence" was not Baudouin's only dream. He reminded his readers that people had once been grouped primarily according to religion, but that religious denomination (*wyznanie religijne*) was slowly becoming the private matter of each individual. Perhaps in the more or less distant future "national denomination" (*wyznanie narodowe*) would also become such a private, individual matter. Obviously that was not now the case (BdC 1925, 14). In the meantime, one could work for the recognition of the right to be "nondenominational" or "multidenominational" with respect to nationality (BdC 1906a, 22). Such a right would contribute to the "hygiene of inter-national life"(*higiena życia międzynarodowego*), along with (1) the separation of church and state and of schools and church; (2) the elimination of the national state, which should be beyond nationality and religion and should guarantee full individual freedom; and (3) the elimination of the distinction of *przybysze* 'those newly arrived'and *tuziemcy* 'natives'. History should start from the present moment (BdC 1906a, 19–21; 1913, 51).

Baudouin did not only have dreams; he also had a nightmare. Independent Poland had been born out of a conflict among the partitioning powers, but that conflict had led to the tragedy of Poles in the Russian army killing Poles in the German and Austrian armies and vice versa. Are we to wait, he asked in 1925, for a similar conflict among partitioning powers to lead to the birth of a Ukrainian state as Ukrainians in opposing armies (e.g., Soviet and Polish) kill one another (BdC 1925, 17)? (In 1913 Baudouin had similarly cautioned Ukrainians that hoping for a war between Austria and Russia was "extremely naive." It might come, but if it did, the Polish and Ukrainian lands might well suffer the most, and in any case war is always a disaster [BdC 1913, 44–45].)

Baudouin's solution within the framework of the Russian Empire had been autonomy and federalism. In 1905 he had been one of the organizers of a Congress of Autonomists, which brought together representatives of fourteen nationalities (Armenians, Azeris, Bashkirs, Belarusians, Estonians, Finns, Georgians, Jews, Kirghiz, Latvians, Lithuanians, Poles, Tatars and Ukrainians). The Union of Autonomists-Federalists later had its own caucus in the First and Second Russian Duma (BdC 1906a, 3; 1916a, 19). Baudouin and his colleagues supported the territorial integrity of Russia, at least for the time being, but called for the guaranteeing of minority rights through proportional representation, for the equality of all languages (even if Russian was to continue to serve as an interlingua), and for other moves toward federalism and autonomy (BdC 1906a, 8, 13–14, 21 et passim; 1906b, 27–28). Baudouin saw

the issue of national autonomy and equality as an extremely urgent matter; he criticized political parties for giving higher priority to other issues, such as elections. (He characterized this as the "maniacal demand that firemen must be elected by universal, equal, direct and secret ballot"—BdC 1906b, 32–33.) In 1916, reprinting his 1905 remarks to the Congress of Autonomists, Baudouin bitterly wrote of his naivete: instead of the peaceful coexistence of nationalities that the congress had tried to promote, what was being realized was "the mutual snapping of the various animals imprisoned in a single menagerie" (*gryznja raznorodnyx životnyx, zakljućënnyx v odnom zverince*—BdC 1916a, 20).

In the context of the 1920s, Baudouin pointed to the existence of nations that have a common language and culture despite belonging to different states. Switzerland was a model: its residents identified themselves as Swiss citizens without giving up their German, French, or Italian language and culture. For now, this was what he could best recommend to the Ukrainians. Perhaps the time would come when a separate state could be achieved without bloodshed, but "today's degenerate and rabid human beast" (*dzisiejsze bydlę ludzkie, zwyrodniałe i rozwścieczone*) was not capable of working out such peaceful solutions (BdC 1925, 14, 18–19).[7]

The situation of Ukraine and the Ukrainians after the World War reminded Baudouin of the prewar situation of Poland and the Poles, divided among three states. Ukraine was divided among four: Russia, Poland, Romania, and Czechoslovakia. During the years of partition those Poles who bore Poland in their hearts and dreams could say, in the words of the Polish national anthem, "Poland has not yet perished while we are alive." Now in "degenerate" (*zwyrodniałej*) independent Poland most could only say, "Poland has not yet perished *although* we are alive." While there might be fewer nationally conscious Ukrainians than there once were comparable Poles, Baudouin continued, there were certainly enough to serve as a basis for a future Ukraine. While they lived and continued to be born, they could say with full faith and hope, "Ukraine has not yet died" (BdC 1925, 16).[8]

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NOTES

1. In what follows, references to Baudouin's publications will be cited using the abbreviation "BdC." Page references are given to the most recent publication of each item, or to the offprint in the case of BdC 1906a. Selections of his linguistic writings have been published in various languages, including Russian (BdC 1963), English (BdC 1972), and Polish. The Polish edition, *Dzieła wybrane*, was published in six volumes under various editors between 1974 and 1990, with the sixth volume containing a selection of his publicistic writings. Volume 1 (BdC 1974) includes a bibliography of his writings; Rothstein 1976b contains additions and corrections to that bibliography. Baudouin's publicistic work is discussed in Kulczycka-Saloni 1983; Rothstein 1975, 1976b, 1983, and 1989; and in Toman 1991.

2. Peretz presumably had in mind Herodotus' account of Xerxes ordering his soldiers to punish the Hellespont after a storm had destroyed the bridge that he had constructed. The 1947 edition of Peretz's collected works does not provide any bibliographical data for his article about Baudouin, but since Peretz died in 1915, it dates from a time before Baudouin's permanent return to Poland. I am grateful to Professor Robert Szulkin of Brandeis University for the reference to Peretz's article.

3. Baudouin's command of the Polish language seems not to have suffered from his long years in Russia. His student, the linguist Kazimierz Nitsch, described Baudouin's style and language as "purely Polish, without Russianisms, although sometimes...with certain individual eccentricities [*z pewnymi indywidualnymi dziwactwami*]" (Nitsch 1935, 361). Nitsch's comment is somewhat understated; Baudouin had a tendency to neologisms and to what one would have to call an idiosyncratic style.

4. Other observations by Baudouin concerning the Ukrainian language are discussed in Łesiów 1989.

5. Baudouin here alludes to the Latin formula of the moderate Hussites of fifteenth-century Bohemia, who demanded the right to receive communion in both forms (*sub utraque specie*).

6. Baudouin quoted the proverb in Russian: *ne nos dlja tabakerki, a tabakerka dlja nosa.*

7. In the discussion at the Baudouin panel in 1992, Professor Andrzej Walicki of Notre Dame University pointed to similarities between Baudouin's approach to nationality and that of the Austromarxists (Otto Bauer, Karl Renner). Walicki also cited in this context such Ukrainian thinkers as Myxajlo Drahomanov and Bohdan Kistjakovs'kyj. This, however, is a topic for another paper.

8. Baudouin cited the first line of the official version of the Polish anthem: "Jeszcze Polska nie zginęła, póki my żyjemy." The original text was written by Józef Wybicki in 1797 at a time when an independent Poland no longer existed. The Ukrainian words that Baudouin quoted, "Šče ne vmerla Ukrajina," begin the then (1925) unofficial Ukrainian national anthem, the text of which was written by Pavlo Čubyns'kyj.

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Planning of the Capital in Kharkiv

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During the late 1920s and early 1930s, the eastern Ukrainian city of Kharkiv was being planned and developed as the capital of Soviet Ukraine. This article will attempt to record, insofar as the available evidence permits, the actual processes and vicissitudes by which physical changes in the city were brought about, and the nature, in architectural terms, of those changes.

The 1920s and early 1930s were important years in the development of twentieth-century architecture. The immediate post–World War I years brought to Europe a short period of great artistic vitality. The best known architectural achievement of that period was the International Style. Its development is associated with such architects as Walter Gropius, Mies van der Rohe and Weimar Germany's Bauhaus school. In the post-revolutionary lands of the former Russian Empire, the new evolving architectural style was similarly oriented toward a machine esthetic with a tendency to abstraction. A lack of materials and the limitations of the Soviet economy did not, however, permit the advanced construction that was then being carried out in Germany. In later years Western writers often emphasized the technological origins of modern architecture, although Frank Lloyd Wright and Le Corbusier placed emphasis on its social significance. The modernism of Weimar Germany, where many workers' apartments were built in the modern architectural style, is similarly associated with socialism. Vasyl' H. Krychevs'kyi's comment in the journal *Chervonyi shliakh* on the architecture of that time probably reflected the thoughts of his contemporaries in 1920s Ukraine: "... the new architectural forces in our Union, together with those in the West, attempt to find common forms for [contemporary] structures, for artistic technical expression, and without any question Moscow occupies the leading architectural position in the Union. The principles of the new utilitarian understanding of architecture have distinct expression in two Moscow groups: OSA and ASNOVA."[1] Further on Krychevs'kyi states that both groups believe that one of the incontestable conditions of the rebirth of architecture is the importance of structure and that "OSA works under the constant influence of Western constructivists—Gropius, Le Corbusier, Dutch architects and others..."[2]

One art form which is a strong indicator of a country's life is architecture. While an ideology is consciously created, the works of art which the ruling groups commission usually reflect their often unconscious ambitions. This is particularly true of architecture. Of all the arts, architecture is most closely linked with politics: buildings and spaces between them form the very environment in which people live, which they move through and see constantly. Architecture inevitably reflects the power relationships and thus the basic

values of the society. The role of political symbolism in the Kharkiv government center of the 1920s and 1930s has not yet been reviewed in the West.

In the Soviet Union, however, architecture was a symbol of the state, a product of its centrally planned economy, and a major tool of its propaganda. A review of the vicissitudes of Soviet architectural history leads one to the analysis of the empire's power and policies. In the case of Ukraine in the mid-1920s, its leadership continued to harbor hope that the republic would develop into a strong and proletarian yet autonomous state. There was belief in forthcoming social progress and trust in Western technology. There was also an evolving struggle for the development of an independent and contemporary Ukrainian culture. These considerations were reflected in Kharkiv's planning and design programs. The architecture of the new capital of Soviet Ukraine, its expression in sharp contrast with the past, reflected these expectations. While Ukraine's construction industry was backward and primitive, to its citizenry the capital's modern architecture represented progressive society and symbolized a new world. Political events of the first half of the 1930s, however, changed the situation.

In the metamorphoses of the early 1930s, the modernistic architecture of the Soviet Union's revolutionary years became associated with decadence, while the neoclassical architectural heritage was equated with society's proletarian character. In the Party's view modern architecture—for over a decade identified with the October revolution and now associated with reactionary capitalism and West European cosmopolitanism—was incapable of expressing the character of the proletarian society. On the other hand neoclassicism, which in architecture emphasized columned façades, symmetry and monumentality, became a convenient vehicle for conveying the image of the power of the new proletarian state. Finally, with the introduction of neoclassicism to Soviet architecture came the rediscovery of Russian classicism and the Russian architectural heritage.

Before discussing the planning and development of Kharkiv in the 1920s and 1930s, a short review of the historical background seems in order. In the middle of December 1919 the Red Army, repulsed from Kiev, entered Kharkiv, installed the third Soviet Ukrainian government, and proclaimed this northeastern Ukrainian city near the Russian border the capital of Soviet Ukraine. In subsequent years the Bolsheviks consolidated their hold over the entire Ukraine, and in 1922 Soviet Ukraine joined the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. By the mid-1920s, native Ukrainian Communists had forced the Communist party to grant Soviet Ukraine a large measure of political and cultural autonomy. In this environment, Ukrainian culture emerged from decades of tsarist russification and began to search for new ties with its indigenous roots and its European traditions. The blossoming of literature, the arts, cinema, architecture, and intellectual thought in 1920s Ukraine was subsequently stilted, however, by the deadly embrace of Moscow's Stalinism.

Architecture in nineteenth-century Ukraine, as in all of Europe, consisted of a potpourri of eclectic styles. As far as Ukraine's sacred architecture is concerned, in 1803 the Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox church banned construction of church buildings designed in the vocabulary of Ukrainian vernacular architecture. Under the guidance of the official Russian church diocesan architects, many old wooden churches in the vernacular architecture were either drastically altered or demolished. The Russian Orthodox church actively propagated standardized architectural designs of the Russo-Byzantine revival style.[3] The immediate pre–World War I years in the Russian Empire were marked by renewed interest in neoclassical architecture.[4] In Ukraine, Art Nouveau ushered in a revival of vernacular architecture and the Ukrainian baroque, along with their reinterpretation in the contemporary idiom. The latter continued after the First World War, well into the late 1920s—a crucial period in the cultural history of Ukraine. Concurrently, an untried and revolutionary International Style of concrete, steel and glass heralded a new era of architecture.

In post-revolutionary and early 1920s Ukraine, the cities of Kiev and later Kharkiv were the centers of cultural regeneration. Kiev enjoyed a remarkably rich cultural life—it was a focus of experimentation in literature, art and music. This sudden growth of avant-garde currents of the 1920s in Soviet Ukraine and the Soviet Union in general was not a result of an official policy, but rather a spontaneous reaction to the revolutionary situation. Furthermore, it seems that the Bolshevik government did not even give consideration to the question of architectural style in the early 1920s. There was an avant-garde tone; there was a vague idea that modernism was doing in art and architecture what the Bolsheviks were supposed to be doing with society. The avant-garde character of these years may be illustrated by reproductions of cover pages of three publications (figs. 1, 6, 14). By the mid-twenties, the modernists had almost completely prevailed over the traditionalists. According to one Soviet observer, in the mid-twenties "Symbolist Romanticist elements appear in Ukrainian architecture, owing to a determination to superimpose plastic ornamentation vaguely reminiscent of Baroque on buildings conceived in contemporary mode. Such attempts are derived directly from Tatlin's experiments and from Erich Mendelssohn's Expressionism."[5] The author refers to the work of such architects as Hnat F. Milinis and Pavlo F. Alioshyn. The designs of the more important buildings selected at that time by the central authorities were of modern idiom, while the designs for less important buildings chosen by local agencies tended to be in more traditional styles. By the time of the First Five-Year Plan, with the Bolsheviks tightening their control over the country, the government was insisting on the new International Style.

Probably the most illustrative example of the attitudes of the unbridled cultural ferment in 1920s Ukraine was Kharkiv's monthly journal *Nova generatsiia* (the New Generation), a publication of the literary society of the

same name. Its editor was Mykhailo Semenko (1892–1937), a poet and the founder of Ukrainian futurism—a movement in the arts characterized by the rejection of tradition and convention, and a striving to express the movement and dynamic energy of contemporary life. For Semenko, the machine workshop was a tenet of faith, as if mechanization were identical with progress. Highly didactic in nature, the journal *Nova generatsiia* expressed revolutionary triumph, optimism, and moral righteousness regarding the development of modern forms of literature, art and architecture. Its pages were devoted to polemics with other literary groups and to the propagation of modern West European movements. On its cover of 1 October 1927, the following slogan appeared:

> WE ARE AGAINST;
> NATIONAL NARROW-MINDEDNESS
> UNSCRUPULOUS SIMPLIFICATION
> BOURGEOIS FASHIONS
> AMORPHOUS ART ORGANIZATION
> PROVINCIALISM

Provincialism seems to have been one of the main targets of *Nova generatsiia*. Its pages are full of photographs of the works of Bauhaus designers; of the Swiss-born architect, painter and sculptor Le Corbusier; of such architects as Bruno Taut, Jacobus J. P. Oud, and Giacomo Prampolini; of the West European artists Joan Miró, Paul Klee, Georges Braque, Juan Gris and Pablo Picasso; of the Ukrainian artists Vadym H. Meller, Vasyl' D. Iermilov (Ermilov), Anatol' H. Petryts'kyi, Alexander Archipenko, and Pavlo M. Kovzhun. A drawing by the latter, a well-known graphic artist, appeared on the cover of the June 1929 issue of *Nova generatsiia* (fig. 1). The journal's editors reprinted articles from French, German, Polish, and Czech architectural journals, and published reports on Alexander Dovzhenko's work in the cinema and the equally experimental works of the Berezil' Theater. The attitude of *Nova Generatsiia* may be seen in its strong interest in the works of the avant-garde pioneer László Moholy-Nagy, a voice of the modern movement in the photography, film, architecture, theater arts, and design of that time. Another pioneer of the modern movement, Kiev-born Kazimir Malevich, described his theoretical outlook in a series of essays written especially for *Nova generatsiia* and published in 1928–1929. They covered his attitudes on modern art and its development, and are recognized for their breadth and vision. Interestingly, despite the concurrent existence of turbulent artistic debates in 1920s Moscow and Leningrad, and the influence of the UNOVIS[6] school on Ukraine's architecture, relatively little of the events of the modernist movement in Russia was reflected on the pages of *Nova generatsiia*. Professional journals similarly informed the Ukrainian reader about current events in the West.[7]

Kharkiv's architects collaborated closely with *Nova generatsiia*. In May 1928 they organized the Union of Contemporary Architects of Ukraine (OSAU—Obiednannia suchasnykh arkhitektoriv Ukrainy) and delegated three prominent Kharkiv architects—Hryhorii O. Ianovyts'kyi, Iakiv A. Shteinberh, and Ivan I. Maloziomov—to represent it on the journal's editorial board.[8] OSAU's declaration was published in Kharkiv's Journal *Zodchestvo*.[9] Kharkiv's architects in the 1920s were indeed an open-minded community. The designers of almost all the major buildings constructed in Ukraine in the 1920s were selected by competitions. In the late 1920s and early 1930s, for example, over twenty all-Union and two international architectural competitions were carried out for major Kharkiv projects.[10] The establishment of modern directions in the architecture of Kharkiv in the 1920s was facilitated by the existence of new local construction organizations such as Inbud (Industrial Construction) and the Ukrainian Institute of Construction.[11] In a span of less than ten years Kharkiv's planners, architects, and governmental clients commissioning major design projects succeeded, in a very difficult political and economic environment, in developing the Ukrainian capital's government center—the only constructivist style urban complex of major buildings and open spaces. During this period of the Soviet Union's increasing concentration on heavy industry, even the pressing problem of housing had to await its turn, but work on the new capital's center continued.

Kharkiv's planning work commenced early. Expansion of the city limits and development of a master plan were initially investigated in 1919.[12] In 1922, the year Ukraine joined the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Ukrainian government approved the extension of Kharkiv's city limits. A year later, an architectural-engineering team was organized by Kharkiv's municipal administration. The newly formed municipal technical bureau, whose staff included Viktor K. Trotsenko, worked under the leadership of chief engineer I. F. Voitkevych.[13] The group commenced its work by designing a number of small-scale low-rise housing units. Such housing was apparently influenced by the discussion of planned communities, especially the work of Ebenezer Howard and his publications.[14] In 1923–24 Viktor Trotsenko built the Kharkiv Steam Locomotive Plant housing development, which consisted of attractive two-story, two- and four-apartment "cottages" (three rooms per apartment), using mansard roofs and porches which reflected the influences of Ukrainian Moderne and folk architecture.[15]

In 1923–24, I. F. Voitkevych's team also succeeded in formulating an overall scheme for Kharkiv's development. According to this plan, industrial development was allocated to the southern outskirts of the city, while residential neighborhoods were to be concentrated in the more attractive northwestern part of the city; a site was also selected for the new center of the capital.[16] Industrial plants were to be located at a distance of 20–30 km from the city, sited at the intersections of existing radial and future ring roads. Major plants or

industrial complexes were to serve as bases for the development of satellite towns.[17] The Voitkevych team's plans also envisioned a wide range of public works, including the clean-up of rivers, park development, etc. Thus, at this early exploratory stage of planning, Kharkiv's city planners attempted to take a comprehensive approach to the city's development.[18]

The city of Kharkiv was developed on a hilly plateau between two rivers—the Kharkiv and the Lopan. The original seventeenth-century fortress, now the historic core of the city, was situated in the triangular space where the Kharkiv river joined the Lopan. The proposal for development of the new government center in the northern part of Kharkiv—the sparsely built-up Nahirnyi (Upper) Region, some distance north of the city's historic core—introduced a new approach in the development of a contemporary urban center and established a north-westerly direction for the city's future development. The new government center was to be developed in a sparsely built-up area at the junction of the old and new sections of the city (the site of the former city dump and waste land); new vehicular arteries were to connect the two areas.[19] The place selected for the new center was located between two radial roadways leading to the original Kharkiv fortress. At one time the site straddling these two roads (Sums'ka and Klochkivs'ka) had been occupied by the homestead of Kharkiv's regimental judge Tymko Klochka.[20] In the eighteenth century, this area had been occupied by the Klochkivka *sloboda* of some sixty-five households and eighty-five houses[21]—hence the name of the adjoining city street, Klochkivs'ka. A schematic drawing of the composition of nineteenth-century Kharkiv conveys the relationship of Sums'ka Street and its environs to the traditional center of the city (fig. 2).

Implementation of the plans formulated in 1923–24 was limited, however, by the lack of resources to a partial rehabilitation of streets, planting of trees, and some construction of low-rise residential quarters. Nevertheless, the planning concepts formulated by Voitkevych and his colleagues were later adopted and further refined, elaborated, and carried out in the development programs of the 1920s and in the city's master plan formulated in 1931–33.

THE GOVERNMENT CENTER

A review of Kharkiv's development in the 1920s should give special attention to the city's government center—a large, open urban space surrounded by a complex of government office buildings (for a schematic composition of Kharkiv in 1930–40, see fig. 3). The government center, later known as Dzerzhyns'kyi Plaza, was sited on land owned by Kharkiv University before the revolution, in an unencumbered area adjacent to University Park (renamed Taras Shevchenko Park in the 1930s).[22] The new government center was envisioned as the focal point of the capital of Ukraine by Voitkevych's colleague Viktor K. Trotsenko, who was thirty-seven years old at the time.[23]

Although Trotsenko went on to design a number of important buildings, his name was not even listed in the first edition of the *Ukrains'ka radyans'ka entsyklopediia.*[24] Trotsenko initially conceived of the government center as a large circular plaza, indirectly connected to Sums'ka Street, a major city thoroughfare leading to the city's historic core around Tevelev Square. This plaza was later enlarged by adding a rectangular open space directly connecting the plaza to Sums'ka Street.[25] Thus, it evolved into its present configuration of a union of a circle and a rectangle.[26] The final design of the government center's 11.5 hectares of open space consisted of two contiguous segments—a large circular space almost 300 meters in diameter, connected to an abutting rectangular plaza 115 meters wide and 430 meters long.[27] According to the master plan, the government center complex was planned for the new automobile era.[28] The government's administrative buildings were to be built on the periphery of, and facing, the circular space (fig. 4). An inner one-way street in front of these office buildings was to provide vehicular access to the individual building entrances, while in the rear an enclosing loop was to accommodate both automobile service and streetcar traffic. The rectangular part of the plaza was bounded on its eastern end by the city's major artery, Sums'ka Street (once known as the city's aristocratic thoroughfare, which led from the core of the city to Myronosyts'ka Church [Church of the Myrrh-bearing Women]). On the west it abutted the round open space encircled by a roadway generating five radiocentric streets. The elevation difference of the slightly sloping (from NE to SW) open space, from Sums'ka Street to the lowest point on the circular plaza, varies from six to eight meters.

The government center building complex was indeed gigantic—it was advertised as the largest open space in Europe. Its implementation was a major Ukrainian planning and construction effort of the late 1920s and early 1930s. With the avant-garde style of the new buildings, the designers created a geometrically powerful structure, conceived for utility and efficient production, and programmed to shape the New Man of the socialist society.

The final appearance of Dzerzhyns'kyi Plaza, however, was not the result of meticulous planning or of a precise and methodical implementation of the initial program. A review of the events of the late 1920s and early 1930s will show that while the overall scheme was established in the early stages of planning, the final design was implemented piecemeal, building by building, with politically motivated improvisations.

In the spring of 1925 the Ukrainians in the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine succeeded in overcoming the pro-Russian faction of Emmanuil I. Kviring and Dmytro Z. Lebid', and introduced the "Ukrainization" program. Coincidentally, at about the same time planning commenced on the first major building of the government center. Construction of this ambitious project was undertaken even before the planning of such renowned Soviet capital efforts as the Dnieper River hydroelectric power plant (1927–32),

Greater Zaporizhzhia (1928), the Moscow Metro (1932), or the city of Magnitogorsk (1930). The first planning legislature to appear in the Soviet Union was that of the Ukrainian republic in 1925, followed two years later by one in the RSFSR.[29]

An all-Union competition was announced in the spring of 1925[30] for the design of the first building of the government center—the Derzhprom (State Industry) building. This building was initially to accommodate the administrative branches of Ukraine's industry, and its program of requirements envisioned office facilities for some thirty government agencies dealing with Ukraine's economic development, as well as two auditoriums (with 1,000 and 250 seats), a library of 200,000 volumes, a restaurant, a telegraph and post office, a radio station, and banking facilities.[31] By August, twenty-two design entries had been submitted.[32] The first prize for the design of the Derzhprom (submitted under the heading "Uninvited Guest") was awarded to the vice rector of the All-Russian Academy of Arts in Leningrad, Sergei S. Serafimov, and to the Ukrainian architect Samuil M. Kravets′.[33] The construction of the building was executed according to the final design of Sergei Serafimov, Samuil Kravets′ and Mark Fel′ger (Feldger), while the construction was directed by an engineer, the academician P. P. Rottert.[34] Working drawings for the Derzhprom building were executed by a team of Kharkiv architects and architectural students under the supervision of Samuil Kravets′.[35] The selected design had an impact on the further development of constructivist architecture in Kharkiv and throughout Ukraine, specifically on the design of large office buildings. Five years later, commenting on the selected design entry, a critic wrote: "The proposed design looked with hesitation into the future... [I]t copied the face of industrial capitalist giant-buildings. But of all the submitted entries it was the only one that broke with the eclecticism of the past and in this is its major importance. In this selection is the victory of contemporary architecture in 1925."[36]

The Derzhprom building was allocated a dominating site off the open space, on the axis of the circular park (see fig. 4). The large, sprawling structure was sited on the perimeter of the plaza in the northwestern part of the round open space. It straddled three city blocks (between Henri Barbusse and Romain Rolland Streets) and two of the circle's four radial streets (see fig. 5) The fan-shaped composition had a radial plan configuration oriented toward the center of the circle. Its wide façade (front façade 240 meters wide, rear façade 400 meters wide)[37] faced the open space of Trotsenko's circle and, further in the distance, the historic center of the city. Automobile circulation was considered a major planning factor and the traffic, piercing the circle enclosing the building, provided access to the individual entrances of the Derzhprom, to Trotsenko's open space enclosed by the inner circular roadway, and the surrounding street network. The design produced a close relationship between the building's internal circulation and the surrounding street network. It was

also a response to the mid-1920s vision of Dzerzhyns'kyi Plaza as the veritable nerve center of Ukraine's twentieth-century capital city.[38]

The total volume of the Derzhprom building was 347,000 cubic meters.[39] Visually, the building dominated the capital center's large open space and its ensemble of buildings. The new office complex actually consisted of three separate and well- articulated structures of reinforced concrete and large areas of glazing, which were connected by overhead bridges on the third, fifth and sixth levels. Each unit had its own entrance hall. All three were connected and shared such common facilities as a dining hall, library, and auditoria.[40] The building's simple geometric and starkly bare volumes gradually increased in height, from six levels on the two side wings towards the center's two twelve-story high (sixty-three meter) towers. At the center, at the point where the main building entrance was flanked by the two towers, the height of the building was unexpectedly lowered again to six levels. A similar treatment of the entrance solutions was employed in the two side wings. The plain façades were articulated by alternating horizontal bands of concrete wall surfaces and glass, while analogous vertical bands of fenestration accentuated the stair towers. The rich and playful skyline of the three-block-long complex visually enlivened the entire plaza. The two designers succeeded in creating a new structure of powerful massing— its geometric volumes of reinforced concrete were clearly expressed, almost naked. With the shifting position of the sun, due to the play of light and shade, the imaginatively shaped volumes seemed to be continuously changing their appearance. The French communist writer Henri Barbusse described it as an "organized mountain." One of the building's co-architects stated that the design of the new structure aimed to "show a factory, a plant which became a palace."[41]

Preparatory construction work began in 1925. The ground-breaking ceremonies were chaired by the head of the Soviet Ukrainian government, Hryhorii I. Petrovs'kyi, and the Chairman of the Council of Commissars, Vlas I. Chubar. The first phase of Derzhprom construction was completed in 1927, the second phase in 1928. Into the completed building moved a potpourri of users—the Council of People's Commissars, Ukraine's Derzhprom (State Economic Council), the Supreme Council of the People's Economy of the Ukrainian SSR, and others.

In the context of the almost primitive conditions of the Ukrainian economy of that time, the construction of this original building of reinforced concrete certainly had to have political meaning. Reinforced concrete construction has been often used in areas where crude mass labor is readily available. In 1920s Ukraine, however, with its great demand for and shortage of steel, such construction was perceived as both difficult and innovative. It not only symbolized industrialization, but must have catered to Ukrainian national sentiments and aspirations.[42] The new building also reflected the vision of the Ukrainian communist leadership of that time. The architectural symbolism of

the Kharkiv government center conveyed a sense of expectation. In retrospect, it is ironic to note that what was then perceived as a celebration of modern construction and technology was conceived and implemented in a setting where reinforced concrete structures had to be created by crude mass labor and handicraft methods.

In the fall of 1927, on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the October revolution, a major exhibition of Ukrainian art and architecture was held in the partially completed Derzhprom building. This exhibition might have been inspired by the June 1927 exhibition of modern architecture in Moscow. Moscow's two-month-long show had exhibited works of Soviet and foreign architects. Among the exhibited works were designs by students from the Kiev Art Institute and the Polytechnic of Fine Arts in Odessa. Works from Kharkiv had included designs for the Railroad Workers Club by Aleksandr Dmitriev and for the Post Office Building by Arkadii Mordvinov. In one exhibition hall there were planning studies of Tuapse and Baku. However, designs of Kharkiv's government center or the Derzhprom building apparently were not exhibited.[43]

Vasyl' Iermilov, one of the most significant figures among the artists of the 1920s in Kharkiv, designed a modernistic rostrum for this exhibit, to be placed in front of the Derzhprom building. The initial design of Iermilov's rostrum was reproduced on the cover of the journal *Nove mystetstvo* (Number 23, 1927)(fig. 6). Typical of Iermilov's work, it was "above all an architectural construction in which the supportive and constructive elements are inseparable."[44] The photograph of the rostrum installed in front of the Derzhprom building clearly shows the main legend "BUDYNOK DERZHAVNOI PROMYSLOVOSTY, VYSTAVKA, 10 ROKIV ZHOVTNIA" (State Industry Building, Exhibition, Tenth Anniversary of October), with additional announcements in German ("Ausstellung") and English ("Exhibition"). Anatole Kopp, however, identified it as an "entrance to the Kharkov Agricultural Exposition."[45] The exhibition's architectural displays included entries in the design competitions for the government building, Derzhprom building, and a number of designs executed by Kharkiv's Union of Engineers and Architects. A reviewer of this event wrote in the journal *Chervonyi shliakh* that the exhibit demonstrated the total victory of contemporary architecture over the advocates of a Ukrainian baroque revival. The same author applauded this development, because "Ukrainian creative culture should not be based on outdated techniques."[46]

Despite various pronouncements, the Derzhprom building was not seen as a total success. An article published in *Nova generatsiia* made the following critique of its design: "Shortcomings of the Derzhprom building's design annoy all of us from the first day of its occupancy. The large number of staircases, draughts, inadequate toilet facilities, and most important, the glassed southern facade—all of this makes working conditions in the Derzhprom unbearable."[47] Improvements in the design process were obviously needed.

In an article published in the spring of 1928, Vasyl' Krychevs'kyi offered the following assessment of the evolving Ukrainian architecture of the late 1920s: "Local circumstances play a role in the development of a style...[E]ach country brings its own peculiar character into architecture. This happened in past periods of the neoclassic and baroque and other styles among various peoples, and this is happening with the constructivist-functionalist style in the German, French, and Dutch lands—so will it be in our country." Regarding Derzhprom, Krychevs'kyi specifically stated, "The new designs of the Kharkiv buildings did not provide us with a real expression of our new architecture—it is only a beginning—an exact translation of borrowed forms. We cannot resolve the tasks presented to us by contemporary architecture within several years. A style is established slowly, regardless of various impractical modern tendencies..."[48]

Despite intensifying industrialization and the ubiquitous slogan "overtake and surpass," the government center seemed to remain a priority of the Ukrainian leadership. In 1927, an all-Union competition for the design of the second major building of the capital center, the House of the Government of the Ukrainian SSR, was carried out. It was to be sited on the circular plaza east of the Derzhprom building. The first prize for the design of the House of the Government was awarded to the Odessa-born architect Oleksander V. Lynets'kyi (designer of the Kharkiv stock exchange, 1925–26, and the city's department store on Rosa Luxemburg Square, 1930s), who submitted an entry under the motto "1871–1917,"[49] The second prize went to the Leningrad architect Sergei Serafimov, who had developed his design in less than two months.[50] This obviously unrealistic competition period reflects unknown political pressures related to what must have been a sensitive issue. Among the other entries was one submitted by the Leningrad architects Aleksandr I. Dmitriev and Oskar R. Munts.[51] Design entries of that competition were displayed in the fall 1927 exhibition of Ukrainian art and architecture.

Enlargement of the original circular open space designed by Viktor Trotsenko might have been motivated by the desire to create a more imposing plaza and to develop a better relationship to the existing street network. It appears that the enlargement, from the original configuration of a large round space into a union of a circle and a rectangle, was not debated in the press. One may suspect that the enlargement of the plaza might also have been influenced by the need to provide additional building sites on the periphery of the plaza's open space (see fig. 4). This might explain the discussions centered on the deficiencies of the design and configuration of the enlarged Dzerzhyns'kyi Plaza. The overall design of the governments center was thus re-examined. In 1927, a design competition was held to remedy perceived defects in the capital center's open space, the relationship of circular space to the rectangular plaza, their configuration, and what was then seen as the plaza's awkward relationship to Sums'ka Street.[52] From the available information, however, it seems that the results of the competition did not alter the design of the plaza.

In his above-mentioned article the widely respected Vasyl' Krychevs'kyi wrote that at the beginning of 1928, Lynets'kyi's design for the House of the Government was completed, and plans were being formulated for the House of Trade (*Kooperatsii*) building. Krychevs'kyi compared the already designed House of the Government with the Derzhprom building, then under construction, and described them as "grandiose buildings of structurally simplified forms modeled after American" architecture.[53] For unknown reasons, however, Oleksander O. Lynets'kyi's design for the House of the Government was never executed. Little published information on this building is available. We do know, however, that as of spring 1928, the overall plan of the government plaza envisioned three major structures on the periphery of the circular space—the completed Derzhprom building, the already designed House of Government, and the proposed House of Trade. The answer to the riddle of the House of Government is probably hidden in political changes of this period. For it is at this time, in the late 1920s, that Stalin's struggle to establish complete personal dictatorship ended in victory. Obviously, there were other priorities.

On 27 December 1927 the Fifteenth All-Union Congress of the Communist Party condemned all deviations from the party line as interpreted by Stalin. The same Congress adopted measures that signified the beginning of the First Five-Year Plan. The year 1929 was a watershed in the Soviet economy: the experimentation with NEP in agriculture was completed, work commenced on the First Five-Year Plan, and plans were being formulated for the collectivization of the peasantry. With the beginning of the First Five-Year Plan, the Soviet city planner was being charged to design the physical framework for the forthcoming rapid industrialization. The Ukrainian economic council of 9 August 1929 established a basic organizational framework for the construction industry in Ukraine. In the fall of 1930, the planning organizations of the Donbas and Zaporizhzhia were combined into DIPROMIST (State Institute for City Planning). By the beginning of the First Five-Year Plan, work on the master plans for Moscow and Leningrad, Zaporizhzhia and Kharkiv was unfolding.[54] In 1930, the Kremlin issued a decree on the reconstruction of cities. These events, and Moscow's rearrangement of all-Union priorities, apparently also influenced the direction of the further development of Kharkiv's government center.

In 1929, plans were also being formulated regarding the residential areas surrounding the capital center, and the channelization of the center's projected heavy vehicular traffic, the latter modeled on the work of the Paris traffic planners.[55] Work continued on the completion of the government center's open spaces: the development of the large circular open space started in 1929, and a year later construction work commenced on the paving of the elongated rectangular part of the plaza. Subsequently, Kharkiv's military parades and popular celebrations and demonstrations were transferred to the new govern-

ment center (see fig. 7). In 1927–28 the center was connected by electric tramway, via Klochkivs'ka Street, to the historic core of the city.

In 1929 we observe the first obvious major improvisation in the development of Kharkiv's capital center. Spurred by collectivization and the needs of the First Five-Year Plan, without much preparation or fanfare, construction work on the House of Trade (*Kooperatsii*) commenced on the vacant site to the north of the Derzhprom building. Construction of the new building was executed according to a partially redesigned competition entry submitted in 1927 by the Leningrad architects Dmitriev and Munts for the House of Government.[56] We do not know the basis of the selection of the Dmitriev and Munts entry for the new project. There is also no indication whether the award-winning design for the House of Government by Lynets'kyi, lauded by Krychevs'kyi, was considered. The original composition of the Leningrad design consisted of a central tower flanked by two low wings, basically square in plan, with interior courts. Adapted to the needs of the House of Trade, the resulting massive (282,000 cubic meters)[57] structure apparently was completed only by the end of 1933. It accommodated eighteen cooperative organizations responsible for the development of Ukraine's agriculture.[58] The original design of the House of Trade, however, was never fully implemented, since its centrally located fifteen-story-high tower (which was supposed to complement the similar tower of the Planning Organization building on the other side of the circular open space) was not built.

Two issues of the journal *Budivnytstvo* (Construction) from 1930 vividly demonstrate the evolving program of the government center. An article in the journal's first issue of 1930 describes a government center consisting of the Derzhprom, government building and the proposed House of Trade. The March-April issue, however, totally ignores the question of the government building and without any explanation discusses only the House of Trade.

Commenting on the decision to adopt Dmitriev's design of the House of Government for the proposed House of Trade building, *Nova generatsiia's* critic wrote, "This structure is being constructed according to a design of the House of Government slightly modified by the author—a facility that has altogether different requirements...than the House of Trade..." Further on, the writer states that the design of the House of Trade, based on the modified design of the House of Government, appears to have been created "many years before the original design of the House of Government" and does not contribute to the development of the architecture, and that the results of Dmitriev's redesign of the original 1927 competition entry are a step backward. In conclusion he states, "...some time ago the engineering-technical community expressed its opinion and its protest against the execution of the House of Trade according to the architect Dmitriev's design. The House of Trade presently under construction is a great architectural blunder."[59] (After World War II, in 1953–

57, the House of Trade building was rebuilt in the style of Stalinist socialist realism, according to a design by the architect Petro Iu. Shpara.)

The First Five-Year Plan was approved in April 1929. A few months later, spurred by the needs of the Plan, both the all-Union and the Ukrainian economic councils decided to commence construction of a newly conceived Proiektbud (Planning Building) or, as it was later called, a House of Planning Organizations, by the beginning of 1930. A total of 5,500 persons were to be accommodated in the new facility.[60] A large parcel of land on the territory of the University Park, to the east of the Derzhprom building, a site previously designated for the House of the Government, was allocated for the new structure of the Planning Organizations.

Apparently as a result of the controversy surrounding the selection of Dmitriev's design for the House of Trade, Kharkiv's leadership decided to announce an all-Union competition for the newly proposed House of Planning Organizations. Unfortunately, the competition period again was unrealistically short. Apparently only eight design entries were submitted for the jury's consideration. On 5 February 1930, the design entry by Sergei Serafimov (submitted under the motto "Overtake and surpass") was awarded the first prize. The award-wining design was a re-working of Serafimov's 1927 entry in the House of Government competition.[61] Second prize went to the Vesnin brothers from Moscow, and third prize to the Kharkiv architects Hryhorii O. Ianovyts'kyi and Mykhailo M. Movshovych. The construction of the House of Planning was executed according to the final design of Sergei Serafimov and Mariia A. Zandberg-Serafimova. Responding to the Kremlin's demand for speed, on 15 April 1930 construction commenced on the House of Planning Organizations. The construction work was done by the engineers Sheier, Medvedivs'kyi and Velchykiv.[62] Originally the construction was to be completed by the fall of 1931. The construction of the building's wings was being completed in the summer of 1931, and only in the fall of 1933 was most of the construction work done.

The House of Planning Organizations building was initially designed with 50,000 square meters of net usable space and 300,000 cubic meters of volume; however, the final design apparently reduced the building's volume to 270,000 cubic meters.[63] Among its features were a 500- and 200-seat auditorium, two 100-seat meeting halls, an exhibition hall, a 100,000-volume library, and a cafeteria. The new building was to house the capital's planning, design, and construction management agencies. Sited off the main axis of Trotsenko's circular park, it enclosed it from the southwestern side (see fig. 4). Although of the same vocabulary as the Derzhprom building, its composition was totally different.[64] The massive complex consisted of a slender fourteen-story -high central tower flanked by two symmetrical U-shaped lower wings. Thus, the building's volumes increased in height from seven levels at the ends of the side wings to a ten-level height at midpoint, and culminated in a fourteen-story-high

central tower. The tower was connected to the side wings by bridges. It was accented by two vertical bands of continuous fenestration (see fig. 8). The entire width of the building's front façade facing the circular open space was about 260 meters. As in the Derzhprom building, the façades of the structure were articulated by alternating bands of plain concrete wall surfaces and glass. In the rear of the tower, facing University Park, was a semi-circular auditorium and related support facilities.[65] Reviewing the results of the competition for the House of Planning Organizations, *Nova generatsiia*'s critic spoke harshly of "incomprehensible misunderstanding by the jury" that had awarded the first prize to Sergei Serafimov.[66] The winning entry was severely criticized for a number of reasons including uneconomical layout, lack of standardization of the structural system, poor planning (such as having drafting studios with southern exposure), and the artificially developed design of the façades and the central tower. Most importantly, in the view of the *Nova generatsiia* reviewer, the design repeated mistakes of the Derzhprom building and did not introduce anything new to the the Dzerhyns'kyi Plaza's appearance. The author effectively pointed out the advantages of a design entry submitted by the Vesnin brothers, labeling Serafimov's design as the second mistake of the capital center's development, and called for reconsideration of the decision.[67] (After the Second World War, in 1953–63, the Planning Organization Building was converted by the architect Veniiamyn P. Kostenko to a main building of the university; its exterior walls were then faced with a ceramic tile skin.)

In the late 1920s, two young Kharkiv architects were commissioned to design two major buildings fronting the rectangular plaza. Hryhorii Ianovyts'kyi, a 1925 graduate of the Kharkiv Institute of Art, was asked in 1928 to design an imposing 125,000 cubic meter hotel named the International (the present-day Kharkiv).[68] The lack of resources apparently delayed construction of the hotel until 1931–34. The main wing, however, was apparently completed later. The subdued horizontal volumes of the hotel's constructivist style vocabulary successfully established a transition from the exuberant forms around the circular plaza to the more quiet character of Sums'ka Street. The building's elegant design composition is a good example of the work of this talented architect. Unfortunately, the original design of the hotel was modified to reflect growing criticism of constructivist architecture. A drawing of the original design of the International Hotel (fig. 9) and a photograph of the building as it looked in 1941 (fig. 10) provide an opportunity to compare the initial constructivist version and the more conventional and acceptable eventual solution. After the hotel's destruction in the Second World War the entire structure, like other buildings on the plaza, was rebuilt in the Stalinist socialist realist style.

The second building, the House of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine, was sited in the highest part of Dzerzhyns'kyi Plaza (fig. 4). It was located at the end of the longitudinal axis of the plaza's rectangular space,

fronting Sums'ka Street. Architect Iakiv A. Shteinberh's design for the asymmetrical façade of the headquarters of the Communist party has an interesting history.[69] At that time there existed on the selected site two eclectic buildings, a three-story structure built in the neoclassical Empire style and an adjoining two-story-high Renaissance Revival building. The program of requirements for the new Central Committee building called for more than doubling the net usable area of these two structures. Shteinberh, a 1925 graduate of the Kiev Art Institute, responded to his charge with an innovating, sophisticated, and at the same time economical solution. Instead of demolishing the two existing buildings, he proposed that the structures be retained, preserved, and enlarged by the construction of additional floors (27,000 cubic meters) and a new wing (11,000 cubic meters), both designed in the constructivist vocabulary. This would almost double the volume of 28,000 cubic meters of the two existing structures. Visually, Iakiv Shteinberh proposed what he called "a four-dimensional" solution. The eclectic front façades of the existing two buildings were to be preserved. Above them, the rhythm of the preserved façades would be spanned by a horizontally expressed constructivist addition of three levels (Shteinberh referred to this addition as a contemporary "entablature"). A new entrance was proposed, to be located in the contemporary extension to the south of the existing structure (see fig. 11). In the rear of the Communist party headquarters, Iakiv Shteinberh proposed a new wing that would accommodate a kitchen and dining room of 320 seats on the lower level and an auditorium of 725 seats on the upper level. Such original and daring design solutions, incorporating old façades into new structures, were attempted again only decades later, for example in 1975 in Aldo Giurgola's design for the Penn Mutual Tower in Philadelphia (Giurgola later won the international competition for the Canberra Parliament building). Unfortunately, Iakiv Shteinberh's imaginative solution was rejected, and the final design eliminated retention of the eclectic façades (1930–32). On the site of Shteinberh's building, which was destroyed during World War II, a new six-story regional Communist party headquarters, designed in the socialist realist style by Volodymyr M. Orekhiv and Veniiamyn P. Kostenko, was constructed in the early 1950s.

THE MASTER PLAN

Concurrently with the development of a new government center, the city's long-range master plan was being formulated. It is obvious that in the minds of the Ukrainian leadership, the construction of the center simply could not wait for the completion of the master plan. In 1930–33 DIPROMIST formulated what has been considered by Soviet historians as Ukraine's most professional planning effort of the 1930s—the Kharkiv Master Plan. A prominent planner, Oleksander L. Einhorn,[70] was appointed chief of the DIPROMIST team of planners charged to develop the Kharkiv Master Plan. "A large collection of

DIPROMIST's architects, engineers, and economists" worked on the development of this plan.[71] The results of I. F. Voitkevych's planning work were apparently fully incorporated into, and refined in, the new master plan of the 1930s.[72] In 1971 the Ukrainian planner Anatolii Stanyslavs'kyi wrote that Kharkiv's planning of the capital of the Ukrainian SSR was most accomplished in both the scholarly and architectural-planning aspects.[73] According to a perestroika-vintage article in a Moscow architectural journal, there were two major planning schools in the Soviet Union in the 1930s—one in Moscow and another in Kharkiv's DIPROMIST. The latter is described as "an independent city planning school whose importance went beyond the republic's boundaries."[74] The author notes with chagrin that in the late 1930s, after the transfer of DIPROMIST to the new capital in Kiev, the school lost its scholarly and professional standing.

Kharkiv's population grew dramatically in the 1920s.[75] Hence the Kharkiv Master Plan, developed in the early 1930s under the direction of two men—an engineer, Oleksander L. Einhorn and an architect, Oleksander M. Kasianiv—envisioned a new city of 1.8 million.[76] According to the authors of a more recent city document, "The 1984–2004 Master Plan," their work is a direct successor to the 1930s Master Plan.[77] Einhorn's team of planners introduced a number of new methodical approaches into Soviet planning practice—for example, consideration of historical and geographic characteristics.[78] Developed in 1931–33, the Master Plan also had such innovative features as wide usage of residential neighborhood units (although the later Soviet terms *mikroraion* and *raion* were not used in Kharkiv, the practice was later widely adopted in Soviet planning work). The master plan aimed at the development of residential and industrial zones, the reconstruction of public open spaces, and the adaptation of the city's existing street system to automobile traffic. For the first time, architectural competitions were being held for the design of major arterial streets.[79] Capitalizing on the city's topography—its ravines and gullies—the master plan proposed to develop multi-level automobile traffic intersections and a system of public transportation, including a subway system creatively adapted to the city's topography.

As was mentioned before, in the late 1920s the open space of the government center was considered to have poor proportions and a less than adequate configuration: there was general agreement that the asymmetrical relation of the round and rectangular parts of the plaza was unsatisfactory, and there was concern regarding the relationship of the plaza to Sums'ka Street (see fig. 4). These concerns lingered on. Recollections by Sergei Serafimov provide us with some insight regarding these uncertainties. According to the co-author of the Derzhprom building, the first structure on the plaza was designed to be seen at a distance not greater than the diameter of the circular open space. Development of the rectangular space of the plaza, however, provided an open view of the Derzhprom building from Sums'ka Street. As seen from Sums'ka Street, the

massing of the Derzhprom Building was visually further diminished by the fact that it is located at the lowest level of the plaza.[80]

Apparently as a result of these concerns, in the first years of the 1930s the DIPROMIST studios reviewed the entire Dzerzhyns'kyi Plaza complex and developed two versions of a well-formulated revised master plan for the government center.[81] According to one version a major structure, the House of the Government, was to be sited between the circular and rectangular portions of the open space—in the area where the two segments of the plaza are joined (a distance of about 100 meters)(see fig. 12: Rejected plan for Dzerzhyns'kyi Plaza, 1933). The two open spaces were to be visually related by two large archways. Thus, each area would have the conventional character of an enclosed urban open space. The rectangular square, with a paved surface, would accommodate parades, mass celebrations and workers' demonstrations. The circular space would provide a recreational, park-like setting.

In the alternative and preferred version of the revised government center master plan, the juncture of the circular and rectangular spaces would remain unencumbered and articulated only by landscaping. On the southern side of the junction of the two parts of the open space, the linkage was to be articulated by a major new building of horizontal composition—the House of the Government.[82] The Government House building, sited between the open space of the plaza and the old University Park, would face both the circular park and the rectangular parade grounds.

DIPROMIST plans for the government center also envisioned construction of the Museum of the Medical Institute (on the northern corner of the rectangular plaza and Sums'ka Street), a recreational complex of cinema, cafe and restaurants (fronting the University Park, on the southern corner of the plaza and Sums'ka Street)(see fig. 13: Master plan of the government center, architect Borys Pryimak, 1933). Previously formulated plans of a neighboring "New" Square off Sums'ka Street were retained. In addition to the State Theater for Mass Performances, the proposed cultural complex of buildings included the All-Ukrainian Picture Gallery.[83] A comparison of DIPROMIST's 1934 plan for the government center with that of 1929 shows that the original concept of the street layout was retained by DIPROMIST planners. By 1934, however, the magnitude of the entire complex and the density of its development was less daring and was markedly reduced in intensity. By 1934, the architectural concepts were also more definitive.[84] These changes were probably the consequence of more mature professional cadres, the realization of economic limitations, and above all the drastically diminishing strength of the local leadership.

Reviewing the designs for Dzerzhyns'kyi Plaza and the surrounding buildings in an article written in the fall of 1933, Oleksander Kasianiv was harshly critical of the work already accomplished. For the first time in the press, he stressed that "an unusual and important deficiency of Dzerzhyns'kyi Plaza is its

independent, isolated existence in the city's plan. Dzerzhyns'kyi Plaza...is detached from the entire city and in the first place from its old city center..."[85]

Responding to the deficiency of the Dzerzhyns'kyi Plaza location, the Kharkiv planners of the early 1930s proposed a new ceremonial Lenin Avenue (somewhat analogous to Washington's Pennsylvania Avenue between the White House and the Capitol), which would connect three urban nodal points: the historic core of the city around Tevelev Square, the yet-to-be-developed New Square, and Dzerzhyns'kyi Plaza, then under construction. At one end of the proposed Lenin Avenue would be the Dzerzhyns'kyi Plaza building complex. At the other end would be Tevelev Square, and the former Nobility Assembly Hall converted by the architect Oleksander V. Lynets'kyi into the All-Ukrainian Central Executive Committee (VUTsVK) building (destroyed during the Second World War).[86] After the transfer of the capital of Ukraine from Kharkiv to Kiev in early 1934, the well known and respected architect Vasyl' Krychevs'kyi, in an attempt to prevent demolition of the medieval church of St. Michael of the Golden Domes, proposed an analogous solution for the development of a new capital center of Ukraine in Kiev.[87] Krychevs'kyi's proposal consisted of clusters of structures around two major buildings (the Central Committee and the Council of Ministers buildings) located on two Kievan hills—the historic Old Town (site of the Monastery of St. Michael of the Golden Domes) and the underdeveloped Pechers'ke hill. The two complexes were to be connected by a wide avenue-viaduct built over the deep ravine that separates the two hills.[88] Neither the scheme in Kharkiv nor that in Kiev was implemented.

With the transfer of the capital of Soviet Ukraine to Kiev, no further development of the capital center complex was carried out by DIPROMIST. The subject of the city's core, however, continued to occupy the attention of the Kharkiv planners through the post–World War II years.[89] The historic Tevelev Square remained the city's center, and on the fiftieth anniversary of Soviet rule in Ukraine it was renamed Soviet Ukraine Square.

NOVYI KHARKIV

Since Kharkiv's population was growing dramatically, plans were developed for new housing and a number of major new public buildings. Beginning in 1923–24, such architects as Viktor Trotsenko, Samuil Kravets', and Heorhii Vehman had worked on Kharkiv's housing problem.[90] In 1929 the Ukrainian Institute of Construction under the leadership of Professor Iakiv V. Stoliarov commenced construction of experimental two- and three-story buildings of large pre-fabricated blocks in Kharkiv's Kholodna Hora region. In 1930–31, the first six-story-high apartment buildings of large pre-fabricated blocks in the USSR were built in Kharkiv, under the engineer Andrii S. Vatsenko.[91] Trotsenko's initial attempts in 1923–24 to develop cottage-like housing units

culminated in Kievan architect Pavlo Al'oshyn's design of a new town for the Kharkiv Tractor Plant. In 1929 Al'oshyn was invited from Kiev to Kharkiv and appointed chief architect of DIPROMIST. In the same year, he and his team of young architects were charged with developing the capital's new garden city, with a population of 126,000 and 615 hectares of land.[92] The tractor plant's new town, popularly known as Novyi Kharkiv (New Kharkiv), was to be located on the city's south-eastern outskirts, some eight kilometers from the city center. Its design had to be completed in one year.[93] The Novyi Kharkiv developers' ambitions were comparable to those of a new government center. Similar housing problems occupied other Soviet designers as well. At the same time, in 1929, Nikolai Ladovskii won first prize for his design entered in an extensively debated "socialist city" competition—a green city resort near Moscow which was to expand and grow in a linear fashion.[94]

The distinguishing features of the design of Kharkiv's new town were the clear establishment of zoning, separation of the residential zone from the industrial zone by a green belt of 500 meters, and such naively idealistic proposals as common dining facilities. The rich topography of the central portion of the new town was to be devoted to a park-like recreational zone (with 20 square meters per person), which was to include a stadium, gymnasium, and hospital. The basic planning unit of the new town was to be a neighborhood unit which was to occupy a large block and include apartments for families, dormitories for the unmarried, common facilities including kitchens and dining areas, and a school and kindergarten.

The first phase of Novyi Kharkiv, some forty-six buildings, was designed by Pavlo Al'oshyn. Its design features included open spaces between buildings, the use of red and white brick building material, and a rich utilization of balconies and greenery. The initial design also called for connection of individual buildings by glass-enclosed pedestrian bridges on the second level. The new town's neighborhood units each accommodated 3,000 inhabitants housed in eight structures, six for families and two for singles. Each neighborhood unit also had community accommodations including a club, a shop, and children's facilities. Construction of the new residential community commenced at the same time as the construction of the tractor plant, and intensive work on both projects continued until 1931. Subsequently, priority was placed on the development of the plant. By January 1932, of the forty-two four-to-six-level residential units that had been begun, only eighteen were completed.[95] These were attractive, well-proportioned buildings. Further construction of the new town, just as other euphoric Kharkiv projects, was curtailed by the Kremlin's priorities for industrial development. Nevertheless, throughout the coming decades the design of Kharkiv's new town was considered by Soviet architectural historians as an outstanding example of constructivist work.[96]

INTERNATIONAL COMPETITIONS

The progression of Kharkiv's competitions of the 1920s culminated in 1930 in a series of international competitions for two major projects—a design for a monument to Taras Shevchenko and a multi-use opera theater with four thousand seats.

The Shevchenko monument competition was initially announced on 21 September 1929. In 1930, however, a new open international competition was announced. The program of the competition was published in four languages (fig. 14). A large jury, chaired by the president of Soviet Ukraine, Hryhorii Petrovs'kyi, included such well-known figures as artist Ivan Padalka (executed for "nationalist formalism" in 1938); art historian Fedir Ernst (exiled from Ukraine in 1934); the well-known painter, graphic artist and architect Vasyl' Krychevs'kyi (emigrated during World War II); stage director and producer Les' Kurbas' (accused of nationalism and formalism in 1933 and subsequently arrested, exiled and executed); historian and former rector of Kharkiv University Dmytro Bahalii (died in 1932); avant-garde artist and chief designer of the Berezil' Theater Vadym Meller; renowned avant-garde artist and stage designer Anatol' Petryts'kyi; poet and editor of *Nova generatsiia* Mykhailo Semenko (executed in 1937); art historian and director of the State Museum of Art Stefan Taranushenko (arrested and exiled in 1934); writer Mykola Khvyl'ovyi (committed suicide in 1933); and others. The Taras Shevchenko monument was to be sited in the most vibrant place in the city, and since the seventeenth century its traditional center—St. Nicholas Square, renamed in 1919 after the executed Russian-born Bolshevik agent Musii S. Tevelev. Over a hundred entries were submitted in the competition, among them works by artists in France, Germany, Italy , and Czechoslovakia. The entry selected by the jury, which had been submitted by a group of Leningrad sculptors under the leadership of K. Alekseeva, was not accepted by the party.[97] Decades later, a Soviet historian wrote that the jury had favored anti-realistic entries and that most of the proposals were influenced by expressionism and formalism.[98]

According to Soviet sources, the Church of St. Nicholas on Tevelev Square interfered with the city's streetcar traffic.[99] However, the location of the church on the square, as shown on the plan published in the program of the 1930 International Competition, indicates that the church building in no way impeded the movement of vehicular traffic and did not require demolition (see fig. 15). Nevertheless, during the 1930s planning exercises the eclectic-style Church of St. Nicholas (the largest, richest, and most popular house of worship in the city) was demolished.

In 1933 another all-Union closed competition was announced for the Shevchenko monuments in Kharkiv and Kaniv. On 27 September 1933 a new jury, toeing the Stalinist line, reviewed the thirty competition entries. Among them were works by such well-known Ukrainian artists as Ivan Kavaleridze,

Vasyl' and Fedir Krychevs'kyi, Vadym Meller, and Anatol' Petryts'kyi. The jury refrained from making a selection, but instead commissioned two artists, the Russian sculptor Matvei G. Manizer and the Ukrainian Adolf Strakhov (Braslavs'kyi), to develop separate new proposals. These were reviewed on 10 October 1933, and Matvei Manizer's entry was awarded first prize. In the spring of 1934 a cornerstone was laid for the construction of the Shevchenko monument on the somewhat secluded and quiet site in the former University Park. In the same year, the park was renamed Pavel Postyshev Park (subsequently it was designated Taras Shevchenko Park).[100] The Shevchenko monument was finally erected in the spring of 1935. The sculptor was Matvei G. Manizer, the architect Iosif G. Langbard, both from Leningrad. Langbard was also the winner of the 1935 competition for the design of Kiev's government center, which was to be built on the site of the demolished medieval monastery of St. Michael of the Golden Domes. By that time, Strakhov was working on the Tevelev monument.[101]

Another major international competition was held for the design of the State Theater for Mass Performances.[102] It was one of the main events for Ukraine's architectural community. Initial plans for the State Theater or the Grand Opera House were formulated in 1929. Subsequently, the Ukrainian government approved the project, and in July 1930 the international competition was announced. The competition program was published in five languages. A six-month design period assured the quality of the entries submitted. In addition, fifteen entries were invited from individual architectural schools and professional societies. The new theater, a favorite project of Commissar of Education Mykola D. Skrypnyk, was to be used not only for theatrical performances, but also for national festivals, demonstrations, and public meetings. The location selected for the new theater building, off Sums'ka Street, was apparently on or near the site of Myronosyts'ka Church and its cemetery, which were subsequently demolished (the present-day Skver Pobidy—Victory Park). In the eyes of the planners, the church building interfered with the city's vehicular traffic.[103]

According to a recently published work on the archives of Walter Gropius, "the central requirement of the competition was for a spatially undivided fusion of stage and auditorium, where 'theater performances, community festivals, sports events, circus shows, and Agit brigade spectacles' would occur."[104] The envisioned four-thousand-seat house was to be the largest facility of its kind—larger than the opera houses in Odessa, Vienna, Moscow, Paris, or Milan. The announcement of the State Theater for Mass Performances competition elicited a wide response. Of the 144 entries, ninety-one came from abroad (from western Europe, the United States, Japan, Hungary, Romania, and Poland). One of the outstanding designs was submitted by Walter Gropius, founder and director of the Bauhaus.[105] Other prominent west European architects who took part in the competition were Hans Poelzig and Marcel

Breuer. There seems to be a consensus among critics that the latter's design was "influenced by the mechanistic spirit of El Lissitzky, of Tatlin, and of Ladowsky."[106] The competition's fifty-four-member jury was chaired by Ukraine's Commissar of Education, Mykola Skrypnyk. Of the 144 entries submitted, the jury selected 22 for further detailed consideration. One finalist's entry was submitted under the motto "Mazepa." The winning entry came from two famous Moscow architects—the Vesnin brothers. The Vesnins' design "included a horseshoe-shaped hall in which the single amphitheater and semicircular stage formed part of a combined ovoid volume, the spectator capacity of which varied from 2,000 to 6,000 seats."[107] According to one writer, the Vesnins' design for the Kharkiv theater "demonstrated a flowing elegance absent in many other designs of the period."[108] The Vesnin brothers described their design for the theater as "one of our most successful works."[109]

The secretariat of the jury organized an exhibition of works submitted in the competition, which was opened on 2 March 1931. Tens of thousands visited this exhibition. Tours were organized in various Ukrainian cities. A number of conferences were held on this occasion, including the All-Ukrainian Convention of Engineers and Technicians. During these gatherings, resolutions were passed endorsing construction of the theater building. Plans were also discussed for the publication of an album of works in the competition, and the organization of a traveling exhibit. The competition results were published in a number of professional journals in Soviet Ukraine, western Ukraine (then part of the post–World War I Polish Republic), and in western Europe. Construction of the theater apparently commenced in 1933. A change in the political climate, and the equally sudden transfer of the capital of Ukraine back to Kiev, resulted in abandonment of this project.

WORKERS' CLUBS

Among Kharkiv's other major new constructionist edifices built during this period were clubs and theaters. The construction of workers' clubs in Kharkiv dates to the turn of the century, when the "Narodnyi Dim" buildings were being introduced.[110] The workers' club building type of the 1920s was developed to foster social change and collectivization of public life, and to complement the existing spartan housing. It was mostly initiated by industrial enterprises, and tended to resemble small theater buildings. In contrast to the prevailing Soviet practice of building clubs for one particular factory, at that time clubs in Kharkiv were built primarily for the general use of a particular profession or trade. (This peculiarity might have reflected the Communist leadership's view that in the setting of Kharkiv, such clubs would be more effective in reeducating the growing number of rural immigrants.) For example, a club for textile workers was built in 1929 by the architect M. Luts'kyi, and a club for food processing workers was designed by the architect Oleksander Lynets'kyi. The

construction industry's Club of Construction Workers (built in 1927–28) was designed by the architects Iakiv Shteinberh, Ivan Maloziomov, and Hnat Milinis (who subsequently became an associate of Moisei Ginsburg in Moscow). The latter was a good example of a workers' club—it accommodated a 1,200-seat theater, a library, a lecture hall with 120 seats, dining for 200, a gymnastics hall, and other facilities which were arranged around a central open court.

One of the outstanding structures of that type was Kharkiv's Palace of Labor (built in 1927–29 according to the winning entry in an all-Union competition submitted by the architect Aleksandr Dmitriev, and later renamed the Palace of Railroad Workers). Facing a small square in a low-rise residential section of the city, it was the focal point of the square and the surrounding neighborhood. The club accommodated a 2,000-seat theater with two levels of balconies, a library, a music studio, and a radio station. Built of reinforced concrete and brick, the Palace of Labor had a simple and symmetrical exterior emphasized by the outwardly curved undulating façade, and an entrance of polished labradorite. Its interior was more lavish, enriched with marble and labradorite.

The best concert hall in 1930s Kharkiv was housed in the Red Factory Theater, located on Povstannia Square in the industrial district of the city.[111] An open competition for the building was announced in December 1930. Built according to an award-winning design by two Kharkiv architects, Valentyn I. Pushkariov and Viktor K. Trotsenko, it essentially functions as a neighborhood theater of 1,500 seats. Its interior originally was decorated with frescoes by the well-known Ukrainian artists Mykhailo L. Boichuk, Vasyl' F. Sedlar and Ivan I. Padalka.[112] Unfortunately, these frescoes were later labeled nationalist works and destroyed, and the interior was rebuilt in the socialist realist style.[113]

SHIFTING POLITICAL CLIMATE

In the spring of 1930, as Kharkiv was being shaken by the S.V.U. (Spilka vyzvolennia Ukrainy—Union for the Liberation of Ukraine) show trials of forty-five leading cultural figures, the Kremlin announced a new competition for the Palace of Soviets in Moscow. It was to provide a model for the architecture of the new socialist society. The Kremlin's decree on the reorganization of literary and artistic associations was issued on 23 April 1932. The Kremlin-sponsored Union of Soviet Architects was established in June 1932.

The year 1933 was critical in the history of the Ukrainian people.[114] It was also an important year in the history of Soviet architecture. In 1933 the Second Five-Year Plan commenced. During that year, the planning work on the capital of Soviet Ukraine in Kharkiv was being completed.

The Soviet leadership's disillusionment with contemporary architecture culminated in a 10 May 1933 decision to award the first three prizes in the

Palace of Soviets design competition (which was carried out in four separate rounds) for design entries executed in the pseudo-classical monumentalism of the new style of Socialist Realism. But even more significant than the selection of these designs was the accompanying report, in which the jury condemned modern architecture in formal terms. In the matter of style, the jury stated, Soviet architects should move towards adopting the heritage of classical architecture. Thus, the constructivism of the New World, which advocated machine-age architecture of abstract forms and social utopianism, collided with Stalinism. The reign of artificially created architecture of the nouveau riche—the Soviet ruling circles' style of Socialist Realism, which the proletariat "could understand better"—began in the Soviet Union. Russian fascination with American architecture of the pre-revolutionary decades[115] seems to have culminated in the following years in the pompous design of a tall, stepped-back Palace of Soviets inspired by New York's Art Deco style architecture of the early 1930s.

In December 1933 the first plenary assembly of the organizational bureau of the Union of Soviet Architects of Ukraine was held. In his speech to the plenary assembly the chair of the organizational bureau, Ivan Maloziomov, "reviewed in detail the mistakes in the architects' work. The former OSAU was the bearer of constructivism, which disregarded artistic elements in architecture. Due to the lack of revolutionary spirit among architects, nationalist tendencies nestled into architecture.... The Central Committee's resolution of 23 April 1932, on the reconstruction of art organizations, the government's decision on the competition for the Palace of Soviets... became the turning point in the development of Soviet architecture."[116]

In the same eventful year of 1933, in another part of Europe Adolf Hitler, himself a frustrated architect-planner, closed the "Bolshevik International" Bauhaus—the revolutionary school of German avant-garde architecture. The Nazis branded modern architecture as decadent and denounced it for lack of national roots. Hence, neoclassical architecture and planning were being developed in the context of the Third Reich's society and politics. Similar tendencies appeared in Italy, where Benito Mussolini favored monumentality and grandeur. These events tempt one to conclude that totalitarian regimes tended to favor neoclassical architectural expression. In this vein, in an article on "The Architecture of Authority," written in the immediate post–Second World War years, a British writer stated that "in officially banning modern architecture Hitler merely followed Stalin in recognizing what had long since been axiomatic among Powers: that the correct wear for ceremonial occasions is the Classic."[117] Discussing the 1930s, however, one should recognize that at that time the neoclassical style was an official expression in many lands—including the United States, Hitler's Germany, Mussolini's Italy and Stalin's Soviet Union—and that "various social and political philosophies" expressed themselves in a similar manner.[118] It is interesting also to note that Hitler's

personal architect, Albert Speer, saw the neoclassicism of the 1930s as a non-ideological movement—he "preferred to see neoclassicism within a broader, European context."[119]

The above notwithstanding, one should point out that once Stalin (just as Hitler) had consolidated his power, he proceeded to adopt the neoclassical expression, as one that could deliver architectural authority to his proletarian state. The Soviet architectural metamorphosis of the early 1930s has fascinated historians and architectural students.[120] It is stressed that the Soviet avant-garde architects "wanted to build a perfect, mechanistic architecture in a country with no industrial base, no tradition of machine-base technology, and certainly no cultural elite."[121] The 1930s realization that the world revolution was not materializing underscored for the Soviet citizen the difficulties of building socialism and developing a country with a primitive and backward industry. The question has been raised, "How could a population which was just emerging from serfdom, but which still perceived aristocracy as embodying all that was possible in terms of culture and style, suddenly accept and come to terms" with constructivist ideas?[122] Following up on the latter, Kenneth Frampton wrote that "the proclamation that 'proletarians also have a right to colonnades'—was nothing if not a masterstroke of political strategy."[123] Thus, the introduction of neoclassicism as the official architectural style of the Soviet Union seemed to address a number of issues. The Party was sponsoring an architecture that looked expensive and dominant, that was columned and monumental. Finally, with the rediscovery of neoclassicism, Soviet architects begun to assert the special debt they owed to Russian classicism.

In the historic year of 1933, while DIPROMIST planners were completing their work on the master plan of the new capital of the Ukrainian proletarian state and its government center, Dzerzhyns'kyi Plaza (fig. 13), alternative plans were apparently being formulated in the Communist party's offices. In December 1933, the government of the Ukrainian SSR made the sudden and unexpected decision to transfer the capital back to Kiev. The reasons and motivation for this sudden decision were never fully and satisfactorily explained. Is it possible that the new ruling circles preferred traditional Kiev to avant-garde Dzerzhyns'kyi Plaza in Kharkiv?

At that time, construction of the government center's Derzhprom, Planning Organization, and Central Committee buildings had been completed; the International Hotel and the Trade House buildings were still in scaffolding.[124] It is interesting to note that the Kharkiv chief planner's three-page review of the major features of Kharkiv's master plan, published in the November-December issue of the Moscow journal *Arkhitektura SSSR* (which had been submitted on 31 October 1933 and signed for printing on 7 December 1933), does not refer to the city of Kharkiv as the capital of the Ukrainian SSR. Could this mean that by that time, the author or publishers already knew that the capital was being transfered to Kiev? Results of DIPROMIST's Kharkiv planning work, both for

the final development of Dzerzhyns'kyi Plaza and for the city's master plan (apparently written before October 1933—thus well before the the decision to transfer the capital to Kiev was made public in January 1934) were published in a series of articles in February of the following year.[125] In one of the articles, DIPROMIST architect O. Kasianov pointedly stated that construction of the new government center facilities could not wait until the master plan of the city was completed, and continued to review proposals for completion of the Ukrainian government's administrative center in Kharkiv. From the same article it appears that by 1933 Stalin's deputy in Ukraine, Pavel Postyshev, was taking an active role in suggesting various improvements to DIPROMIST's master plan. Nevertheless, discussing the government center, Oleksander Kasianov's article states that "in the coming years the House of the Government, the Museum of the Medical Institute and a major clinic will be constructed...the architectural composition of the square will be completed." Construction on the New Square and the Vesnin brothers' theater was also to commence in 1933.[126]

The development of the capital city in Kharkiv also provides insights regarding the decision makers' attitudes toward architectural and religious landmarks. The politically motivated destruction of Kharkiv's architectural landmarks dates back to the nineteenth century.[127] The events of the late 1920s and the beginning of the 1930s in Kharkiv continued the old patterns and resulted in the demolition of religious structures of the nineteenth-century eclectic styles. (Compare the existence of numerous landmarks in the nineteenth century [fig. 2] and their subsequent absence in 1930–40 [fig. 3]). In 1934, the architect Oleksander Kasianov, one of the leaders of Kharkiv's planning effort, flatly stated that there were no historical or architectural landmarks in the city worth saving![128] One can only conjecture that the loss of the then preciously few existing landmarks (the destruction of such buildings as the Church of St. Nicholas and the Myronosyts'ka Church) served both as a prelude and as a training ground for the events in the coming months in Kiev.[129] It should be noted, however, that in contrast to the losses in Kiev, the demolition program in Kharkiv was less thorough. The two oldest historical architectural landmarks in Kharkiv—the Ukrainian baroque Intercession Monastery Church of 1689 and the baroque Collegiate Church of the Assumption (built in the 1770s, used before World War II as a radio studio, in the 1960s as a dry cleaning and fabric dyeing shop, and later as an organ recital hall) with its tall campanile (1821–49)—were preserved.

This review of a decade in Kharkiv's planning, design, and construction has attempted to show not only the period's search for a new mode of expression, but also how local leaders attempted to use the available resources and talents to build their vision of the new proletarian capital of an autonomous Ukrainian SSR. Dzerzhyns'kyi Plaza, the new town of Novyi Kharkiv, the State Theater

International Competition and the 1934 DIPROMIST Master Plan reflected not only the popular hopes of those days, but also the self-assurance of the Ukrainian leadership, and the talents and growing professional competence of its designers. Decades later, El Lissitzky wrote of Derzhprom and similar structures that "the huge dimensions of these massive buildings are an expression of new power rather than one of new ideas in design."[130] On the other hand, in 1974 a Russian reviewer of Kharkiv's planning of the 1920s and the beginning of the 1930s wrote that it had a major importance in the development of Soviet planning, that the architecture of Dzerzhyns'kyi Plaza represented one of the more completed new complexes of Soviet architecture of that period, and that it stimulated the development of similar architectural ensembles in other parts of the Soviet Union.[131] The architectural plans and designs of the late 1920s and early 1930s were indisputably ambitious for a land poor in human and economic resources, a land recovering from a decade of warfare. The capital city's leadership and the avant-garde designers wanted to develop a machine-inspired architecture in a rather primitive economic setting and in the absence of a machine-based technology. We have also seen how, in a period of relative freedom and autonomy, external political forces continually and sometimes drastically changed and redirected plans formulated by the Kharkiv government and planners. The intrusion of political events eventually put an end to these plans—the Kremlin had different priorities. Much of what was discussed, planned and designed at that time was never executed.

Nevertheless, the ensemble of buildings surrounding Dzerzhyns'kyi Plaza, though unfinished, remains the only major urban complex built during these turbulent years in Ukraine or in the entire Soviet Union. Decades later, lacking adequate interpretations of the scale and breadth of Kharkiv's ambitions in the 1920s, a Soviet writer brushed them off as a result of the period's "gigantomania."[132] In retrospect, the achievements of the late 1920s and early 1930s had a local character and in the long run only a limited impact on either city or country. Relatively little has been published on the subject. During the last decade, Western architectural historians have demonstrated an increasing interest in the Russian avant-garde movement in art and architecture;[133] consequently, more attention may also be paid to Kharkiv and Ukraine of the 1920s and early 1930s.[134]

The events in Kharkiv between 1920 and 1930 are important as a manifestation of the vibrancy of that period. The more professional approach in developing a new government center in post-revolutionary Kharkiv stands in stark contrast to the brutal force and dilettantism of mid-1930s Kiev, where naively primitive anti-traditionalist planning gestures served brutally political purposes. Notable among the events of the latter period was the destruction of ancient Kiev's architectural landmarks—the surviving witnesses to Ukrainian history.

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NOTES

1. ASNOVA ("rationalists") and OSA ("constructivists") were the two dominant associations of modernist Soviet architects. Both strove for modernity and machine esthetics, and both followed closely the work of West European modernists (Le Corbusier, Bauhaus, De Stijl). The two groups differed primarily on social and political issues. The leader and ideologist of ASNOVA (Assotsiatsia novykh arkhitektorov—Association of New Architects, 1923–32) was Nikolai Ladovskii, who wanted to achieve a "rationalistic esthetic." The constructivists' society OSA (Obshchestvo sovremennykh arkhitektorov—Society of Contemporary Architects, 1925–30) was a multi-disciplinary research group founded in reaction to ASNOVA. Exponents of "constructivism" criticized the "rationalists" for their antiquated ideas and formalism, and advocated a communal socialist approach and the use of modern technology.

2. V. H. Krychevs'kyi, "Arkhitektura doby," *Chervonyi shliakh* (Kiev) 3 (1928), p. 111.

3. In early nineteenth-century Kharkiv there were ten major church building complexes—one monastery and nine churches (Assumption, St. Nicholas, Annunciation, St. Demetrius, Nativity, Resurrection, St. Michael, Ascension, and Myronosyts'ka or Church of the Myrrh-bearing Women). In the city center there were the following religious landmarks: the Intercession Monastery's historic Cossack church (1689, Ukrainian baroque style), the Collegiate Church of the Assumption (1771–77, late baroque style, architect A. Ievlashev) and its tall campanile (1821–49, architect Ie. Vasiliev), the Church of St. Nicholas (eighteenth-century, Ukrainian baroque style), the Church of the Holy Trinity (1764, Ukrainian baroque), the Myronosyts'ka Church (nineteenth-century, Ukrainian baroque). In the coming decades practically all of these landmarks of architecture were lost.

The Myronosyts'ka Church was enlarged in 1803, rebuilt and altered in 1837–41, and totally reconstructed in 1893. Its free-standing Ukrainian vernacular architecture wooden bell tower was demolished in 1910 and replaced by an attached masonry belfry in the Russian style.

By the mid–nineteenth century the old Church of St. Nicholas, one of the remaining historic landmarks of the city, was still in very good physical condition and adequate in size for its congregation. The city's Bishop Amvrosii (who set himself the goal of "renovating," i.e., demolishing old Ukrainian baroque style masonry and vernacular architecture timber churches and free-standing belfries, and replacing them with new structures in the Russo-Byzantine Revival style), however, was instrumental in its demolition. On the site of the demolished landmark a new Byzantine Revival style building was erected (1887–96, architect Nemkin).

The Annunciation Church across the Lopan River shared a similar fate. Under Bishop Amvrosii's pressure the old structure was demolished and a large Byzantine Revival style structure was constructed (1888–1901, architect M. Lovtsov). Among its architectural features was a white Carrara marble iconostasis.

In the 1850s, the old Church of the Holy Trinity was similarly and needlessly demolished. On its site, in 1857–61, a new eclectic structure was built. In the 1920s it was one of the largest and wealthiest churches of the city.

For details regarding Kharkiv's nineteenth-century architecture, see D. I. Bagalei and D. P. Miller, *Istoriia goroda Khar'kova za 250 let ego sushchestvovaniia (s 1655-go po 1905-i god)*(Kharkiv: M. Zil'berberg i Ko., 1912), vol. 1.

4. William Craft Brumfield, *The Origins of Modernism in Russian Architecture* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), pp. 237–96.

5. Selim O. Khan-Magomedov, *Pioneers of Soviet Architecture* (New York: Rizzoli, 1987), pp. 257–58.

6. The UNOVIS (Founders of the New Art) school was founded in 1919 in Vitsebsk by Kiev-born Kazimir Malevich. From the end of 1922, Malevich worked in Leningrad's Institute of Artistic Culture. UNOVIS had branches throughout eastern Europe and Soviet Asia.

7. S. S. Pasternak, "Khronika zakordonnoho budivnytstva," *Budivnytstvo* 9 (1931), p. 37.

8. *Nova Generatsiia* 3 (1928), p. 453.

9. *Zodchestvo* 4 (1928).

10. M. P. Bazhan, ed., *Istoriia ukrains'koho mystetstva* (Kiev: URE, 1967), 5:87. G. Gorvits, "Stanovlenie arkhitektury sovetskogo Khar'kova," *Arkhitektura SSSR* 5 (May 1974), p. 43.

11. Gorvits, pp. 42–43.

12. Ibid., p. 43.

13. A. I. Stanislavskii, *Planirovka i zastroika gorodov Ukrainy* (Kiev: Budivel'nyk, 1971), p. 91; Gorvits, p. 43; I. A. Alferov, V. L. Antonov, and P. E. Liubarskii, *Formirovanie gorodskoi sredy (na primere Khar'kova)*(Moscow: Stroiizdat, 1977), p. 14.

14. In the early 1920s Ebenezer Howard's ideas about garden cities and garden apartments were well known in the USSR, and by 1924, workers' housing modeled on Howard's work was endorsed by the Kremlin. See Milka Bliznakov, "Soviet Housing During the Experimental Years, 1918 to 1933," in *Russian Housing in the Modern Age*, ed. William Craft Brumfield and Blair A. Ruble (Cambridge: Woodrow Wilson Center Press and Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 89–90.

15. V. H. Zabolotnyi, ed., *Narysy istorii arkhitektury Ukrains'koi RSR* (Kiev: Derzh. vyd. lit. z budivnytstva i arkhitektury, 1962), 2:15; I. N. Sedak, ed., *Arkhitektura Sovetskoi Ukrainy* (Moscow: Stroiizdat, 1987), pp. 73–74; Bazhan 5:90.

16. Alferov, Antonov, and Liubarskii, p. 14; Stanislavskii, p. 91; Gorvits, pp. 42–43.

17. Alferov, Antonov, and Liubarskii, p. 14.

18. Gorvits, pp. 42–43.

19. Gorvits, pp. 42–43; A. Kasianov, "Rekonstruktsiia tsentra Khar'kova," *Arkhitektura SSSR* 2 (February 1934), p. 55.

20. Oles' Sylin, "Nahirnyi ansambl' Kharkova," in *Nauka i kul'tura*, no. 23, ed. Olena Serhiienko (Kiev: Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR, Society "Znannia," 1989), p. 475.

21. N. T. Diachenko, *Ulitsy i ploshchadi Khar'kova* (Kharkiv: Prapor, 1966), p. 146.

22. F. Kondrashenko, "Proiekt administratyvnoho tsentru i skhema zabuduvannia zhytlovoho sektoru navkolo ploshchi Dzerzhyns'koho v Kharkovi," *Budivnytstvo* 1 (1930), pp. 28–29.

23. Sylin, p. 477; Khan-Magomedov, p. 278.

24. Though Viktor K. Trotsenko did not have formal architectural training, in 1924 he was awarded the title of architect. In addition to the Steam Locomotive Plant workers' housing (1923–24), Viktor Trotsenko designed Ukraine's pavilion for the world exhibition in Belgium (1924), the Red Factory Theater in Kharkiv (with Valentyn Pushkariov, 1931–38) and a number of housing projects. In 1924–25 V. Trotsenko won an all-Union competition for a new type of living quarters—the communal house (Khan-Magomedov, p. 344.). Trotsenko was also associated with the historian Stefan Taranushenko, with whom he studied Ukrainian folk architecture and published works on Ukrainian folk residential architecture. See "Iubilei arkhitektora V. K. Trotsenko," *Stroitel'stvo i arkhitektura* (Kiev), August 1969, p. 41.

25. Sylin, p. 477; Gorvits, p. 45.

26. Bazhan 5:92–95.

27. Zabolotnyi 2:42. Somewhat different dimensions are provided by other sources. See N. P. Bylinkin, ed., *Istoriia sovetskoi arkhitektury 1917–58* (Moscow: Gos. izd. lit. po stroi., arkh. i stroi. mat., 1962), p. 49.

28. Kondrashenko, pp. 29–30.

29. Gosplan SSSR, *Rekonstruktsiia gorodov SSSR* (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel'stvo "Standartizatsiia i ratsionalizatsiia," 1933), p. 3.

30. T. Nikolenko and V. Gorozhankin, "Dom gospromyshlennosti v Khar'kove," *Arkhitektura SSSR*, May-June 1984, p. 102. Another source states that the competition was announced in the fall of 1925. See V. P. Moiseenko and M. I. Goncharenko, "Sergei Savvich Serafimov,"*Stroitel'stvo i arkhitektura* (Kiev) 3 (1979), p. 24.

31. Moiseenko and Goncharenko, p. 25.

32. Nikolenko and Gorozhankin, p. 102.

33. S. S. Serafimov, "Tvorcheskie otchety," *Arkhitektura SSSR* 5 (May 1935), p. 15.

34. Khan-Magomedov, p. 258. The talented architect Samuil M. Kravets' (1891–1966) also took part in the Kiev Railroad Station competition (subsequently won by Oleksander Verbyts'kyi). In Kharkiv, Kravets' designed the Palace of the Reinforced Concrete Workers on Railroad Square, the Turbine Factory complex (1929), the Chemistry Department building (1929-30), and a number of other structures. By the beginning of the 1930s Kravets' was the chief architect of the first section of the Moscow metro. Its Lenin Library station, completed in 1934, was designed by Samuil Kravets' and another Ukrainian architect, Petro Kostyrko (with Vasyl' Krychevs'kyi, Kostyrko also designed the Taras Shevchenko museum in Kaniv, 1936–38). Subsequently, Samuil Kravets' was promoted to chief architect of the Moscow metro project. See also N. Kolli and S. Kravets, *Arkhitektura moskovskogo metro* (Moscow: Izd. Vsesoiuznoi akademii arkhitektury, 1936); Glavnyi arkhitektor Metroproekta S. M. Kravets, "Istoricheskoe zasedanie," *Arkhitektura SSSR* 12 (December 1939), p. 10.

35. A. Slovins'kyi, "Ploshcha Dzerzhyns'koho i Budynok kooperatsii," *Nova generatsiia* 6/7 (1930), p. 75.

36. Sylin, p. 476.

37. Kondrashenko, pp. 28–32.

38. Bazhan 5:94; Moiseenko and Goncharenko, p. 25.

39. Zabolotnyi 2:59.

40. Serafimov, p. 13.

41. Moiseenko and Goncharenko, p. 25.

42. El Lissitzky, *Russia: An Architecture for World Revolution*, trans. Eric Dluhosh (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1970), p. 23.

43. Irina Kokkinaki, "The First Exhibition of Modern Architecture in Moscow," *Russian Avant-Garde, Art and Architecture*, guest ed. Catherine Cooke, *Architectural Design* 5–6 (1983), pp. 50–59.

44. Zinovii Fogel', *Vasilii Ermolov* (Moscow: 1975), p. 26. See also Valentine Markade, "Vasilii Ermolov and Certain Aspects of Ukrainian Art of the Early Twentieth Century," in *The Avant-Garde in Russia, 1910-30*, ed. Stephanie Baron and Maurice Tuchman, New Perspective (Los Angeles: Los Angeles County Museum of Art, 1980), pp. 48–49; *Vasily Dmitrievich Ermolov, 1894-1964: Gouaches, Sculptures, Reliefs* (New York: Leonard Hutton Galleries, April 27-June 18, 1990), pp. 48–49; Jo-Anne Birnie Danzker, Igor Jassenjawsky, and Joseph Kiblitsky, *Avantgarde & Ukraine* (Munich: Klinkhardt and Biermann, 1993), pp. 27–29.

45. Anatole Kopp, *Town and Revolution: Soviet Architecture and City Planning, 1917–1935* (New York: George Braziller, 1970), p. 50.

46. P. Horbenko, "Ohliad Vseukrains'koi khudozhn'oi vystavky v 10 rokovyny zhovtnia," *Chervonyi shliakh* 3 [60] (1928), p. 127.

47. Slovins'kyi, p. 75.

48. Krychevs'kyi, pp. 113–14.

49. Iurii Varvarets'kyi, "Deiaki rysy ukrains'koi skul'ptury 20-kh rokiv," *Obrazotvorche mystetstvo* 6 (1970), p. 14; Krychevs'kyi, p. 113.

50. Moiseenko and Goncharenko, p. 25.

51. "Arkhitektor A. I. Dmitriev," *Arkhitektura SSSR* 2 (February 1979), pp. 32–33.

52. G. Ianovitskii, "Novye zdaniia Khar'kova," *Arkhitektura SSSR* 6 (June 1938), p. 53.

53. Krychevs'kyi, p. 113.

54. Gosplan SSSR, *Rekonstruktsiia gorodov SSSR*, p. 7.

55. Kondrashenko, p. 76.

56. "Arkhitektor A. I. Dmitriev," *Arkhitektura SSSR* 2 (February 1979), p. 33.

57. Bazhan 5:95.

58. Gorvits, p. 45.

59. Slovins'kyi, pp. 75–76.

60. A. V. Vodopianiv, "Fabryka proiektiv 'Dimproiektbud'," *Budivnytstvo* 3-4 (1930), pp. 98–102.

61. Moiseenko and Goncharenko, pp. 24–25; Vodopianiv, pp. 98–102.

62. "Arkhitektor A. I. Dmitriev," p. 41.

63. Zabolotnyi 2:59; Vodopianiv, p. 100.

64. Serafimov, "Tvorcheskie otchety," pp. 13–15.

65. Vodopianiv, pp. 98–102.

66. Slovins'kyi, p. 76.

67. Ibid., pp. 77–78.

68. Ianovitskii, p. 53.

69. Ia. Shteinberh, "Nadbudova budynku TsK KP(b)U," *Budivnytstvo* 9 (1931), pp. 33–36.

70. Professor Oleksander L. Einhorn was born in 1888 in the city of Mariupol' in south-eastern Ukraine, and died in 1939 in Kharkiv. Einhorn studied in Kharkiv and western Europe. In 1917 he returned to Kharkiv. By 1929 he was chief planner of cities and towns in the Donbas. With the establishment of DIPROMIST he worked as its technical director. In 1934, after Fal'kovych, the first director of DIPROMIST, was arrested, Einhorn was demoted to head of the first architectural-planning studio. He was a corresponding member of the Academy of Architecture of the USSR. For his work on the Kharkiv Master Plan, he was elected an honorary member of the Royal Institute of British Architects. In 1931 Einhorn took part in the competition for the Stockholm city center. Oleksander Einhorn was chief planner of the Ukrainian cities of Zaporizhzhia, Odessa, and Kryvyi Rih. Professor Einhorn taught from 1929, and in 1934 was appointed full professor of the Kharkiv Institute. In contrast to the ideas regarding garden cities and city satellites than prevailing in Moscow, Einhorn was a strong proponent of the compact city, stressing the importance of urban dwellers' access to the city's cultural and historical resources. He is considered the leader of the Ukrainian planning school of the late 1920s and early 1930s. He was conspicuously absent from those asked to work on the development of the Kiev master plan of the mid-1930s. See also the obituary in *Arkhitektura Radians'koi Ukrainy* 1 (1940), p. 40, and T. Nikolenko, "Aleksandr L'vovich Eingorn," *Arkhitektura SSSR* 11–12 (November–December 1989), pp. 98–102.

71. Zabolotnyi 2:62.

72. Gorvits, p. 44.

73. Stanislavskii, p. 118.

74. Nikolenko, p. 98.

75. According to a 1934 article, Kharkiv's population increased from 380,000 in 1926 to 836,000 in 1932. A. L. Eingorn, "Pereplanirovka i arkhitekturnaia rekonstruktsiia Khar'kova," *Arkhitektura SSSR* 2 (February 1934), p. 38. A more recent source states that the city's population grew from 417,000 in 1926 to 742,000 in 1933. Alferov, Antonov, and Liubarskii, p. 14.

76. Eingorn, pp. 38–51; idem, "Skhema pereplanirovki Khar'kova," *Arkhitektura SSSR* 6 (1933), pp. 12–14.

77. Nikolenko, p. 101.

78. Alferov, Antonov, and Liubarskii, p. 23.

79. Ibid., p. 30.

80. Serafimov, p. 15.

81. Kasianov, "Rekonstruktsiia tsentru Khar'kova," pp. 52–59.

82. Ibid., p. 57.

83. Ibid., p. 55.

84. Ibid., pp. 54–57; Kondrashenko, pp. 30, 32. Kondrashenko's article also provides reproductions of the 1929 plan for the government center.

85. Kasianov, p. 55.

86. Ibid., p. 55.

87. The formal decision to relocate the capital of the Ukrainian SSR from Kharkiv to Kiev was made sometime in December 1933. The capital was transferred on 24 January 1934. Early in 1934, the architectural planning administration of the Kiev city council developed feasibility studies for eight schemes for a new government center. Three of the eight studies investigated the location of the proposed government center on the site of medieval Kiev's historic upper town. Early in

April 1934, NKVD Commissar Vsevolod Balitskii approved a planning scheme locating the government center on the sites of St. Michael of the Golden Domes Monastery (12th-18th c.) in the upper town, the Church of St. Basil (12th-18th c.), and the adjoining historic district and archaeologically valuable area.

88. M. Kholostenko, "Arkhitekturnaia rekonstruktsiia Kieva," *Arkhitektura SSSR* 12 (1934), pp. 21–22; Vadim Pavlovsky, *Vasyl H. Krychevsky: Life and Work* (New York: Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the U.S., Inc., 1974), p. 100.

89. Alferov, Antonov, and Liubarskii, pp. 30, 44; Iu. E. Titiniuk, "Esteticheskoe formirovanie peshokhodnykh trass goroda," *Stroitel'stvo i arkhitektura* (Kiev) 7 (July 1984), pp. 5–7.

90. Gorvits, pp. 42–43. Among Kharkiv's new housing facilities designed in the constructivist vocabulary one should mention the housing complex by Samuil Kravets' (1928–33), the apartment building on Pushkin Street (Hryhorii Ianovyts'kyi, 1931), the apartment building on the corner of Sums'ka and Maiakovs'kyi Streets (Veniiamyn Kostenko, 1928), the Luch housing complex (Heorhii Vehman, 1928–30), the Hihant student dormitory complex for 2,500 students on Pushkin Street (Oleksandr Molokin, 1928–29), the Pivden'stal' apartments on Dzerzhyns'kyi Street (Viktor Trotsenko), and the apartment building on Chernyshevs'kyi Street (1931). The latter was obviously influenced by the architecture of the government center.

91. Zabolotnyi 2:34; Gorvits, p. 48.

92. Bazhan 5:95–96.

93. V. Ie. Iasievich, "Pavel Al'oshin," *Arkhitektura SSSR*, January–February 1988, pp. 96–102.

94. Milka Bliznakov, "The Realization of Utopia: Western Technology and Soviet Avant-Garde Architecture," in *Reshaping Russian Architecture*, ed. William C. Brumfield (Cambridge-New York: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 1990), pp. 161–62.

95. Eng. Fidrovs'kyi , "Zhytlove budivnytstvo na KhTZ na pershomu etapi," *Budivnytstvo* 6 (1932), p. 201.

96. Bazhan 5:95; Holovko, pp. 26–27; V. Ie. Iasievych, *Kyivs'kyi zodchyi P. F. Al'oshyn* (Kiev: Budivel'nyk, 1966), pp. 39–44; idem, "Tvorcheskoe kredo zodchego," *Stroitel'stvo i arkhitektura* (Kiev) 3 (March 1981), p. 27; Khan-Magomedov, p. 334.

97. Vadym Pavlovs'kyi, *Shevchenko v pamiatnykakh (1861–1964)* (New York: The Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1966), p. 23.

98. A. Nimenko, *Pamiatnyky Tarasovi Shevchenku* (Kiev: Mystetstvo, 1964), p. 39. See also V. Davydenko, "Ne zabuty pomianuty," in *Nash Shevchenko—Al'manakh na 1961 rik* (Jersey City: Svoboda, 1960), pp. 71–83; Pavlovs'kyi, *Shevchenko v pamiatnykakh (1861-1964),* pp. 20–26.

99. N. T. Diachenko, *Ulitsy i ploshchadi Khar'kova*, 4th edition (Kharkiv: Prapor, 1977), p. 50.

100. Ibid., p. 181.

101. M. P. Bazhan, ed., *Slovnyk khudozhnykiv Ukrainy* (Kiev: URE, 1973), p. 221.

102. *Budivnytstvo* 7–8 (1931), pp. 32–52. See also *L'Architecture vivante*, Summer 1933 (special issue on the competition for the Kharkiv Theater); Edouard Menkes, "Concours pour le Théâtre de Kharkov," *Architecture d'aujourd'hui* 6 (1931), pp. 62–64; *Program of the International Competition for the Design of a 4,000 Seat State Theater at Kharkov* (Moscow, 1931).

103. S. Krushel, "Snesennye i zakrytye khramy v Khar'kove," *Vestnik Instituta po izucheniiu istorii i kul'tury SSSR* 4[11] (1954), p. 110. On 27 March 1983, in a conversation with the author, Professor George Shevelov of Columbia University recalled that the Myronosyts'ka Church was demolished sometime in 1929–30, or even earlier, purportedly due to its interference with the city's trolley traffic. Professor Shevelov witnessed the demolition of its bell tower.

104. Winfried Nerdinger, ed., *The Walter Gropius Archive: An Illustrated Catalogue of the Drawings, Prints, and Photographs in the Walter Gropius Archive at the Busch-Reisinger Museum, Harvard University* (New York, London and Cambridge: Garland Publishing, Inc. and Harvard University Art Museums, 1990) 2:112.

105. Ise (Frank) Gropius, *Walter Gropius: Bauten und Projekte, 1906–1969* (Zurich: Kunstgewerbemuseum, 1971), pp. 16–17. See also Nerdinger, pp. 112–21.

106. Giulio Carlo Argon, *Marcel Breuer* (Milan: Gorlich editore, 1957), p. 68. See also Peter Blake, *Marcel Breuer, Architect and Designer* (New York: The Museum of Modern Art, 1949), pp. 39–40, 43–44, 59–60, 70.

107. Khan-Magomedov, p. 477. See also A. Chiniakov, *Bratia Vesniny* (Moscow: Izd. lit. po stroitel'stvu, 1970), pp. 128–30.

108. Blair A. Ruble, "Moscow's Revolutionary Architecture and its Aftermath: A Critical Guide," in *Reshaping Russian Architecture,* ed. William C. Brumfield (Cambridge-New York: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 1990), p. 123.

109. O. A. Shvidkovsky, *Building in the USSR, 1917–1932* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971), p. 55.

110. I. Iu. Starostenko, "'Narodnyi Klub' v russkoi arkhitekture dorevoliutsionnogo perioda,"*Stroitel'stvo i arkhitektura* (Kiev) 7 (July 1985), pp. 28–29.

111. E. A. Lymar, "Sproba zaproiektuvaty rad. suchasnyi teatr," *Budivnytstvo* 3–4 (1931), p. 21.

112. V. Sedlar, "Freskovye rospisi khar'kovskogo Krasnozavodskogo teatra," *Arkhitektura SSSR*, January 1935, pp. 35–41.

113. Sketches of at least one composition ("Physical Culture and Sport in the USSR") survived and were exhibited in the summer of 1988 in Kiev. See Ol'ha Kobets', "Povernennia myttsia," *Vechirnii Kyiv*, 9 August 1988, p. 3.

114. This year left a more permanent mark on the Ukrainian population than the October revolution. In January 1933 the Kremlin attacked the Ukrainian Communist party and directed a Russian party apparatchik, Pavel Postyshev, to Kharkiv as Stalin's deputy in Ukraine. It was Postyshev's proclaimed task to eliminate centers of Ukrainian counter-revolution and their manifestations. With his arrival in Ukraine, the "Ukrainization" program ended. In the tragic spring of 1933 millions of Ukrainian peasants died in an artificially created famine. In the same year a well-known Ukrainian writer and prominent Communist, Mykola Khvyl'ovyi, committed suicide in protest against Postyshev's policies. Two months later, the old Communist and former commissar of education Mykola Skrypnyk also committed suicide.

115. William C. Brumfield, "Russian Perceptions of American Architecture, 1870–1917" *Architecture and the New Urban Environment: Western Influences on Modernism in Russia and the USSR* (Washington: The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 1988), pp. 51–67.

116. "Pershyi plenum orhbiura Spilky radians'kykh arkhitektoriv Ukrainy," *Chervonyi shliakh* 1 (1934), pp. 191–92.

117. Lionell Brett, "The Architecture of Authority,"*Architectural Review* 99, no. 593 (May 1946), p. 134.

118. Geoffrey Broadbent, "AD Profile 23: Neo-Classicism," *Architectural Design* 49, no. 8–9, p. 2.

119. Ibid., p. 39.

120. Eric Dluhosh, "The Failure of the Soviet Avant-Garde: A Review of *Sovětská architektonická avantgarda* by Jiři Kroha and Jiři Hrůza," *Oppositions* 10 (Fall 1977), pp. 31–55.

121. Broadbent, p. 54.

122. Ibid.

123. Kenneth Frampton, "Commentary: Jiři Kroha and the Crisis of Post-Modernism," *Oppositions* 10 (Fall 1977), p. 29.

124. I. Sosfenov, "Ploshchad' Dzerzhinskogo v Khar'kove," *Arkhitektura SSSR*, February 1934, p. 60.

125. "Sotsialisticheskii Khar'kov," *Arkhitektura SSSR* 2 (1934), pp. 38–62.

126. Kasianov, pp. 54–55.

127. Bagalei and Miller, vol. 1.

128. Kasianov, p. 58.

129. Krushel, p. 110.

130. El Lissitzky, *Russia: An Architecture for World Revolution*, p. 23.

131. Gorvits, pp. 42, 46.

132. N. P. Bylinkin, ed., *Istoriia sovetskoi arkhitektury 1917–1958* (Moscow: Gos. izd. po stroi., arkh. i stroi. mat., 1962), p. 20.



Fig. 1. Cover page of *Nova generatsiia*, no. 6, 1929, artist Pavlo Kovzhun




Fig. 2. Drawing of schematic composition of Kharkiv (second half of the nineteenth century)
Source: I. A. Alferov, V. L. Antonov, P. E. Liubarskii, *Formirovanie gorodskoi sredy (na primere Khar'kova)* (Moscow: Stroiizdat, 1977), pp. 6–7, Dwg. 1 v




Fig. 3. Drawing of schematic composition of Kharkiv (1930–40)

Source: I. A. Alferov, V. L. Antonov, P. E. Liubarskii, *Formirovanie gorodskoi sredy (na primere Khar'kova)* (Moscow: Stroiizdat, 1977), pp. 16–17, Dwg. 8

1. Dzerzhyns'kyi Plaza
2. Traditional center of the city




Fig. 4. Plan of Dzerzhyns'kyi Plaza, 1934

1. State Industry (Derzhprom) building, architects Sergei Serafimov, Samuil Kravets' and Mark Fel'ger (1925–29)
2. Planning Organizations (Proiektbud) building, architects Sergei Serafimov and Mariia Zandberg-Serafimova (1930–33)
3. Trade (Kooperatsii) building, architects Aleksandr Dmitriev and Oskar Munts, (1929–33)
4. Hotel International, architect Hryhorii Ianovyts'kyi (1931–34)
5. Central Committee building, architect Iakiv Shteinberh (1930–32)
6. Postyshev Park (later Taras Shevchenko Park)
7. Veterinary Institute

Sources: M. P. Bazhan, ed., *Istoriia ukrains'koho mystetstva* (Kiev: URE, 1967), 5:92; A. I. Dobrovol's'kyi, ed., *Ukraina, arkhitektura mist i sil* (Kiev: Derzh. vyd. lit. z bud. i arkh., 1959), p. 53



Fig. 5. State Industry (Derzhprom) building, architects Sergei Serafimov, Samuil Kravets' and Mark Fel'ger, 1925–29, photo from the late 1930s



Fig. 6. Initial design of the rostrum stand by Vasyl' Iermilov, October 1927 exhibition of Ukrainian Art and Architecture

Source: *Nove mystetstvo* (New Art), no. 23, 1927, cover page



Fig. 7. Rectangular portion of Dzerzhyns'kyi Plaza. View of the Hotel International (center) and the Central Committee building (right side), photo from the late 1930s




Fig. 8. Planning Organization (Proiektbud) building, architects Sergei Serafimov and Mariia Zandberg-Serafimova, 1930–33, photo from the late 1930s




Fig. 9. Drawing of the Hotel International (original design), architect Hryhorii Ianovyts'kyi, 1928

Source: Gosplan SSSR, *Rekonstruktsiia gorodov SSSR* (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel'stvo "Standartizatsiia i ratsionalizatsiia," 1933)




Fig. 10. Hotel International, architect Hryhorii Ianovyts'kyi, 1931–34. Photo circa 1941




Fig. 11. Drawing of the rejected design for the Central Committee building, architect Iakiv Shteinberh

Source: Ia. Shteinberh, "Nadbudova budynku TsK KP(b)U," *Budivnytstvo*, no. 9, 1931, p. 35




Fig. 12. Rejected plan for Dzerzhyns'kyi Plaza, architect Borys Pryimak, DIPROMIST (State Institute for City Planning), 1933

1. State Industry (Derzhprom) building (1925–29)
2. Planning Organizations (Proiektbud) building (1930–33)
3. Trade (Kooperatsii) building (1929–33)
4. Hotel International (1931–34)
5. Central Committee building (1930–32)
6. Proposed Medical Institute
7. Proposed cinema and restaurant complex
8. Proposed House of the Government
9. City Park

Sources: T. Nikolenko, "Aleksandr L'vovich Eingorn," *Arkhitektura SSSR*, November-December 1989, p. 100; I. Sosfenov, "Ploshchad' Dzerzhinskogo v Khar'kove," *Arkhitektura SSSR*, February 1934, p. 64




Fig. 13. Master plan of the government center, architect Borys Pryimak, DIPROMIST (State Institute for City Planning), 1933

1. State Industry (Derzhprom) building (1925–29)
2. Planning Organizations (Proiektbud) building (1930–33)
3. Trade (Kooperatsii) building (1929–33)
4. Hotel International (1931–34)
5. Central Committee building (1930–32)
6. Proposed Medical Institute
7. Proposed cinema and restaurant complex
8. Proposed House of the Government building
9. City Park
10. Proposed New Square

Source: N. P. Bylinkin, ed., *Istoriia sovetskoi arkhitektury 1917–1958* (Moscow: Gos. izd. po stroi., arkh. i stroi. mat., 1962), p. 49; I. Sosfenov, "Ploshchad' Dzerzhinskogo v Khar'kove," *Arkhitektura SSSR*, February 1934, p. 64




Fig. 14. Cover of the *Prohrama mizhnarodnoho konkursu na proiekt pam'iatnyka T. H. Shevchenkovi u m. Kharkovi* (Program of the International Competition for the Design of the T. H. Shevchenko Monument in Kharkiv), Kharkiv, 1930




Fig. 15. Plan of the Tevelev Square area, 1930

1. Park
2. VUTsVK (All–Ukrainian Central Executive Committee) building
3. Stock Exchange
4. Hotel Chervonyi
5. Church of St. Nicholas
6. Proposed site of the Taras Shevchenko monument

Source: *Prohrama mizhnarodnoho konkursu na proiekt pam'iatnyka T. H. Shevchenkovi u m. Kharkovi* (Program of the International Competition for the Design of the T. H. Shevchenko Monument in Kharkiv), Kharkiv, 1930

133. Catherine Cooke, ed., "AD Profile 47: Russian Avant-Garde Art and Architecture," *Architectural Design* 53, no. 5–6 (1983); *Architectural Drawings of the Russian Avant-Garde* (New York: Museum of Modern Art), 1990; *Art Into Life: Russian Constructivism, 1914–32* (Seattle and Minneapolis: Rizzoli, The Henry Art Gallery, University of Washington, and the Walker Art Center, 1990); Christina Lodder, *Russian Constructivism* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983); Andreas C. Papadakis, *The Avant-Garde: Russian Architecture in the Twenties* (London: Academy Editions; New York: St. Martins Press, 1991).

134. H. O. Lebediv, "Poshuky novykh form ukrains'koi arkhitektury 20-kh rokiv–pochatkiv 30-kh rokiv XX st.," *Ukrains'ke mystetstvoznavstvo* 6 (1974), pp. 63–64; Marjan Susovski, ed., *Ukrajinska avangarda 1910–1930* (Zagreb: Muzej sovremene umjetnosti, 1990); Jo-Anne Birnie Danzker, Igor Jassenjawsky, and Joseph Kiblitsky, *Avantgarde & Ukraine* (Munich: Klinkhardt and Biermann, 1993).

DOCUMENT

Stalin's Meeting with a Delegation of Ukrainian Writers on 12 February 1929*

LEONID MAXIMENKOV

During Stalin's rule a routine ritual was applied to the study of practically any scholarly issue. A prerequisite for publication was a reference to a selection of works by Lenin and Stalin, and to resolutions of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks)(TsK VKP[b]) or the Party congresses. Then these primary dogmas would be applied to the study of a particular subject. For example, any important topic in Soviet literary studies had to mention the following roster of "epoch-making events" in the genesis of the proletarian literature of socialist realism: (1) the TsK VKP(b) Resolution of 25 April 1932, (2) Stalin's meeting with the writers and his dictum about them as "engineers of human souls" (26 October 1932), (3) the All-Union Congress of Soviet Writers of August 1934, and (4) Stalin's catch-phrase about Mayakovsky as the "best and the most talented poet of our Soviet epoch" (December 1935). Practically any event in Soviet literature or culture (publication of a popular novel, a script for a movie, celebrations of Pushkin or Shevchenko anniversaries, the award of a literary prize) was to be traced to, or connected with, one of the above-mentioned episodes, and more often with all of them simultaneously.[1]

As with many ideological dogmas in Stalin's USSR, this particular selection of "historical" events was arbitrary. First of all, Stalin's meeting with the writers at Maxim Gorky's apartment was not officially recorded. The event itself had been a casual and non-official gathering lasting a few hours. As a source it can hardly be compared to the meticulously recorded, edited, and published proceedings of the First Congress of Soviet Writers (the book comprises 700 pages). In the regime's mythology, however, Stalin's phrase about writers as "engineers of human souls" outweighed entire volumes. In the same way, the 1932 TsK VKP(b) resolution was a bureaucratic masterpiece in its own right, complete with introduction, principal part, and conclusions. The records of its preparation by a special commission of the Politburo and of its editing could constitute a separate volume, while Stalin's words on Mayakovsky were scribbled in the margins of a private letter written to Stalin by the poet's lover Lili Brik. Again, one phrase overshadowed many previous and future

* I wish to thank the following scholars who helped me in preparation of this publication: Denis Babichenko, Galina Gorskaia, Liudmila Kosheleva and Larisa Rogovaia, all of them research fellows at Rossiiskii Tsentr Khraneniia i Izucheniia Dokumentov Noveishei Istorii (RTsKhIDNI) in Moscow; Dr. Oleg Khlevnuk, senior editor at *Svobodnaia mysl'* in Moscow; and, especially, Professor Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone of Carleton University in Ottawa, my first university teacher of Political Science.

Central Committee decisions, and in fact generated them. This incongruity constituted the core of the regime's semi-mystical approach to Stalin's word.

The legend about Stalin's style of leading the literary front, revealed and publicized *ad nauseam*, purposely hid, falsified, and purged from collective memory many other crucial and more important events. One of them is the subject of this article. It was a meeting held by Stalin and Lazar' M. Kaganovich with Ukrainian writers which took place in Moscow on 12 February 1929. Soviet sources are remarkably laconic about this event. In 1929 it received some low-key coverage in the Soviet press.[2] From the 1930s to the early 1950s it was mentioned in passing.[3] Finally, in the 1960s to 1980s it was almost totally forgotten.

In the mid-1940s, immediately after the Second World War, for example, the 1929 meeting was discussed in the context of the struggle against the Ukrainian nationalism of the 1920s (*khvyl'ovyzm*). However, the event's current importance was stressed rather than its diachronic value in 1929. The regime was destroying Ukrainian culture in Galicia, Bukovyna and Transcarpathia. Therefore, the 1929 meeting was described in terms of its relevance to the present time:

> The struggle against *khvyl'ovyzm* showed how closely different enemy elements were collaborating: from the yellow-and-blue emigration to national deviationists. It showed that all of them were oriented to the "West," to imperialist aggression, that all of them planned to tear Ukraine away from the Land of the Soviets.
>
> The struggle against *khvyl'ovyzm* strengthened the links between Soviet Ukrainian and Russian literatures. In 1929 a special conference aimed at further cooperation between Ukrainian and Russian literatures was convened by AGITPROP of the TsK VKP(b). Stalin took part directly in the work of the meeting.[4]

This fragment is a typical example of Stalinist falsification of history. A later reading of the events and accusations of the Great Purge era is transposed to an earlier date. A writers' conference in Moscow is depicted as a climax in the struggle against Ukrainian nationalists, which was not the case. The alliance with Russian literature is stressed. In fact, Stalin's speech (given not at the conference but after it) was more futuristic than historical. It presented a view of the future rather than analyzing the past. Stalin did not, in fact, *preside* over the conference.

In 1954, a whitewashed edition of *An Essay on the History of Ukrainian Literature* was published to commemorate the 300th anniversary of the Treaty of Pereiaslav. It was a special occasion and the first major event after Stalin's death to signal some change in Soviet nationalities policy. Therefore, references to nationalism in general and to *khvyl'ovyzm* in particular were watered down. It would not have been polite to use the vocabulary of the Great Purge during the festivities. Consequently, the 1929 meeting was presented in different garb:

The sojourn of writers from Ukraine in the capital of the USSR became a review of the achievements of Soviet Ukrainian literature. It became a manifestation of the unbreakable friendship between the Russian and Ukrainian nations. Afterwards, a meeting was held at the TsK VKP(b), in which the writers from Ukraine took part. It was devoted to issues of further strengthening of the fraternal links between Russian and Ukrainian literature. After the meeting, the delegation of writers from Soviet Ukraine was received by Stalin.[5]

Apart from the characteristic rhetoric, which can be disregarded, again there was no concrete information on the substance of the meeting. The last and most informative phrase was misleading, too. In 1945 it had been written that Stalin *took part in the conference*. In 1954 it was stated that Stalin had met with the writers *after* the conference. Did Stalin receive the writers for five minutes or for five hours? Did he meet with them at the reception? What exactly was said or discussed at that meeting? Did the writers speak? What did they say? Was the "strengthening of fraternal links" the only reason for this unusual occasion? The *Essay's* very meager references were not sufficient to provide an understanding of such a crucial event.

During the decades of "thaw" and "stagnation," however, even the briefest mention of that session was dropped from the history books. Stalin's actions before 1934 remained beyond criticism, and instead were condemned to oblivion. In the 920 pages of the academic history of Ukrainian literature published in 1964 there is not one reference to the meeting. It is mentioned neither in the ten volumes of the *History of the Ukrainian SSR*[6], nor in the eight-volume set of the *History of Ukrainian Literature*[7]. Obviously, the memory of the event was indiscriminately censored inside Soviet Ukraine. It was also unjustifiably erased from the history of the national literatures of the Soviet Union.[8]

In the diaspora, on the other hand, George S. N. Luckyj not only discussed the context of the meeting, but also reconstructed its framework from secondary references dispersed among the pages of literary journals of 1929. His classic work on Ukrainian literary politics was originally published in 1956. Professor Luckyj returned to the issue in a "Reappraisal" in the revised version of his study, which appeared in 1990. He quoted the *samvydav* account of the 1929 event by Borys Antonenko-Davydovych and concluded, "Now, in the 1980s, this story has gained wide circulation among those who held Stalin responsible for many heinous crimes in the Ukraine."[9]

Borys Antonenko-Davydovych left a very vivid and impressive account of the 1929 gathering. But was it accurate? When was it written? Is it possible that later memories and knowledge interfered with the information dating from 1929 and somewhat influenced the account? For example, the writer ironically refers to Stalin as the "great leader of the nations." This title, however, was not

yet in use in 1929. The writer mentions five fragments attributed to Stalin. They deal with (a) the difference between *natsiia* and *natsional'nost',* (b) Western Ukrainian literature, (c) Mikhail A. Bulgakov's *The Days of the Turbins*, (d) Russian chauvinism versus Ukrainian nationalism, and finally, (e) parts of the Voronezh and Kursk gubernias populated by Ukrainians. It turns out that all these issues were indeed discussed at the meeting. They did not, however, constitute even a tenth of the topics covered.

For a long time the documented truth about what was said on 12 February 1929 was not known. We would not know it even today, had the failed 1991 coup in the USSR not led to the opening of the former Communist party archives in Moscow. Now the time has come to publish the verbatim report (*nepravlennaia stenogramma)* of Stalin's 1929 meeting with the Ukrainian writers. The photocopy of 38 double-spaced typewritten pages of verbatim report was discovered in the Stalin section (*fond* 558, *opis'* 1) at the *Rossiiskii Tsentr Khraneniia i Izucheniia Dokumentov Noveishei Istorii* (RTsKhIDNI) in Moscow, formerly known as the*Tsentral'nyi Partiinyi Arkhiv Instituta Marksizma-Leninizma pri TsK KPSS*. It is an unedited copy not intended for publication. It has a considerable number of spelling, syntactic, and logical mistakes, as well as several gaps. Most of the writers who ask questions of Stalin are not identified. Stalin's own thoughts are sometimes very vague. For example, he fails to complete several sentences, often repeats himself, and contradicts his own ideas. However, this document has a unique feature: we witness Stalin engaged in a spontaneous dialogue. During the confrontation, his style changes dramatically. Once he has concluded the theoretical part, the doctrinaire attitude disappears and his speech becomes informative: it is illustrated with examples from fictional literature and even with some personal reminiscences. This contrast between dry, dogmatic theoretical digressions (pages 1–12) and controversial exchange of ideas (pages 13–37) makes this document a rather readable text. It does not appear to have been retouched by anybody.

Why did this document end up in the Stalin section of RTsKhIDNI? After all, given its inherently unpublishable nature (both politically and literally), it should have been kept locked in the safes of the "Kremlin archive" (which is still closed to scholars and the general public). It is in the Kremlin that the bulk of Stalin's heritage is kept. The Stalin collection of RTsKhIDNI has "only" around six thousand files ranging from one to several hundred pages long. These are telegrams, speeches, articles, letters, notes, and proofs of Stalin's books. However, it is easier to say what is missing: the majority of Stalin's correspondence and his documents from the Politburo, Orgbiuro and Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks) (minutes, verbatim reports, and all files pertaining to the Politburo). In this context, the verbatim report of the 12 February 1929 meeting should belong to the Kremlin archive. Probably it was transferred from there

in the late 1940s, when the preparation of Stalin's *Selected Works* for publication was under way. Possibly, the report was considered for publication, but its contradictory message, ambiguous content and overall "stream-of-consciousness" nature prevented this. Besides, many issues relevant in 1929 (e.g., Galicia and the Russian Association of Proletarian Writers [RAPP], future collectivization, and Bulgakov's plays) had become obsolete by 1949. One could say that this particular report is unique among Stalin's documents. It is precisely because of its raw, unedited, uncensored form that it gives one the impression of being present at the meeting.

A few words must be added regarding the historical background. In February 1929, Stalin's struggle with Bukharin entered its crucial stage. Collectivization (in fact a genocide of the Ukrainian and Russian peasantry) required a major reappraisal of all policies. In his future cultural and literary policies, Stalin wanted to distance himself from the ultra-leftist ideologues of RAPP (Averbakh, Kirshon, etc.) and to lay his stakes on the centrist fellow-traveler writers (Ivanov, Lavrenev, Leonov, Kataev, etc). This trend would culminate in 1932 with the banning of RAPP. With collectivization, nationalities policy also moved to the center of the political struggle. The destruction of the peasantry would force millions of peasants to migrate to the cities. Those who survived the genocidal famine, exile, and the GULAG would become proletarians. That, in turn, would force them to learn the Russian language. On the other hand, the Red Army would need politically instructed soldiers (in a historical perspective, unilingual). This explains why all these subjects were covered in Stalin's lecture to the Ukrainian writers. This made it a uniquely programmatic, policy-making speech.

Ukraine was an ideal case for lecturing. It was the second largest republic of the Union, with formidable industrial and agricultural bases. By crushing Ukraine, Stalin could more easily break resistance in the rest of the country. But Ukraine was also one of the most unreliable territories for Stalin's experiments. In Stalin's mind, Ukraine exemplified several threats to his monolithic power: a) it was a country divided into two parts and split among four countries, thus posing a constant threat of foreign-based irredentism; b) the language and culture represented a formidable bastion; c) Ukrainian nationalism was strong, even among the members of the Communist party; d) the peasantry, as the core of the nation, was rich and its agriculture productive; e) there was an obvious divide between the Russian proletariat and the Ukrainian peasantry. Thus, the struggle promised to be fierce. Few suspected all this in February 1929. In the 1990s, however, we read Stalin's words in their exact, true meaning. From the verbatim report it becomes clear that Ukraine was doomed to be the logical target for Stalin's experiments. Yet hardly anyone in the audience was able to make the connection between his quasi-cartesian digressions and the future genocide.

In any discussion about the genesis of Stalin's communism, one theory always springs to mind. It is a theory that from the late 1950s was branded as anti-Marxist even in orthodox Soviet textbooks. It holds that the class struggle will become more acute as communism is approached. The proclamation of this theory is usually identified with Stalin's speech at the February-March plenum of the TsK VKP(b) in 1937. Some scholars trace it a few years further back, to January 1933 (Stalin's speech at another plenum). Others make a logical connection between this thesis and that of the intense and never-ending consolidation of the state and its punitive organizations (army, police, and state security) proclaimed by Stalin at the Eighteenth Congress of the VKP(b) in 1939. The logical link between these two assumptions was obvious: to liquidate the class enemies, the organs of the NKVD had to be solidified.

The text of the verbatim report clearly indicates that both these theories (intensified class struggle and fortified government) had been formulated in general terms by February 1929. This means that the ideological rationale for the Great Purge was coined one year before the beginning of the genocide known as collectivization and six years before the onslaught of the *Yezhovshchina*. Furthermore, both components of the formula were melded with a third key element: the nationalities issue. This was a completely new turn in the genesis of Stalinism. And unlike other theoretical discoveries, it was kept secret. The intensified class struggle (collectivization) was to bring about the annihilation of nationalities. Thus, the 1929 revolution was conceived not only as a war against the peasantry, but also as a liquidation of nationalities as such. This is why the results of this war were so devastating, particularly in Ukraine. Its strong nationalism and powerful peasantry, with a considerable part of the nation living in three enemy border states (Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Romania), made it an enemy in the eyes of the Kremlin. It is thus a paradox that Stalin revealed his cyphered plans for Ukraine to the Ukrainian writers.

For the sake of crushing the Ukrainian national spirit, Stalin would even make certain concessions to Russian nationalism. He permitted the staging of an anti-Ukrainian play, Bulgakov's *The Days of the Turbins*, in Moscow. As if expecting resistance on this issue, Stalin prepared for the debate. The focal point of the controversy was precisely Bulgakov's treatment of recent Ukrainian history (Hetman Skoropadsky and Petliura) and the Ukrainian language in his play. The play had been triumphantly shown on the stage of the Moscow Art Theater (MKhT) from 1926. The action takes place in Kiev in the winter of 1918 and the spring of 1919. The Ukrainian content is present at several key levels: (a) the treatment of the Hetman and his staff, (b) Petliura's army, (c) the Ukrainian language as a main structural element, and (d) Ukrainian characters. All these levels are structurally united by mockery (phonetic, grammatical, and lexical) of the Ukrainian language in the best traditions of the tsarist regime. Bulgakov's play was fiercely attacked by RAPP. The play was accused of *smenovekhstvo* and closeted White Guard sentiments. Almost nothing was

said in the Soviet Russian press, however, about the play's anti-Ukrainian motifs. This fueled suspicion that the anti-Ukrainian flavor had been tacitly sanctioned. The Ukrainians feared a conspiracy involving the ideologue Vaganian, the old Bolshevik Larin, and the head of *Glaviskusstvo* (which supervised the theaters), Sviderskii. Stalin reassured the writers, saying that the problem lay elsewhere.

The mechanics of Stalin's politics are reflected in his rhetorical style. He distracts the audience with seemingly unrelated examples and then astonishes it with his ideas or conclusions. For example, he discusses small semi-feudal nations in Siberia numbering several thousand people, then in effect equates them with the Ukrainian nation and language, implicitly asking whether Ukraine is really a nation, whether Ukrainian is really a language. He paints a utopian picture of a de-nationalized countryside following future collectivization, then predicts that this will be the fate of Ukraine. He discusses the tasks of national defense, then implies that a single language should be introduced in order to secure the defense of the nation.

In reading the English translation of the verbatim report, one must keep in mind several catch-words used by Stalin: *natsiia* , *natsional'nost'*, *narod, narodnost'*, *etnograficheskaia gruppa.*[10] Although *iazyk* refers to "language" while *govor* is "dialect," Stalin sometimes confuses the two concepts, saying, for example, *kievskii iazyk.* The Russian word *gosudarstvo* can be translated in several ways: "state," "government," "country." *Velikoderzhavnyi shovinism* is "Great Russian chauvinism," while by *natsionalism* Stalin usually means the nationalism of former colonies of the Russian Empire. During the course of his political career Stalin skillfully played with these two concepts. He publicly supported a two-way struggle, but privately urged a crackdown on local nationalism as the more important task. In 1933, when Levon Mirzoian[11] was named to head the *krai* commitee of the VKP(b) in Kazakhstan (which was not yet a union republic), Stalin urged him to fight local nationalism. As a point of reference he sent to Alma-Ata a strongly worded 1932 VKP(b) resolution on Tajikistan. In an accompanying telegram Stalin compared Kazakhstan to Ukraine:

Top secret.
Copying forbidden.
To be returned.
Alma-Ata.
Kraikom of the VKP(b), to Mirzoian.

Great Russian chauvinism is being fought not only by local party organizations but by the TsK VKP(b) in general. The immediate task of the Kazakh Bolsheviks, while fighting Great Russian chauvinism, is to concentrate its fire on Kazakh nationalism and its deviations. Otherwise it would be impossible to defend Leninist internationalism in Kazakhstan. One cannot say that you in Kazakhstan have more internationalist educa-

tion of the masses than in Ukraine. It is rather the other way round. And if now, nevertheless, local nationalism does not represent the major threat in Kazakhstan, this can be explained. It is more difficult for Kazakh nationalism to close ranks with foreign aggressors than for Ukrainian nationalism. Nevertheless, this circumstance, favorable for Kazakhstan, should not lead to a weakening of the Kazakh Communists' struggle against Kazakh nationalism and the spirit of reconciliation with it. On the contrary, the struggle with local nationalism should be strengthened in every possible way, in order to create the conditions for propagating Leninist internationalism among the working masses of the nationalities of Kazakhstan. As material for orientation we are sending you the TsK VKP(b) resolution on Tajikistan.

Stalin.[12]

If in theory Stalin stressed the importance of the struggle with Great Russian chauvinism, in practice the main effort was reserved for local nationalisms. This can be seen from samples of Stalin's work as an editor that for decades were kept secret from the general public. For example, in December 1934 Stalin finished editing *The History of the Civil War.* From the very beginning he left an authoritarian mark on the entire volume, from its cover to the last entry of the index. Among his hundreds of major and minor changes, the following three stand out. Originally the text read as follows:

a. "Russia is a prison of nations" [this is a subtitle in chapter 4].

b. "The policy of the Russian tsars starting from Ivan the Terrible had a pronounced aggressive character."

c. "Before annexation to Russia, Ukraine stood incomparably [*nesravnenno*] higher with respect to culture than Great Russia."[13]

Stalin changed the first excerpt to "Tsarist Russia is a prison of nations" (in order to avoid any association with contemporary Russia); he deleted the reference to Ivan the Terrible (foreshadowing the future rehabilitation of the tsar) in the second, and censored the word *nesravnenno* with reference to pre–1654 Ukraine in the third (thus implying that the1654 treaty was a progressive step for Ukraine).

The destruction of Ukrainian culture, which received a powerful impetus in February 1929, was a key element in Stalin's policies. By the late 1940s, cultural assimilation based on genocide of the peasantry and the post-war crackdown in Galicia sometimes bewildered even the apparatchiks from AGITPROP. A typical example is a letter of 6 May 1948 from Dmitrii T. Shepilov, deputy head of the TsK VKP(b) Department of Agitation and Propaganda, to Politburo member Andrei A. Zhdanov and First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Ukraine Nikita S.

Khrushchev. It dealt with the music for the new national anthem of the Ukrainian SSR. On the advice of his musical consultants, Shepilov wrote:

> The only serious defect of the last version of the anthem is its almost total lack of intonations of Ukrainian songs. One can distinguish in the anthem echoes of Arenskii's "Solemn March," from the USSR anthem, from old Russian revolutionary songs, and even from church concertos by Bortnians'kyi. But what is lacking are the intonations of the best, and particularly the heroic songs of the Ukrainian people. This anthem could successfully, and perhaps with greater reason, become an anthem for the Russian Federation.[14]

Such an aberration was a logical result of the Stalinist policy towards Ukraine proclaimed at the 12 February 1929 meeting with Ukrainian writers.

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NOTES

1. *Literaturnaia entsiklopediia* (Moscow: Khudozhestvennaia literatura) vol. 11 (1939), p. 580, s.v. "Ukrainskaia sovetskaia literatura."
2. The editorial in the organ of the Russian Association of Proletarian Writers (RAPP) did not mention it at all. "Za internatsional'nuiu solidarnost'," *Na literaturnom postu* 3 (1929): 1–4.
3. "Biograficheskaia khronika," in I. V. Stalin, *Sochineniia* (Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1949), 11:377.
4. Akademiia Nauk Ukrains'koi RSR, *Narys istorii ukrains'koi literatury* (Kiev: Akademiia nauk Ukrains'koi RSR, 1945), 241.
5. Akademiia Nauk SSSR, *Ocherk istorii ukrainskoi sovetskoi literatury* (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Akademii nauk SSSR, 1954), 66.
6. *Istoriia Ukrainskoi SSR* (Kiev: Naukova dumka) vol. 7 (1984). In this particular volume, which deals with "the Ukrainian SSR during the period of construction and strengthening of a socialist society (1921–1941)," neither Lazar' M. Kaganovich nor Nikita S. Khrushchev, who headed the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Ukraine in those years, is mentioned.
7. *Istoriia ukrains'koi literatury u vos'my tomakh,* 8 vols. (Kiev: Naukova dumka), vol. 6 (1970).
8. G. I. Lominadze, ed., *Istoriia sovetskoi mnogonatsional'noi literatury v shesti tomakh*, 6 vols. (Moscow: Nauka, 1970–74), vol. 1 (1970).
9. George S. N. Luckyj, *Literary Politics in the Soviet Ukraine, 1917 - 1934*, revised and updated edition (Durham, NC; Duke University Press, 1990), 144–145, 252–253, citing Borys Antonenko–Davydovych, "Spohad pro pryiom Stalinom ukrains'koi delegatsii 1929 roku," *Suchasnist'* 7-8 (1984): 4–12.
10. For the background of Stalin's views on nationality problems, see his works *Marxism and the Nationalities Question* (1913) and *On the Foundations of Leninism* (1924).
11. Levon Mirzoian (1897–1937) was an Armenian Communist. In 1925–29 he was a secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Azerbaijan; in 1933-38 he headed the Party *kraikom* in Kazakhstan. He perished during the Great Purge.
12. Joseph Stalin to Levon Mirzoian, telegram, 22 December 1933, RTsKhIDNI, fond 558, opis' 1, delo 5171, list 1.
13. Stalin, edited draft of the first volume of *Istoriia Grazhdanskoi voiny*, not earlier than December 1934, RTsKhIDNI, fond 558, opis' 1, delo 3165, listy 41, 42, 44.
14. Dmitrii T. Shepilov to Andrei A. Zhdanov and Nikita S. Khrushchev, 6 May 1948, RTsKhIDNI, reel 1490, delo 636, listy 291-92.

Transcription

БЕСЕДА тов. СТАЛИНА С УКРАИНСКИМИ ПИСАТЕЛЯМИ.

от 12 февраля 1929 г.

КАГАНОВИЧ. – Слово имеет т. СТАЛИН.

СТАЛИН. – По моему, главный вопрос, это вопрос о том, что будто бы . . . (не слышно) в Советском Союзе представляет из себя материал, для того, чтобы дать почву для образования общесоюзного языка, т.е. русского, неравенство литературы, очевидно, и отсутствие предпосылок для развития национальной культуры так надо понимать вопрос. Это неверно, конечно. Я часто получаю письма от разных товарищей, между прочим и от украинцев, по вопросу о том, что такое нация, причем считают, что в ряде признаков, определяющих понятие “нация”, надо добавить еще один признак “государственность”. Затем, получаю письма о том, что неправильно было мое выступление на одном из собраний, кажется в КУТВ’е, есть такой университет народов Востока, где я говорил о том, что национальные культуры имеют свою будущность, что национальная культура в нашей среде, в советской среде, означает разнообразие форм культуры при одинаковости содержания, социалистического содержания. Не согласны с этим многие товарищи. Причем считают, что лозунг развития национальной культуры, выдвигаемый партией и Советской властью, что этот лозунг неправильный, так как на самом деле развитие к социализму ведет уже теперь к тому, что национальная культура должна отмереть и общий язык — мировой, должен быть выработан в период переходного времени от капитализма к социализму. А у нас, в нашем Союзе, будто бы все это дело должно перевариваться дело национальных культур в одну культуру и один язык, очевидно русский язык, как наиболее развитой. Вот этакие письма я получаю. Приводятся цитаты из сочинений Ленина насчет того, что Ленин выступал часто против национальной культуры, считал, что это буржуазный предрассудок. Приводятся цитаты из Ленина о том, что национальные различия должны отмереть, государственные границы и всякие другие различия, вплоть до языка. Приводятся цитаты из Ленина насчет того, что мы, дескать, марксисты, стремились к слиянию наций еще до февральской революции, как же, говорят, теперь мы национальные культуры развиваем. Намекают на то, что существование национального правительства и национальных республик с национальными совнаркомами — что это не установка наша, а тактика, ну если хотите, понимайте в некотором роде маленькая

уступка, очень временная. Вот такие письма я получаю часто. У меня, к сожалению, нет времени для того, чтобы все эти материалы собрать и сегодня-завтра выступить. Но я это в ближайшее время сделаю наверняка для того, чтобы все эти вопросы разъяснить. Эти письма содержат ту путаницу, которую вы критикуете косвенно в ваших вопросах. Поэтому может быть не лишним будет здесь сказать, в двух словах по этим вопросам, кое-что сказать и одновременно ответить на ваши вопросы.

Прежде всего насчет наций. Что такое нация? Два слова. Я уверен, что у вас имеется некоторое сомнение в определении понятия "нация", которое у нас в марксистской среде установилось. Какие признаки излагаются в произведениях марксистов, русских марксистов если взять, территориальное единство, язык, экономическая общность, и некоторая общность национального духа считают, что к этому надо прибавить "государственность", что ежели имеется группа населения, имеющая общий язык, общую территорию, затем, общую экономическую жизнь, связанность разных провинций в одно целое на данной общей территории, общий культурный дух и культурный багаж, то этого недостаточно, для того чтобы такую группу населения называть нацией. Необходимо еще прибавить — если у нации есть свое государство, тогда эта нация, если у нее есть все эти четыре признака, но нет пятого признака, нет государства, то это не нация. Я должен сказать, что это совершенно неприемлемая точка зрения. Если бы мы на эту точку зрения стали, очевидно, мы должны были тогда сказать, что, скажем, те же самые узбеки не были нацией, пока не образовали свою Советскую государственность, только после этого. Или ирландцы не представляли нации, пока у них свободное государство не организовалось. Только после этого Ирландия стала нацией. Но откуда же взялось тогда национальное движение? Или взять, например, Грузию до революции. Кажется в октябре там было организовано государство. По этой теории выходит, что до этого периода Грузия не представляла собой нацию. То же самое можно сказать и про Армению. По этой теории только после того, как здесь организованы были государства, только после этого Грузия и Армения стали нациями. Я хочу сказать, что так могут смотреть только такие люди, которые считают нацией только ту группу населения, которая добилась своей государственности. Они не считают такую группу населения, которая имеет все остальные признаки нации, считать нацией. Это великодержавная точка зрения — признание нации только под оболочкой государственности. Откуда же в таком случае взялось национальное движение у этих национальностей, когда там не было государственности? Вот недоумение, которое имеется у многих товарищей. То, что установлено марксистской литературой — четыре признака, определяющих нацию — они остаются основными

признаками нации и элемент государственности не составляет того конститутативного признака, без которого нельзя признать нацию нацией.

Второй вопрос о судьбах национальностей и их национальных культур в обстановке развития в период перехода от капитализма к социализму. Мы теперь переживаем переходный период от капитализма к социализму. Наша страна не может быть названа капиталистической, точно так же как она не может быть названа социалистической. Она идет от остатков капитализма или от тех новых зарождающихся прослоек капитализма, которые имеются в условиях нэп'а, к социализму. И здесь же надо ответить на те ссылки на Ленина, которые делаются отдельными товарищами. Совершенно верно, что т. Ленин спорил в 1912–13 году с бундовцами, которые считали возможным развитие интернациональной культуры безнационально. Тов. Ленин был совершенно прав, но он вовсе не считал возможным развитие интернациональной культуры безнационально. Он боролся за интернациональную культуру по содержанию. Но когда ему Либман и Юдкевич задавали вопрос: ну, хорошо, интернациональная культура, — это так должны смотреть марксисты, — но будет ли она безнациональной? Ленин решительно отмежевался от этой точки зрения. Он говорил: да, мы стоим за развитие интернациональной культуры, мы стоим за то, чтобы различные национальности в нашей стране развивали интернациональную культуру по содержанию. Но я, Ленин, стою за то, чтобы у каждой национальности была национальная культура по форме. Представить интернациональную культуру без национальной формы нельзя. Так могут рассуждать только досужие люди. Но люди дела и люди жизни никогда не могут серьезно смотреть на этот вопрос так, что будто бы возможно при существовании национальностей развитие интернациональной культуры безнационально, т.е. развитие интернациональной культуры, не выраженное в той или иной национальной форме. Вот почему ссылки на Ленина по этому вопросу являются неверными. Я устанавливаю, что Ленин ратует за интернациональную культуру среди национальностей, существующих в стране, но он не считал возможным развитие интернациональной культури безнационально. Он считал, что интернациональная культура будет иметь разнообразные формы сообразно с существующими национальностями в данной стране. Вот это нужно обязательно установить.

Затем, второе, что нужно установить — нельзя искажать Ленина, когда ссылаются на него и утверждают, что Ленин, будто бы, исходя из необходимости слияния национальностей, вместе с тем утверждал, что в период переходного времени национальности исчезнут. Неверно это. Можно сослаться на то, что т. Ленин круто поставил вопрос о

национальных различиях, когда он сказал, что различия между национальностями, различия всякие, различия языка, даже государственные различия — они долго еще будут существовать после того, как мировая диктатура пролетариата установится. Понимаете — в мире уже нет капитализма, установлена мировая диктатура пролетариата, не союзная наша, а мировая, и долго еще после этого, по мнению Ленина, будут существовать национальные различия. Это единственное место, где Ленин круто, открыто и до конца поставил вопрос о национальных различиях. Поскольку Ленин говорил о слиянии до взятия власти, в 12–14–16 г. г., он имел в виду не исчезновение различий между национальностями, а исчезновение антагонизма. Это вещи разные. Ленин писал о национальном гнете, к этому сводилось все тогда. Ленин писал о необходимости уничтожить национальный гнет, уничтожить антагонизм между национальностями и между рабочими. Мы этого дела добились в основном. Я не могу сказать, чтобы в смысле национальных взаимоотношений между рабочими различных национальностей у нас все обстояло хорошо. Я не могу этого сказать, потому что есть русский шовинизм, не национализм, а шовинизм, пережиток старого, есть местный национализм, вызванный тем, что нации угнетались, причем угнетались сильно, и люди не могут отрешиться, освободиться от этих воспоминаний, эти воспоминания углубляются; есть местный шовинизм, есть местные республиканские шовинизмы. Возьмите ту же Грузию, там штук 5–6 национальностей имеется, кроме грузин. Некоторые наши коммунисты стремятся к тому, чтобы . . . (не слышно). Мы, москвичи, не давали им этого делать. От местного национализма к шовинизму очень легко перейти. Все это я знаю, тут пережитков осталось много, но надо признать, что базы для национального угнетения уже нет. Если где нибудь попытки такие появятся, мы их отсечем потому что это идет в разрез не с тактикой, а со всей установкой партии коммунистов и Советской власти. Надо различать те места из сочинений Ленина, где говорится о том, что взятие власти пролетариатом или даже установление демократической диктатуры поведет к подрыву национального гнета и в этом смысле — к сближению национальностей. Это надо различать от того тезиса, где Ленин говорит о национальных различиях в период диктатуры пролетариата. Часто наши товарищи, отдельные товарищи, которые недовольны той национальной политикой, которая ведется Советской властью, спутывают эти две вещи. Когда Ленин говорил об отделении национальностей вплоть до образования самостоятельного государства, он отчетлево формулировал так: "разъединиться для объединения" — это и есть марксистский подход. Дать национальным государствам возможность создавать свои государства для того, чтобы убить всякую возможность заподозревания друг друга, и когда взаимное доверие

создастся, поставить вопрос об объединении. Ленин не стоял вовсе за то, чтобы все государства раздробились. Он стоял за то, чтобы они, государства, раздробившись, дали возможность создать почву для взаимного доверия рабочих и крестьян и потом поставить практически вопрос об объединении. Национальный вопрос мы марксисты разрешаем, и вопрос об освобождении национальностей не так как буржуа. Они разъясняют для того, чтобы дать замкнуться в своей скорлупе друг от друга оттолкнуться и отгородиться таможенными преградами. У нас у марксистов не так стоит вопрос, мы гораздо дальше идем всяких этих буржуазных радикалов по вопросу об освобождении национальностей, вплоть до создания отдельных государств, но мы добиваемся этого не для того, чтобы отгородились, друг от друга национальности, а для того, чтобы потом объединиться. Вот это и значит постановка Ленина — разъединиться для того, чтобы объединиться.

Такая диалектическая постановка имеется у Ленина в вопросе об уничтожении классов. У нас многие говорят, как же так уничтожение классов, а идет классовая борьба. В том то и дело что Ленин так ставит вопрос — уничтожать классы путем классовой борбы. Противоречиво это, но страшно жизненно. Или уничтожить государство путем усиления функций государства. Мы к чему стремимся, к тому, чтобы государство отмирало. Но каким путем добиваемся? Самым невиданным усилением функний государства в лице низового пролетариата. Такого государства, такого обширного, с большими функциями, как диктатура пролетариата, не бывало никогда в мире. Где видели государство, которое обнимало почти всю страну. Это же почти бюджет государства, бюджет всей промышленности. Или, если у нас социалистический сектор сельського хозяйства разовьется как следует, тоже будут предприятия это государственные большей частью, не бывало никогда в истории народов такого обширного и мощного по своей силе, по своему объему государства, как пролетарская диктатура, а мы стремимся уничтожить всякое государство. Не противоречиво ли это? Да, противоречиво. Но это противоречие диалектическое, абсолютно обходимое для уничтожения государства . . . (не слышно) довести до логического конца все свои функции, самые широкие и самые мощные функции с тем, чтобы потом государство, исчерпав себя до дна, стало . . .

Тоже самое насчет национальной культуры надо сказать. Объединить национальную культуру на базе общего социалистического содержания, путем усиления развития национальных культур. Так стоит вопрос. Этого люди не понимают. Ежели вы марксисты думаете, что когда либо создастся общий язык, а это будет, это будет не русский язык, не французский, национальний вопрос нельзя в одном государстве решить, национальный вопрос стал и вне государственным уже давно, если когда либо общий язык создастся, он создастся безусловно, то это после

того, как мировая диктатура пролетариата будет завоевана, так долго только спустя после этого, когда социализм будет утверждаться не в одной стране, а во всех странах. Так вот развитие национальных культур в эпоху диктатуры пролетариата, максимальное развитие, покровительство национальным культурам, потому мы этим культурам покровительствуем для того, чтобы они исчерпав во всю себя и создали почву для развития языка во всем мире не русского, а международного языка. Когда это будет? Слишком далеко до того времени. Ленин прав, говоря, что это долго — после того, как установится во всем мире международная диктатура пролетариата. Вот как ставится вопрос. Люди, марксисты, мыслящие слишком просто, упрощающие сложнейшие вопросы национального развития, люди, которые некоторые толкования не понимают, а в этих толкованиях все дело, не понимают того, что мы хотим подготовить элементы... не могут переварить того, что мы хотим подготовить элементы международной социалистической культуры путем предельного развития национальной культуры, то также не понимают как мы хотим притти к уничтожению классов путем усиления классовой борьбы, или как мы хотим притти к отмиранию государства путем небывалого расширения функций этого государства, или как мы хотим добиться объединения народов разных стран путем их разъединения путем освобождения их от какого-либо гнета, путем предоставления им права на образование национального государства. Кто не понимает этой жизненной постановки вопроса, тот не понимает, что мы проводим политику максимального развития национальной культуры, с тем, чтобы она исчерпала себя до конца и чтобы затем была создана база для организации международной социалистической культуры не только по содержанию, но и по форме.

Было бы ошибочно, если бы кто-либо думал, что в отношении развития национальной культуры отсталых национальностей будто бы центральные работники держатся политики нейтралитета: ну, дескать, развивается национальная культура, так пусть ее развивается на здоровье, наше дело сторона. Такая точка зрения была бы неправильна. Мы стоим за покровительственную политику в отношении развития национальной культуры у отсталых национальностей. Это я подчеркиваю, чтобы те упрощения, которые имеются в этом вопросе, поняли, что мы не сторона, а активные деятели, покровительствующие развитию национальной культуры. Мы стоим за то, чтобы культуру, духовный багаж, имеющийся у данной национальности, сделать достоянием всего народа. На каком, например, языке мы можем поднять культуру Украины? Только на украинском. Перед нами стоит примитивная проблема, разрешение которой стоит дорого и которая уже разрешена во многих государствах, — это проблема первоначального всеобщего обязательного обучения. Мы должны добиться того, чтобы

рабочий и крестьянин приходили на фабрику и завод, или на сельскохозяйственное предприятие, грамотными, имея, по крайней мере, 4–х классное образование. Этой ступени достигли уже давно такие государства как Германия, Англия, Франция, Швейцария и т.д. На каком языке этого можно достигнуть? На русском? Только на родном языке. Если мы хотим широкие массы народа поднять на высшую ступень культуры, или не на высшую, а хотя бы на среднюю или даже низшую ступень культуры, мы должны родной язык каждой национальности развивать максимально, потому что только на родном языке мы можем достигнуть этого. Другого средства для поднятия культурности масс, кроме родного языка, в природе не существует. Вот почему совершенно неправильным и ошибочным было бы занимать позицию нейтралитета в отношении развития национальной культуры. Тогда мы должны признать, что никакой промышленности не поднимем и никакой обороны не создадим. Ибо отчего зависит обстановка обороны страны? От культурности населения, от того, каков будет наш солдат, разбирается ли он в элементарных понятиях культуры, может ли он пользоваться, например, компасом, разбраться в картах, есть ли у него хотя бы примитивная грамотность, культура, чтобы он мог понять приказы и т.д. Если этих элементарных условий нет, мы не можем создать настоящую оборону страны. Точно так же нам совершенно не безразлично, в каком состоянии поступают рабочие на наши заводы и фабрики. Ведь мы перевооружаем теперь нашу промышленность и начинаем перевооружать и сельское хозяйство, потому, что при старых орудиях крестьянин не сможет справиться с задачами и требованиями, которые предъявляются выросшей промышленностью и всем хозяйством. Повторяю, нам совсем не безразлично, в каком виде поступают на наши фабрики и заводы рабочие, культурны они или не культурны. Это очень серьезный вопрос. Никакой серьезной индустрии развить мы не сможем, не сделав все население грамотным. Пустяки все, если думают, что можно совершенно некультурных людей, неграмотных людей можно заставить так же развить свой труд и так же использовать машины, как это делается народами, где культурность на высокой ступени находится. Так вот, даже для осуществления самой элементарной пропаганды поднятия грамотности, даже для этого национальная культура является тем воздухом, без которого мы шагу сделать не можем. Вот почему какой нибудь нейтралитет, даже косвенний, он уже преступен, он — против интересов пролетариата, против партии, против народа.

Вы спрашиваете, какие перспективы национальной культуры. Ясно, она будет развиваться. Конечно, мы могли бы, придя в страну, сказать: “ну, мы маленько подождем, как будет партийный аппарат национализироваться на Украине, литература, профессиональный

аппарат, государственный и проч.". Мы на это так смотреть не можем, мы должны это дело двинуть вперед активно. Вот насчет темпа — в этом и состоит покровительственная политика Советской власти в отношении развития национальных культур, т.е. то, о чем Советская власть принципиально отличается от всякой другой власти. А всякая другая власть боится развивать национальную культуру, потому что по буржуазному — развитие других национальностей есть решение в сторону . . . (не слышно).

Перспективы какие? Перспективы такие, что национальные культуры даже самых малых народностей СССР будут развиваться мы будем им помогать. Без этого двинуться вперед, поднять миллионые массы на высшую ступень культуры, и тем самым сделать нашу промышленность, наше сельское хозяйство обороноспособными, — без этого мы не сможем.

Крестьянин — одно дело, если он 4 класса прошел, некоторые элементарные агрономические знания приобрел, если может ориентироваться, — такой крестьянин поднимает сельское хозяйство; другое дело — абсолютно безграмотный, элементарных знаний нет. На каком языке его образовывать? Только на народном, потому что других языков он не знает. Перспективы такие, что национальные культуры будут развиваться, а Советская власть должна развитию национальных культур помогать. Об этом т. Каганович говорил с вами, долго я распространяться не буду, но два слова скажу, что надо различать в национальной культуре две стороны: форму и содержание. Когда говорят — форма ничего не значит — это пустяки. От формы страшно много зависит, без нее никакого содержания не бывает. Форма — национальная, содержание — социалистическое. Это не значит, что каждый литератор должен стать социалистом, марксистом и проч. Это не необходимо. Это значит, что в литературе, поскольку речь идет о литературе, должны появиться новые герои. Раньше обычно героев иных выдвигали, теперь должны появиться герои из народа, из крестьян, из буржуазии — в том освещении, которого они заслуживают. Взять, например, таких попутчиков, я не знаю, можно ли строго назвать попутчиками этих писателей, таких писателей, как Всеволод Иванов, Лавренев. Вы может быть читали "Бронепоезд", Всеволода Иванова, может быть, многие из вас видели его, может быть вы читали или видели "Разлом" Лавренева, — Лавренев не коммунист, но я вас уверяю, что эти оба писателя своими произведениями "Бронепоезд" и "Разлом" принесли гораздо больше пользы, чем 10–20 или 100 коммунистов писателей, которые пичкают, пичкают, ни черта не выходит; не умеют писать, не художественно. Или взять, например, этого самого всем известного Булгакова, если взять его "Дни Турбиных". Чужой он человек, безусловно. Едва-ли он советского образа мысли. Однако, своими турбиными он принес все-таки большую пользу, безусловно.

КАГАНОВИЧ. – Украинцы не согласны. (шум, разговоры)

СТАЛИН. – А я вам скажу, я с точки зрения зрителя сужу. Возьмите "Дни Турбиных" общий осадок впечатления у зрителя остается какой, несмотря на отрицательные стороны, в чем они состоят тоже скажу, общий осадок впечатления остается такой, когда зритель уходит из театра. Это впечатление несокрушимой силы большевиков. Даже такие люди крепкие, стойкие по своему честные в кавычках, как Турбин и его окружающие, даже такие люди безукоризненны по своему и честные по своему в кавычках должны были признать в конце концов, что ничего с этими большевиками не поделаешь. Я думаю, что автор конечно этого не хотел, в этом он неповинен, дело не в этом конечно. "Дни Турбиных" это величайшая демонстрация в пользу всесокрушающей силы большевизма (ГОЛОС: и сменовеховства). Извините. Я не могу требовать от литератора, чтобы он обязательно был коммунистом и обязательно проводил партийную точку зрения. Для беллетристической литературы нужны другие меры — не революционная и революционная, советская, не советская, пролетарская не пролетарская. Но требовать, чтобы литература была коммунистической — нельзя. Говорят часто правая пьеса или левая. Там изображена правая опасность. Например, Турбины составляют правую опасность в литературе. Или, например, "Бег", его запретили, это правая опасность. Это неправильно, товарищи. Правая и левая опасность это чисто партийное. Правая опасность — это значит, люди несколько отходят от линии партии, правая опасность внутри партии. Левая опасность — это отход от линии партии влево. Разве литература партийная? Это же не партийная, конечно, это гораздо шире литература, чем партия и там мерки должны быть другие, более общие. Там можно говорить о пролетарском характере литературы, об антипролетарском, о рабоче-крестьянском характере, об анти-рабоче-крестьянском характере, о революционном, не революционном, о советском, антисоветском. Требовать, чтобы беллетрическая литература и автор проводили партийную точку зрения, тогда всех беспартийных надо изгонять. Правда это или нет? Возьмите Лавренева, попробуйте изгнать человека, он способный, кое-что из пролетарской жизни схватил и довольно метко, рабочие прямо скажут, пойдите к чорту с правыми и левыми, мне нравится ходить на "Разлом" и я буду ходить и рабочий прав. Или возьмите Всеволода Иванова "Бронепоезд". Он не коммунист Всеволод Иванон, может быть он себя считает коммунистом (шум, разговоры). Ну он коммунист липовый (смех). Но это ему не помешало написать хорошую штуку, которая имеет величайшее революционное значение, воспитательное значение бесспорно. Как вы скажете — он

правый или левый? Он ни правый, ни левый, потому что он не коммунист. Нельзя чисто партийные мерки переносить механически в среду литераторов. Я считаю, что тов. в очках, там сидящий, не хочет меня понять. С этой точки зрения, с точки зрения большего масштаба и с точки зрения других методов подхода к литературе, я и говорю, что даже и пьеса "Дни Турбиных" сыграла большую роль. Рабочие ходят смотреть эту пьесу и видят: ага, а большевиков никакая сила не может взять! Вот вам общий осадок впечатлений от этой пьесы, которую никак нельзя назвать советской. Там есть отрицательные черты, в этой пьесе. Эти Турбины по-своему честные люди, даны как отдельные оторваные от своей среды индивиды. Но Булгаков не хочет обрисовать настоящего положения вещей, не хочет обрисовать того, что хотя они может быть и честные по-своему люди, но сидят на чужой шее за что их и гонят. У того же Булгакова есть пьеса "Бег". В этой пьесе дан тип одной женщины, — Серафимы и выведен один приват-доцент. Обрисованы эти люди честными и проч. И никак нельзя понять, за что же их собственно гонят большевики, ведь и Серафима и этот приват-доцент, оба они беженцы, по-своему честные неподкупные люди, но Булгаков, — на то он и Булгаков, — не изобразил того, что эти, по-своему честные люди, сидят на чужой шее. Их вышибают из страны потому, что народ не хочет, чтобы такие люди сидели у него на шее. Вот подоплека того, почему таких, по-своему честных людей, из нашей страны вышибают. Булгаков умышленно, или не умышленно, этого не изображает. Но даже у таких людей, как Булгаков, можно взять кое-что полезное. Я говорю в данном случае о пьесе "Дни Турбиных". Даже в такой пьесе, даже у такого человека, можно взять кое-что для нас полезное. Почему я все это говорю? Потому что к литературе нужно прилагать более широкие масштабы при оценке. Правый или левый не подходит. Можно говорить — пролетарский или антипролетарский, советский или антисоветский.

Взять, например, "Бруски" Парфенова. Сейчас самым характерным для деревни является то, что нет одной деревни. Есть две деревни. Новая деревня, которая поворачивается к городу, ждет от него тракторов, агрономических знаний и т.д., хочет жить, по-новому, по-новому работать, связаться с городом. Это новая деревня. И есть старая деревня, которая чихать хочет на все новое, на трактора, на агрономические знания и т.д. Старая деревня хочет жить по-старинке, и гибнет. У Парфенова в "Брусках" замечательно обрисовываются эти две деревни, их борьба между собой. Должна ли быть литература, рисующая деревню, крестьянской? Вот Парфеновские "Бруски". Парфенова нельзя назвать крестьянским писателем, хотя он в своем произведении пишет только о крестьянстве, а о городе у него нет ни слова. Или взять другое менее известное произведение "Катя Долга"

Коробова. Коробов замечательно изображает здесь плутни кулаков, всякие их махинации. Прекрасно показано как новая деревня растет, как новые типы крестьян народились. Это не такой крестьянин, который неряшливо, обязательно грязно живет, нет, он и в красноармейцах побывал, кое-кто из них на фабриках и заводах был, кое-каких знаний нахватался, читает книжку, по новому хочет сельское хозяйство вести, все ждут крестьяне, что они получат трактор, организуют коллективное хозяйство и поведут дело так, чтобы земля давала в два-три раза больше. Тут новая деревня изображена великолепно. Конечно, неправильно, когда говорят, что на Украине литература должна быть чисто крестьянская. Неправильно это. Совершенно правильно то, что раньше рабочие на Украине были русские, а теперь — украинцы. Состав рабочего класса, конечно, будет меняться и будет пополняться выходцами из окружающих деревень. Это общий закон национального развития во всем мире. Если вы возьмете венгерские города лет 40 тому назад, они были немецкими, а теперь стали венгерскими. Возьмите латышские города — они раньше были эстонские, теперь стали латышскими. Состав рабочего класса должен пополняться из окружающих деревень. За волосы нельзя вытаскивать национальности, это трудно и может вызвать отпор со стороны русских элементов и дать некоторый повод русским шовинистам, но если взять естественный процесс, — не отставать от этого процесса, — национализация пролетариата должна быть и шаг за шагом должна итти. Это общий закон, и смычка национальная, смычка между городом и деревней пойдет. Украинские рабочие в качестве героев произведений будут выступать, их много теперь. Даже коренные русские рабочие, которые отмахивались раньше и не хотели изучать украинского языка, я знаю многих таких, которые жаловались мне — "не могу, тов. Сталин, изучать украинский язык, язык не поворачивается" — теперь по иному говорят, научились украинскому языку. Я уже не говорю о новых рабочих, за счет которых будет пополняться состав рабочего класса. У вас сложится такая литература, как здесь, у русских там будут изображены и рабочие, и крестьяне, и буржуазия, отрицательно, или положительно, все зависит от вкуса. Они будут изображены так же, как и в других советских странах. И разговоры насчет того, что у нас только крестьянская литература должна быть в смысле героев, они скрывают некоторый шовинизм насчет того, что, мол, плохо дело пошло; даже работники Украины как бы затормозили это дело и считают, что литература для рабочих должна быть русская, а для крестьян — украинская. Это — сознательная или бессознательная махинация у людей, которые не хотят понять того, что рабочий класс все время будет пополняться выходцами из окружающих деревень. Вот вам вопрос о перспективах. Значит, о судьбах национальных культур в

эпоху перехода к социализму, в эпоху диктатуры пролетариата, и о характере украинской литературы я сказал. У нас ошибок много в отношении украинской советской культуры, то, о чем говорит т. Фил . . . заграницей. Это — большая ошибка, отчасти и вашей ошибкой это является.

ГОЛОС С МЕСТА: и журнал этот называется "Новая Россия".

СТАЛИН. — У вас все права в руках, вы должны потребовать отменить это новое название. Если они не соглашаются, для того, чтобы показать свои экспонаты литературы, надо их за шиворот брать, привлечь к суду классовому, общественное мнение разбудить. Это ваша ошибка, ваши упущения. Ежели вы будете напоминать, когда нужно готовиться, ошибок и опущений, уверяю вас, что ни одной из таких ошибок не будет. Вы должны напомнить, потому что такая масса вопросов и так загружен работой, что иногда даже не узнаешь. Я узнал о том, что за-границей собираются демонстрировать в Бельгии, Брюсселе после того, как это в печати появилось. Вы должны были об этом своевременно поставить вопрос и призвать к ответу, тогда была бы представлена украинская литература. Таких ошибок у нас много и боюсь, что они еще будут.

Я думаю, что вопросы ваши исчерпал или может быть чего либо не коснулся. О перспективах культурного развития я говорил. О содержании и форме национальной культуры тоже говорил. О том, что в будущем, после того, как мировая диктатура будет завоевана не в одной стране, а мировая, долго еще будет национальное различие, конечно еще долго будет, я говорил, когда отдельные языки, как отдельная сокровищница отдельных национальностей, сольется в порядке естественном без всякого насилия в один язык, это область такого далекого прошлого — когда мировой социализм установится, и когда он войдет в быт, а пока мы не только не развиваем национальные культуры, а мы покровительствуем им, потому что без этого культурности миллионной народной массы не поднять, только на основе родного языка можно поднять. Теория или версия насчет того, что мы идем сейчас к отмиранию национальных культур и национального языка во имя общего языка, она глупа конечно и не научна совершенно.

Я думаю, смешивать тезис об уничтожении национального гнета и национального антагонизма с тезисом уничтожения национального различия — никак нельзя. Это две вещи различные. Национальный гнет уничтожается в основе, он уничтожен, однако, национальное различие в итоге не уничтожается, оно теперь только как следует проявляется, только теперь некоторые засидевшиеся начинают замечать, что есть некоторые народности, у которых есть свой язык. Путали

Дагестан с Туркменистаном, теперь перестали. Путали Бедоруссию с Украиной — теперь перестали.

ГОЛОС С МЕСТА: Тов. Сталин, как вопрос с Курской, Воронежской губерн. и Кубанью в той части, где есть украинцы. Они хотят присоединиться к Украине.

СТАЛИН. — Этот вопрос не касается судьбы русской или национальной культуры.

ГОЛОС С МЕСТА: Он не касается, но он ускорит дальнейшее развитие культуры там в этих местностях.

СТАЛИН. — Этот вопрос несколько раз обсуждался у нас, так как часто слишком меняем границы (смех), слишком часто меняем границы — это производит плохое впечатление и внутри страны, вне страны. Одно время Милюков даже писал заграницей. Что такое СССР? Нет никаких границ. Любая республика может выйти из состава СССР, когда она захочет. Есть ли это государство или нет? 140 млн. населения сегодня, а завтра 100 млн. населения. Внутри мы относимся осторожнее к этому вопросу, потому что у некоторых русских это вызывает большой отпор. С этим надо считаться. С точки зрения национальной культуры, и с точки зрения развития диктатуры и с точки зрения развития основных вопросов нашей политики и нашей работы, конечно, не имеет сколько нибудь серьезного значения куда входит один из уездов Украины и РСФСР. У нас каждый раз, когда такой вопрос ставится, начинают рычать: а как миллионы русских на Украине угнетаются, не дают на родном языке развиваться, хотят насильно украинизировать и т.д. (смех). Это вопрос чисто практический. Он раза два у нас стоял. Мы его отложили, — очень часто меняются границы. Белоруссия ставит сейчас вопрос о том, чтобы часть Смоленской губернии присоединить к ним. Это тоже вызывает отпор у русских. Я думаю, что такой вопрос надо решать осторожно, не слишком забегая вперед, чтобы не развивать отрицательного отпора со стороны той или другой части населения. Это внизу тоже имеется. Я не знаю, как население этих губерний хочет присоединиться к Украине? (ГОЛОСА: хочет). А у нас есть сведения, что не хочет. (ГОЛОСА: Хочет, хочет). Есть у нас одни сведения, что хочет, есть и другие сведения — что не хочет.

Что же еще есть? Кажется я на все вопросы ответил. Вот еще — какая разница между понятием — нация и национальность. По-разному употребляются эти два слова. Можно вопрос поставить таким образом. Чем отличается период подымающегося капитализма от периода феодализма? Тем, что при феодализме страна раздроблена, общего

литературного языка нет, хотя корни языка одинаковы, и нет общих культурных и экономических центров. Страна разбита на отдельные княжества, причем очень часто эти княжества ведут между собой истребительные войны. Духовного национального единства и, так сказать, экономических обручей, связывающих отдельные уголки страны, княжества и провинции, в этот период еще нет. В период переходный от феодализма к капитализму, когда капитализм еще не развился и не образовались общие центры, стягивающие все участки страны, — в этот период национальность существует, но это еще не нация. Она становится нацией только тогда, когда объединяется в смысле языка, территории, экономической общности и общности национального духа, когда она представляет из себя целостный организм, одинаково в национальном смысле преломляющий внешние события, например при нападении вся страна объединяется, чтобы оборонить себя от врага. Это мы имеем в период подымающегося капитализма. При феодализме, когда одно княжество хочет напасть на другое, то это не вызывает объединения для отпора врагу. В Грузии, например, когда на Восточную Грузию нападала Персия, Западная Грузия присоединялась к Персии или отходила к Турции. Какая же это нация? Нет национальных элементарных признаков, нет того, что называется национальным чувством. При феодализме имеются элементы нации: есть общий язык или, по крайней мере, корни языка, территория одна, но стягивающих воедино нацию факторов нет. Когда создаются эти стягивающие факторы, — а это бывает при начале подымающегося капитализма, — только тогда можно говорить о нации, как об определенной категории. Но в литературе одно другим часто заменяют — нация и национальность. Существуют отдельные народности. Ну, взять хотя бы остяков. Как назвать остяков? Нацией трудно назвать. Это этнографическая группа. Или взять тунгусскую народность. Национальностью их не назовешь. Это этнографическая группа. С точки зрения научной можно было такую градацию установить: нация, как более целостное образование; это — понятие эпохи поднимающегося капитализма; национальность — переходная ступень от феодализма к капитализму. Затем, народности, не имеющие командующего класса, — этнографические группы. Вот, например, Тану-Тувинская республика — как ее назвать? На различных языках говорят, страна маленькая, нет еще шлифовки. У вас украинский язык только еще шлифуется. За основу вы какой язык взяли? Кажется, Киевский?

ГОЛОС С МЕСТА: Киево-Полтавский.

СТАЛИН. — Да, Киево-Полтавский взят язык. Сейчас у вас период шлифовки литературно-национального языка происходит. Поймут ли у вас харьковцев, галичан?

ГОЛОС С МЕСТА: Понимают.

СТАЛИН. — Галиция понимает?

ГОЛОС С МЕСТА: Можно присоединить Галицию к Украине, они нас понимают. (смех).

СТАЛИН. — Почему вы за основу общелитературного языка взяли два языка — Киевский и Полтавский?

ГОЛОС С МЕСТА: Это давно уже, сто лет тому назад.

СТАЛИН. — Значит вас понимают галичане?

КАГАНОВИЧ. — Так же, как в Вятской губернии крестьянин понимает язык другой губернии, но не поймет всего того, что в “Правде” написано.

ГОЛОС С МЕСТА: Он московского крестьянина понимает.

КАГАНОВИЧ. — Он московского крестьянина поймет, но то, что в “Правде” делается, он не понимает.

ГОЛОС С МЕСТА: Не целесообразно брать за пример Западную Галицию.

СТАЛИН. — Почему?

ГОЛОС С МЕСТА: Там больше западного влияния.

ГОЛОС С МЕСТА: Чем язык проще, тем больше понимают друг друга.

СТАЛИН. — Это рационально для Советской Украины. Откуда брать материал для языка? У народа. Для кого литература создается? Для народа. Раз у вас применяют полтавско-киевский язык очевидно, он больше понятен народу, чем галицийский.

Позвольте вопрос задать? Можно?

ГОЛОСА С МЕСТ: Пожалуйста!

СТАЛИН. — Как в Галиции происходит дело? Вы следите за литературой? А они за литературой украинской следят? Перепечатывают ее?

ГОЛОСА: Еще бы, перепечатывают.

СТАЛИН. — Раньше, я помню в 1902–3–4 г., когда на Украине ничего украинского не было из организаций, кроме "просвиты", может быть, кто нибудь помнит, я встречался в ссылке с одним товарищем из Западной Украины и у меня создалось впечатление, что украинская литература, поскольку она существовала в Восточной Украине, она находится под духовной гегемонией Галиции. У меня такое впечатление получилось в 1902–3–4 году, когда я встречался с товарищами с Западной Украины. Так как в России русское правительство не дает украинцам хоть в какой нибудь степени свою культуру развивать, то украинские товарищи, те которые хотели украинскую культуру развивать, поворачивали лицо к Галиции и у них брали образцы литературы. Теперь как обстоит дело, обратно или нет?

ГОЛОС МЕСТА: у меня такое предложение — пускай т. Сталин задаст вопросы, а потом т. Кулик ответит.

СТАЛИН. — Это что касается беллетристической литературы, теперь вообще, если взять науку, научную литературу, публицистику. (ГОЛОС: тоже самое). Вы ли от них берете и переводите? (ГОЛОС: наоборот, они у нас берут). (ГОЛОС: неимоверная культурная бедность).

Я хочу сказать, что ежели Советская власть у вас добилась таких результатов, что у вас начинают брать примеры, образцы проч., то это большое завоевание. (ГОЛОС: вне всякого сомнения). (ГОЛОС: это факт). Гегемония в ваших руках. (ГОЛОС: несомненно). Школы существуют там (ГОЛОС: очень немного, из трех тысяч осталось 700 с чем-то). Низшие и средние школы (ГОЛОС: да). А университет есть, где бы можно было вырабатывать высший командный состав (ГОЛОС: нет), то что называется высшим командным составом по культуре? (ГОЛОС: научная академия есть), это требует того, чтобы был университет высшая школа, затем, чтобы была фундаментальная литература по всем отраслям науки, чтобы на этом украинском языке люди могли получить все образование с низу до верху. Есть ли такая богатая библиотека (ГОЛОС: есть) по химии, по физике, по всем отраслям знания? (ГОЛОС: есть там что-то вроде академии). Она легальная? (ГОЛОС: да). А университета нет? (ГОЛОС: нет). А средняя школа

типа гимназии есть (ГОЛОС: есть семь средних школ). На украинском языке преподают? (ГОЛОС: да, на украинском) (ГОЛОС: на украинском преподается гимнастика и рисование).

Теперь еще вопрос: плохо переводят русские ваши литературные произведения? (ГОЛОС: совсем не переводят, мало и плохо).

КАГАНОВИЧ. — Есть талантливые произведения гораздо талантливее, чем многие здесь издающиеся в большом количестве.

СТАЛИН. — Вы тоже, товарищи, очевидно грешите в этом отношении "Бруски" не читали, Коробова — не читали, "Катя Долга" — Коробова — не читали. (ГОЛОСА: нет, читали). А, например, Биль-Белоцерковского у вас, пожалуй, из гордости не переводят на украинский язык (ГОЛОС: Киршона "Рельсы гудят" давно уже идут). ("Разлом" давно идет — голос). Я кончил.

КУЛИК: Я остановлюсь на положении культуры в Западной Украине, поскольку знаком с этим вопросом.

Первый вопрос относительно культурной гегемонии. Даже в дореволюционное время, когда на Западной Украине цензурные условия были значительно легче, даже тогда Западная Украина названа была Пьемонтом развития украинской культуры. Но чисто политическое значение вкладывалось в этот термин. Это не значит что там развитие украинской культуры достигло большой широты. Мы должны сказать, что крупнейшие украинские литературные силы и в дореволюционные времена были здесь, у нас. Можно назвать несколько отдельных фигур, выдвинувшихся там, на Западной Украине. Надо сказать, что первым украинским писателем, который изображал в своих произведениях жизнь индустриального пролетариата, который, к слову сказать был одним из первых писателей, изображавших жизнь индустриальных рабочих, был писатель, живший на Западной Украине. Это вполне понятно. Там был украинский пролетариат, который пользовался украинским языком. Но всетаки, центр литературной жизни в смысле богатства, в смысле количества писателей, в смысле охвата тем, был у нас. У нас были такие писатели, как Квитко, не говоря уже о Шевченко . . . (т. Кулик перечисляет фамилии писателей). Все это классики. Была плеядя модернистов, крупнейших поэтов, как Николай Вороный, Олес Чупренко и др. На Западной Украине также были символисты и модернисты, но гораздо менее крупные, чем писатели, которые были у нас.

После революции положение создалось такое, что у нас тот политический момент, момент большей политической свободы на Западной Украине исчез, там уже не стало политических преимуществ,

которые прежде были по сравнению с нами. После революциии для развития украинской культуры у нас создались огромные возможности. На Западной Украине, я имею в виду не только Галицию, но и Буковину, и Прикарпатскую Русь, там украинских школ осталось очень мало, крупных научных культурных объединений нет, если не считать научного товарищества имени Шевченко. Это старое товарищество, которое в свое время вело довольно крупную культурную работу. Но ни в какое сравнение не может итти работа этого товарищества с работой нашей Украинской Академии Наук, которая, как известно, далеко не является идеалом. Но это крупнейшее научное учреждение. Кроме того, у нас масса всякого рода научных кафедр и институтов. Там университетов нет. Там ведется борьба за украинский университет с польским правительством.

СТАЛИН. — В Праге, кажется, есть университет?

КУЛИК. — Это эмигрантский университет, созданный для петлюровских эмигрантов, для петлюровского офицерства. Для была создана высшая школа. Но Пражский украинский университет не считается высшим учебным заведением. Если говорить о . . . . Академии с.х., то это не научное учреждение, а политическое учреждение. Ведутся переговоры между польским и чехо-словацким правительствами о переводе этой с.х. Академии в Польшу в качестве школы офицеров (смех). Дальше, есть украинский институт в Берлине. Опять-таки, в большей мере это политическое учреждение, чем научное. Это не школа высшая, а институт.

ГОЛОС С МЕСТА: Гетманский!

КУЛИК. — Те под эгидой петлюровщины, эти — под эгидой гетманщины. Попытки противопоставления Западной Украине у нас есть со стороны отдельных товарищей, но попытки эти успеха не имеют. Это видно из того, что, когда здесь была созвана конференция по установлению единого правописания, постановили пригласить всех зарубежных украинских представителей; они съехались сюда и признали то правописание, которое было принято здесь.

СТАЛИН. — И Западная Украина тоже признала?

КУЛИК. — Да, все признали. Но я хочу один момент отметить, легенду о галицийском языке. Это — вещь, которая страшно мешает работе. Никакого галицийского языка, языка Шевченко нет.

СТАЛИН. — Наречие?

КУЛИК. — Это тот-же украинский язык, в котором есть ряд полонизмов. Тут замечательный процесс: с одной стороны — полонизмы, с другой стороны — русситизм. Галиция ближе к русскому языку, чем наш Полтавско-Киевский язык.

КАГАНОВИЧ. — Литературный язык не ближе.

КУЛИК. — Я помню разговоры о Шевченковском языке, которые якобы, все понимают. Помню, как т. ... произвел любопытный опыт, когда собралась конференция учителей. Он спросил у присутствующих: "вы все понимаете язык Шевченко?" Ему ответили, что все понимают. Тогда он попросил прочесть лозунг, висевший на стене. Некоторые из присутствующих заявили ему, что оне не понимают слово "ромен" — плеть. А это была цитата из Шевченко, причем очень популярная цитата.

СТАЛИН. — "Ромен" — это старо-славянское слово.

КАГАНОВИЧ. — Слово имеет т. ХВЫЛЯ.

ХВЫЛЯ. — Маленькое замечание в ответ на вопрос т. Сталина. Тов. Сталин поставил вопрос так: каково соотношение между тем культурным процессом, который идет на Украине, и тем, что остается от старого на Украине, и может ли на основании этого процесса западная буржуазия говорить, что украинского народа не существовало.

Если взять это соотношение, то я должен привести такой факт, что даже украинские органы, если взять этот литературный журнал, который ведет бешеную травлю против советской Украины, если взять весь литературный материал, который они дают в этом журнале, то мы увидим, что они больше, чем на 50%, перепечатывают из наших произведений, которые мы печатаем у себя в Советской Украине.

СТАЛИН. — Они хоть говорят о том, что перепечатывают?

ХВЫЛЯ. — Иногда пишут, иногда поступают жульническим образом, пишут о том , что это произведения посланы прямо им. Это первое. Второе, есть у нас на Советской Украине формирование кадров, от низу до верху, по линии искусства, науки и т.д. Этот процесс уже закончен и сейчас идет не только ликвидация неграмотности населения, ликвидация технической неграмотности, но и выработка новых кадров, начиная с низших ступеней, и кончая более высокими.

И последнее — насчет галицийского языка литературного, украинского и т.д. Я может быть не точно дам ответ на этот вопрос. Мы считаем, — на основе длительной разработки этого вопроса для самих себя, нам часто приходилось встречать на рабочих собраниях заявления: "вы нам говорите по галицийски, мы ничего не разумеем". Можно сказать так, что украинский литературный язык, который красив со стороны людей, которые не хотят понимать этого языка и иронически настроены, этот литературный украинский язык рассматривается, как синтезирующий язык всего народа, как галицийский язык. Но украинский язык, язык простого крестьянина, который имеет ограниченное количество терминов, это происходит от того, что у него процесс производства ограничен в такой же пропорции, как язык Тургенева, Пушкина находится в говору любой русской губернии Рязанской, Тульской и т.д. Вполне понятно, что есть говор Полтавский, Черниговский, есть говор Подольский, там более мягкое произношение, есть более твердое произношение, но некоторые изменения в ударениях и произношениях имеются и в галицийском говоре. Но нужно указать на то обстоятельствосейчас, когда создавалась специальная конференция от украинских ученых представителей разных областей, где разрабатывался вопрос о правописании, не раз было сделано замечание представителями ученых западной Украины, что именно в данный момент пьемонтом развития украинской культуры и развития украинской . . . считают украинскую литературу (шум, разговоры).

ГОЛОС С МЕСТА: называют великой Украиной нашу Украину.

ГОЛОС С МЕСТА: Вы говорили о "Днях Турбиных". Мы видели эту пьесу. Для меня лично и многих других товарищей некоторое иное освещение этого вопроса, там есть одна часть в этой пьесе, там освещено восстание против Гетмана. Там показаны честные офицеры, которые подавляют это восстание, революционное восстание против Гетмана. Это революционное восстание показано в ужасных тонах под руководством Петлюры, в то время, когда это было революционное восстание масс, проходившее не под руководством Петлюры, а под большевистским руководством. Вот такое историческое искажение революционного восстания, а с другой стороны — изображение крестьянского повстанческого движения, как . . . по моему, со сцены художественного театра не может быть допущено и если положительным является, что большевики понудили интеллигенцию придти к сменовеховству, то во всяком случае такое изображение революционного движения и украинских борющихся масс, не может быть допущено.

КАГАНОВИЧ. — Единая неделимая выпирает (шум, разговоры).

ТЕСНЯК. — Когда я смотрел "Дни Турбиных" мне, прежде всего, бросилось то, что большевизм этих людей побеждает не потому что он есть большевизм, а потому что делает единую великую неделимую Россию. Это концепция, которая бросается всем в глаза и такой победы большевизма лучше не надо.

ГОЛОС: Почему артисты говорят по-немецки чистым немецким языком и считают вполне допустимым коверкать украинский язык, издеваясь над этим языком. Это просто антихудожественно?

ГОЛОС С МЕСТА: И второй вопрос — вопрос не из защиты полковника Балбача, почему автор рисует русское офицерство идеалистами, а когда дело доходит до полковника генерального штаба — Балбача, который являлся полковником генерального штаба, он изображен бандитом, буквально диким некультурным — это значит, что может быть доброго на Украине.

С МЕСТА: Я совершенно не тот вопрос хочу задать, который задал тов. Микитенко. В конце концов полковник Бабачан может быть изображен как угодно. Дело не в этом. Но вот кроме того впечатления от "Дней Турбиных", о котором говорил т. Сталин, у зрителя остается еще другое впечатление. Эта пьеса как бы говорит: смотрите, вы, которые психологически нас поддерживаете, которые классово с нами спаяны, мы проиграли сражение только потому, что не были как следует организованы, не имели организованной массы и несмотря на то, что мы были благородными и честными людьми, мы всетаки, благодаря неорганизованности погибли. Кроме впечатления, указанного т. Сталиным, остается и это второе впечатление. И если эта пьеса производит некоторое позитивное впечатление, то она производит и обратное впечатление социально, классово враждебной нам силы.

СТАЛИН. — Насчет некоторых артистов, которые по-немецки говорят чисто, а по-украински коверкают. Действительно, имеется тенденция пренебрежительного отношения к украинскому языку. Но чего бы требуете от этих артистов, они же не коммунисты, а просто артисты. У нас есть и коммунисты, которые пренебрежительно относятся. Я могу назвать ряд резолюций ЦК нашей партии где коммунисты обвиняются в великодержавном шовинизме.

С МЕСТА: Стало почти традицией в русском театре выводить украинцев какими-то дураками или бандитами. В "Шторме", например, украинец выведен настоящим бандитом.

СТАЛИН. — Возможно. Но между прочим это зависит и от вас. Вы можете и должны оказывать свое воздействие в этом отношении. Недавно, полгода тому назад, здесь в Москве было празднество и украинцы, как они выражались, созвали свою колонию в Большом театре. На празднестве были выступления артистов украинских (ГОЛОС С МЕСТА: Артистов из пивных набрали?). Были от вас певцы и бандуристы. Участвовала та группа, которую рекомендовали из Харькова (С МЕСТА: Это на съезде Советов?). Нет, это кажется на Октябрьских торжествах. Начинание было очень хорошее. Но вот произошел такой инцидент. Дирижер стоит в большом смущении — на каком ему языке говорить, — на французском можно? может быть на немецком? Мы спрашиваем: а вы на украинском говорите? Говорю. Так на украинском и объявляйте, что вы будете исполнять. (С МЕСТА: Это вполне понятно). Так как же он может такие вопросы ставить? На французском он может свободно говорить, на немецком тоже, а вот на украинском стесняется, боится как бы ему не попало. Так что, товарищи, от вас тоже многое зависит. Конечно, артисты не будут коверкать языка, если вы их как следует обругаете, если вы сами будете организовывать вот такие приезды, встречи и проч. А то вот приехал без всякого организующего начала со стороны коммунистов дирижер, он, видимо, человек знающий, и попал, как ему показалось, в чужое государство, где по-украински нельзя говорить. Вы тоже виноваты. Насчет "Дней Турбиных" — я ведь сказал, что это антисоветская штука и Булгаков не наш. Я сказал это. Но что же, несмотря на то, что эта штука антисоветская, из этой штуки можно вывести? То, чего автор сам не хотел сказать. И основное впечатление, которое остается у зрителя, это всесокрущающая сила коммунизма. Там изображены русские люди — Турбины, и остатки из его группы, все они присоединяются к Красной армии, как к русской армии. Это тоже верно.

ГОЛОС: С надеждой на перерождение.

СТАЛИН. — Может быть, но вы должны признать, что и Турбин сам, и остатки его группы говорят: "народ против нас; мы должны бросить оружие, потому что народ против нас, руководители наши продались. Ничего другого не остается, как покориться". Нет другой силы. Это тоже нужно признать. Почему такие пьесы ставятся? Потому что своих настоящих пьес мало, или вовсе нет. Я против того, чтобы огульно отрицать все в "Днях Турбиных", чтобы говорить об этой пьесе, как о

пьесе, дающей только отрицательные результаты. Я считаю, что она в основном все же плюсов дает больше, чем минусов. Вот он пишет т. Петриенко: ""Дни Турбиных"... (читает)..." Вы чего хотите, собственно?

ПЕТРИЕНКО. — Мы хотим, чтобы наше проникновение к Москву имело бы своим результатом снятие этой пьесы.

ГОЛОС: Это единодушное мнение.

ГОЛОС: А вместо этой пьесы пустить пьесу Киршона "О Бакинских комиссарах".

СТАЛИН. — Если вы будете писать только о коммунистах, это не выйдет. У нас 140 млн.-ное население, коммунистов — только полтора миллионов. Не для одних же коммунистов эти пьесы ставятся. Такие требования предъявлять при недостатке хороших пьес — с нашей стороны, со стороны марксистов, значит отвлекаться от действительности. Вопрос можно задать?

ГОЛОСА: пожалуйста!

СТАЛИН. — Вы как, за то, чтобы ставились пьесы, вроде "Горячее сердце" Островского?

ГОЛОС: Она устарела. Дело в том, что мы ставим классические вещи.

СТАЛИН. — Слово "классический" вам не поможет. Рабочий не знает, классическая ли это вещь, или не классическая, а смотрит, что ему нравится.

ГОЛОС: Островского вещи вредны.

СТАЛИН. — Как вам сказать! А вот "Дядя Ваня" — вредная вещь?

ГОЛОС: Тоже вредная.

СТАЛИН. — Я хочу добавит, одно...

ГОЛОС: Неверный подход, если говорят, что все несовременное можно ставить.

СТАЛИН. — Так нельзя. А "Князь Игорь"? Можно его ставить? Как вы думаете? Снять может быть эту вещь?

ГОЛОС: Нет.

СТАЛИН. — Почему? Очень хорошо идет "Князь Игорь"?

ГОЛОС: Нет, но у нас оперный репертуар не богатый.

СТАЛИН. — Значит, вы считаетесь с тем, есть ли репертуар свой, или нет.

ГОЛОС: Считаемся.

СТАЛИН. — Уверяю вас, что и "Дядя Ваня", и "Князь Игорь" и "Дон Кихот" и все произведения Островского, — они вредны; и полезны, и вредны, уверяю вас. Есть несколько абсолютно полезных вещей. Я могу назвать несколько штук: Биль-Белоцерковского две вещи, я "Шторма" не видел, во всяком случае "Голос недр" — хорошая штука затем Киршона "Рельсы гудят", пожалуй "Разлом", хотя надо вам сказать, что там не все в чистом виде. И затем, "Бронепоезд", тоже, конечно, не все чисто, как говорят. Я его не видел, не могу сказать и не знаком с этой вещью. Неужели только и ставить эти четыре пьесы. Стало быть из того материала, который у нас имеется, причем этот материал вырабатывается живыми людьми, которые не могут сразу стать художниками... (ГОЛОС: а мы М . . . сняли). Легко снять и другое и третье. Вы поймите, что есть публика она хочет посмотреть. Конечно, если белогвардеец посмотрит "Дни Турбиных" едва-ли он будет доволен, не будет доволен. Если рабочие посетят пьесу общее впечатление такое — вот сила большевизма, с ней ничего не поделаешь. Люди более тонкие заметят, что тут очень много сменовеховства, безусловно, это отрицательная сторона, безобразное изображение украинцев — это безобразная сторона, но есть и другая сторона.

КАГАНОВИЧ. — Между прочим — это главрепертком мог-бы исправить.

СТАЛИН. — Я не считаю главрепертком центром художественного творчества. Он часто ошибается. Но вы должны понять при такой скудости нашей пролетарской социалистической революционной, если хотите, литературы, репертуар страшно . . . мы не можем пренебрегать некоторыми вещами, где имеется ряд положительных сторон. (ГОЛОС: можно перевести и ставить здесь грузинские революционные пьесы).

(ГОЛОС: "Руль" принимает "Дни Турбиных" как свою пьесу и публикует, что эта пьеса представляет борьбу с большевиками на юге России). Что-то не похоже, чтобы там белогвардейцев победили. (ГОЛОС: там большевизма, по существу говоря, нет, там большевики в тумане). Вы хотите, чтобы он настоящего большевика нарисовал. Такого требования нельзя предъявлять. Вы требуете от Булгакова, чтобы он был коммунистом, этого нельзя требовать. Нет пьес. Возьните репертуар художественного театра, что там ставят? "У врат царства", "Горячее сердце", "Дядя Ваня", "Женитьба Фигаро" (ГОЛОС: а это хорошая вещь). Чем? Это пустяковая бессодержательная вещь. Шутки дармоедов дворян и их прислужников (ГОЛОС: нужно сказать, как ориентируется западная Украина, которая ориентируется на нас, на советсткую Украину (шум, разговоры). Вы может быть будете защищать воинство Петлюры? (ГОЛОС: нет зачем). Вы не можете сказать, что с Петлюрой пролетарии шли. (ГОЛОС: в этом восстании большевики участвовали против Гетмана). (ГОЛОС: это восстание против Гетмана). (ГОЛОС: а петлюровщина как таковая потом развернулась). (ГОЛОС: петлюровское французское командование было, когда обратились представители, то они сказали: головка у вас, говорят, петлюровская, но хвост у вас большевистский). Штат петлюровской дивизии если взять, что он плохо изображен?

СТАЛИН. — Штаб петлюровской дивизии если взять, что он плохо изображен? (ГОЛОС: Мы не обижаемся за Петлюру). Там есть и минусы и плюсы. Я считаю, что в основном плюсов больше.

КАГАНОВИЧ. — Товарищи, вы, всетаки, я думаю, не на "Днях Турбиных", давайте с "Днями Турбиных" кончим.

С МЕСТА: Вы несколько раз говорили по вопросу о том, что целый ряд обид в области культурной и иной жизни, которые имеются в отношении Украины, что тут виноваты сами украинцы, которые недостаточно ставят и выдвигают этот вопрос. (СТАЛИН: И украинцы). У нас такое впечатление и убеждение, что формула XII съезда о том, что основная опасность — это великодержавный шовинизм и что с этой опасностью нужно бороться, — эта формула прекрасно усвоена у нас на Украине, усвоено и то, что одновременно нужно бороться и с местным шовинизмом. Но эта формула плохо усвоена в руководящих органах, даже в Москве. Если говорить о борьбе с великодержавным шовинизмом, то нужно сейчас поставить вопрос о том, чтобы скрыть этот великодержавный шовинизм в какой-то конкретной форме. На Украине мы имели такую конкретную форму — шумкизм, и вели с ним борьбу. А в практике московской работы и работы в РСФСР этого нет, хотя

фактов шовинизма в отношении Украины можно найти много. Этот вопрос имеет болшое значение и должен быть освещен на конкретном материале.

СТАЛИН. — У вас получается нечто вроде декларации. Я несколько раз беседовал с т.т. Петровским, Чубарем и Кагановичем, когда он работал на Украине. Они высказывали недовольство тем, что в наркоматских аппаратах проявляют полное пренебрежение к хозяйственным и культурным нуждам Украины. Эти товарищи могут подтвердить это. Я каждый раз ставил вопрос — назовите хоть одно лицо, чтобы его можно было высечь на глазах у всех. (ГОЛОС С МЕСТА: Ларин у вас проявляет себя в этом отношении). Я говорю о наркоматских аппаратах, о всех наших центральных учреждениях, хозяйственных и прочих, против которых идут жалобы. Назовите хоть одного человека, который пренебрежительно к интересам Украины.

С МЕСТА: Я могу рассказать, как конфисковали украинскую литературу в Москве за то только, что... (конец не слышен).

СТАЛИН. — Я спрашивал т.т. Чубаря, Кагановича и Петровского, и ни разу они не попытались назвать хоть кого-нибудь. Они всякий раз сговаривались и ни разу назвали никого. Пойдут, попугают, те уступят, и делу конец. Так ни разу никого не назвали. У нас имеются по этому вопросу постановления и решения партии и Советской власти. Но они имеют моральное значение, не каждый же проводит их. Мало — принять решения, надо их усвоить, мало — усвоить, надо их переварить. Некоторые не усваивают вообще, не подчиняются, не хотят. Есть такие и среди коммунистов. Другие — хотят, да не умеют, не усваивают. Третьи — усваивают, да не умеют претворить в жизнь. Назовите таких людей, таких шовинистов, которые бы проводили великодержавную политику. Вы назвали Свидерского. Может быть напишете?

ГОЛОСА: Мы пришлем заявление.

СТАЛИН. — Я думаю, что он не главный, Свидерский, и это не главное, что вас беспокоит.

ГОЛОС: Есть стенограмма партийного совещания. Если вы поинтересуетесь фактами, то я думаю, что эта стенограмма даст вам кое-что.

ГОЛОС: Это по линии литературы.

СТАЛИН. — Я беру все хозяйственное дело, все советское. Я часто просил и т. Кагановича, и т. Чубаря, и Петровского — назовите хоть одного такого человека. Они не назвали ни одного. Ларин что-то написал, но это пустяки.

ГОЛОС: А Ваганьян?

СТАЛИН. — Ваганьян отрицает национальную культуру.

КУЛИК. — Тов. Сталин, вот одна справка: раньше наших книг вывозили на . . . рублей, а за три месяца последние книг вывезено на 35 тыс. рублей. Просто игнорировали вывоз украинских книг.

СТАЛИН. — Что касается "Международной книги", тут такое безобразие было. Один товарищ произвел недавно обследование, тов. Ионов, и он говорит, что на 600 тыс. золотых рублей мы ввозим книг из-заграницы, из них на 200 тыс. макулатура, никому не нужные книги.

ГОЛОС: Трудно поймать великодержавного шовиниста за хвост.

СТАЛИН. — Извините, очень легко, если он отмахивается только декларациями.

Вот, собственно, все вопросы.

КАГАНОВИЧ. — Итак, беседа с т. Сталиным сводится к тому, что надо, чтобы вы и все украинцы подошли к вопросам союзного строительства, к своим претензиям не с точки зрения критики, а с точки зрения органического внедрения и предъявления определенных требований. Это абсолютно правильно, и то, что вы приехали к нам в Москву, я убежден, свидетельствует о том, что мы продвигаемся гигантски вперед. Но нельзя отрицать того факта, что среди украинских писателей были известные настроения.

СТАЛИН. — Они чувствуют себя, как гости, в то время, когда они должны чувствовать себя хозяевами.

КАГАНОВИЧ. — Надо приезжать не только в гости, а надо органически взяться за дело, добиться переводов и т.д. В частности, мне тов. Остап Вышня подал записку относительно украинского дома писателей "Слово". Я в этом "доме" принимал горячее участие на Украине и сейчас, если время позволит мне, я займусь этим вопросом. Но это частность. Я думаю, что ваш приезд сюда во многом поможет, во многом сблизит нас. Вы видите, что политика партии и центральных

советских учреждений совершенно определенная. Национальная политика в ЦК совершенно определенна, вы это знаете прекрасно. И что ясно видно из выступления тов. Сталина, общая линия, которую мы проводили на Украине и которую проводим.

Позвольте, товарищи, на этом считать нашу беседу оконченной. (Аплодисменты).

Translation

A Conversation of Comrade Stalin with Ukrainian Writers, 12 February 1929[1]

KAGANOVICH: Comrade STALIN has the floor.

STALIN: In my opinion, the most important issue [raised by the writers] is that, supposedly, the... (inaudible) in the Soviet Union presents the material basis for the formation of an all-Union language—that is to say, Russian—and, obviously, the inequality of literature, as well as the absence of the preconditions for the development of national culture. This is how the question should be understood. Of course, this is not accurate. I frequently receive letters from various comrades—including Ukrainians, by the way—regarding the question of what is a nation, in which it is argued that, to the [formulaic] series of characteristics which define the concept of the "nation," the characteristic of "statehood" should be added. In addition, I receive letters to the effect that my presentation at one meeting—I believe that it was at the KUTV,[2] a university of the peoples of the East—was incorrect. There I argued that national cultures have a future, and that in our environment, in the Soviet environment, national culture means the diversity of the forms of culture with uniformity of content—socialist content. Many comrades do not agree with this. And they even argue that the slogan of the development of national culture promulgated by the Party and by the Soviet power, that that slogan is erroneous, because in fact development in the direction of socialism is already leading to the extinction of national culture and that therefore a common, world language should be created in the transitional phase between capitalism and socialism. And they argue that here, in the Soviet Union, this whole business should be taking place, this fusion of the national cultures into one culture and one language—obviously the Russian language, as the most developed. These are the sort of letters I receive. They invoke citations from the works of Lenin to the effect that Lenin often **[2]** argued against national culture, considering it to be a bourgeois notion. They cite Lenin to the effect that national distinctions should die out, as well as state borders and all other distinctions, up to and including language. They cite Lenin to the effect that, supposedly, we Marxists worked for the fusion of nations even before the February Revolution, so how, they say, can we be cultivating national cultures now? They hint that the existence of national government and national republics with national Councils of People's Commissars is not really our position, but rather a tactical move, or, if you prefer, a kind of small concession—and a very temporary one at that. I receive letters like that all the time. Unfortunately, I do not have the time to collect all of this material and make a presentation today or tomorrow. However, I will do this for sure in the very near future in order to settle these questions. These letters

contain that morass which you indirectly criticize in your questions. Therefore, it might not be redundant to deal with these questions briefly—to say a few words about them and at the same time answer your questions.

First of all—about the nation. What is a nation? A few words. I am sure that you have certain doubts about the definition of the concept of "nation" that has been worked out in our Marxist milieu. What characteristics are posited in the works of Marxists—our Russian Marxists for example? Territorial unity, language, economic communality, and a certain communality of national spirit. Some believe that statehood should be added to this list. They argue that if there exists a group of the population that has a common language, a common territory, and in addition a common economic life, with the mutual affinity of various provinces in one whole on a given common territory, a common cultural spirit and culture baggage, this is still not enough to call such a group of the population a nation. [According to them] [i]t is also indispensable **[3]** to add: if a nation has its own state, then it really is a nation. But if it has all four characteristics, but lacks a state, then that is not a nation. I must say that this is a completely unacceptable point of view. If we were to adopt this point of view, we would be forced to say that, for example, the Uzbeks were not a nation until they created their Soviet statehood, only after that. Or that the Irish did not constitute a nation until their free state was organized. Only after that did Ireland become a nation. But then where did the national movement come from? Or take, for example, Georgia before the revolution. According to this theory, it would appear that Georgia was not a nation up to that period. One could say the same thing about Armenia. According to this theory, only once states had been organized here, only then did Georgia and Armenia become nations. What I mean to say is that such a point of view can be held only by people who consider only that group of the population which has achieved statehood to be a nation. They do not consider a group of the population which does not have statehood, but which has all the other characteristics, to be a nation. This is a great-power point of view—to recognize nationhood only when it is packaged as statehood. Where, then, did the national movement come from in those nationalities which did not have statehood? This is the misgiving which troubles many comrades. That which has been determined by the Marxist literature—the four characteristics which define the nation—these remain the fundamental characteristics of the nation and the element of statehood does not amount to a constitutative characteristic, without which the nation cannot be recognized as a nation.

The second question—on the fate of the nationalities and their national cultures in the circumstances of Soviet development in the period of the transition from **[4]** capitalism to socialism. We are now experiencing the transitional period from capitalism to socialism. Our country cannot be called capitalist, just as it cannot be called socialist. It is moving from the remnants of capitalism—or from those newly-engendered layers of capitalism present in

the conditions of the NEP—toward socialism. And it is here that we must respond to those quotations from Lenin made by certain comrades. It is absolutely correct that in 1912–13 Comrade Lenin debated with the Bundists, who believed in the possibility of the non-national development of international culture. Comrade Lenin was completely correct, but he absolutely did not believe the non-national development of international culture was possible. He fought for a culture which would be international in content. But when Libman and Iudkevich asked him the question, All right then, international culture—that is what Marxists should believe in—but will it be non-national? Lenin decisively distanced himself from this point of view. He said, Yes, we are for the development of international culture. We are for the various nationalities of our country developing a culture which is internationalist in content. But I, Lenin, am for each nationality having a culture which is national in form. It is impossible to conceive of international culture without national form. Only armchair theorists can think like this. But people of action and people who know real life could never take this position seriously—that, given the existence of nationalities, international culture could somehow develop non-nationally, and not expressed in this or the other national form. This is why references to Lenin on this question are incorrect. It is my determination that Lenin called for an international culture among the nationalities that exist in this country, but that he did not consider **[5]** the development of international culture to be possible non-nationally. He believed that international culture would have diverse forms in accordance with the existing nationalities in any given country. And it is this which absolutely must be asserted.

Beyond this, the second thing that must be asserted—one must not deform Lenin by quoting him and claiming that Lenin, taking as his starting point the necessity of the fusion of nationalities, supposedly also maintained that the nationalities would disappear in the transitional period. This is not correct. One can refer to the fact that Comrade Lenin posed the question of national distinctions starkly when he said that the distinctions between nationalities—all distinctions, distinctions of language, even state distinctions—would continue to exist long after the world-wide dictatorship of the proletariat had been established. You understand?—there is no more capitalism in the world, the world dictatorship of the proletariat has been established (not our union dictatorship, but the world-wide one), but even long after this, in Lenin's opinion, national distinctions will continue to exist. This is the only place where Lenin starkly, openly and completely dealt with the question of national distinctions. Insofar as Lenin spoke of fusion before the seizure of power, in the years [19]12–14–16, he had in mind not the disappearance of distinctions among nationalities, but rather the disappearance of antagonism. These are very different things. Lenin wrote about national oppression, that was the extent of the question then. Lenin wrote of the necessity of abolishing national oppression, of abolishing the antagonism among nationalities and among

workers. We have basically achieved this. I cannot say that, in the sense of national relations among workers of various nationalities, everything is perfect here. I cannot say this because there is Russian chauvinism—not nationalism, but chauvinism, a remnant of the past, and there is local nationalism, evoked by the fact that nations had been oppressed—and oppressed forcefully—and people **[6]** cannot shake that off and escape from these memories, and these memories are deepened. There is [also] local chauvinism—there are local republican chauvinisms. Take Georgia for example. There are a bunch of nationalities—five or six—besides the Georgians. Some of our Communists are trying hard to... (inaudible) We in Moscow didn't let them get away with that. It is very easy to go from local nationalism to chauvinism. I know all about this—a lot of remnants [of pre-Soviet thinking] are left—but it must be admitted that the basis for national oppression no longer exists. And if anywhere such attempts are made we cut them off, because this goes not against the tactics but the whole position of the party of Communists and the Soviet power. The distinction must be made between those places in the works of Lenin where it says that the seizure of power by the proletariat or even the establishment of the democratic dictatorship will lead to the undermining of national oppression and in that sense to the drawing together [*sblizhenie*] of nationalities. This must be differentiated from that thesis where Lenin speaks of national distinctions in the period of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Frequently, our comrades—individual comrades who are dissatisfied with the national policy of the Soviet power—confuse these two things. When Lenin spoke of the separation of nationalities up to and including the formation of an independent state, he clearly stated the formula thus: "Disunite for the sake of unification [*raz"edinit'sia dlia ob"edineniia*]." This is contradictory, but it is correct. "Disunite for the sake of unification"—this, precisely, is the Marxist approach. Give the national states the opportunity to form their states in order to kill any possibility of their being suspicious of one another, and once mutual trust has been established, raise the question of unification. Lenin did not at all support the break-up of all states. His position was that they—the states—having broken up, should make it possible to create the basis for the mutual trust of workers and peasants, and then **[7]** the issue of unification could be raised in practical terms. We Marxists do not solve the national question and the question of the liberation of the nationalities the same way that the bourgeois do. They interpret it so as to lock themselves up in their shells, push away from each other and wall themselves in with tariff barriers. This is not how we Marxists deal with the issue. We go much further than any bourgeois radicals in the question of the liberation of nationalities—we go all the way to the formation of separate states. But we strive for this not so that the nationalities should isolate themselves from each other, but so that they can then unite. This, precisely, is the position of Lenin—disunite in order to unite.

The same dialectical approach can be found in Lenin with regard to the question of the elimination of classes. Many of us say, How can we speak of the elimination of classes [as an accomplished fact] when the class struggle is [still] going on? That's precisely the point of how Lenin frames the question—classes are to be eliminated by the means of class struggle. This is contradictory, but terribly vital. Or take the elimination of the state through the strengthening of the functions of the state. This is precisely what we are striving for—the withering away of the state. But how are we going about it? Through the most unprecedented strengthening of the functions of the state in the person of the lower proletariat. Such a state—so far-reaching, with such great functions—as the dictatorship of the proletariat has never before been seen in the world. Where have you ever seen a state which embraces almost the entire country? This is almost the entire budget of the state, the budget of all industry as a whole. Or, if the socialist sector in agriculture develops the way it should (that will also consist of state enterprises in large part)—then there will have never before in the history of all peoples been a state as far-reaching and mighty as the dictatorship of the proletariat, and yet we are trying to eliminate the state as such. Is this not contradictory? Yes, this is contradictory. But this is a dialectical contradiction, absolutely **[8]** necessary for the elimination of the state... (inaudible) all of its functions—the broadest and most powerful functions— must be taken to their logical limit so that then the state—having exhausted itself completely, will become...

The same must be said of national culture. To unite national culture on the basis of a common socialist content, by way of intensifying the development of national cultures. This is the nature of the question. This is what people do not understand. If you Marxists think that someday a common language will be created— and this will happen, but it will not be the Russian language, or French—the national question cannot be solved in one state. The national question has long ago exceeded the boundaries of the state. If someday a common language is created—it will be created without question—this will happen after the worldwide dictatorship of the proletariat has been won, and only long after this, when socialism will be established not in one country but in all countries. And that's why—the development of national culture in the epoch of the dictatorship of the proletariat, maximal development, sponsorship of national cultures. We sponsor these cultures so that they exhaust themselves completely so that they can then create the basis for a language of the whole world—not Russian, but an international language. When will this be? That time is still too far off [to tell]. Lenin is right when he says that this will be long after the international dictatorship of the proletariat has been established for the whole world. This is how the question should be posed. People—Marxists—who think too simplistically, simplifying the most complex questions of national development, people who do not understand certain interpretations—and the whole essence is precisely in these interpretations—do not understand

that we want to prepare the elements... they cannot digest the fact that we want to prepare the elements of an international socialist **[9]** culture by means of the maximal development of national culture. In precisely the same way they do not understand how we want to arrive at the elimination of classes by means of intensifying the class struggle, or how we want to arrive at the withering away of the state by means of an unprecedented expansion of the functions of that state, or how we want to achieve the unification of peoples by means of their disunification, by means of liberating the peoples of various countries from any and all manner of oppression, by means of offering them the right to form their national state[s]. He who does not understand this vital posing of the question does not understand that we are following a policy of the maximal development of national culture so that it exhausts itself completely and then the basis will have been created for the organization of an international socialist culture not only in content but also in form.

It would be a mistake if someone were to think that with regard to the development of the national culture of backward peoples the central [Party] workers maintain a policy of neutrality, as if saying, Look here—a national culture is developing. Well, let it develop to its heart's content—it's not our business, we're only by-standers. Such a point of view would be incorrect. We are for a policy of [active] sponsorship with regard to the development of the national culture of backward peoples. I stress this so that those oversimplifications existing on this question understand that we are not bystanders, but active agents sponsoring the development of national culture. We are for making the culture—the spiritual baggage—present in any given nationality the property of the people as a whole. So, for example, in what language may we raise the culture of Ukraine? Only in Ukrainian. We have before us a primitive problem, the solution of which is very costly and which has already been solved in many states. This is the problem of universal primary education. We must strive to ensure that a worker and peasant **[10]** coming to a factory or plant, or to an agricultural enterprise is literate, having, at the very least, a fourth-grade education. States such as Germany, England, France, Switzerland and so forth already reached this level long ago. In what language can this be achieved? In Russian? Only in the native language. If we want to raise the broad masses of the people to the highest level of culture—or if not to the highest at least to the middle or even lower level of culture—we must give the maximum development to the native language of each nationality, since only in the native language can we achieve this. Other than the native language, no means of raising the cultural level of the masses exists in nature. This is why it would be completely incorrect and mistaken to maintain a position of neutrality with regard to the development of national culture. In that case we would have to admit that we will not raise any industry or create any defense. For what does the condition of the defense of the country depend on? On the cultural level [*kul'turnost'*] of the population, on what kind of soldier we have, whether he has

any inkling of the most elementary notions of culture, whether he can use—for example— a compass, whether he knows something about maps, whether he has even a primitive degree of literacy, culture, so he can take commands and so forth. If these elementary conditions are not met, we will not be able to create a true defense of the country.[3] In precisely the same way it is completely not indifferent to us in what condition workers enter our plants and factories. For we are now re-arming our industry and are even beginning to re-arm our agriculture, because with the old implements the peasant can't handle the tasks and demands posed by the growing industry and the economy as a whole. I repeat, to us it is absolutely not a matter of indifference in what condition workers enter our factories and plants, whether they are cultured or not cultured. This is a very serious question. We will not be able to develop any sort of serious industry if we have not made the whole population literate. **[11]** It is silly to think that completely uncultured people—illiterate people—can be forced to develop their labor [skills] and to use machines the way it is done among peoples whose culture is on a high level. So therefore, even for the accomplishment of the most elementary propaganda, the raising of literacy—even for that— national culture is the air without which we cannot take even one step forward. This is why any kind of neutrality—even an indirect one—is simply criminal. It is against the interests of the proletariat, against the Party, against the people.

You ask, What are the prospects for national culture? Obviously, it will [continue to] develop. Of course we could, when coming into a country, say, Well, we'll just wait a bit while the Party apparatus is nationalized in Ukraine, as well as the literature, the professional apparatus and the state's, and so on. We cannot look at this in such a way—we must actively push this matter forward. Now as for the pace—that is precisely where the Soviet power's policy of sponsorship enters into play, in other words that [factor] in which the Soviet power is in principle different from any other regime. Any other regime is afraid to develop national culture, because in the bourgeois way of doing things the development of national culture is a decision toward... (inaudible).

What are the prospects? The prospects are that the national cultures of even the smallest nationalities of the USSR will develop and we will be helping them. Without that we will not be able to move forward, raise the masses of millions to a higher level of culture, and without that we will not be able to make our industry or our agriculture suitable for defense.

A peasant—it's one thing if he's finished four grades and has gained some elementary agronomical knowledge, if he **[12]** knows his way around. This sort of peasant raises the level of agriculture. It's another thing if he's absolutely illiterate and doesn't have even elementary knowledge. In what language can he be educated? Only in the people's language, because he doesn't know any other languages. The prospects are that national cultures will develop, and that the Soviet power should help in the development of national cultures. Comrade

Kaganovich has spoken with you about this and I will not dwell on it at length, but I will say two words: in national culture the distinction must be made between two facets—form and content. When they say form is meaningless—that is empty talk. An awful lot depends on form, because without it no content is possible. The form—national, the content—socialist. This does not mean that every literary writer must become a socialist, Marxist and so forth. This is not indispensable. This means that in literature—insofar as we are speaking of literature—new heroes must appear. Earlier, different heroes were usually put forward. Now heroes must appear from the people, from among the peasants, the bourgeoisie—in the depiction which they deserve. Take, for example, such fellow-travelers—I don't know if, strictly speaking, these writers can be called fellow-travelers—as Vsevolod Ivanov[4] and Lavrenev.[5] Perhaps you have read *The Armored Train* [*Bronepoezd*], by Vsevolod Ivanov, perhaps many of you have seen it. Perhaps you have read or seen *The Break-up* [*Razlom*], by Lavrenev. Lavrenev is not a Communist, but I assure you that both of those writers with their works *The Armored Train* and *The Break-up* brought much more benefit than ten-twenty or a hundred Communist writers who scribble and scribble and nothing the hell comes of it—they don't know how to write, it's not artistic. Or take, for example, that one, the one everyone knows—Bulgakov.[6] If you take his *Days of the Turbins*. He's an outsider, no question. It is most doubtful that he is of a Soviet frame of mind. Nevertheless, he made a great contribution with his *Turbins*, no question. **[13]**

KAGANOVICH: The Ukrainians don't agree.[7] (commotion, talking)

STALIN: Well I will explain it to you—I'm judging it from the point of view of the viewer. Take *The Days of the Turbins*. The overall impression which the viewer is left with, despite the negative sides (I will also tell you what these consist of), the overall impression is such when the viewer walks out of the theater: the impression is that of the invincible power of the Bolsheviks. Even such strong people, such stalwart and (in their own way) honorable—in quotation marks—people as Turbin and those around him, even such irreproachable (in their own way) and honorable (in their own way)—in quotation marks—people have to admit in the end that there is nothing they can do against those Bolsheviks. I think that, of course, the author did not want it this way. That is not his fault and that, of course, is not the issue. *The Days of the Turbins* is the most magnificent demonstration of the invincible power of Bolshevism.

A VOICE FROM THE AUDIENCE: And of the changing of guideposts [*smenovekhovstvo*].[8]

STALIN: Excuse me, but I cannot demand of a literary author that he must be a Communist and that he must follow the Party point of view. For belletristic

literature other standards are needed— non-revolutionary and revolutionary, Soviet and non-Soviet, proletarian and non-proletarian.[9] But to demand that literature be Communist—this is impossible. People often speak of a "rightist" or "leftist" play. There the rightist threat is depicted. For example, the Turbins constitute the rightist threat in literature. Or, for example, *Flight* [*Beg*]—they banned it, because it was the rightist threat.[10] This is incorrect, comrades. The rightist and leftist threat is purely a Party matter. The rightist threat means that people are departing somewhat from the Party line, the rightist threat is inside the Party. The leftist threat is a leftward departure from the Party line. Since when is there a "Party" literature? This is not Party [literature], of course, it is much broader—literature—than the Party and there other standards are needed, more general ones. There one can speak of the proletarian character of literature **[14]**, or of anti-proletarian, of its worker-peasant character, of its anti-worker-peasant character, of revolutionary, non-revolutionary, of Soviet, non-Soviet. To demand that belletristic literature and the author follow the Party line—then all the non-Party people would have to be driven out. Is this true or not? Take Lavrenev, try to drive him out. He is talented and he has managed to capture certain things from proletarian life, and quite aptly at that. The workers come right out and say, Go to hell with your rightists and leftists—I like going to see *The Break-up* and I'll keep on going. And the worker is right. Or take Vsevolod Ivanov's *Armored Train*. He's not a Communist—Vsevolod Ivanov, but perhaps he considers himself a Communist (commotion, talking). Well, let's just say he's a make-believe Communist (laughter). But that didn't stop him from writing a good thing, which has the greatest revolutionary significance, indisputable instructional significance. So what will you say—is he a rightist or a leftist? He is neither a rightist nor a leftist because he is not a Communist. Party standards should not be applied to the milieu of literary writers in a purely mechanical way. It seems to me that the comrade in the eyeglasses sitting over there doesn't want to understand me. It is from this point of view, from the point of view of the large scale and from the point of view of the different methods of approaching literature, that I say that even the play *The Days of the Turbins* has played a very large role. Workers go to see that play and they see, Look at that—there's no power that can beat the Bolsheviks! There you have it—the general impression left by that play, which in no way can be called Soviet. There are negative sides to that play. Those Turbins are, in their own way, honorable people, if taken as separate individuals apart from their milieu. But Bulgakov doesn't want to show the true state of things, he doesn't want to show how these people—although they might be honorable in their own way—are sitting on the neck of other people and that's why they are being driven out. That same Bulgakov has a play called *Flight*. In that play the character of one woman—Serafima—is depicted, as well as that of a *Privatdozent* **[15]**. These people are portrayed as honorable and so on. And it's impossible to understand—why, concretely, are the Bolsheviks driving these people out? Both

Serafima and the *Privatdozent,* they are both refugees, and, in their own way, honorable and incorruptible people. But Bulgakov—and that's why he's Bulgakov—doesn't show that these, in their own way, honorable people, are sitting on the necks of others. Here you have the underlying reason why such honorable, in their own way, people are thrown out of our country. Bulgakov—whether intentionally, or unintentionally—doesn't show this. But even from people such as Bulgakov certain useful things can be taken. In this case I am speaking of *The Days of the Turbins*. Even from such a play, even from such a person, we can get certain things which are useful for us. Why am I saying all of this? Because broader standards must be applied in evaluating literature. "Rightist" and "leftist" do not apply. One can speak of "proletarian" or "anti-proletarian," "Soviet" or "anti-Soviet."

Take, for example, Parfenov's *Beams* [*Bruski*].[11] At the moment, the most characteristic thing about the village is that there is no longer one village. There are two villages. The new village, which is turning toward the city, awaiting from it tractors, agronomical knowledge and so forth, wants to live in the new way, to work in the new way, to link up with the city. And then there is the old village, which doesn't give a whit about the new, about tractors, agronomical knowledge and so on. The old village wants to live in the old way, and it is perishing. In Parfenov's *Beams* these two villages and the struggle between them is depicted wonderfully. Should literature portraying the village be "peasant" [literature]? Look at Parfenov's *Beams*. Parfenov cannot be called a peasant writer, even though in his work he writes only about the peasantry and there isn't a single word about the city. Or take another, less well-known work—*Katia Dolga* by Korobov.[12] **[16]** Korobov gives a wonderful portrayal of the swindles of the kulaks and of all of their other schemes. There is an excellent depiction of how the new village is growing and how new types of peasants have been born. This is not that peasant who lives sloppily—always in filth. No, he has been in the Red Army, some of them have been in the factories and plants, and have managed to gain a certain amount of knowledge. He reads books and wants to do agriculture in the new way. The peasants are waiting to get a tractor, they organize a collective farm and will do their work in such a way that the land will bring forth two or three times as much. Here the new village is depicted magnificently. Of course, it is incorrect when they say that literature in Ukraine should be of a purely peasant character. This is incorrect. It is completely correct that earlier the workers in Ukraine were Russians but now they are Ukrainians. The composition of the working class will, of course, change and be replenished with newcomers from surrounding villages. This is a general law of national development in the world as a whole. If you take Hungarian cities forty years ago, they were German, but now they have become Hungarian. Take the Latvian cities—before, they were Estonian [*sic*], now they have become Latvian. The ranks of the working class should be replenished from surrounding villages. The nationalities must not be dragged

in by their hair—this is difficult and might evoke resistance from the Russians and give a certain pretext for Russian chauvinism. However, if we take the natural process—not falling behind that process—the nationalization of the proletariat must happen and move forward step by step. This is a general law, and the national link-up [*smychka*], the link-up between the city and the village, must take place. Ukrainian workers will appear as the heroes of [literary] works—there are already a lot of them now. Even old-line Russian workers who used to try to get out of it and refused to study the Ukrainian language (I know many who used to complain to me, "I can't do it, Comrade Stalin, I can't learn **[17]** Ukrainian—my tongue won't turn to speak it"), now speak in a different tone and have learned Ukrainian. I am not even talking about the new workers who will replenish the ranks of the working class. You will then have the same literature as the Russians have here. There will be depictions of workers, and peasants and the bourgeoisie—whether they are positive or negative will all depend on taste. They will be depicted in the same way as in other Soviet countries. And comments along the lines that our literature should be purely peasant in terms of heroes mask a certain chauvinism along the lines of, so they say, things have gone very badly: even the [Party] workers of Ukraine appear to be hindering the work and believe that literature for workers should be Russian and that literature for peasants should be Ukrainian. This is a machination—whether conscious or unconscious—by those who refuse to understand that the working class will be replenished continuously by newcomers from surrounding villages. Here, in sum, you have the answer to the question regarding prospects. In other words, I have spoken on the future of national cultures in the epoch of the transition to socialism, in the epoch of the dictatorship of the proletariat, and on the character of Ukrainian literature. There have been many mistakes made with regard to Ukrainian Soviet culture, as Comrade Fil... writes abroad. This is a big mistake—in part, the mistake is also ours.

A VOICE FROM THE AUDIENCE: And that journal is called *New Russia* [*Novaia Rossiia*].

STALIN: You have all your rights—you should demand that the new name be removed. If they don't agree, in order to display [only] their [own] works of literature, you should grab them by the collar and bring them before the class tribunal, arouse public opinion. This is your mistake and your negligence. If you bring up these mistakes and negligence when it is time to prepare, then I assure you that there will not be a single one of these mistakes. You should bring these things up **[18]**, because there is such a mass of problems and such a heavy load of work that you don't even find out about things. I found out that they were planning a demonstration abroad, in Belgium, in Brussels, after this appeared in the press. You should have raised this question at the proper time and

demanded a response—then Ukrainian literature would have been included. You have made a lot of mistakes like this, and I am afraid that you will make more.

I think that I have dealt with your questions in full—or perhaps I have not touched upon some topic or another? I have spoken on the prospects for cultural development. I have also spoken on the content and form of national culture. I have spoken on the fact that in the future, after the world-wide dictatorship will have been won not only in one country but world-wide, national distinction will continue to exist, for a long time of course. Various individual languages, as the individual treasure-houses of individual nationalities, will fuse into one language naturally and without the application of force, but this is a matter for the far-distant future, when world-wide socialism will have been established and entered into everyday life. In the meantime we are not only developing national cultures but actively sponsoring them, because without this the cultural level of the millions of the popular masses cannot be raised—only on the basis of the native language can it be raised. The theory or idea that we are even now moving toward the extinction of national cultures and national language in the name of a common language is of course stupid and completely unscientific.

I believe that the thesis of the elimination of national oppression and national antagonism must not be confused with the thesis of the elimination of national distinctions. These are two different things. National oppression is being eliminated at the root—it has been eliminated. However, national distinctions are not being eliminated as a result—only now are they showing themselves as they should. But now people who have not kept up with the times are beginning to notice that there are certain peoples [*narodnosti*] who have **[19]** their own language. They used to get Daghestan and Turkmenistan mixed up—now they have stopped. They used to get Belarus and Ukraine mixed up—now they have stopped.

A VOICE FROM THE AUDIENCE: Comrade Stalin, what is the current state of the question in those parts of Kursk and Voronezh gubernias and the Kuban′ where there are Ukrainians? They want to be united with Ukraine.

STALIN: This question is not connected to [that of] the future of Russian or national culture.

A VOICE FROM THE AUDIENCE: It is not connected, but it will speed up the further development of culture in those areas.

STALIN: We have discussed this question several times, since we change borders too frequently. (laughter). We change borders too frequently, and this creates a bad impression both within the country and outside the country. Abroad, Miliukov once even wrote, What is the USSR? It has no borders. Any

republic is free to leave the USSR whenever it decides to. Is this a state or is it not? Today—a population of 140 million, tomorrow—a population of 100 million. Internally, we are very careful with this subject, because it evokes strong resistance from some Russians. This must be taken into account. From the point of view of national culture, and from the point of view of the development of the dictatorship, and from the point of view of the development of the basic issues of our policy, it makes no serious difference, of course, where one district or another of Ukraine or the RSFSR belongs. Whenever this question is raised here they begin to roar, And what about the millions of Russians oppressed in Ukraine? They don't allow them to develop in their native language, they want to Ukrainianize them by force and so on. (laughter) This question is purely practical. We discussed it twice. We set it aside—borders change very frequently. Belarus is now raising the question of uniting a part of Smolensk **[20]** province to them. This also arouses resistance among Russians. I think that this question must be dealt with in a careful manner, not getting too far ahead of ourselves so as not to cause a negative reaction among this or that part of the population. This is also present at the lower levels. I don't know whether the population of those provinces wants to unite with Ukraine.

VOICES: It wants to.

STALIN: But we have information that it doesn't want to.

VOICES: It wants to, it wants to.

STALIN: According to some of our information it wants to, but we also have information that it doesn't want to.

What else? It seems that I have answered all of the questions. Here is another: What is the difference between the concepts of "nation" [*natsiia*] and "nationality" [*natsional'nost'*]? These two words are used in different ways. The question can be framed in the following manner: What is the difference between the period of emerging capitalism and the period of feudalism? The difference is that under feudalism the country is fragmented, there is no common literary language—although the roots of the language are the same—and there are no common cultural and economic centers. The country is broken up into separate principalities which, moreover, very frequently wage internecine war with one another. In that period, a spiritual national unity and, so to speak, the economic bonds which link the various corners of the country—the principalities and provinces—do not yet exist. In the period of the transition from feudalism to capitalism—when capitalism has not yet developed and the common centers drawing together all the parts of the country have not yet been created—in that period the nationality exists, but this is not yet a nation. It becomes a nation only when it unites in the sense of language, territory,

economic communality and communality of national spirit, when it forms a integral organism, reacting to external events in a unified and national sense. For example, at the time of an invasion the country as a whole unites in order to defend itself from the enemy. This is what we have in the period of emerging capitalism. Under feudalism, when one principality wants to attack another this **[21]** does not evoke unification for the repulsion of the enemy. In Georgia, for example, when Persia attacked eastern Georgia, western Georgia joined with Persia or else went over to Turkey. The elementary national characteristics are not there—there is nothing of what is called national feeling. Under feudalism, the elements of the nation are present: there is a common language (or, at the very least, the roots of that language), there is a single territory, but the factors which draw the nation together into one whole are not present. When these unifying factors are created—and this occurs at the beginning of emerging capitalism—only then can one speak of the nation as a determined category. However, in the literature, they often interchange one with the other—nation and nationality. There are also peoples [*narodnosti*]. Well, take the Ostyaks for the sake of argument. What should the Ostyaks be called?[13] It's hard to call them a nation. They are an ethnic group. Or take the Tungus people.[14] You can't call them a nationality. They are an ethnic group. From a scientific point of view the following gradation might be established: the nation, as the more integral formation—this is a concept of the period of emerging capitalism; nationality—the transitional stage between feudalism and capitalism; then—peoples that do not have a leading class, which are [only] ethnic groups. Take, for example, the Tannu-Tuvan republic.[15] What would you call it? They speak different languages,[16] the country is tiny, the polishing process [*shlifovka*] hasn't happened yet. In your country the Ukrainian language is only now being polished. What language did you take as your basis? The Kievan, I believe.

A VOICE FROM THE AUDIENCE: The Kievo-Poltavan.

STALIN: Yes, the Kievo-Poltavan language was taken. At the moment the period of the polishing of the literary-national language is under way in your country. Would your people be able to understand people from Kharkiv, [or] Galicians?

A VOICE FROM THE AUDIENCE: They can understand them.

STALIN: Can Galicia understand?

A VOICE FROM THE AUDIENCE: Galicia can be united with Ukraine, Galicia understands us. (laughter)

[22] STALIN: Why did you take as the basis for the common literary language two languages, the Kievan and the Poltavan?

A VOICE FROM THE AUDIENCE: That happened a long time ago, a hundred years ago.

STALIN: In other words, the Galicians can understand you?

KAGANOVICH: Just the same way a peasant in Viatka province can understand the language of another province, but can't understand everything written in *Pravda*.

A voice in the audience: He can understand a peasant from Moscow [province].

KAGANOVICH: He can understand a peasant from Moscow [province], but he can't understand what's going on in *Pravda*.

A VOICE FROM THE AUDIENCE: It is not worthwhile to take Western [*sic*] Galicia as an example.

STALIN: Why not?

A VOICE FROM THE AUDIENCE: There is more Western influence there.

A VOICE FROM THE AUDIENCE: The more simple a language is, the better people can understand each other.

STALIN: This makes sense for Soviet Ukraine. Where does one get material for a language? From the people. For whom is literature created? For the people. Since the Kievo-Poltavan language is applied in your case, it is therefore obviously more comprehensible for the people than the Galician.

Allow me to ask you a question. May I?

VOICES IN THE AUDIENCE: Please do!

STALIN: How are things going in Galicia? Are you following the literature? And do they follow Ukrainian literature? Do they reprint it?

VOICES: And how! They certainly do reprint it.

STALIN: Earlier, I remember, in the year 1902–3–4, when in Ukraine there was nothing Ukrainian in terms of organizations except for Prosvita[17]—

perhaps some of you remember—I met with a comrade from Western Ukraine in exile and I got the impression **[23]** that Ukrainian literature, insofar as it existed in Eastern Ukraine, was under the spiritual hegemony of Galicia. That's the impression I got in the year 1902–3–4 when I met with comrades from Western Ukraine.[18] Because in Russia the Russian government did not give the Ukrainians the least opportunity to develop their culture, Ukrainian comrades—those who wanted to develop Ukrainian culture—turned toward Galicia and took models of literature from them. What is the situation now? Is it reversed, or not?

A VOICE FROM THE AUDIENCE: I would like to make the following suggestion—let Comrade STALIN ask questions, and then Comrade Kulyk will answer them.

STALIN: I mean in terms of belletristic literature and in general—if one takes scholarly and scientific literature, political journalism [*publitsistika*].

A VOICE: The same thing.

STALIN: Or do you take from them and translate?

A VOICE: The other way around—they take from us.

A VOICE: An incredible cultural poverty.

STALIN: I would like to say that if the Soviet power has achieved such results in your country that others are beginning to take examples, models and so forth from you—then this is a big accomplishment.

A VOICE: Beyond any doubt.

A VOICE: That's a fact.

STALIN: We [now] have hegemony.

A VOICE: Without a doubt.

STALIN: There are schools there.

A VOICE: Very few—of three thousand only seven hundred or so are left.

STALIN: Primary and secondary schools?

A VOICE: Yes.

STALIN: But is there a university in which the highest directing element can be formed?

A VOICE: No.

STALIN: That which might be termed the highest directing element in culture?

A VOICE: There is an academy of sciences.

STALIN: This requires a university—a higher school—and beyond that a basic literature in all branches of science, so that in that Ukrainian language people might be able to get a complete education from top to bottom. Does such a rich library exist?

A VOICE: It does.

STALIN: In chemistry, physics, all the branches of science?

A VOICE: There is something like an academy there.

STALIN: Is it legal?

A VOICE: Yes.

STALIN: But there's no **[24]** university?

A VOICE: No.

STALIN: And is there a secondary school of the *gymnasium* type?

A VOICE: There are seven secondary schools.[19]

STALIN: Is instruction in the Ukrainian language?

A VOICE: Yes, in Ukrainian.

A VOICE: In Ukrainian they teach [only] gymnastics and drawing.

STALIN: And here's another question: Do the Russians translate your literary works poorly?

A VOICE: They don't translate them at all—very little and poorly.

KAGANOVICH: There are some talented works—much more talented than many of those that are published here in large quantities.

STALIN: Comrades, you, too, are not without fault in this respect. You haven't read *Beams*, you haven't read Korobov, you haven't read Korobov's *Katia Dolga*.

VOICES: No, we've read [them].

STALIN: Well, Bill'-Belotserkovskii for example.[20] I'd bet that out of pride they don't translate him into Ukrainian.

A VOICE: Kirshon's *The Rails are Humming*[21] has been running for quite a while already.

A VOICE: *The Break-up* has been running for quite a while.

STALIN: I have finished.

KULYK:[22] I shall focus on the cultural situation in Western Ukraine since I am familiar with that question.

The first question regarding cultural hegemony. Even in the pre-revolutionary period, when the conditions of censorship were much lighter in Western Ukraine, even then Western Ukraine was called the Piedmont of the development of Ukrainian culture.[23] However, a purely political meaning was implicit in this term. This does not mean that the development of Ukrainian culture achieved any great breadth. We should admit that even in the pre-revolutionary period the most prominent Ukrainian literary forces were here, in our country. One could name a few individual figures who achieved prominence there, in Western Ukraine. It should be noted that the first Ukrainian writer to depict the life of the industrial proletariat in his works—and, by the way, one of the first writers to depict the life of industrial workers—was a writer who lived in Western Ukraine.[24] This is completely understandable. There **[25]** was a Ukrainian proletariat in existence there, one that used the Ukrainian language. But nevertheless, the center of literary life in the sense of richness, in the sense of the number of writers, in the sense of the broad variety of themes, was in our country. In our country we had writers such as Kvitko [*sic*],[25] not to mention Shevchenko ... (Comrade Kulyk lists the names of writers). And all of these are classics. There was a constellation of modernists—major poets like Nikolai [Mykola] Voronyi, Oles' Chuprenko [*sic*][26] and others. There were also

symbolists and modernists in Western Ukraine, but they were much less prominent than the writers we had here.

After the revolution a situation was created here in which the political aspect—the aspect of greater political freedom in Western Ukraine—disappeared, and they no longer had the political advantages which they used to have in comparison to us. After the revolution, immense opportunities for the development of Ukrainian culture were created here. In Western Ukraine—I have in mind not only Galicia but also Bukovyna and Subcarpathian Rus'—very few schools remained,[27] and there are no major scholarly/cultural organizations, unless you count the Shevchenko Scientific Society.[28] This is an old society, which at one time was engaged in rather important cultural work. But that work can in no way compare to the work of our Ukrainian Academy of Sciences which, as we know, is far from being in an ideal condition. However, it is the most important scholarly institution. Besides that, we have a mass of all sorts of scholarly chairs and institutes. There are no universities there. There, a struggle is being waged with the Polish government for a Ukrainian university.[29]

STALIN: There is, I believe, a university in Prague.[30]

KULYK: That is an émigré university, created for Petliurist émigrés, for the Petliurist officers. A higher school was created for them. But the Prague Ukrainian university is not **[26]** considered to be an institution of higher learning. If one speaks of the ... Academy of Agriculture—that is not a scholarly institution, that is a political institution. Negotiations are being held now between the Polish and Czechoslovak governments regarding the transfer of that agricultural academy to Poland as a school for officers. (laughter) Further, there is a Ukrainian Institute in Berlin. Once again, this, too, is to a large extent more of a political institution than a scholarly one. This is not a higher school but rather an institute.

A VOICE FROM THE AUDIENCE: And a Hetmanite one!

KULYK: Those are under the aegis of the Petliurist movement, these are under the aegis of the Hetmanite movement. Certain individual comrades have made attempts to set us at odds with Western Ukraine, but these attempts have not met with success. This is made clear by the fact that when we called a conference here for the purpose of establishing a unified orthography, we decided to invite all the representatives of Ukrainians abroad.[31] They gathered here and recognized the orthography which had been accepted here.

STALIN: And Western Ukraine also recognized it?

KULYK: Yes, everyone recognized it.[32] But I would like to turn to one aspect of the question, namely, the myth of the Galician language. This is a thing which hinders us terribly in our work. There is no such thing as a Galician language, [in supposed contrast to] a "language of Shevchenko."

STALIN: But a dialect?

KULYK: It is the exact same Ukrainian language, but it contains a number of Polonisms. We have a remarkable process here: on the one hand—Polonisms, and on the other—Russianisms. Galicia is closer to the Russian language than is our Kievan-Poltavan language.

KAGANOVICH: The literary language is not closer.

KULYK: I remember all the talk about "Shevchenko's language" which, supposedly, everyone can understand. I [also] remember how Comrade —— once carried out an interesting experiment at a conference of teachers. He asked the people present, **[27]** "Do all of you understand the language of Shevchenko?" They answered that all of them understood. He then asked them to read a slogan which was hanging on the wall. Some of those present told him that they didn't understand the word *romen* [*sic*], "strap." This was a quote from Shevchenko, and a very well-known one at that.

STALIN: *Romen*—that's an Old Slavonic word.[33]

KAGANOVICH: Comrade KHVYLIA[34] has the floor.

KHVYLIA: I would like to make a small comment in response to a question of Comrade Stalin's. Comrade Stalin posed the question thus: What is the correlation between the current cultural process in Ukraine and that which remains from the past in Ukraine, and, on the basis of this process, is the Western bourgeoisie able to maintain that the Ukrainian people does not exist? In terms of this correlation, I must cite the fact that even the Ukrainian [press] organs—if we examine that journal which carries on a rabid campaign against Soviet Ukraine, if we take all of the literary material published in that journal, we will find that more than fifty percent consists of reprints of our works that we publish here in Soviet Ukraine.

STALIN: Do they at least mention the fact that these are reprints?

KHVYLIA: Sometimes they do, but sometimes they act like swindlers and claim that those works had been sent directly to them. Secondly, here in Soviet Ukraine we have [a policy of] the training of cadres from top to bottom in the

arts, sciences, and so forth. This process has been completed and now not only the liquidation of illiteracy among the population is under way, not only the liquidation of technological illiteracy, but also the creation of new cadres, beginning at the lower levels and extending to the highest.

And finally—with regard to the Galician literary language and the Ukrainian and so forth. I will, perhaps, not answer this question precisely. **[28]** We believe—on the basis of our own lengthy examination of this question, we were often faced with the following declaration at workers' meetings: "You're speaking to us in Galician; we can't understand anything." One could make the following statement: The Ukrainian language—which is fine from the point of view of people who do not want to understand that language and who have an ironic attitude [towards it]—this Ukrainian literary language, as the synthesizing language of the people as a whole, is considered to be the Galician language. But the Ukrainian language, the language of the simple peasant, which has a limited quantity of terms—this is a result of the fact that in it the process of production is limited in the same proportion as the language of Turgenev or Pushkin is in relation to the dialect of any given Russian province, Riazan', Tula and so forth. It is completely understandable that there is a Poltava dialect, one in Chernihiv, a Podolian dialect. There one has a softer pronunciation, [elsewhere] there is a harder pronunciation. However, there are also certain variations in stress and pronunciation in the Galician dialect. This circumstance must be cited now: when a special conference of Ukrainian scholars-representatives of various regions was called to work out the question of orthography, the representatives of Western Ukraine commented more than once that precisely at the present moment they consider [Soviet] Ukrainian literature to be the Piedmont of the development of Ukrainian culture and the development of Ukrainian... (commotion, talking)

A VOICE FROM THE AUDIENCE: They call our Ukraine the "Great[er] Ukraine."

A VOICE FROM THE AUDIENCE: You spoke of *The Days of the Turbins*. We saw this play. I personally and many other comrades see this question in a somewhat different light. One part deals with the uprising against the hetman. It depicts honorable officers who [try to] put down that uprising, the revolutionary uprising against the hetman. That revolutionary uprising is portrayed **[29]** in frightful tones, [as being] under the leadership of Petliura, even though [in fact] this was a revolutionary uprising of the masses which took place not under the leadership of Petliura, but under Bolshevik leadership. Thus, we have a distortion of a revolutionary uprising and, on the other hand, the depiction of a peasant insurrectionary movement as... in my opinion, this must not be permitted on the stage of the [Moscow] Art Theater, and even if it might be a positive aspect [of the play] that the Bolsheviks compel the intelligentsia to

change its signposts [*k smenovekhovstvu*], such a depiction of the revolutionary movement and the Ukrainian struggling masses must not, in any case, be permitted.

KAGANOVICH: The "One and Indivisible" [*edinaia nedelimaia*][35] is showing through. (commotion, talking)

TESNIAK: When I watched *The Days of the Turbins* the thing that struck me most was that Bolshevism defeats those people not because it is Bolshevism, but because it is creating a unified, great and indivisible Russia. This is the message which strikes everyone who sees the play, and we would be better off without this kind of victory of Bolshevism.

A VOICE [MYKYTENKO]:[36] Why do actors speak German in the pure German language but find it perfectly acceptable to twist the Ukrainian language, thereby ridiculing that language? This is simply anti-artistic.

A VOICE FROM THE AUDIENCE [MYKYTENKO]: A second question—a question not in defense of Colonel Balbach [*sic*].[37] Why does the author portray the Russian officers as idealists, but when it comes to the colonel of the General Staff Balbach [*sic*], who had been a colonel of the General Staff, he is portrayed as a bandit, quite literally as savage and uncultured? This implies, What possible good can come from Ukraine?

FROM THE AUDIENCE: I would like to raise a question completely different from Comrade Mykytenko's. It really makes no difference how Colonel Babachan [*sic*] is portrayed. That is not the problem. However, besides the impression from *The Days of the Turbins* which Comrade Stalin spoke of, the viewer is also left with yet another impression. It is as if the play is **[30]** saying, Look here, you who support us psychologically and are bound by class to us. We lost the battle only because we were not as organized as we should have been and we did not have an organized mass [of followers]. Despite the fact that we were noble and honorable people we, nevertheless, perished because of our lack of organization. Besides the impression indicated by Comrade Stalin, this second impression is also left. And even if that play creates a certain positive impression, it also creates the opposite impression of the social and class force which is hostile to us.

STALIN: With regard to the actors who speak German clearly but twist Ukrainian: Indeed, there exists a tendency toward an attitude of disdain for the Ukrainian language. But what can you expect from these actors—they are not Communists, but merely actors. I could cite an entire list of resolutions of the

Central Committee of our Party in which Communists are accused of great-power chauvinism.

FROM THE AUDIENCE: It's become almost a tradition of the Russian theater to show Ukrainians as some kind of fools or bandits. In *The Gale* [*Shtorm*], for example, the Ukrainian is depicted as a complete bandit.

STALIN: That is possible. However, this also depends on you, by the way. You can and you should apply your pressure in this respect. Recently, about half a year ago, there was a celebration here in Moscow and the Ukrainians gathered their "colony," as they put it, in the Bolshoi Theater. Ukrainian actors performed at the celebration.

A VOICE FROM THE AUDIENCE: Did they recruit the actors in beer cellars?

STALIN: You [Ukraine] sent singers and bandurists. The group which Kharkiv had recommended took part.

FROM THE AUDIENCE: Was that at the Congress of Soviets?

STALIN: No, I believe it was at the commemoration of October. The production was very good, but then the following incident took place—the conductor stood there in great confusion as to what language he should speak in: Should he speak in French? **[31]** Or perhaps in German? We asked him, "Do you speak Ukrainian?" "I do." "So just announce in Ukrainian what you will be performing."

FROM THE AUDIENCE: That was quite understandable.

STALIN: But how can he ask such questions? He can speak French fluently, German also, but he's hesitant about speaking Ukrainian, afraid that it might get him in trouble. So you see, comrades, a lot depends on you. Actors will of course stop twisting the language if you chew them out the way you should and if you yourselves organize these kinds of concert tours and meetings and the like. Otherwise, there will be situations like that: without any organizational guidance from the Communists, some conductor arrives here and he—apparently a man who knows his way around—thinks he has wound up in a foreign country—as it seems to him—where speaking Ukrainian is not allowed. You are also to blame. With regard to *The Days of the Turbins*—I did after all say that it is an anti-Soviet thing and that Bulgakov is not ours. I said as much. But what, then, can we draw from that thing even though that thing is anti-Soviet? That, which the author himself did not want to say. And the basic impression

that the viewer is left with is of the invincible might of Communism. Russian people—the Turbins—are depicted there, and the survivors of his group join the Red Army as a Russian army. That is also accurate.

A VOICE: With the hope of [its] regeneration.

STALIN: Maybe so, but you should admit that Turbin and the survivors of his group say, The people are against us. We must give up our weapons because the people are against us and our leaders have sold out. We have no choice but to submit. There is no other force. This should also be admitted. Why are such plays performed? Because we have very few real plays of our own, or even none at all. I am against negating everything in *The Days of the Turbins* as a whole, against speaking of that play as of a play which gives only negative results. I believe that, overall, it nevertheless **[32]** gives more pluses than minuses. Look what he writes, Comrade Petrienko: "*The Days of the Turbins*...(Stalin continues reading)..." What is it that you want, exactly?

PETRIENKO: We want our penetration of Moscow to result in the cancellation of that play.[38]

A VOICE: That is our unanimous opinion.

A VOICE: And instead of that play, Kirshon's play *The Commissars of Baku* should be performed.[39]

STALIN: If you write only about Communists that won't work. We have a population of 140 million, and only a million and a half Communists.[40] These plays are of course performed not only for Communists. To make such a demand when there is a shortage of good plays is, from our side, from the Marxist side, a distraction from reality. May I ask a question?

VOICES: Please do.

STALIN: What is your position—do you support the performance of plays like Ostrovskii's *A Passionate Heart* [*Goriachee serdtse*]?

A VOICE: It's outdated. The fact of the matter is, we produce classic works.

STALIN: The word "classic" won't help you. The worker doesn't know if it's a classic work, or not a classic—he just goes to see what he likes.

A VOICE: Ostrovskii's works are harmful.

STALIN: That's hard to say. How about *Uncle Vanya*[41]—is that a harmful thing?

A VOICE: It's also harmful.

STALIN: I would like to add one thing...

A VOICE: It's a mistaken approach when they say that anything non-contemporary can be performed.

STALIN: That's wrong. And *Prince Igor*?[42] Should that be performed? What do you think? Perhaps we should remove it [from the repertory]? **[33]**

A VOICE: No.

STALIN: Why not? Is *Prince Igor* very popular?

A VOICE: No, but our opera repertory is not very rich.

STALIN: In other words, you take into account whether or not you have your own repertory?[43]

A VOICE: Yes, we take that into account.

STALIN: I assure you that not only *Uncle Vanya*, but also *Prince Igor*, and *Don Quixote*, as well as all the works of Ostrovskii—they are all harmful. Both useful and harmful, of this I assure you. There are a few absolutely useful works. I can name a few things: Two things by Bill'-Belotserkovskii—I haven't seen *The Gale*, but in any case *The Voice of the Depths* is a good thing. Beyond that—Kirshon's *The Rails are Humming*, and most likely *The Break-up* as well, although I should tell you that not everything is quite right there. Beyond that—*The Armored Train*, although, of course, not everything is quite right there either, as people tell me. I haven't seen it, so I can't say—I'm not familiar with that piece. Now how can we possibly put on only these four plays? It seems that from the material we have at hand—and keep in mind that this material is produced by ordinary people who cannot become artists overnight...

A VOICE: But we cancelled *M...* [*Myna Mazailo*?]

STALIN: It's easy to cancel this thing, or that thing, or another thing. But you must understand that there is such a thing as an audience and it wants to see [plays]. Of course, if a White Guardist goes to see *The Days of the Turbins* it's hard to see how he would be pleased—he wouldn't be pleased. If workers go

to see the play the general impression will be, Just look at the power of Bolshevism, there's nothing you can do to stop it. More refined people will notice that there's an awful lot of changing of signposts [*smenovekhovstva*]. Without a doubt, that is a negative aspect. The disgraceful [*bezobraznoe*] depiction of the Ukrainians is a disgraceful aspect, but there is also another aspect.

KAGANOVICH: By the way, the GLAVREPERTKOM could correct that.[44]

STALIN: I do not consider the GLAVREPERTKOM to be the center of artistic creativity. It often makes mistakes. But you must understand that with **[34]** such a meagerness of our proletarian, socialist, revolutionary—if you will—literature, the repertory is terribly... we cannot cast aside certain works which contain a whole series of positive aspects.

A VOICE: Georgian revolutionary plays can be translated and performed here.

A VOICE: *Rul'*[45] accepts *The Days of the Turbins* as its own play and publishes it, claiming that that play shows the struggle against Bolshevism in the south of Russia.

STALIN: Somehow it's hard to believe that they defeated the White Guardists there.

A VOICE: In essence, there is no Bolshevism there. Bolshevism is in a fog there.

STALIN: You would want him to portrary a true Bolshevik. Such a demand cannot be made. You demand that Bulgakov be a Communist. One cannot demand this. There aren't any plays. Take the repertory of the Art Theater—what are they performing there? *At the Gates of the Kingdom*, *A Passionate Heart*, *Uncle Vanya*, *The Marriage of Figaro*.

A VOICE: Now that's a good thing.

STALIN: In what way? It's an empty-headed, meaningless thing. The jokes of parasitical aristocrats and their lackeys.

A VOICE: We must raise the issue of the orientation of Western Ukraine, which is oriented towards us, towards Soviet Ukraine.

STALIN: Perhaps you shall defend Petliura's legions?[46]

A VOICE: No, what for?

STALIN: You cannot say that the proletarians followed Petliura.

A VOICE: The Bolsheviks took part in that uprising against the hetman.

A VOICE: That was an uprising against the hetman.

A VOICE: And the Petliura movement as such got going only later.

A VOICE: There was a Petliurist French command, and when the emissaries turned to them they said, "Your head is Petliurist, but your tail is Bolshevik."

STALIN: Well, take the staff of the Petliurist division—are you saying that it is depicted badly?[47]

A VOICE: We're not offended on account of Petliura.

STALIN: There are both minuses and pluses there. I believe that, basically, there are more pluses.

KAGANOVICH: Comrades, I think that you, after all, are not at a performance of *The Days of the Turbins*. Let's be done with *The Days of the Turbins* already. **[35]**

FROM THE AUDIENCE: Several times you spoke to the effect that in a whole series of affronts to Ukraine in the sphere of cultural and other life, that the Ukrainians themselves are to blame here, because they do not raise and push this question sufficiently.

STALIN: The Ukrainians, too [are to blame].

FROM THE AUDIENCE: It is our impression and conviction that the formula of the Twelfth Congress to the effect that the fundamental threat is posed by great-power chauvinism and that that threat must be combatted—this formula has been assimilated perfectly well by us in Ukraine, as has the idea that it is necessary to combat local chauvinism at the same time.[48] But this formula has been assimilated poorly in the directing organs, even in Moscow. If we are to speak of great-power chauvinism, we must at the same time raise the question of unmasking that great-power chauvinism in some concrete form. In Ukraine, we had such a concrete form—Shumskism, and we fought against

it.[49]But in the practice of Moscow [Party] work and the [Party] work in the RSFSR there is nothing like this, even though many instances of chauvinism with regard to Ukraine may be found. This is a question of great significance and must be illuminated on the basis of concrete material.

STALIN: This is turning into something of a declaration on your part. Several times I spoke with Comrades Petrovs'kyi,[50] Chubar,[51] and Kaganovich[52] when he was working in Ukraine. They expressed their dissatisfaction with the apparats of the People's Commissariats for displaying a total disregard for the economic and cultural needs of Ukraine. Those comrades can confirm this. Each time I asked the question: Name at least one person, so that he can be whipped in front of everyone.

A VOICE FROM THE AUDIENCE: Larin has revealed himself in this regard.[53]

STALIN: I am talking about the People's Commissariat apparats, about all of our central institutions—economic and otherwise—against which complaints have been made. Name at least one person who shows disregard for the needs of Ukraine.

[36] FROM THE AUDIENCE: I could tell how they confiscated Ukrainian literature in Moscow only because... (end of sentence inaudible).

STALIN: I asked Comrades Chubar, Kaganovich, and Petrovs'kyi to do this and not once did they try to name even one person. Each time they discussed it among themselves and not once did they name anyone. They go there, try to scare people a bit, the others back down and that's the end of it. And in this way not once did they name anyone. On this question we have resolutions and decisions of the Party and Soviet power. But they have a moral significance, and not everyone puts them into practice. It is not enough to adopt decisions, they must be assimilated. It is not enough to assimilate them, they must be digested. There are those who don't assimilate at all, don't obey—because they don't want to. There are such people among the Communists, too. Others want to, but they don't know how, so they don't assimilate. Still others assimilate, but don't know how to put them into living practice. Name such people, such chauvinists, who carry on a great-power policy. You named Sviderskii.[54] Perhaps you could put that in writing?

VOICES: We'll send a [formal] statement.

STALIN: I don't think that he is the main one—Sviderskii, and that is not the main thing that is bothering you.

A VOICE: There is a stenogram of a Party conference. If you are interested in facts, I think that stenogram will offer you something.

A VOICE: It concerns literature.

STALIN: I take all business having to do with economics and the Soviets. I often asked not only Comrade Kaganovich, but also Chubar, as well as Petrovs'kyi—name at least one such person. They didn't name a single one. Larin wrote something, but that's silly.[55]

A VOICE: And what of Vaganian?[56]

STALIN: Vaganian denies national culture.

KULYK: Comrade Stalin, here is a documented fact: our books used to be exported in the amount of —— rubles, but in the last three months books were exported [only] in the amount of 35,000 rubles. They've simply been ignoring the export of Ukrainian books.

[37] STALIN: With regard to Mezhdunarodnaia kniga[57]—there was such a disgraceful mess here. One comrade—Comrade Ionov[58]— made a study not long ago and he says that of the 600,000 gold rubles' worth of books that we import from abroad, 200,000 rubles' worth are pulp, completely useless books.

A VOICE: It's hard to catch a great-power chauvinist by the tail.

STALIN: Excuse me, but it's very easy if he only defends himself by waving declarations.

These, in effect, are all the questions [to be dealt with].

KAGANOVICH: And so, the conversation with Comrade Stalin can be summarized as follows: it is necessary for you and all the Ukrainians to approach questions of all-Union construction and also your complaints not from the point of view of criticism, but from the point of view of organic inculcation [of Party policy] and the presentation of specific demands. This is absolutely correct, and I am convinced that the fact that you come to us in Moscow demonstrates that we are pushing gigantically ahead. But one cannot deny that among the Ukrainian writers there were certain attitudes [of discontent].

STALIN: They feel like guests when they should feel like they're at home.

KAGANOVICH: It is necessary to come not only to visit, but one must also apply oneself organically to the task, to demand translations and so forth. In part, Comrade Ostap Vyshnia[59] presented me with a note regarding the Ukrainian home for writers, Slovo [The Word]. I took fervent part in that "home," and now, if time allows, I will look into that question. But this is [only] a specific matter. I think that your visit here will help very much—bring us closer in many ways. You can see that the policy of the Party and the central Soviet organs is perfectly well-defined. The national policy in the Central Committee is perfectly well-defined, and you know this perfectly well. And, as can be seen clearly in Comrade Stalin's speech, [so is] the general line which have have been putting into practice in Ukraine and which we are now putting into practice.

With this, allow me, comrades, to consider our conversation at an end. (Applause).

Translated from the Russian by Leonid Heretz

NOTES

1. "Beseda tov. Stalina s ukrainskimi pisateliami ot 12 fevralia 1929 g." ("Comrade Stalin's Conversation with Ukrainian Writers, 12 February 1929"), RTsKhIDNI, fond 558, opis' 1, delo 4490, listy 1-37.

Material in parentheses is part of the original text. Numbers in brackets indicate pages of the original. Other material in brackets was inserted by the translator. Paragraphing and punctuation have been changed slightly to facilitate reading. Except where noted otherwise, the following footnotes are by the author of the preceding commentary.

2. KUTV—Kommunisticheskii universitet trudiashchikhsia vostoka—was founded in Moscow on 21 April 1921. Part of the nomenklatura of the Central Committee of the VKP(b), its aim was to educate apparatchiks from the eastern Soviet republics and regions. See *Bol'shaia sovetskaia entsiklopediia*, 3rd ed., vol. 12 (Moscow, 1973), 575.

3. In 1929 a system of Territorial Militia was still a basic feature of the organization of the Red Army. Out of the 562,000-strong armed forces, 75% of infantry divisions were organized according to the national and territorial principle. Therefore, the local language was the main communication tool in each particular unit. In the military reform of the 1930s, that principle was discarded, and the Russian language became the principal vehicle of communication in the army. This constituted one step towards the fulfillment of Stalin's theory of a universal language.

4. Russian writer Vsevolod Ivanov (1895–1963) was the author of the novel *Armored Train 14-69* (1922), which was presented as a play by the Moscow Art Theater (MKhT) in 1927.

5. Russian writer Boris Lavrenev (1891–1959) wrote the drama *The Break-up*, which was staged in 1927.

6. Mikhail Bulgakov (1891–1940) was the author of *The Days of the Turbins*, staged by MKhT in 1926.

7. Stalin appears to miss the point of disagreement. The members of the delegation oppose Bulgakov's treatment of the Ukrainian characters and the Ukrainian language, while Stalin insists on the political utility of the play.

8. *Smenovekhovstvo* was a social and political movement among Russian emigre intellectuals that appeared in the 1920s as a response to the New Economic Policy in Soviet Russia. The

ideologues of this movement called on the emigration to cooperate with the Soviet intelligentsia, expecting the regeneration (*pererozhdenie*) of the Soviet government as a Russian national and imperial state. Bulgakov's critics called him an emissary of *smenovekhovstvo*.

9. Here Stalin almost literally repeats the arguments expounded in his letter to the playwright V. Bill′–Belotserkovskii. Although the letter, dated 2 February 1929 (i. e., one week before the meeting), has different nuances, these might have been added by the editors who prepared it for publication twenty years later. Thus, in his letter Stalin uses clearcut antonyms such as "Soviet" and "anti-Soviet," "revolutionary" and "counterrevolutionary." These terms bear the political connotations of articles of the Criminal Code. On the other hand, in his public speech Stalin uses less antagonistic and criminally charged epithets, such as "revolutionary" and "non-revolutionary." I. V. Stalin, *Sochineniia*, 13 vols. (Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1946–52), 11:326–28.

10. In the same letter, Stalin made a distinction between the two plays. He almost suggested that after elaboration the play could have been allowed to be staged.

11. Fëdor Panferov (1896–1960), a Russian writer. The first volume of his novel *Beams* (*Bruski*) appeared in 1928. It foretold the scenario of Stalin's collectivization, especially its utopian ideas. This raises the question of how many political ideas Stalin borrowed from second-rate politically correct literature.

12. Iakov Korobov (1874–1928), a Russian peasant writer. His novel *Katia Dolga*, published in 1926, was another violently anti-kulak piece. In 1931, the second year of the genocide of the peasantry, *Literaturnaia entsiklopediia* praised this book for its depiction of the countryside with its "backwardness," "darkness," the "idiocy of peasant life," and "the signs of new social relationships." *Literaturnaia entsiklopediia* 5 (Moscow: Kommunisticheskaia akademia, 1931), 481–82.

13. The Ostyak people is now called the Khanty, and since 1940 the Ostyak-Vogul National Region (formed in 1930) has been called the Khanty-Mansi National Region, part of the Tiumen′ oblast in Siberia. In 1989 they numbered 22,000.

14. The Tungus people is now called the Evenki. The Evenk National Region, established in 1930, is situated in Krasnoiarsk krai. In 1989 the Evenki numbered 30,000.

15. This is an eloquent example of Stalin's nationality policy in practice. He does not realize he is dealing with a formally independent country. The People's Republic of Tuva was proclaimed in August 1921. From 1914 it had been under the protection of the Russian Empire. It was annexed by the USSR in October 1944. Unlike the other four "fraternal republics" (Moldavia, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia), however, it was given the lowest status in the state nomenklatura. It was made an "autonomous region." It was upgraded to an autonomous republic in 1961.

16. Even according to the first edition of the *Bol'shaia sovetskaia entsiklopediia* (1926–47), s.v. "Tuva," the Tuvan people spoke one language, "one of the most ancient languages of the Turkic family."

17. Prosvita was a cultural and educational society created in 1868. It continued to exist in Western Ukraine until 1939. "By 1938 Prosvita had over 360,000 members using 3,000 libraries and 80 branches." Michael Yaremko, *Galicia-Halychina (A Part of Ukraine). From Separation to Unity* (Toronto: Shevchenko Scientific Society, 1967), 235.

18. This reminiscence is yet another obscure point in Stalin's personal biography. He speaks of 1902–1904 as his years of exile. But even if one narrows it to the single year of 1903 and check the official *Kratkaia Biografiia*, the findings undermine the plausibility of Stalin's meetings with the Western Ukrainian comrade in exile, since Stalin arrived on exile on 27 November 1903, but escaped on 5 January 1904. Iosif Vissarionovich Stalin. *Kratkaia biografiia*. 2nd ed. (Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1950), 20.

19. According to Yaremko, in Volhynia "from approximately 1,000 Ukrainian schools in 1917, only seven remained in 1929 representing only 0,02% of the Ukrainian children being taught in their mother tongue .... The gymnasia (secondary schools) fared similarly. By 1930 only six state and four private Ukrainian gymnasia remained in Eastern Galicia representing one gymnasium for

every 230, 000 Ukrainians." Michael Yaremko, *Galicia - Halychina (A Part of Ukraine). From Separation to Unity* (Toronto: Shevchenko Scientific Society, 1967), 234.

20. Vladimir N. Bill'-Belotserkovskii (1874–1970), a Russian writer. His play *The Gale*, staged in 1926, was praised for its glorification of the Bolshevik party during the civil war.

21. Vladimir M. Kirshon (1902–1938), a Russian playwright, was a secretary of RAPP and chairman of its cinema section. Kirshon was one of the ideologues of proletarian literature. His play *The Rails Are Humming* was produced in 1927. Its principal conflict involves a proletarian factory director who struggles for socialist reconstruction. Kirshon perished in the Great Purge. See O. K. Borodina, *Vladimir Kirshon* (Kiev: Izdatel'stvo Kievskogo universiteta, 1964).

22. Ivan Kulyk (1897–1941), a Ukrainian writer, one of the leading officers of VUSPP. In 1934 he became the first president of the Union of Writers of Ukraine. He was arrested in 1937 and perished in the Great Purge.

23. This is an allusion to the Italian Risorgimento and the Piedmont of King Victor Emmanuel, who began the struggle for the reunification of Italy. In the pre-revolutionary Ukrainian context, it meant that the reunification of Ukraine and the achievement of statehood would begin in Galicia.

24. Kulyk obviously means Ivan Franko (1856–1916).

25. Since the verbatim report is not edited or proofread, it has many spelling, syntactic, and stylistic mistakes. The sense of this fragment would indicate that Kulyk was referring to Kvitka-Osnov'ianenko.

26. This is another instance of flaws in the text. Two different poets, Oleksander Oles' and Hryts'ko Chuprynka, are recorded as one person.

27. Michael Yaremko gives the following figures: "Prior to the Polish occupation there were 2420 Ukrainian schools in Eastern Galicia. A year after Grabski's law [1924] went into effect this number was cut to 1055 and by 1927 to 740. Ten years later there were only 450, which meant that only 5 per cent of the Ukrainian children were being taught in their native tongue." Michael Yaremko, *Galicia - Halychina (A Part of Ukraine). From Separation to Unity* (Toronto: Shevchenko Scientific Society, 1967), 234.

28. The Shevchenko Scientific Society, founded in 1873, continued to exist under Polish rule.

29. Cf. Michael Yaremko: in 1930, "the Ukrainian Scientific Institute in Warsaw was founded by the Polish Government ... instead of a promised university." (op. cit., 235).

30. Stalin was well informed. There was a Ukrainian university in Prague and an agricultural institute in Poděbrady.

31. An all-Ukrainian conference on orthography was convened by the People's Commissariat for Education of the Ukrainian SSR in Kharkiv from 26 May to 6 June 1927. See Roman Smal-Stocki, *Ukrains'ka mova v Soviets'kii Ukraini (Materiialy i zavvahy)*, Pratsi Ukrains'koho Naukovoho Instytutu (Warsaw, 1936). Three delegates represented Western Ukraine, while the Eastern part was represented by sixty people. George Y. Shevelov, *The Ukrainian Language in the First Half of the Twentieth Century (1900–1940). Its State and Status* (Cambridge: Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, 1990), 132.

32. Cf. George Y. Shevelov: "The new code was a compromise that did not satisfy either party." Shevelov, *The Ukrainian Language*, 132.

33. Here Stalin displays the remnants of his Russian Orthodox seminary education. The word *remin'* (strap) is indeed of Old Church Slavonic (not Old Slavic) origin. Shevchenko uses it in his "Poslanie," line 168. The typescript, apparently incorrectly, renders it *romen*.

34. Andrii Khvylia was a Ukrainian literary critic and a head of AGITPROP of the TsK KP(b)U. At the first congress of the Union of Writers of Ukraine (1934) he presented a report "On the Artistic Tasks of Ukrainian Poetry." He perished in the purges.

35. "One and Indivisible Russia" was the programmatic slogan of the White movement (translator's note).

36. Ivan Mykytenko (1897–1937) a Ukrainian playwright. A member of VUSPP and VOAPP, he perished in the purges.

37. This should read "Bolbotun." In the first edition of Bulgakov's play *Belaia gvardiia* (*The White Guard*), this character is identified as "BOLBOTUN, commander of the First Cavalry Division of Petliura, 43 years old." M. A. Bulgakov, *P'esy 1920-kh godov* (Leningrad: Iskusstvo, 1989), 35. The same is true for *The Days of the Turbins*. The historical character was Petro Bolbochan.

38. "In March 1929 the life of *The Days of the Turbins* was interrupted for the next three years." Anatolii Smelianskii, *Mikhail Bulgakov v khudozhestvennom teatre* (Moscow: Iskusstvo, 1989), 145.

39. Kirshon's *City of Winds* is based on a popular theme of the 1920s: the fate of the twenty-six Baku commissars executed by the counterrevolutionaries in 1918.

40. Here Stalin succinctly expresses the rationale for the 25 April 1932 TsK VKP(b) resolution, which would ban RAPP.

41. A play by Anton Chekhov on stage at MKhT.

42. Alexander Borodin's opera was in the repertoire of the Moscow Bolshoi Theater.

43. This statement is another example of Stalin's duplicity. Precisely at that moment, proletarian watchdogs were attacking Nikolai S. Golovanov, conductor of the Bol'shoi Theater orchestra. He was accused of favouring the tsarist repertoire and resisting the introduction of new operas and ballets. Stalin wrote to Bill'-Belotserkovskii that "*golovanovshchina* is an anti-Soviet phenomenon." *Sochineniia*, 11 (1949), 327, 368. Seven days later he de facto defended Golovanov.

44. GLAVREPERTKOM was the main government censorship body in the field of Soviet theater. It corresponded to GLAVLIT in literature and other printed media. Kaganovich's suggestion is ambiguous: by *popravit'* he either means the further editing of Bulgakov's play or its total ban.

45. *Rul'* was a Russian daily newspaper published in Berlin in 1920–1931. Its political orientation was close to the Cadets (Constitutional-Democratic party).

46. Symon Petliura had been assassinated in Paris in 1926. Yet for many years, the epithet *petliurovskii*, the word *petliurovshchina*, and the name of the ataman itself were used as highly charged political accusations in the struggle with "Ukrainian nationalism." One therefore should not underestimate Stalin's use of the phrase *voinstvo Petliury*. It was yet another ominous sign.

47. Stalin is referring to act 2, scene 2 of Bulgakov's *Days of the Turbins*.

48. The Twelfth Congress of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) (May 1923) condemned two deviations in the nationalities policy: Great Russian (*velikorusskii*) chauvinism and local nationalism. Later, however, Stalin's policy placed more emphasis on the struggle against nationalism in the former colonies of the tsarist empire. In linguistic terms, this was reflected in the subtle substitution of the word *velikorusskii* by *velikoderzhavnyi* (great-power). Thus, the Russian content was diluted. This was a departure from the Twelfth RCP(b) Congress resolution that stated, "Condemning both of these deviations, as harmful and dangerous for the cause of communism, and bringing to Party members' attention the particular harm and particular danger of deviation towards Great Russian chauvinism, the Congress calls on the Party for the urgent liquidation of these remnants of the past in our constructive Party work." *KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh i resheniiakh s"ezdov, konferentsii i plenumov TsK*, 7th ed. (Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1954), 1:718.

49. Shumskism was "a ukrainization policy that led to nationalist deviation." George S. N. Luckyj, *Literary Politics in the Soviet Ukraine, 1917–1934*, revised and updated edition (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1990), 79-80. The phenomenon was named after Oleksander Ia. Shums'kyi, people's commissar of education in Ukraine in 1925–27. See ibid., 43. On the tragic fate of Shums'kyi in 1946 see Iurii Shapoval, "'Ne samohubets.' Zlochyn, rozsekrechenyi cherez 46 rokiv," *Literaturna Ukraina*, 25 February 1993, 7.

50. Hryhorii Petrovs'kyi (1878–1958) was a member of the Bolshevik party from 1897. In 1919–38 he headed the All-Ukrainian Central Executive Committee. Demoted in 1939, he worked as deputy director of the Museum of the Revolution in Moscow.

51. Vlas Chubar (1891–1939) headed the Ukrainian Council of People's Commissars in 1923–34. He perished in the purges.

52. Lazar' Kaganovich (1893–1991) was a secretary general of the TsK KP(b)U in 1925–28.

53. Iurii Larin (Mikhail Lur'e)(1882–1932) was an economist and a member of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the National Economy (VSNKh).

54. In fact, the name of Larin was mentioned earlier. There is no reference to Sviderskii, however, in the minutes. Aleksei I. Sviderskii (1878–1933), an old Bolshevik, headed GLAVISKUSSTVO (a sort of Ministry of Culture) in 1928–29. He was forced out of office together with Anatolii V. Lunacharskii, who was people's commissar of education of the RSFSR. Stalin emphasizes Sviderskii's name because this was his style of liquidating opponents.

55. Iurii Larin defended his article in *Bolshevik* at the sixteenth plenary session of the Fifteenth VKP(b) Congress in 1927. He began his speech with the following words: "'I will just say a couple of words. The first regards the speech at our Congress by Comrade Skrypnyk. The second deals with the speech made abroad by Marshal Piłsudski, head of the Polish army and the Polish government.' (laughter)" *XV s"ezd VKP(b). Stenograficheskii otchet* (Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1961), 1: 781.

56. Varshak A. Ter-Vaganian (1893–1938) was associated with the literary journal *Krasnaia nov'*. In 1928 he was expelled from the Party. He was shot as a result of the Kamenev-Zinoviev trial of August 1936. For a detailed discussion of Larin's article in the December 1926 issue of *Bol'shevik* and Vaganian's 1927 book *O natsional'noi kul'ture* see George O. Liber, *Soviet Nationality Policy, Urban Growth and Identity Change in the Ukrainian SSR 1923–1934* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 154–55.

57. Until recently, the Moscow-based Mezhdunarodnaia kniga was the main government organization in charge of exporting books published in the USSR and of importing international books.

58. I. I. Ionov (1887–1942) joined the Bolshevik party in 1904. In 1928–29 he was chairman of the board of the publishing house Zemlia i fabrika, and later headed Mezhdunarodnaia kniga. Ionov perished during the purges.

59. Ukrainian writer Ostap Vyshnia (Pavlo Hubenko) (1889–1956) spent 1933–43 in the GULAG.

ESSAY

Ukraine between East and West: Some Reflections on Professor Ševčenko's Essay

WŁADYSŁAW A. SERCZYK

In spite of several works published on this subject so far, this title seems to contradict common sense. After all, location between East and West means, in the traditional sense of the word, the situation of someone or something on the border of two spheres of civilization. In the best formulation, it means location on the border of the influences of two churches or only two rites: Greek Byzantine and Latin. If one looks at the problem from this point of view, it becomes evident that neither all of Ukraine nor (as some of my compatriots would like it to be) all of Poland lies on such a border; only the western lands of the former and the eastern lands of the latter do so.

The conclusion that follows from such an approach to the problem is of extraordinary importance: neither Ukraine nor Poland should claim a special role in either the past or the present. Such a statement permits one to avoid at the very outset the terminological, historical, and other difficulties that so far have complicated the issue so much.

Despite this, it is worthwhile examining once more the elements that form the large system of mutually overlapping structures known as Central-Eastern Europe, and Ukraine's place in it.

The first question that should be answered in this case is, When was this Central-Eastern European community formed, and should one not rather speak exclusively of Eastern Europe? Was it really so that as early as at the time of the formation of the Czech, Polish, Ruthenian, Hungarian and other states, they constituted a factor having the same weight as the German state, for instance? Would it not be better to think rather of Germany as one of the independent components of the European continent, a role that none of the newly formed East European states could yet have brought itself to play? Would it not be better, then, if we treated them similarly to the entities that existed on the Balkan or even Iberian Peninsulas? In a word, could it possibly be that our perception of the past (incidentally, both Polish and Ukrainian) is burdened by an inferiority complex which results from the sense of a constant lack of full worth? Do we not constantly desire to demonstrate our difference from the Asiatic cultures which, according to our understanding, constitute something rude or considerably worse and primitive in comparison with the mature, as we understand it, Mediterranean sphere of civilization?

Can one speak of the Central-Eastern European community in the early Middle Ages? Was its existence brutally broken by the Mongol invasion or did it arise only later, in the fifteenth, sixteenth, or even seventeenth centuries? What relation does the post-Yalta world have to it? Do the borders of that world of Eastern Europe—pushed as far west as the Elbe—coincide, at least in the cultural sense, with the earlier delimitations of spheres of civilization?

The second question, of equally fundamental importance, is this: How should one understand the idea of a "bridge," which Ukraine would like to be now and in the future, apparently intending to compete effectively with Poland in this respect? Does the bridge signify a mere border construction like a physical bridge over which vehicles loaded with the material and spiritual goods of the West and East will roll, while the bridge by itself plays no other role than the purely technical one, nor wants to play any other role because it has no such ambitions? Or will the products passed on in both directions perhaps be transformed and enriched?

If we adhere to the traditional point of view from which the existence of one Europe of Latin influences and another Europe of Greek influences proceeds, then it may turn out that, depending on the historical period, the Ukrainian lands belonged to different cultural spheres at different times, and at certain times constituted a real bridge between them. For it seems incontestable that the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth as a whole evolved towards the West and its influences. Oriental elements, or the aspects of Muscovite-Mongol severity which appeared here and there, determined the character of the whole as little as did the elements of Islamic culture in the national existence of the South Slavs. Consequently, when most of the Ukrainian lands were included in the Commonwealth and the Ukrainian economic, political, and spiritual elites yielded to a visible and rapid Polonization, the civilizational development of Ukraine proceeded to an ever increasing extent according to Western models. The emergence of confraternities or, even less so, the foundation of the Kiev Academy, which implied a Western rather than "Greek" model of education, cannot be regarded exclusively as phenomena characterizing only the lands between the Bug (Buh) and the Dnieper or even the lands situated further east. Ukraine was part of Western Europe.

Of course, one can ponder whether her special location caused the process to begin earlier. The proof can be seen in the case of L'viv, initially a town with a clearly German character which only later took on cosmopolitan characteristics, like any large commercial center. Personally I do not exclude such a possibility, because the transformations observable in the Ukrainian lands that happened after the Union of Lublin did not occur against any preexisting cultural elements, but rather clearly enriched them, as if performing the role of a catalyst for processes that theretofore had been latent.

The Union of Brest (Berestja, Biareście) seems to have caused a slow shift of Ukraine to the East. There is not the slightest doubt that the efforts of

Muscovy also played a considerable role in this case. Nevertheless, it was a sui generis paradox that the attempt to widen the Latin influences on the spiritual culture of a country that had clearly gravitated precisely towards the West finally led to a visible and rapid reorientation. As one can see, forcing people to act against their own tradition and to destroy a spirituality already formed leads to effects that are different from those originally intended.

On the other hand, Xmel'nyc'kyj's uprising was the factor, this time of a political nature, which precipitated and then perpetuated the process of the expansion of the influences of the East. As early as in the transitional period, clerics educated in the Kiev Academy, such as Teofan Prokopovyč, disseminated Latin seeds on Muscovite soil. But what they achieved was only the more efficient impact of Russia on Ukraine, for now this impact was draped in a different, not Byzantine or Oriental, dress. From the moment when Ukraine was included in the empire, the Russian authorities had no doubt that Ukraine was to remain forever its part and parcel, formed in the same way as other provinces annexed to the empire. Ukraine was to become the East.

From the moment of Mazepa's defeat and the total collapse of his plans, the Ukrainian lands were treated precisely in this manner. The tsars ostentatiously treated both the country and the population inhabiting it as an "object," allowing no manifestations of that population's "soul" based on tradition. This was done by Peter I, Elizabeth, Catherine II, and Nicholas I, as well as Alexander II. In spite of this, however, a different mode of thinking and different mores, a gravitation towards the West and finally, the nuclei of national revival, which developed so ebulliently in the nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries, survived. Moreover, they aroused an ever more determined counteraction on the part of the authorities, which justifiably saw in them a real threat to the integrity of the empire. "Little Russia" did not want to be Russia, and continued to remain Ukraine.

It is worth noting here that the disputes about the names of various fragments of Ukrainian lands always had a clear political underpinning. Whereas no great resistance was offered to the term "Eastern Galicia," which alluded, though artificially, to the old Galician principality (not to mention the term "Western Ukraine"), the term "Eastern Little Poland" (Małopolska Wschodnia) propagated by the authorities of the Republic of Poland in the inter-war period was never approved by the Ukrainian inhabitants of the eastern palatinates. They treated that "Little Poland" on a par with the "Little Russia" of yore.

Besides, this treatment of Ukraine became a sui generis standard for all non-Ukrainian authorities, no matter what political orientation or constitutional system they represented. After all, the Provisional Government behaved no differently, entering into open conflict with the Central Rada of Kiev—not to mention the Soviet authorities. It was Lenin who was the author of an exceptionally cynical note in which he simultaneously included recognition of the Central Rada and an ultimatum in several points threatening it with war if

it failed to meet the conditions he dictated (which, incidentally, clearly violated the Rada's sovereignty). Thus he wrote, among other things:

> Will the Rada undertake to refuse transit to any army units on their way to the Don, the Urals or elsewhere, unless it has the sanction of the [Soviet—W. A. S.] Commander-in-Chief? Will the Rada undertake to assist the revolutionary troops in their struggle against the counter-revolutionary Cadet-Kaledin revolt? Will the Rada undertake to stop attempts to disarm the Soviet regiments and the workers' Red Guard in Ukraine and immediately return arms to those who had been deprived of them? In the event no satisfactory answer is received within forty-eight hours, the Council of People's Commissars will deem the Rada to be in a state of open war with Soviet power in Russia and Ukraine [sic].[1]

This incident might be treated exclusively as a manifestation of Soviet imperial actions if one disregarded the fury displayed then and later, precisely in relation to Ukraine. We can observe it both in the months preceding the final formation of the USSR and in the years of "Ukrainization," and finally in the years of the so-called Great Famine, which in fact was caused and spread by appropriate decisions of the authorities. The new authority accepted without reservations the Oriental humility, submissiveness, and servility manifested towards the stronger party; moreover, it based the effiency of its own functionaries' activities on those phenomena, and adapted them to the state doctrine being propagated. However, those "elements of the East" proved to be too weak in Ukraine. The striving towards independence based on models of Western democracy was a much stronger factor. In the twentieth century, when Ukrainians obtained the chance for a real self-determination, they clearly positioned themselves on the Western side of the European civilizational barrier, rejecting without any difficulty or the least hesitation the models imposed by Moscow, both tsarist and Bolshevik.

Of course, today one can and one should ponder to what tradition Ukraine ought to turn now, and whether it should constantly look to history at all for the most appropriate model of behavior.

As in many countries that have just regained independence or have begun to build their sovereign statehood anew, so in Ukraine we observe attempts at a critical look at her own past. A revision of the views that have so far been imposed on national historiography tends toward proving the specificity and uniqueness of the path that this nation has traversed over the centuries. This is a natural phenomenon, and it reminds one of the great life-long work of Myxajlo Hruševs'kyj, which he began in 1904 with the essay "The Conventional Scheme of 'Russian' History and the Problem of a Rational Systematization of the History of Eastern Slavdom." As we remember, Hruševs'kyj tried to prove that the history of Ukraine-Rus' formed a continuation of the history of Kievan Rus' and that its development had proceeded in a totally different

manner from the history of Russia, which had separate roots and was based on a different state tradition.

Hruševs'kyj's views are being resurrected today, as an idealized and, so to speak, rewritten history of Cossackdom in which Ukrainian hetmans are credited with supposedly independent acts of participation in the defense of the country against aggressors (e.g., Konaševyč-Sahajdačnyj). When the views of those hetmans are examined, matters that might dim the gleaming image of the hero are avoided (Mazepa). The old heroes disappear; new ones appear. The figure of Bohdan Xmel'nyc'kyj no longer assumes superhuman dimensions, Karmeljuk has been withdrawn from the national pantheon, and their places have been taken by Ivan Pidkova and Pylyp Orlyk. In the Soviet period the name of the latter, like that of Mazepa, was a synonym of betrayal of Ukrainian (read: Russian) national interests.

The Soviet state, and the imperial policy that it propagated, did not allow the idea that Ukraine or any other Soviet province might refer to the tradition of state independence, to its own national ideas, language, customs, or even religion. This is why, among other things, the Greek Catholic church supporting the Ukrainian national movement was so persecuted in western Ukraine.

In this case the authoritarian system also wanted to unite Ukraine with the East, because at that time the West signified not a certain sphere of civilization and culture, but a political and constitutional system—parliamentary democracy of the Western type. Thus, the present-day attempts to tie the history of Ukraine more closely to the history of Western Europe and to its models of development can be understood as a sui generis political activity. The manipulation of history in this process does not necessarily mean, however, that the so-called objective truth might in the final analysis require a conclusion with a message diametrically opposed to that which results from the above-mentioned manipulation.

In Ihor Ševčenko's paper "Ukraine between East and West," which was delivered during the First International Congress of Ukrainianists in Kiev in August 1990,[2] we find some interesting considerations about the appearance of the influences of West and East in Ukraine. The author (dealing to a much lesser extent with the issue of whether Ukraine belonged to the Western or Eastern spheres of civilization) even notes that those influences had usually reached Ukraine through all kinds of intermediaries, and due to that the Ukrainian lands, perhaps even contrary to the author's intention, appear as a bridge of sorts connecting East with West. I think that this is not a fully justified view.

I have no doubt that the above-mentioned attempts to build de novo almost the entire history of Ukraine, the general revision of existing assessments of the past, and the creation of new heroes or the retrieval of the old ones from the darkness of oblivion, are processes that are generally accepted by society. It is hard to wonder at them, although one may suspect that they result from a

complex of under-appreciation. For many years, efforts had been made to deprive the Ukrainian nation of its own history, and fate cast that nation sometimes towards the Western sphere of civilization, sometimes towards the Eastern. Unlike Poland, Ukraine lacked such a strong feature of cultural affiliation as Latin, which was not only a liturgical language but also the language of the educated elites, opening direct access to the West European historical treasury.

In this situation, however, should Ukraine's place in Europe be determined only ex post? Should Ukraine's role in a Europe that is integrating be defined only depending on the result obtained?

It must be remembered that, even though from a geographical viewpoint the idea of Europe equals de Gaulle's political vision of a Europe "from the Atlantic to the Urals," Europe's historical dimensions have been undergoing constant change during the past centuries. Thus it may have happened that due to changes in the shape of historical Europe, a country that retained the same shape sometimes found itself within the confines of Europe and at other times suddenly left Europe. It is enough to recollect the lands populated by West Slavs who found their place not only in the West, but even in Europe, only when national state organisms began to arise in those territories. By that time, historical Europe had all of antiquity and half the medieval period behind it.

The case of Ukraine is more complicated because in the past, as I have tried to prove, it would change its allegiance to a given cultural sphere. If one accepts the caveat about the changeability of the confines of historical Europe, it would even happen that Ukraine ended up outside of it, as also happened, incidentally, to the Polish state, to the Scandinavian countries, and others.

In this situation, therefore, it is proper to formulate the question differently: Did the clear gravitation of Ukraine towards the West of Europe in the past cause durable consequences for its civilization, or was that gravitation only the result of certain political configurations, directions of development and political intentions of neighboring states, or even of fortuituous coincidences?

In my opinion the answer should not be difficult.

Kievan Rus′ was already manifestly oriented towards wider contacts with the West. The unforgettable Ivan L. Rudnytsky wrote plainly:

> Political Byzantinism remained totally alien to Kievan Rus′.... In pre-Mongol Rus′, as in the medieval West—and in contrast to Byzantium and Moscow—political and ecclesiastical authority were not fused, but remained distinct, with each of the two autonomous in its own sphere. A social system characterized by contractual relations, regard for the rights and the dignity of the individual, limitation of the monarchical power of the prince by a council of boyars and a popular assembly, autonomous communal city life, territorial decentralization of a quasi-federative nature—all this gave the Kievan polity a distinct libertarian imprint. And this libertarian, essentially European spirit also characterizes Ukrainian state organizations of later epochs.[3]

Rudnytsky drew a different conclusion from his considerations than might be expected, however, because he did not unequivocally support the concept that the Ukrainian lands belonged to the Western world:

> Ukraine, located between the worlds of Greek Byzantine and Western cultures, and a legitimate member of both, attempted, in the course of its history, to unite the two traditions in a living synthesis. This was a great task, and it must be admitted that Ukraine has not fully succeeded in it. The synthesis has been approached in the great epochs of Ukrainian history, in the age of Kievan Rus' and in seventeenth-century Cossack Ukraine. In both cases, although these epochs were rich in promise and partial achievement, the final synthesis miscarried, and Ukraine succumbed to excessive pressure from the outside, as well as to internal centrifugal tendencies.[4]

This scholar thus opened the road to new research aimed at establishing a correlation between external and internal factors in the history of Ukraine and at defining which of the phenomena observed in the past played a constructive role and which of them led to destruction.

At any rate, Rudnytsky assigned for Ukraine the role of an inter-cultural bridge in history, and presumably saw the same role for her in the future. But at present, several state organisms claim this role, and it may happen that the bridge, once constructed, will lead nowhere, because none of the East European states will be willing to admit a preponderance of the elements of the East in its tradition, culture, and political features.

Agreeing with Rudnytsky that the position of Ukraine was often determined by her neighbors—that is, the so-called external factor—I think that Ukraine has always gravitated towards the West, becoming to a greater or lesser extent a significant part of it. Moreover, this was meaningful not only for Ukraine herself, but also for the West which, through Ukrainian participation, enriched its cultural treasury and, in particular, perfected its ideas of an integrated Europe. It was thanks to that "borderland world" that there appeared the ideas of the restoration of the unity of the Christian world and of the necessity of widening the scope of commercial exchange. At the same time, it was easier for the Europeans to understand the real Orient—the East, which they encountered at fairs in L'viv or Kiev.

Should Ukraine today be merely a bridge to the West, an eclectic or even organic synthesis of two spheres of civilization? Would it not be better if, as in the past, Ukraine still remained one of the important elements of the Western world?

From the viewpoint of the interests of both sides—the West and Ukraine, as part of it—there can be only one answer, taking into account the consistency of the further development of the Ukrainian lands with their historical tradition. Ukraine should opt for complete participation, on equal terms with others, in the joint creation of universal European values.

The continuation of the old division into the non-Roman "barbaricum" and the civilized world of the Latin remainder made no sense even in the late Middle Ages. Our present-day historical experience has considerably surpassed the knowledge of the sixteenth- and seventeenth-century German, Italian, or English travellers to whom, immediately after crossing the Vistula, Oder, or sometimes even the Elbe, it seemed that they had come to a primitive land, and their ignorance of the language of the local population became an obstacle to a thorough acquaintance with the real state of affairs.

An equally rich spiritual life developed in the shadow of churches topped with onion-shaped cupolas as in the shadow of spiry Gothic cathedrals, and the links with the West that had existed since the times of Kievan Rus′ were transformed into a conscious unity from the moment of encounter with the Mongol aggressors in the first half of the thirteenth century. True, the understanding of time was different, different importance was attached to religious symbolism, and the process of acquiring knowledge and documenting it with formal scholastic degrees was treated differently. However, fundamental differences sometimes appear between children of the same parents; how much greater, then, are the differences that may appear between societies living at some distance from each other!

Ukraine's lack of statehood for many centuries seems to have caused the most difficulty in determining to which cultural sphere the Ukrainian lands belonged. This lack of statehood had an impact on many syntheses of Ukraine's history. Today this factor has ceased to exist. Thus, a favorable time has come again for both historians and politicians.

Translated from the Polish by Bohdan Strumiński

NOTES

1. Vladimir I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, vol. 26 (Moscow-London, 1964), pp. 362–63.
2. Ihor Ševčenko, "Ukraine between East and West," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 16, no. 1/2 (June 1992).
3. Ivan Lysjak-Rudnyc′kyj, *Miž istorijeju i politykoju. Statti do istoriji ta krytyky ukrajins'koji suspil'no-polityčnoji dumky* (Munich, 1973), p. 15.
4. Ibid., p. 16.

REVIEW ARTICLE

On Teaching the History of Russian

HORACE G. LUNT

A LINGUISTIC HISTORY OF RUSSIA TO THE END OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY. By A. P. Vlasto. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986. Paperback ed. 1988. xix, 408 pp. ISBN (paper) 0-19-815662-6.

Slavists in non-Slavic lands devote much of their time to teaching Russian, the indispensable tool for studying all aspects of Russian culture. Like all standard languages that have been in use for several generations, Russian is a complex system with component parts of varying ages and origins. Children learn to utilize the language in all its complexity without reference to history. For example, a child old enough to know the words is somehow aware that in some verbs a root-final *t* or *d* alternates with щ/жд (возвращен, рожден), and in others with ч/ж (замечен, разбужен). Foreign students need to learn the facts, preferably with the expectation that ч/ж is normal, and щ/жд "irregular." It is pedagogically useful to have special labels for anomalies, so one dubs the forms *Slavonic* and adds a footnote explanation of the "foreign" alternation. From a strictly linguistic point of view, however, they are merely details of synchronic grammar.

Children have to learn the system before they can start to look at its history. Adult outsiders, on the other hand, may profit from some historical information. For example, it seems illuminating to American students of Russian to know that there once was an exotic vowel where R now has stem-alternations such as отец отца or окно окон, or to Russian students of Ukrainian that "i" frequently corresponds to a R "e" that never turns up as "ё" (and in pre-1917 spelling is written "ѣ"), рідко, цілий, сісти. In reality the students have to learn the words lexeme by lexeme, but the notion of a weak vowel/strong vowel as the ancestor of a contemporary vowel/zero alternation or of a separate vowel (*not*-e, *not*-i) apparently helps organize the process of memorization.[1]

The structure of many Russian words is readily apparent, and attention to roots and suffixes enables students to increase their vocabulary with greater ease. Therefore, a teacher may well mention that глава 'chapter' and главный 'chief' have the same root as голова 'head', and still later that глава may sometimes serve as a poetic equivalent of голова. This is part of what students must learn to be fully competent in *contemporary* Russian. More subtleties are needed to handle Dostoevskij and Puškin, and sample texts from Deržavin and Karamzin require even more commentary. This is all appropriate in a serious course on the structure of Russian, where many of the heterogeneous details can be treated in a special subdivision, a historical commentary.

A commentary based on twentieth-century Russian may possibly be extended to serve as a useful introduction to selected eighteenth-century works, but analysis that really deals with the language and culture of the 1700s needs to focus on the facts of that century, with appropriate historical notes—without reference to post-1800 information. An alternative is to hope that our students can make do with a good knowledge of modern

Russian, a solid grounding in OCS, and at least some acquaintance with the political history, not to mention fundamental concepts of linguistics. Teachers can budget only a small number of hours with each student, barely enough to point out the most important facts and principles. Since much of the basic material is poorly known and/or controversial, teachers also have the task of persuading the student to learn facts well enough to make reasoned choices among conflicting and often polemical opinions. Therefore one hopes for handbooks that will be comprehensive and well organized. The book under review, I suspect, is essentially Vlasto's notes for tutorial sessions, originally a historical commentary tailored to the needs of specific students.

This is not any kind of a history of Russia, as the title might imply, but an attempt at a history of the Russian language. The preliminary chapter, on East Slavic in relation to Common Slavic and Old Church Slavonic,[2] includes notes on prehistoric phonology, a pitifully inadequate list of "Early East Slav Documents," a periodization, and brief remarks about the alphabet and orthography. This last information belongs later, after the linguistic system that needs to be represented in writing has been described. Vlasto never quite manages to establish a basis, a linguistic system of an early period from which, eventually, modern standard Russian will evolve. As we read on—in chapters on phonology, morphology, syntax, vocabulary, dialects, and "Spoken Language and Written Languages"—we find no clear discussion of any topic. The author's knowledge of linguistics seems to be limited to the sort of information found in old-fashioned introductory textbooks of Latin and Greek. His retention of labels like "*ja*-stem" to refer to modern R is symptomatic of his misunderstanding of the historical restructuring that established Common Slavic, as opposed to late Indo-European, and of later reshapings that separate R from ComSl. He too often strays into oddities that have to do with contemporary Russian usage, well beyond his cut-off date of 1800.

Thus, for instance, his section on possessive adjectives (pp. 114–15, in the chapter on morphology) is in fact notes on the origin of R surnames. Along the way he throws in—as factual information—the mythic explanation of the place-name *Kiev*, as a "fossilized" possessive of a personal name, Kyj, supposed to have been a ferryman. More likely it is an adaptation from an Iranian **Kūjāva*—a plausible derivation from the Iranian name Qūya,apparently the name of a Khazar official at the time Kiev was founded as an outpost of the Khazar state.[3] The word was perceived or restructured in early Slavic terms as **kyjevo,* easily interpreted as a possessive and put into the masculine gender to correspond to most town-names.

The term *Russian* is nowhere defined. The branching off and final separation of Ukrainian and Belarusian (which Vlasto terms White Russian) are grudgingly mentioned, but Vlasto opines that without political intervention BR would be a mere Russian dialect (p. 335), and he works hard to minimize Ukrainian's linguistic right, so to speak, to be classed as a separate language (p. 337). However, he gives very little credit to Russian as an independent unit; it is from the beginning under the crushing weight of OCS, and nearly all written evidence is labelled as "Ch[urch] Sl[avonic]".

Comparison with a similar work is illuminating. *German: A Linguistic History to 1945,* by C. J. Wells, was also published at the Clarendon Press, in 1986. It is a history of the language, within a framework of culture and society, focusing on linguistic analysis with careful attention to the written evidence and problems of how the data are to be interpreted in terms of linguistic theory. It is, to be sure, longer (591 pp.), but Wells has fifty-two densely-printed pages of bibliography to Vlasto's token listing of a scant hundred titles, plus an index of names (12 pp.) and a general index (46 pp.)—neither of

which is in Vlasto. Subtracting Wells's thirty-page introduction (a clear framework of methodology) and his chapters on the period from 1800 to 1945, we find some 310 pages devoted to ca. 1050-1800, the period Vlasto tries to cover in 393 pages. Wells provides well organized bodies of data that are lucidly compared and contrasted in contexts that clearly delineate the regional, cultural and diachronic problems that need to be addressed. The number of systems and the degree of their differences is probably greater than those required by the combined data of Russian, Belarusian, and Ukrainian. Wells has shown that this sort of task can be performed. Vlasto has not known how to classify the basic data or what questions to ask.

Vlasto's book was completed in 1983, but in spirit it belongs to the early 1950s, with little to distinguish it from Soviet handbooks of the 1930s and 1940s and their more recent epigones. It shares the generic shortcomings I have discussed in detail in a series of reviews and articles which are listed in a more general critique ("History, Nationalism, and the Written Language of Early Rus′," *Slavic and East European Journal* 24 [1990]: 1–20) and in a summary statement of my own views ("The Language of Rus′ in the Eleventh Century: Some Observations about Facts and Theories," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 12–13 [1988/1989]: 276–313). Like the Russo-centered Soviet scholars I cite in those articles, Vlasto lumps just about all pre-1700 evidence together, without seriously attempting to show differences between epochs and regions; like them, he is often incomplete and inaccurate in dealing with individual topics. And he outdoes them in his insistence on "ChSl" as *the* significant element; this bias creates a wholly misleading impression of the nature of medieval East Slavic written culture. The vaunted duality of the early language is illusory, for the borrowed elements were integrated into a fairly normalized system, with some identifiable items where variability was permitted. When he labels something "ChSl.," readers should ask, How does he know?

In discussions of modern relationships like голова/глава (the *tort*-formula words), the term *Slavonic* is a legitimate label for the original SSl shapes, but its value shifts for different periods. In the early language, we recognize a mixture of identifiably SSl elements against a generally ESl background that is reminiscent of the 1800s, but there is a difference: some comparable items are observed to co-occur in ways that have defied all attempts at semantic or stylistic categorization. In *trat* vs. *torot* contrasts, for example, one finds (1) essentially indifferent choice for some words (with statistical dominance always in favor of the *trat* shape), (2) usual or even exclusive *trat* for others, and (3) a favoring of *torot* for very few. Thus, in the *Повѣсть временныхъ лѣтъ* (PVL) the root **wold* 'rule' is variable in the verb владѣти and the noun власть 'authority, dominion, domain' but invariable in the synonym область, and the noun владыка 'lord, bishop'.[4] The ubiquitous **gordъ* 'town, city', whether it refers to an outlying stockade or to Kiev, Byzantium, or Jerusalem, is variable. Vlasto asserts (p. 18), "The striking contrast OCS *gradŭ*/ESl. город [sic, without ъ] was *rigorously maintained* [emphasis in original] as a touchstone of ChSl. *vis-à-vis* the vernacular." He is wrong, even in terms of any single PVL manuscript.

There are nearly 300 passages in the PVL where **gordъ* occurs, but only 111 are preserved in all five witnesses. For some, it is inappropriate to make simple same/different decisions (e.g., at 9.16 is the diminutive form RAHX городокъ "the same"—except for pleophony—as LT градъ?). Only forty-three times is град- in all five, and eleven times they agree on город-. Otherwise they represent eleven patterns. For now, I will ignore the evidence of the younger manuscripts (RA and X) and present data from

the Laurentian and Hypatian copies, traditionally believed to represent redactions composed in Kiev between 1110 and 1125. Each manuscript is the work of two scribes, and prudence requires that we keep the data of each separate, at least for the first steps. L^a overlaps slightly with H^b, but for our sketch this is unimportant. (L^b = PSRL 1 107.8 to the end.) There are four patterns:

	LH град-;	L град- H город-;	L город- H град-;	LH город-.
L^a, H^a	20	46	1	16
		L=H **36** 43%	L H **47** 57%	
L^b, H^b	44	36	12	19
		L=H **63** 57%	L H **48** 43%	
L, H	64	82	13	35
		L=H **99** 51%	L H **95** 49%	
	33%	42.3%	6.7%	18%
100% = 194				

These figures show that the two scribes who wrote the initial portions, L^a and H^a, differed in their selection of "borrowed" and "native" spellings of this noun-stem definitely more often than they agreed, while the two main scribes, Lavrentij (L^b) and H^b, agreed more often. The randomness of choice, however, is clear. These are not selections made by purposeful editors for whom городъ had functions distinctively contrasted to those of градъ and somewhat modified by careless later copyists; the two spellings are permitted alternatives, without special semantic or even stylistic significance. The variables belong in the realm of orthography, subject to the taste and whims of individual scribes. This sort of permissible variation for certain items within a system that is otherwise quite standardized is not unusual in medieval texts, and must be allowed for when we describe norms of usage.

It is an axiom that language changes; it is common that written language tends to resist change. As the relative political unity of Rus′ fragmented and Muscovy was divided from the Lithuanian commonwealth, the spoken dialects diverged at an increasing rate, but the language of the essentially fixed church services remained close to the norms established before 1200. The book language of religion was revered, and it served as the model for all writing. By the middle of the fifteenth century the gap between speech and "proper" writing was considerable; it was made even larger by the decision of church authorities to revise the church books to fit the new models brought from Bulgaria—the "Second South Slavic influence." The entrenched "Rusisms" of spelling, grammar, and vocabulary were mostly replaced by Bulgarian habits, and by 1700 the acquisition of literacy did mean learning an essentially new language, Slavonic.[5] At this point students and scribes became fully conscious of parallel forms and learned to class them into two opposing systems. The language situation of the eighteenth century is *not* that of the twelfth or fourteenth centuries. The stylistic conventions of Lomonosov are *not* applicable to the early period. It is time for the epochs to be treated separately in handbooks; unfortunately, many Russian scholars continue to view the period from ca. 1050 to 1700, or even to 1800, as a monolithic whole. Vlasto has assimilated this view, and he reinforces misunderstandings again and again by seeing etymology as all-important, while he virtually ignores function.

For example, Vlasto informs us that апрель 'April' is "on principle" a Slavonicism (p. 20), because it begins with *a*. Now, its ancestor, априль, surely arrived via OCS with

the earliest teachers, but was the word still alien to the Christian East Slavs who used it in 1100? In 1300? It might have been been part of a special sphere of usage for the first generation or two because the native names for months may not have coincided specifically with the subdivisions of the new calendar. Soon, however, it must have been a normal Rusian word, becoming more distinctively native when *i* shifted to *e* ca. 1400. As for initial *a*, it was doubtless unusual in any Slavic dialect in 950. Nevertheless, the presence of the conjunction *a* 'and, but' and extended forms like *али, ати, аще* (or *аче*) opened the way for items like ангелъ, апостолъ, Адамъ, Авраамъ as Christianity spread and such words became familiar, and the phonological rules of morpheme structure adapted to include them.

Vlasto's historical calculations are based on the premise that datable evidence is probably unreliable. Thus in a note on East Slavic penetration "into Russia" (p. 4), he remarks that the town of Staraja Ladoga "shows certain (archeological) traces of Slavs in its population from ca. AD 800, so their arrival in the north should be put a century or so before this." On the contrary, this evidence—together with everything else we know—marks the earliest plausible date for Slavs in this region. On a Russian innovation based on old materials, the generalizing particle *ни* '-ever' (as in что ни говоришь, как бы то ни было), he declares it is "apparently not well authenticated before the Muscovite period: the usage is foreign to OCS and other Slav languages but is scarcely likely to be so recent in ESl." Since he is aware it is *only* Russian, why assume that it went unrecorded for long?

The "older present of гнать" was not женю (186), but жену. Vlasto's context here gives the clue that *older* denotes some time after 1100 (and in fact the elimination of жен-forms cannot be pinned down, because the near-synonymous forms from *gon-i-* were always available). His next note, "лететь (летѣти) is a new infinitive (no other is recorded)" allows a careful reader to infer that *new* refers to some remote epoch before OCS or ER were written down. Unfortunately, this careless use of *old/new* and *early/late* is all too common throughout the book. (I will not speculate about why Vlasto picked this particular verb, out of the mass of ComSl verbs that in comparison to Baltic show innovations).

Vlasto often fails to recognize the difference between sounds and letters, between phonology and orthography. For example, he states (p. 21), "Gk. Ἰωσήφ > OCS (J)esifŭ/Josifŭ," with the footnote, "There was no sequence [jo] in C[om]Sl. native words; *Josifŭ* is a learned transcription." Now, the letter-sequence "(J)e" is meaningless with reference to glagolitic, but might possibly refer to the visual distinction between Cyrillic "e" versus "ѥ," neither of which occurs at the beginning of the name *Joseph.* The letter-sequence "Jo" has no meaning in terms of either OCS alphabet, for they have no "j" (as Vlasto notes on p. 37). The name was probably pronounced as a sequence of two syllables—indeed foreign to the native phonotactic inventory—[io]; in any case, it is normally written in transliteration of the Gk stem "*iosif-*", that is Іосифъ-, Іѡсифъ- Иосифъ, or Иѡсифъ- (whereby occasionally the initial *i*-letter is lost after a preceding *i*-letter, so "and Joseph" comes out и осифъ). In the absence of a native [f] in ComSl (a fact Vlasto brings up only later, page 63), the substitution of [p] in this name is probable for most dialects except precisely the speech of Slavs from near Salonika and other towns, who would know enough Greek to have incorporated [f] and [θ] into their active inventory of speech-sounds.

As to the Greek background, Vlasto wrongly dates to before 800 the falling together of /ü/, spelled οι or υ, and /i/, spelled ι, η, ει, etc. (p. 36). At least in the Greek known

to the ninth and tenth century Slavs who elaborated OCS orthography, conflation had not yet taken place, and the surviving eleventh-century OCS manuscripts have spellings like Сурия 'Syria' and муро 'annointing-oil' as normal (whence Соурия, моуро or Сирия, миро); compare, e.g., Robert Browning, *Medieval and Modern Greek (*London, 1969), p. 62. Some paleographers hold that the letter "ю" started out as *OI* but the elements were reversed and joined.

The chapter on syntax is random observations on random topics, large and small. It profusely illustrates Vlasto's idiosyncratic classification of elements as necessarily *either* "Russian" *or* "ChSl." His tendency is to put everything into the non-Russian bin. Indeed, he sees borrowing everywhere. *От* + gen. to denote the agent in a passive construction is not only a Slavonicism, but the OCS equivalent may be a Hellenism; on the other hand, Polish *od* + gen. is "apparently native" (p. 194, with n. 6). The double accusative is "perhaps native Slav, perhaps an influence of Greek on OCS" (p. 219). His "ChSl." example is from Monomax's "autobiography" (PSRL 1, 251.18), usually considered native: и богъ невpежена мя съблюде 'and God kept me unharmed'. (Incidentally, Vlasto ignores examples like this when he holds that мя, тя, ся are unemphatic enclitic alternates to мене, тебе, себе [p. 122]; in fact, the latter are explicitly genitive, and do not begin to compete seriously with мя, тя, ся until about 1400. Similarly, the accusative third person pronoun и persists into the thirteenth century, resisting the influence of imported OCS dialectal его. They should not be presented as equivalent in the chart on p. 125.)

In considering borrowings, Vlasto states (p. 269), "Animate agent nouns in -тель are doubtfully native," with a footnote, "Приятель is only secondarily and misleadingly in -тель: the essential part seems to correspond to (if not borrowed from) G[er]m[ani]c **friond-* (p.p.a.), whence Eng. *friend.* It is pan-Slav and certainly native. The verb is *prijati* + dat. 'be favourable to'." This thoroughly muddled and confusing note involves two principles and a specific etymology: (1) is a suffix borrowed? (2) is a particular word, including all its morphemes, borrowed? There is no doubt whatsoever that the agentive suffix *-telj-* is native to Slavic. It was directly added to a wide range of verbal stems. It was productive in OCS, and there is no way to tell whether words like родитель 'parent' and учитель 'teacher' were native ESl or were imported with the OCS books. They might possibly have been coined in Morava rather than Bulgaria. Приятель, on the other hand, is almost certainly native to all Slavic regions and may well be a pre-Slavic formation. The base is the verbal stem **prijaj-*, also apparently native to most Slavic regions, which is precisely cognate to the Gothic *frijō-*; there is no reason to deny direct Indo-European descent to either group. Vlasto was perhaps misled by the false association East Slavs make with OCS приѧти (U dial. пpияти, R принять) 'to receive' (in fact приѧтель 'receiver' is attested in the originally OCS translation of Ephraim the Syrian).

This confused book is more likely to discourage students than to stimulate them to read old texts (readily available in C. E. Gribble, *Medieval Slavic Texts,* Columbus, Ohio: Slavica, 1973) and work out historical relationships for themselves. It would be nice to have a systematic outline of phonology and morphology to help them, however.

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NOTES

1. Students also of course learn that general rules, even if formulated with "never," will have exceptions, so R гнездо 'nest' (despite U гніздо) behaves like an *-e-* form, pl. гнёзд— not a *-ě-* form (as it "should" if historical developments followed absolute laws, cf. U гнізд).

2. I follow American usage, with *Slavic* as a general term, and *Slavonic* restricted to the oldest written language and its descendants, what Vlasto calls *Church Slavonic*. Further, I use *Rusian* for his *Old Russian*.

3. See Omeljan Pritsak, in Norman Golb and O. Pritsak, *Khazarian Hebrew Documents of the Tenth Century*, 1982, pp. 53-55. Later adaptations of eastern town names are Царицин, from the old Khazar name *Saryγšyn*, "rationalized" to fit the northern dialect adjectival form that replaced the historical царичинъ, and Саратов, for Tatar *Sara tau* "white hill" (M. Fasmer, *Этимологический словарь русского языка*, 1973 sub царица).

4. By PVL here I mean the witness of the five chief manuscripts, the Laurentian, Radziwiłł, Academy (L[av], R, A, cf. *Полное собрание русских летописей* 1) and the Hypatian and Xlebnikov (H, X, cf. *PSRL* 2). When the text of all five is available for a passage, there are thirty-two possible patterns of occurrence, though in fact most are rare. It is notable that L and H often disagree; agreement of all five is frequent but well under 50%. Thus **woldě-* is attested in 11 passages, but only 4 are witnessed by all five MSS; in only one do all five agree (on володѣти, PSRL I 19.16, but in 19.19 for LAH володѣлъ, X and the sixth witness, the lost Trinity copy, have владѣлъ [R omits the sentence]). L agrees with H 9x, and disagrees twice. **Wolstь* is in 35 passages, 31 in all five mss: in 18 the five agree on власть, in 5 on волость; L agrees with H 23x, disagrees 8x (whereby H, as often, favors the *torot* shape). The name *Volodimer* (with the alternate *Volodimir* frequent in RAHX) is barely attested with the spelling Владимир-, the SSl shape that became dominant after 1450.

5. In fact there were of course several varieties of Slavonic, containing various blends of old and new elements from different times and regions.

REVIEWS

NATIONALISM AND POLICY TOWARD THE NATIONALITIES IN THE SOVIET UNION: FROM TOTALITARIAN DICTATORSHIP TO POST-STALINIST SOCIETY. By *Gerhard Simon*. Trans. by *Karen Forster* and *Oswald Forster*. Boulder, San Francisco and Oxford: Westview Press, 1991. xvii, 483 pp. + notes, tables, statistical appendix, bibliography, index.

Had this magisterial work appeared in English in 1986, the year of its publication in German, and not in 1991, when the USSR was already collapsing before our eyes, it might have had a revolutionary impact. At the very least, it could have discouraged the Russocentric, Moscow-oriented view of Soviet politics that persisted to the very end in so much of Western Sovietology and whose more extreme manifestations are today in retrospect only an embarrassment to the reader. As it is, Simon's book remains by far the most comprehensive treatment to date of the Soviet "nationalities question" and the processes of decolonialization which dissolved the Union. It differs from other works in its combination of panoramic sweep embracing all nationalities large and small, analytical structure that integrates central Soviet policy and the most diverse local phenomena into a conceptual whole, and historical perspective ranging from the early 1920s to the mid-1980s. Its topical value today is that it portrays in depth and detail the crucible from which the "newly independent states" of the former Soviet Union, and in particular the Soviet-era elites who still rule most of them, were forged.

The book, although the epitome of serious scholarship, can be read like a historical novel of successive generations, a kind of ethnic *Buddenbrooks*. It begins with the Bolshevik leaders deciding that, in order to hold together the Russian Empire that is their heritage, they must offer attractive incentives to the non-Russian peoples. There follows a period of intense "nation building," described by Simon in almost loving detail, as new republics emerge with their own boundaries, political institutions, educational and cultural establishments, languages and media, and Russian chauvinism becomes a "counter-revolutionary" crime often punishable by death. In this halycon period, the nationalities are strengthened by modernization and industrialization, with their accompanying rise in education and political participation. Then, as Stalin consolidates his power after Lenin's death, he accomplishes a dramatic *volte-face* to halt nation building and recentralize the empire; Russian chauvinism, although not quite overtly rehabilitated, becomes de facto policy. But nation building has released a djinni of ethnic pride and self-confidence that neither Stalin nor his successors ever completely succeed in returning to the bottle. Meanwhile, there is some softening after World War II in the face of nationalist currents that threaten to sap the war effort, but peace brings a new crackdown, punctuated most dramatically by the fate of whole nations deported lock, stock and barrel from their homelands under horrendous conditions of privation and death. Only Stalin's sudden demise brings respite as his heirs, particularly Beria and Khrushchev, use the nationalities card to bid for support from the non-Russians in their struggle for power, ushering in a new era of nation building.

In Simon's analysis, the nationalities were central to that struggle in a way not recognized by political observers at the time, or by most of those who have written about

it since. After Beria's liquidation, Khrushchev continues to defer to the nationalities until after, with their help, he has staged the 1957 ouster of the "anti-Party group" of old Stalinists whose conspiracy against him is motivated in part by their dislike of his softness toward the non-Russians. Now Khrushchev, like Stalin before him, takes advantage of his new ascendancy to turn his back on his non-Russian supporters, even purging many who, like the Uzbek Nuriddin A. Muhiddinov, earlier elevated by Khrushchev to the Presidium and Central Committee Secretariat, had helped him win his battle. As evidence of his own *volte-face,* he espouses the slogan of a single "Soviet people." After Khrushchev himself is removed from office, his successor Brezhnev continues the single "Soviet people" line. Still, he is unable to stem societal processes created by modernization. A long chapter documents the rise, in the face of official repression, of the "new nationalism" that is to topple the regime.

Readers with a special interest in Ukrainian studies will be gratified to find that the author, while neglecting no nationality of any importance, has singled out Ukraine as one of two areas on which he focuses special attention (the other being Central Asia). In addition, Ukrainian is the only one of the non-Russian languages that he has used in his research. For the early Soviet period, he emphasizes the Ukrainization of cities, which "enthusiastically adopted Ukrainian for use in public life" as part of an effort to make rural settlers feel at home in an urban environment, and the rise of Ukrainian-language publishing and education, both banned in tsarist days. Ukrainians become majority participants in organs of local government (but, in jarring contrast, still occupy only a third of key offices at the republican level). As soon as he can, Stalin turns the tables: Ukraine's role as a unique victim of collectivization and famine is seen by Simon as the result of his special mistrust of Ukrainians. Ukrainians in other republics are also made to suffer by abolition of schools and media in their language. The chapter on World War II details anti-Communist activities by Ukrainians engendered by Stalin's earlier cruelties, despite official efforts to win support through the claim that Soviet power had united all of Ukraine for the first time in history. Simon also devotes considerable space to the special role of Ukrainians in Moscow during Khrushchev's reign (although he repeats the mistake of others in calling Ukraine his "native land," the translators' rendering of *Land seiner Herkunft*). He also details the rise of nationalist movements in Ukraine in the later years of the Soviet regime.

The translation, while missing the incisive style of the original, reads on the whole smoothly; passages that I have spot-checked against the original are reasonably accurate. There are slips in editing: "myrid" for *murid,* "diami" for *djami* (or *jami*). The copious bibliography suffers (in the English version) from anomalies: some standard English-language works are cited solely through their German translations, such as Alexander Dallin's *German Rule in Russia,* listed only as "*Deutsche Herrschaft in Russland,* Düsseldorf 1958," and a peculiarity of format introduced into the English version leads to numerous ambiguities for authorless or edited works, such as the suggestion at first glance that Adam Ulam may be the author of *Uncensored Russia,* the volume edited by Peter Reddaway. Through an unfortunate misspelling, Roman Solchanyk (given correctly in the German original) becomes "Solkhanyk" and loses his proper alphabetical place.

Given the overwhelming importance of this work for teachers and students, such lapses are particularly regrettable. They point to the problem of making accurately available to English-speaking readers the increasingly significant body of work on the countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union being produced by Western

European scholars. No doubt some problems could have been avoided in the present case by the author's agreeing to pay for special editorial assistance, but should that be *his responsibility*?

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COMMUNISM AND NATIONALISM. KARL MARX VERSUS FRIEDRICH LIST. By *Roman Szporluk*. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991. xi, 307 pp. ISBN (cloth) 0-19-505102-5. ISBN (paper) 0-19-505103-3.

Two short phrases serve as epigraphs to Roman Szporluk's book: "The workers have no country" (1848), and "Between the individual and humanity stands the nation" (1841). The first belongs to Karl Marx (1818–1883), the other to a thinker of less fame, but of no less originality, Friedrich List (1789–1846). As we see, two outlooks with two world views behind them were formulated by two compatriots almost at the same time. However, the differences that separated them would manifest themselves later, in the rivalry of two mighty political movements—communism and nationalism. This rivalry, which to a great extent has determined the history of the last two centuries, today is far from concluded. This fact alone justifies Szporluk's work. A closer familiarity with it allows us to understand that its contents noticeably exceed the limits of earlier works on the extraordinary combat of these two paramount ideologies.

The work under review consists of fourteen chapters, notes, a substantial bibliography, and an index. The book is divided into three parts. This second edition includes the preface to the first edition (1987).

.The introduction, which is important for an understanding of the conception of the research, contains a number of fundamental theses, which determine the author's points of departure. "It is one of the central ideas of this study," Szporluk writes, "that nationalism—let us stress this point over and over again—was not a product of the Industrial Revolution, but rather had been born beforehand, and that a specifically nationalist reaction to the Industrial Revolution was not reducible to the liberal, conservative, or socialist position" (p. 8). The other significant theoretical principle lies in the estimation of nationalism not merely as an antagonist to Marxism (communism), but as a "third party" in the social arena in the period of industrialization. The other two were communism and capitalism (at least as the ideas of the free trade system).

It happened that at a certain period, nationalism came forward as an ally of Marxism opposing capitalism. But 1917–1918 became a turning point in the history of both Marxism and nationalism. As a result, Marxism confronted nationalism and gained new features in that confrontation. "At the same time," states the author, "nationalism faced the challenge of Marxism and was in turn influenced by it" (p. 15).

Part One (chapters 2–5) deals with an analysis of Marx's views before 1848. It was a very interesting period in the intellectual biography of a thinker who created a new doctrine and whose most brilliant product was the Communist Manifesto. However, before this classical work was published in 1848, Marx and his associate Engels tried to find their own identity in discussions with outstanding German intellectuals. One of them was List, a popular economist and journalist. List was an ardent advocate of protectionist approaches, one of the supporters of German unity; he was later on justly credited to be the classic of German nationalism. Almost simultaneously, Marx and Engels decided to write some brochures critical of List's major work, entitled *The National System of Political Economy* (1841). Some fragments of Marx's manuscript (1844–1845) and full texts of one of Engels' speeches made in 1845, written with such intentions, have reached our times. These works permitted Szporluk to investigate the views of both the young Marx and List on the national problem in great detail. A separate chapter concerned with Marx's critique of List substantially adds to our knowledge of Marxist history. Part One also contains a chapter treating the development of Marx and Engels' views in the period between List's critique and 1848, as well as a separate chapter analyzing the Communist Manifesto.

Part Two (chapters 6–10) is largely devoted to Friedrich List and his magnum opus (chapter 7–9). However, chapter 6, giving a brief overview of the history of nationalism in the period of the "spring of nations" (1848–1849) and thereafter, is of considerable interest. The revolutions of 1848–1849 became a turning point in the history of the nineteenth century. These revolutions yielded unpredictable results for many people, one of such results was, as Szporluk correctly writes, that "in 1848 nationalism took a direction that List had not anticipated" (p. 152). The chief factor determining this new situation was the advent of the "non-historic nations" on the European scene. This terminology was shared, according to Szporluk, by all three—List, Marx, and Engels. At the same time, many leaders of these nations in the last decades of the nineteenth century read List and assimilated his teachings. Thus, even after his death, and quite unexpectedly, List had many grateful adherents. However, the development of individual countries and their peoples in the twentieth century proceeded along quite different routes, which manifested, on the one hand, ulterior functions of nationalism, and on the other, unexpected aspects of its relation to communism.

Part Three consists of chapters 11–13 and the conclusion (chapter 14). In chapter 11, the author analyzes how after 1848, Marxism (socialism) sought to find an explanation for national problems. The short chapter 12 gives a brief review of the peculiarities of the interaction of nationalistic and social problems in the lives of different European countries, Germany in particular. Chapter 13 is entitled "List and Marx in Russia." The author's interesting conclusion applies to the typology of correlation between industrialization and nation building not only in Russia, but also in Germany and France (pp. 223–24). Completing the Russian case studies, Szporluk writes, "by becoming 'Marxist,' Russia did not escape the problems that had been the central concern of List. Lenin translated List into a Marxist language and adapted him to the Russian political tradition, but, as we shall see, he did not transcend or abolish the Listian dialectic of a world of nations" (p. 224).

The conclusion is of special interest. Here the author meditates on the problem of correlation between communism and nationalism, brought to life in world history after World War II. In connection with this he reverts to the destiny of Russia, and writes that after 1917 "Marxism won in Russia, it would seem, but it did so only by becoming a

nationalism. In that doctrine, Marx had to share room with List" (pp. 230–31). However, putting forward such a (at first sight) paradoxical thesis, Szporluk arrives at a conclusion that parallels and completes the initial argument of this book: "Nationalism stubbornly refuses to be pigeonholed in the capitalism-or-communism compartment" (p. 234). Completing his book, the author stresses that, despite the tremendous impact of nationalism and Marxism on our modern outlook, it does not follow that our social life can be reduced to either "class" or "nationality." "Without denying what these two world views have contributed," Szporluk stresses, "it is now necessary to affirm as fundamental values the rights of the individual and humanity's community of fate" (p. 240).

Naturally, Szporluk's opus does not answer all the questions involved, for instance, how the ideas suggested by List find their implementation today, being either transformed or rejected. Another question is whether national communism has a future in the modern world. Has the cradle of nationalism stood always and everywhere by the cradle of communism, promising the ambiguous character of their future relations? Nevertheless, it is clear that such questions will most likely arise from reflection impelled by this book, which was not meant to provide ready and simple answers. Szporluk has written a comprehensive work, with concepts and ideas intended for consideration by the interested reader. The work introduces the reader, intelligently and without bias, to the vast literature on the subject. Finally, this book is an example of an elegant historical essay, with its main characters and the drama of the independent existence of the ideas fostered by them. Marx and List, whose names appear on the cover, are of interest for the author by themselves, but to an even greater degree as vivid personifications of great social movements and ideas. This study is accessible to both the qualified expert and the university student. However, the main ideas of Szporluk's research are important not only for his colleagues, but in equal degree for politicians and public figures, irrespective of their views on Marx and List.

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THE REFORMS OF PETER THE GREAT: PROGRESS THROUGH COERCION IN RUSSIA. By *Evgenii V. Anisimov*. Trans. by *John T. Alexander*. Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1993. xi, 327 pp. + map, index. ISBN (cloth) 1-56324-047-5. $39.95 cloth. ISBN (paper) 1-56324-048-3. $19.95 paper.

This is a translation of Evgenii V. Anisimov's semi-popular *Vremia petrovskikh reform* (Leningrad, 1989), which, as his translator tells us (pp. x-xi), the author himself condensed for this edition (by about one-quarter), mainly by deleting or paraphrasing many of his quotations from primary sources. Dr. Anisimov also modified his original introduction not only (as Professor Alexander also tell us) "to provide some historiographical guidance for non-Russian readers" (p. xi) but also (I would note) to eliminate most of its references to the current (ca. 1988) Soviet debate about Peter's historical significance, which debate was (and is) occuring at a time "when our society has [again]

entered an era of transformations" (original edition, p. 10). Helpful as Anisimov's added historiographical survey is (and it is most helpfully supplemented by Alexander's bibliographical note, this edition, pp. 309–12), the decision to redo the original introduction, with its thesis that the Petrine era witnessed "the foundation of the totalitarian state" and the first mass propagation of "the cult of the strong [*sil'noi*] personality" (original, p. 11), has in effect deprived English readers of an early and clear statement of the book's animating principles. To be sure, some of the original introduction reappears, in more moderate form, in the "Conclusion" to the English edition, where Anisimov now argues that "it was in the varied forms of coercion, which became the regulator of the system Peter created, that its totalitarianism was exhibited" (p. 298). However formulated (and however preposterous), the thesis remains the key to the book's extended, at times brilliant *argumentum.*

It was, in its time and place, a most provocative thesis, especially as it was proposed (in a book with an initial press-run of 150,000) by a writer whose earlier monographic and archival work had established him as a leading historian of the Petrine period and whose current journalistic forays were establishing him as a leading voice in the Soviet reform movement. The example of Paul Miliukov emerges as something of a model for Anisimov (this edition, p. 7): just as Miliukov's "destructive" (ibid.) historical work deliberately undermined for his contemporaries the heroic image of a beneficent and progressive Peter, so Anisimov's work will destroy for Russians today the Soviet (essentially, Stalinist) image of Peter as the great patriotic statesman, the founder of Russia as a civilized world power. As Anisimov says here, concluding his new introduction: "it seemed to me not so important merely to recount to readers the results of the reforms as to try to understand how, when, and why the idea developed under Peter—that social-utopian and peculiar 'Petersburg dreamer'—of saddling his own people with a grandiose, forcible experiment in creating a 'regulated' police state where, for the sake of an abstract idea of the 'common good,' the private interests of the individual were sacrificed" (p. 9).

Thus this book, in either this or its original Russian edition, is as much the passionate polemic of a politically engaged (and most engaging) writer as it is the dispassionate history of an established authority. As such, it is of considerable interest to students both of Russia today and of Russian history—either of whom should of course read it in the original, much fuller version (and for Russian readers, I should point out, the core of Anisimov's *argumentum* was first published in *Voprosy istorii*, 1989, no. 7, pp. 3–20). For those who do not read Russian, this generally fluent and accurate translation makes available in English the bulk of Anisimov's original text—though I am not sure what the uninitiated will gain from the numerous passages, asides, terms, and references that could make sense only to specialists (or the knowledgeable Russian readership, in Russia, at whom the book was originally aimed). Little effort has been made to edit this quite literal English translation for the sake of non-specialist, non-Russian readers.

That said, I must take exception to the prefatory remarks here (pp. vii–viii) by Donald J. Raleigh, editor for M. E. Sharpe of a putative "New Russian History" series of which this is the "first volume" and "whose [general] purpose is to make available to English readers the finest work of the most eminent historians of Russia today." For at least the past sixty years, patently, the "finest work of the eminent historians of Russia" has *not* been published in Russian nor even written, for the most part, by Russians—the archival labors and "factography" of numerous Soviet specialists (including Anisimov), however valuable as such, notwithstanding. Compelling, elegant narrative; sustained,

objective analysis; coherent exposition; technical innovation and fresh perspectives: all these and more have been the work of Western (or émigré) historians of Russia publishing mainly in English but also in German and French. Nor is the supposedly "fresh view" of Petrine Russia presented by Anisimov here "fresh" in any but a Soviet context, a few factual matters aside. Anisimov—like, until very recently, almost all of his Soviet colleagues—makes little reference to the often extensive (as well as far more sophisticated) Western literature in his own and related fields (though his debt on occasion to some Western works is transparent). Until Russian historians take full and explicit account of the entire relevant historiography (as Western historians routinely do), their work will remain provincial at best in outlook and approach if not obsolescent.

Regarding Ukrainian questions, it must be said again that Anisimov's approach, as far as it goes, is "fresh" only in a Soviet context. Thus, Mazepa's revolt is not simply excoriated as an abominable act of treason, in the standard Soviet fashion, but rather is seen, following the populist path of Hrushevsky and Kostomarov (both cited), as the cynical act of a corrupt old tyrant in whose "saga all the problems and tragedy of the Ukraine were reflected as in a drop of water" (this edition, p. 111; in whose "history, as in a drop of water, are reflected the problems and the tragedy of all Ukraine": Russian original, p. 186). Anisimov appears oblivious of the highly relevant work of Orest Subtelny, Frank Sysyn, Zenon Kohut, and other notable contributors to his journal as well as of that of the intervening generation of Ukrainian (émigré) historians, from all of which a vastly more complex picture of the revolt in its Ukrainian—and wider—setting could have been obtained. Similarly, Anisimov has nothing to say about the Ukrainian background of such pivotal figures as Feofan Prokopovych, Stefan Iavors'kyi, and P. P. Shafirov, or about the crucial role of Ukraine as a whole in the Europeanization of Russia (cf. David Saunders, *The Ukrainian Impact on Russian Culture, 1750–1850,* 1985, with extensive bibliography).

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THEOLOGY IN THE RUSSIAN DIASPORA: CHURCH, FATHERS, EUCHARIST IN NIKOLAI AFANAS'EV, 1893–1966. By *Aidan Nichols, OP*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989. 295 pp.

Both the strengths and weaknesses of this volume are introduced in the title itself. Aidan Nichols, O.P. proposes to investigate three issues—the work of diaspora theologian Nikolai Nikolaevich Afanas'ev (1893–1966), its relationship to that of Russian Orthodox diaspora theology in general, and the integration of his work into the ecumenical dialogue between Orthodoxy and Rome. To his credit, Nichols introduces the theology of the Russian diaspora as an important (and poorly studied) aspect of contemporary religion. Using *Theology in the Russian Diaspora* as the title, however, promises more than *Church, Fathers, Eucharist in Nikolai Afanas'ev, 1893–1966* can provide. To identify Afanas'ev as "perhaps the most influential thinker about the Church Russia has produced" (front jacket) seems to overstate his contributions.

Nichols first familiarizes the reader with the broad outline of Russian (especially official) theology from Russian Scholasticism through Slavophilism and the fin de siècle revival of Orthodoxy in Russia. Since this book is meant to be a "modest contribution to this great Dominican tradition in East-West relations" (p. viii), the author emphasizes the place of Western theology in the religious development of Russian Orthodoxy.

Nichols then provides a biographical sketch of N. N. Afanas'ev. Like many Russian émigrés, Afanas'ev moved westward after the revolution until he settled in 1930 at the Institut de Théologie de Paris, otherwise known as the Institut Saint-Serge. Oddly, however, the book gives little in information on Afanas'ev's life in Russia before his emigration. Instead, it relies heavily on a synopsis of pre-revolutionary Russian church history. Nichols correctly mentions the need to understand Afanas'ev's ecclesiology after the revolution in terms of the conflicting jurisdictions of the émigré Russian church. On this point, however (as on Afanas'ev's early life), the reader never receives a satisfactory explanation of either the organizational problems of the Russian church in diaspora or Afanas'ev's specific relation to them. In all, Afanas'ev plays little part in the first one-fourth of the book.

The central part of the work hinges on Nichols' exposition of Afanas'ev's ecclesiological theory. Afanas'ev, according to Nichols, locates the germ of ecclesiological organization in the ante-Nicean conciliar period. Afanas'ev prefers an "Ignatian" concept of church structure, patterned after Ignatius of Antioch. This idea sees the eucharistic assembly as the basic form of all Christian life (pp. 89–90). Placing the Eucharist itself at the heart of ecclesiastical organization allows Afanas'ev to circumvent the issues of church and state relations that he sees beginning with Constantine's conversion and leading even into the Patriarchal, Synodal, and Soviet periods of the Russian church.

In opposition to the Ignatian conception, Afanas'ev produces the "Cyprianic" model of universality, after the work of Cyprian of Carthage. This version posits an ecumenical church (i.e., existing within the bounds of the civilized, Roman world) that is then "parcelled out into distinct 'church communities,' *tserkovnye obshchiny*"(p. 85). The Roman Empire, according to Afanas'ev, negatively influenced the church by accepting the Cyprianic model, by imposing a system of canon law like that of the empire, and by imperializing the conciliar aspect of Christianity by making the emperor the active agent in convening councils. Afanas'ev laments this organization of the church as the pattern taken by both Roman and Orthodox developments. As Nichols points out, Afanas'ev's Ignatian version of church structure fits the idea of *sobornost'*—that mystical conciliarity beloved by so many Orthodox thinkers.

A eucharistic ecclesiology, according to Afanas'ev, defeats the problem of local church versus universal church. This should not be seen, however, as some sort of Orthodox congregationalism—Nichols explains that Afanas'ev accepts the need for legalistic power. Thus the catholicity of the church can be maintained by a system of authority freely given by one church to another, an authority but humbly used by prominent churches to maintain unity and harmony. For Afanas'ev, therefore, the word "catholic" retains what Nichols calls a "qualitative" essence instead of a "quantitative" one (pp. 151–52).

Although Afanas'ev's critique of the Roman church can be easily discerned in this model, Nichols shows that Afanas'ev also questions the national/patriarchal system adopted by the East (not to mention the Synodal mutation found in Russia from 1721

to 1918). None of these forms actually follows early church conciliar teaching or tradition, he claims. What is necessary is a reversal of both papal ecclesiology *and* Orthodox national autocephaly, returning instead to eucharistic *sobornost'* as the building block for church structure. This can be done by understanding the need for freely convened councils whose teachings have been accepted by the local churches, admitting Rome as a first among equals. Nichols explains that Afanas'ev accepts authority only as "a pre-eminence of witness in the freedom of grace, and not a canonical primacy founded on law.... Primacy must be manifested, Afanas'ev explains, within this *concorde* or *concert* of love, and never over against it" (p. 131).

Afanas'ev's work, of course, is only one part of a larger corpus of ecclesiology by émigré theologians such as Berdiaev, Bulgakov, and Florovsky. In keeping with the main title of the work, Nichols provides a synopsis of each of these three seminal writers' work. Unfortunately, however, Afanas'ev again is poorly integrated into the milieu—typically the relationship between Afanas'ev and the others is tacked on to the end of a section. A more clear integration of Afanas'ev's work with that of his contemporaries could greatly strengthen the argument for his central role in Russian diaspora theology. By treating Afanas'ev's writings by year, for example, Nichols signals the importance of chronology (and, to some extent, historical phenomena) to the theologian's ideas. This relationship, however, is never clearly illustrated, nor the reason for the chronology explained.

Finally, Nichols introduces his interpretation of Afanas'ev's ecclesiology in the context of the modern ecumenical movement. To do so, however, the author first gives a lengthy overview of Roman Catholic views on church organization and, especially, papal infallibility. Into this comes Afanas'ev's conception of a eucharist-based "church that presides in love" (p. 204). Indeed, after casting aside the ultramontanist version of the papacy, Nichols argues that the two Vatican Councils can be interpreted to include Afanas'ev's views of ecclesistical organization. This, he concludes, may furnish a starting point for the recreation of a truly ecumenical church administered in Rome but developed from the eucharistic assemblies of both East and West. Nichols points out that, in his last years, Afanas'ev took part as an official Orthodox observer to Vatican II, and that its documents on church organization contain elements of Afanas'ev's ecclesiology.

What Nichols does not discuss, however, is exactly how he believes the church could be reunited under these terms. Afanas'ev, for example, specifically argues that primacy cannot be *taken* by an episcopal see—its position must be freely given by all other churches. If one accepts this view, then all the other great churches (e.g., Moscow and Constantinople) would have to submit themselves to Rome. This seems improbable, considering Orthodoxy's position that Rome has usurped the power of the ecumenical church in part through its proclamation of papal infallibility.

In general, Nichols succeeds in introducing Russian diaspora theology as a vital part of twentieth century religious thought. What the text does not do, though, is to prove conclusively that N. N. Afanas'ev played the central role in Russian theology. A complete Afanas'ev bibliography follows the text, as does a highly truncated general bibliography. Cambridge University Press includes merely a proper-name index.

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MYTROPOLYT ILARION I IOHO PYSANNIA. By *Myroslav Labunka*. Rome: Vydannia Ukrains'koho Katolyts'koho Universytetu im. Sv. Klymenta Papy, 1990.

This slender volume of 124 pages is a welcome addition to the scholarly literature on Kievan Rus'. The prime objective of the monograph is to provide a modern Ukrainian translation of those of Ilarion's writings that have been preserved in the so-called Synodal Codex. A photographic copy of the manuscript is also reproduced. The brief introduction contains all source data and the state of research on Metropolitan Ilarion. The author states that his translation is offered without comment and that he has avoided "criticism, analysis and interpretation" (p. 28).

This is a great pity, and one wonders why a simple new translation was considered sufficient. After all, other translations (by S. Jarmus and V. Krekoten') are available. A scholar of the period will probably turn to the original texts, and the average educated reader of the translation will hunger for some commentary.

This is no place to supply answers as to such a commentary, but to raise some questions by one who is not a specialist in that period but is keenly interested in Ukrainian literature and intellectual history. Without raising the ugly head of revisionism, so popular today in all branches of scholarship, it is legitimate to ask why Old Rus' literature, walled in by theological and textual analysis, should not be open to criticism coming from a modern, secular viewpoint. Without abandoning historical perspective, critics such as these could make Ilarion's writings meaningful to today's readers.

Ilarion's main contribution, the "Sermon about Law and Grace," is a classic elevation of Christian "grace" above Judaic "law." Ilarion equates "grace" with "truth," thereby denying the validity of Jewish "law." This he reiterates many times, continually extolling Christian virtues. "The lake of law," he writes, "has become dry, but the evangelical spring has covered the whole earth with water." These flowery passages reinforce his didacticism. Another of Ilarion's writings, the panegyric praising Prince Volodimer, is developed along similar lines: a eulogy for a Christian ruler.

Today, while admiring his verbal skill, we receive Ilarion's message with scepticism. To be sure, Christianity as a transcendent religion is still with us, but the Judaic concept of law is also deeply ingrained in our society. In today's Ukraine there are many sponsors of "grace" but there is, in fact, no law. Only adherence to the Judaeo-Christian tradition will guarantee that.

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THE ORTHODOX LITURGY. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE EUCHARISTIC LITURGY IN THE BYZANTINE RITE. By *Hugh Wybrew*. Crestwood, N.Y.: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1990. x, 189 pp. ISBN 0-88141-100-0. $9.95.

This book is addressed to the average reader who is familiar with the present Orthodox Liturgy and would like to know how it got that way. Though the author does not pretend to offer fresh research on the topic, he has managed to popularize the research of others faithfully and comprehensively. The resulting small book is easily the best popular introduction to the subject.

Laudably, Wybrew treats the *whole* liturgy, not just the text. The analysis is chronological rather than structural. Instead of tracing the evolution of individual liturgical units one by one, Wybrew presents the entire liturgy in each historical period: the ritual, its settings, and its interpretation (in this regard the table on pp. 182-83 is most useful). In general, Wybrew's descriptions are lively and true. Chapters 2 and 3 are especially good, clear, accessible, and straightforward.

If Wybrew sees what the West can learn from the East, he avoids the starry-eyed, cliché-filled approach to East-West differences with which such issues are too often treated by westerners enamored of the Christian East. Thus Wybrew stresses, rightly, the complete passivity of the average Orthodox congregation, despite the paeans of praise that Western enthusiasts heap on Orthodox liturgy. And Wybrew recognizes the more archaic nature of much in Western liturgy, *pace* the popular myth that whatever is Eastern must be older and more traditional.

Some factual imprecisions: the *eisodikon* is not an "invitatory" but the conclusion of the introit antiphon; the troparia are original psalmic refrains, a liturgical unit with no resemblance whatever to Western collects (p. 6). Codex Barberini Gr. 336 dates ca. 750, not 800 (p. 108). The church described in Photius, *Homily 10, 6* (p. 107), is not the Nea, as was once generally thought, but the Church of the Virgin of the Pharos, the Palatine Chapel or principal sanctuary of the Imperial Palace (see Cyril Mango and R. J. H. Jenkins in *Dumbarton Oaks Papers* 9–10 [1955–56]: 123–40).

Wybrew is occasionally overly cautious, saying "probably" for what is almost certainly true, though this is refreshing in a genre where more often things are flatly asserted to be true when in fact they are completely false.

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BISHOP MICHEL D'HERBIGNY SJ AND RUSSIA. By *Léon Tretjakewitsch.* Das östliche Christentum, n.s., vol. 39. Würzburg: Augustinus-Verlag, 1990. viii, 317 pp. DM 86.

Léon Tretjakewitsch tells the tragic story of Bishop Michel d'Herbigny, S.J., a tireless but misguided missionary who tried to convert the Russian people to Catholicism in the 1920s and 1930s. D'Herbigny believed that the Orthodox believers had to abandon their faith and accept Roman Catholicism in total. He had no appreciation or understanding of the power, beauty, and majesty of the Orthodox religion or Orthodox faithful. He was on a one-man crusade to convert, by subterfuge or braggadocio, the Russians to Catholicism. He was not interested in compromise, dialogue, building relationships, and, in some cases, truth. Throughout his life, for example, he tried to browbeat Russians with the notion that they should follow the footsteps of Vladimir Soloviev who, d'Herbigny argued, had converted to Catholicism. Soloviev, of course, was quite interested in Catholicism, but never did become, as d'Herbigny stated, a Russian John Cardinal Newman.

The book is a testament to the history of misunderstanding, hostility, and confusion that has characterized Catholic-Orthodox relations for centuries. In that sense, it is a primer on what to avoid in the future. Today, more than ever, there is a desperate need for communication, unity, and mutual support among all religious believers. In the wake of the collapse of the Communist regimes, not only is there a political vacuum, but the chaos has also revealed that there is and has been for some time a moral and spiritual vacuity throughout Europe. It is time for Orthodox and Catholic leaders and faithful to renew their faith, to stress their common heritage, and to rebuild the spiritual foundation of Eastern and Western civilizations.

Tretjakewitsch does not go beyond d'Herbigny's experience with Russia; thus, we do not yet have a comprehensive biography of this pivotal Jesuit. The book is important, however, for it documents that the hoary separation between Catholics and Orthodox was still thriving in the twentieth century at a time when such dire enemies of all religion as the Communists emerged and attacked both Orthodox and Catholics. Donald Treadgold provides an excellent preface that puts d'Herbigny into the context of the worldwide Jesuit missionary effort.

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VARSHAVS'KI UKRAINOZNAVCHI ZAPYSKY. Warsaw: Klasztor Ojców Bazylianów, 1989. Volume 1. 256 pp.

Stepan Kozak as editor in chief, Father Iosafat V. Romanyk, O.S.B.M., in the capacity of executive editor and Stepan Zabrovarnyi, Mykhailo Lesiv, Volodymyr Mokryi, and Father Teodozii Taras Iankiv constitute the editorial board of this new periodical of Ukrainian studies. We learn from the editorial introduction to the first issue that the journal is intended as a scholarly organ of the Ukrainian community in Poland. It was possible to implement this plan under the patronage of the Catholic church, a fact consistent with the norms of cultural life in Poland in the last years of communism. The Polish province of the Ukrainian Catholic Order of the Basilian Fathers is the publisher of *Varshavs'ki ukrainoznavchi zapysky*.

The editorial board stresses the socio-political motivation of its program. It associates the importance of Ukrainian studies with the "pulse of the time," which "directs public attention precisely to the problem of national[1] identity" (p. 2). The goal of the journal is "to eliminate from current life a good number of inter-ethnic biases, accumulated painful historical conflicts, and 'white' (more precisely—black) spots" (p. 3). Ukrainianists who "adhere to the tenets of Christianity and scholarly objectivism and truth and who recognize the principle of philosophical, methodological, and political pluralism" (p. 3) are invited to cooperate with the new periodical.

The volume contains twenty-seven texts divided into three groups: articles, communiqués and materials, and review articles and reviews. It appears that Jerzy Kłoczowski's text was erroneously classified as belonging to the article section. It is no more than a discussion of a few publications and conference events connected with the celebrations of the thousandth anniversary of the baptism of Kievan Rus'. It therefore should have been placed in the last section. Another editorial shortcoming is the lack of information about the authors. There is no citation of names of the translators of the texts, which presumably were not all written in Ukrainian.

As far as this reviewer can assess, the volume is distinguished by careful language editing. It is thematically logical and cohesive. It is wholly devoted to the history of Christianity in Ukraine. Thus, it certainly contributes to filling the gap so patently visible in the Ukrainian-language scholarly literature in Central-East Europe.

The texts collected present a chronological panorama of the problem. Some of them (for example, by Ryszard Łużny and Volodymyr Mokryi) represent interesting analyses of the ways and means of adaptation of Christian content by Ukrainian culture. Others (as the one by Stepan Zabrovarnyi) do so in the traditional, justificatory manner. Sometimes a fundamental but interpretatively not very revealing ideological decalaration is attached to a gnoseologically valuable analysis: "This may be a testimony of how deeply the sacral terminology (and the Christian faith itself) penetrated the life of the Ukrainian people" (Marian Jurkowski, p. 75).

The articles devoted to the earliest history of Christianity in Kievan Rus' basically bring nothing new to our knowledge of this subject. On the other hand, deserving attention are the texts on the motif of death in the poetry of the Ukrainian baroque (Myroslav Ivanek), on Lesia Ukrainka's interpretation of the moral contents of Christianity (Volodymyr Smyrniv), on the East Galician group of poets "The Young Muse" (Iaroslav Hrytskov'ian), and the interesting interpretation of the attitude of Metropolitan Andrei Sheptyts'kyi to a number of political problems of his times

[1] In the Central-East European sense, as a derivative of "nation" in a linguo-ethno-historical sense. —TRANS.

(Ryszard Torzecki). The two texts by Oleksandra Hnatiuk, as author and as reviewer, also attract attention.

Many of the texts may arouse interest, and some perhaps polemic. Here I would like to touch upon only a couple of passages that raise doubts.

In Hans Rothe's text—which is otherwise very interesting—the definition of Ukrainian literature of the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries seems insouciant: "this literature of East Slavs in Poland and Lithuania, regardless of the language in which it was written" (p. 110). Thus, the Rothe includes authors of Belarusian origin here, because the language of their works "often" cannot be separated from the Ukrainian language of that time. On the other hand, the Polish-language oeuvre of Ukrainian writers gives the author no similar problems concerning its distinction from Polish literature: "Ukrainian literature includes also the writings in the Polish language created in Ukrainian centers of scholarship and culture." Truly, these definitions cannot be accused of an excess of logic.

What is strange in Hrytskov'ian's article is the dismissal of the fate of Sydir Tverdokhlib with one laconic sentence: "He was killed in 1923" (p. 176), although the author discusses the biographies of the remaining members of the "Young Muse" group in considerable detail. In assessing Tverdokhlib, the author allows himself to be led by Petro Karmans'kyi's opinions formulated already after Tverdokhlib had played a controversial (for it was pro-Polish) role in the aftermath of 1918. Also, Hrytskov'ian's characterization of Karmans'kyi somewhat distorts the ideological silhouette of that blusterous anti-clerical, who fought against the Greek Catholic church (mainly against the Basilians), first in Brazil, then, after 1945, in Soviet Ukraine.

Misylo's text, informatively rich, inclines one to polemicize with some of his interpretations. Doubts are raised by the passage in which the author defends the Greek Catholic priests from the Przemyśl (Peremyshl') eparchy and the Apostolic Administration of the Lemko Region against the "unfounded" view concerning their flight before the Red Army. He maintains that "as a result of archival and field research only one such fact (Khrushch) was identified" (p. 209). He forgets about, for one, the Lemko administrator himself, Oleksander Malynovs'kyi. The list of this type of fugitive—prudent, for that matter—can be found in the reliable work by Dmytro Blažejovs'kyj.[2]

Presenting the history of the controversy between the primates August Hlond and Stefan Wyszyński, on the one hand, and the group of Ukrainian clergy in Poland on the other, Misylo accepts the viewpoint of the latter. He suggests that it was exclusively the ill-will of the Polish hierarchs—an absence of appropriate jurisdictional decisions on their part—that hindered the renewal of the Greek Catholic rite after the Second World War. He achieves this by passing over in silence the role of the Communist state, which implemented Moscow's policy towards Ukrainian Catholics. He simply trivializes this fundamental element of the situation: "After the implementation of the resettlements to the Ukrainian SSR the problem of the Greek Catholic church ceased to exist in the opinion of the authorities" (p. 219). This is as true a formulation as it is an unfortunate one. It applies exclusively to the official aspect of the problem. In fact, using a censorship clause, the authorities forbade the press to mention the existence of the Greek Catholics in Poland. At the same time, they conducted a very active "quiet" policy towards them, exerting strong pressure on the primate and organizing a campaign to make them Orthodox by means of the structures of the Orthodox church, which were

[2] Dmytro Blažejovs'kyj, *Ukrainian Catholic Clergy in Diaspora (1751–1988)*(Rome, 1980).

subordinated to the Office for Denominational Affairs. Therefore, Misylo's conclusion seems to be a special kind of "legalistic" view of historical reality.[3]

The volume under consideration offers many interesting and useful materials. At the moment of its publication it doubtless played an inspiring role in the cultural permutations among Ukrainians in Central-East Europe.

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Translated from the Polish by B. Strumiński

POLISH-JEWISH RELATIONS DURING THE SECOND WORLD WAR. By *Emmanuel Ringelblum.* Edited by *Joseph Kermish* and *Shmuel Krakowski.* Translated by *Dafna Allon, Danuta Dąbrowska,* and *Danna Keren.* Foreword by *Yehuda Bauer.* Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1992. xlvi, 330 pp., index, photographs, appendices. Paper.

There is only one word that adequately describes this work: heroic. Ringelblum (1900–1944), a talented historian who received his Ph.D. in 1927 for research on medieval Polish Jewry, wrote this monograph while hiding in "Krysia," a secret bunker located under a garden on Grójecka Street in Warsaw after he had fled the destroyed ghetto. Over thirty other Jews hid in the same bunker, each having less than one square yard of space and not being able to stand taller than six feet. Although he possessed what was called a "good" appearance—that is, he did not look outwardly Jewish—and had the opportunity to survive in an apartment posing as a Pole, Ringelblum chose to remain in the bunker where he could better continue his writing, using reports from women who could more easily move about war-torn Warsaw. In February of 1944, Ringelblum was to take over command of the Jewish resistance, but the location of the hideout was betrayed to the Gestapo. Captured, Ringelblum was tortured, yet did not reveal any of the mortal secrets that he knew. He was finally executed after watching his wife and thirteen year old son meet the same fate.

Throughout the war, Ringelblum devoted himself selflessly to the preservation of historical documents relating to the experience of Polish Jewry by organizing a clandestine archive, ironically called *Oneg Shabbat*, "the delight of the Sabbath," after Isaiah 58.13. Using a network of agents, Ringelblum collected information from a large segment of the population, both Jewish and non-Jewish. This was used for his historical research and to prepare weekly bulletins which were distributed widely within Warsaw and even smuggled to the Allies. Ringelblum collected some of the material firsthand, for example by removing his identifying armband and following pogromists as they chased fugitive Jews through the city streets. The archives were buried in two locations

[3] Cf. my interpretation in "Ukrainians and the Catholic Church in Poland," *Studium Papers* 12, no. 2 (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1988): 37–41, together with fontological proofs in "Ripecki (Rypećkyj), Mirosław," *Polski słownik biograficzny* 30 (Wrocław, 1988): 304–305; "Rudyk, Stefan," ibid., vol. 33 (1991): 5–6.

in Warsaw. Only one cache survived the war, but it has become the principal source for the history of the Holocaust in Warsaw.

Despite the fact that Ringelblum was murdered before he could finalize the arrangement of his materials, the manuscript is well organized and profound in its analysis of the period. Ringelblum's thesis is that Poland was infected with German antisemitic ideology in the interwar period. This was a "Trojan horse" which caused internal rot and made the Nazi conquest much easier, although a brief rapprochement between the two nationalities occurred during the initial invasion of September 1939. While Ringelblum devotes a chapter to those Poles who rescued Jews (including a glowing treatment of the gardener Mieczysław Wolski who, together with his family, constructed the bunker that hid Ringelblum and others from the Nazis), he argues that the dominant position of the Poles was hostile, or at best indifferent to Jewish suffering.

The scope of the work is broad, and attempts to survey the totality of Jewish existence in Warsaw. Ringelblum documents the creation of the ghetto, the uprising that took place there in 1943, and life for Jews hiding outside its walls. Most fascinating perhaps is his detailed treatment of the underground economy of the ghetto, with a considerable textile trade based on recycling goods and smuggling the new products outside for sale to Polish merchants. Ringelblum also devotes much of his attention to the economy based on blackmailing Jews, in particular the so-called *schmalzowniks* who would hang about the ghetto walls hoping to spot escaping Jews in order to extort money from them. Occasionally these petty crooks would mistakenly harass non-Jews as well, despite the protestations of their victims. Ringelblum refers to one case where blackmailers were actually sentenced to a year in jail for pestering two single non-Jewish women. This was the exception to the rule, so much so that when pursuing a fugitive, Nazis would shout "Catch that Jew!" to gain the assistance of Polish passersby, who would later discover to their dismay that they had actually helped capture a member of the Polish resistance. This phenomenon was so widespread that the Underground had to issue public warnings against the tactic in the clandestine press.

Ukrainians are often mentioned in the text—far more times than the single listing in the index—yet they are invariably mentioned only in passing. With the exception of one instance of a man hidden by a Ukrainian woman in Kolomyia, all references to Ukrainians are as collaborators with the Nazis, usually as part of the Camp Guard (*Lagerschutz*). It has been argued that Ukrainian collaboration in putting down the Warsaw ghetto uprising has been widely exaggerated as a result of a German and Polish predilection to refer to all Eastern Slavs as "Ukrainians."[1] It is unlikely that Ringelblum, a native of eastern Galicia, would not know the difference between a Ukrainian and, for example, a Belarusian. Beyond these frequent references, however, no sophisticated treatment of Ukrainians appears in the book. Ringelblum had completed a monograph on the Trawniki camp as well, which may have been more informative in this regard. Unfortunately, it was destroyed during the Polish uprising of August 1944.

This 1992 edition is basically a reprint of the 1974 volume published by Yad Vashem. Yehuda Bauer has contributed a new foreword, and Zachary Baker has prepared a detailed two-page list of errata that appeared in the original edition. Ringelblum's text is amply supported by some seventy-five pages of introductory and concluding materials. The annotation usually confirms the information provided in the

[1] Yaroslav Bilinsky, "Methodological Problems and Philosophical Issues in the Study of Jewish-Ukrainian Relations During the Second World War," in *Ukrainian-Jewish Relations in Historical Perspective*, ed. Peter Potichnyj and Howard Aster (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1988), 377–79.

text with additional primary materials then unavailable to Ringelblum, but occasionally points out his errors as well. Together with this scholarly support, Ringelblum's monograph is an exceptionally important source for the history of the relations between Jews and non-Jews during the Second World War.

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THE MODERN UZBEKS FROM THE FOURTEENTH CENTURY TO THE PRESENT; A CULTURAL HISTORY. By *Edward A. Allworth.* Series on Nationalities (formerly Nationalities in the USSR). Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1990. $24.95 paper.

As Billington's *The Icon and the Axe* demonstrated long ago, a cultural history can draw together various strands of a people's historical experience and weave a coherent and comprehensive, even a poetic, tapestry of their collective life. Reading such a work is a joy and a revelation. As historians, we savor it; as researchers, we refer to it; and as teachers, we assign it freely. Sadly, Allworth's *The Modern Uzbeks* is not such a work.

Reading this book is irritating and frustrating. The first hundred pages stroll through some basic and interesting elements of historical cultural identity in Central Asia, but lay neither a solid chronological nor a consistent conceptual foundation. Biographical information on key figures is scattered over several chapters. There is no glossary or explanation in the text for many foreign terms. These are drawbacks in a field that, in terms of English-language works, is still in its infancy. An interested reader is likely to be daunted, and our students will surely give up in chapter 2.

A far more serious fault in a scholarly work is the sloppy placement and imprecise content of many end notes. Long passages, including direct quotations, sometimes run for a full page, but the appropriate note is on the next page, e.g., pp. 111–13, 128–29, 156–57, 180–81, 181–82. In the note itself, a series of works may be listed, apparently for the preceding array of ideas, quotations, and facts. But the reader is left to guess which sources go with which passages. There is no excuse for such a practice.

Muddying the conceptual waters of this long work are, first, biases reflected in such inaccurate dichotomies as "nomadic impatience" versus "urban tolerance" (p. 28), or the reference to "civilized twentieth-century conduct" (p. 167). And one would have hoped that the word "potentate" (used five times in the first thirty-five pages alone) would be entirely passé by now. Second, use of the terms "cast of mind" (p. 5), "race," and "racial" as near equivalent to tribe or "nation" (pp. 5, 14, 32, 198, 268, etc.) is reminiscent of nineteenth-century usage and, of course, misleading. Indeed, the entire discussion of "nation," "ethnic group," and "modern" is problematical.

An early example of this difficulty is the description of an "unjust Amir" (pp. 111–14) who was "regarded by his subjects with contempt for his vicious treatment of relatives and for his harem of boys..." He is blamed, at least in part, for the loss of

Bukhara's independence to Russian conquerors. By the end of the passage, this ruler and his son ("who joined stupidity and stubborness to his father's cruelty") are declared to have been "Central Asia's first indigenous rulers to become modern in that they were incapable of beneficially adapting or employing new technology or knowledge." Some definition of "modern" would appear to be in order. More broadly, this section seems to embody the author's failure to connect his narrative to the glimmers of inspiration that occasionally show through.

The reader who persists into the second third of the volume, despite the designation of Part II as "The Conflict Between Old and New *Modernity*," will find a few diamonds in the rough. The description in Chapters 12–13 of Sovietization and the suppression of intellectuals and the powerful symbols of independence is key to the entire Soviet experience. Professor Allworth traces the highly suspect Soviet "ethnogenesis" notion to racialist theories of the 1930s (pp. 235–39, 259, 268), and reveals the pernicious political uses to which it was put. Thus, "the theories made land the core" of a people's evolution, and "those advancing this argument [were required to] search for retrospective proof on the same piece of territory" (p. 236). This in turn led to claims that a "land of the Uzbek" that existed in 1940 had existed from time immemorial, thus obliterating major empires of Central Asia's past, and turning historical figures who fought against (or antedated) Uzbeks to be declared "Uzbeks." Other racialists added the notion of a disconnected "Uzbek language," which allowed them to ignore embarrassing (for Russia and its claims to cultural "elder brotherhood") Turkic literary traditions that conveyed a high ethical and artistic standard centuries before the Russian conquest. Here Professor Allworth deals a significant blow to Russian pretensions, expressed in Soviet academic and political arenas for so many decades that they have seeped into general Western scholarship on Soviet nationalities.

Finally, and central to Professor Allworth's view, is the argument that Central Asian historical identity has been supraethnic and that Central Asian national identity was conceived by the Jadid ("Reform") thinkers early in the twentieth century as "heterogenous...undivided by ethnic or class stratification" (p. 168). The artificiality of Soviet nationality policy, Professor Allworth argues, lay in the attempt to impose ethnically homogenous national identity using mostly externally rather than internally recognized criteria (pp. 288–93). The whole formulation is thought- provoking, and the topic is so pivotal as to be well worth extended consideration. However, the discussion is bogged down by the same unclear terminology (including references to "race," "supraethnic nationality," and the repeated translation of *narod,* Turkish *halk*, as "ethnic group" rather that "a people") and thus, like much of this volume, it never comes entirely into focus.

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CARPATHO-RUSYN STUDIES: AN ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY. Volume 1: 1975–1984. By P*aul Robert Magocsi*. New York and London: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1988. 143 pp.

Dr. Paul Robert Magocsi has produced numerous works over the last twenty years covering Ukrainian and Carpatho-Rusyn cultural history, bibliography, language, geography, and more. Not the least of his works is the important study *The Shaping of a National Identity: Subcarpathian Rus', 1848-1948* (No. 189 in the bibliography being reviewed). Thus, it should not be surprising that he had undertaken the task of bibliographical control of the output of recent writing covering the Carpatho-Rusyn world. We are told that the inception for this work lay in The *Austrian History Yearbook* for 1974, where an "English-language historiographical survey was published on Carpatho-Rusyns and their homeland." This effort was followed by listings of "Recent Publications" in the quarterly *Carpatho-Rusyn American*, begun in 1978 (No. 165 in the bibliography). The listings reflected the burgeoning growth of literature on the topic to such a degree that the present bibliography was created, based on the earlier compilations and updates. There is a total of 710 entries, and the bibliography "represents the first volume in an on-going or current bibliography that will appear at ten-year intervals and will cover works published during the previous decade."

Magocsi defines Carpatho-Rusyns as belonging to three geographic regions: Subcarpathian Rus' in present-day western Ukraine, the Lemko region in southeastern Poland, and the Prešov region in the former northeastern region of Czechoslovakia (now part of the Republic of Slovakia). He further extends his coverage of these areas to include other cultures ("Hungarian, Slovak, German, Jewish, etc."), as well as "non-culturally specific phenomena," by which he means economic, political, geographic, and the like. He subsumes all cultural groups and their environment in these three "territorial units" under the general rubric of "Carpatho-Ruthenica." A fourth region encompasses villages in the Vojvodina and Slavonia areas of Yugoslavia where Rusyns live. Included in these enumerations are those immigrants who came to North America. As these divisions show, and Magocsi himself points out, Carpatho-Rusyns have not had any "homeland" in the usual, political sense of the word, but have lived in or come from different states. Therefore, previous bibliographic compilations have been mainly episodic, regional, or subject-oriented. This bibliography has sought to override these past deficencies and produce if not a "national bibliography," at least a more systematic, total approach.

Material included covers books, pamphlets, and articles that "strive to be scholarly" or provide new data even if in a popular presentation. Anthologies of literatures and collected works of individual authors, and literary histories are also present. Articles in newspapers, almanacs or popular journals are generally excluded, as well as reviews. There are eleven journals included covering Carpatho-Rusyn scholarship that are listed and described in their proper chronological order, but the articles therein are only briefly mentioned in the annotations—articles do not receive special entries, though the authors are indexed and consequently under control. Thus, while you can find a listing and brief

description of Józef Domurad's article on the rebuilt Eastern-rite church in Hańczowa only in the entry for Magury 75 (No. 032), his listing in the index will lead you to No. 032. The same is true for Magury 76 (No. 077), Magury 78 (No. 190), Magury 79 (No. 255), etc., and the authors listed in each entry. What this arrangement tells us is that the number of entries could have been expanded considerably if all these articles had been listed separately. In other words, the real scholarly output goes well beyond the 710 entries presented.

The bibliography is in chronological order, then by alphabetical arrangement according to the entry, whether author, editor, compiler, or title. Full bibliographical data are provided, including English translations for all foreign-language titles. Each entry has an annotation, some quite extensive, providing background for the publication or explication of the contents, and cross references to other entries when necessary. The large format of the book, 8 1/2″ by 11″, may make it difficult to shelve in a library, but it certainly makes it easier to use in the hand. The book lies flat when open, and one can shift from the index to pages of text without having to struggle to keep pages from fluttering shut. The annotations are evenhanded in presenting various viewpoints, including such ongoing polemics as the political set-up to bring Subcarpathian Rus′ into Soviet Ukraine (No. 288), the liquidation of the Greek Catholic church in Subcarpathian Rus′ (No. 340), the Ukrainian influence in Vojvodina (Nos. 018, 314), and Ukrainian émigré attitudes concerning national identity in Subcarpathian Rus′ (No. 323). It is perhaps indicative of Magocsi's sensitivity to his role in these controversies that while he notes that the article cited in No. 323 starts out as a review of his seminal book on Subcarpathian Rus′ (No. 189), he does not give a cross reference to his answer (No. 400) in the same journal.

What makes this work particularly valuable are not only the annotations, but an eight-page introduction which lays out, subject by subject, the background to the development and significance of the decade of publication included in the volume. This is, of course, where the erudition and experience of Magocsi come to the rescue of what would have been otherwise simply a competent work of bibliographical control. As works are cited to support his analysis, the entry numbers are given as well. In this manner, one can follow closely the scholarly output of the decade, some of the previous efforts in the field, and then concentrate on those entries that may be of interest to the reader. The subjects analyzed cover archeology, architecture, ethnography, folklore, history, language, and literature. He also points to the lacunae in the study of Carpatho-Rusyn culture noted by their absence in the bibliography, particularly the need for church history in all its aspects, the history of icon and secular painting, and Rusyn-American history which, he laments, "remains virtually untouched."

One questions whether Magocsi can wait until 1998 to issue the next volume of this bibliography. Since the fall of the Soviet Union and the communist regimes in Eastern Europe, there have been new opportunities for research and publication, interaction between East and West, and political and economical changes. One of these developments is the effort on the part of the Institute for East West Studies, under its president and founder, John Edwin Mroz, to set up the Carpathian Euroregion Project working out of its European Center in Atlanta, Georgia. Begun in May 1992, and under the direction of Dr. Vasil Hudak, it seeks to create trans-frontier cooperation among its members, and to create regional and economic development in the area. There have been conferences and reciprocal visits among participants, to Western Europe and the United States. Another development is the creation of the independent state of Slovakia on 1 January

1993. Further, the area of Slavonia in Croatia was particularly hard hit during the war with Serbia in 1991–1992, undoubtedly marking changes for Rusyns there. Of course, the Greek Catholic church has become openly active again in Ukraine. In the next volume, it may also be necessary to include more references to news sources that can lead the researcher to background material on the immediate effects of these changes. There are also sure to be inclusions from the period covered by this volume that were missed. For instance, while Bohdan A. Struminsky is represented in the bibliography, his article "The Name of the Lemkos and Their Territory" in the *Annals of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the U.S.* for 1981–1983 is not, nor is his work *Old Ruthenian Printed Books and Manuscripts in the Episcopal and Heritage Institute Libraries of the Byzantine Catholic Diocese of Passaic,* published by the Diocese in 1980. There are a few others as well, for instance, *Ukrainian Heritage Notes: The Language Question in Galicia* by Magocsi, published in 1978. The latter two titles are only twenty-one and twenty-two pages respectively, but size is not the criterion here. More significant perhaps is the absence of *Galicia: A Historical Survey and Bibliographic Guide,* again by Magocsi, published in 1983 in 299 pages. Galicia has thirty-three entries in the index, and there is surely room for one more. These gaps are certainly oversights that will be cleared up with the next volume.

The index is full and reliable. My only complaint is that some entries with multiple text references are indicated only by numbers. For example, a reader would have to refer to 101 separate numbered entries in the text to find material wanted under "Biographies and memoirs," 123 under "Czechoslovakia," 113 under "Ethnography," and similarly for "History," "Language," "Literature: history and criticism," and even more for "Prešov Region" (154) or "Subcarpathian Rus′." Even a one- or two-word description for each number under these extensive index entries would be helpful, which Magocsi did partly under "Greek Catholic Church." If one knows the year of publication of some work, that does break the search down to a specific range. If, however, one is looking for a bibliography on Lemkos, there is the choice of forty-two entries under "Bibliographies" or ninety-four under "Lemko Region."

In summary, this is a valuable, non-polemical bibliographical and historiographical record of the effort of one ethnic group to define and expand its identity in all aspects of cultural, social, and political relations, including the intellectual and practical arguments and agreements with its various neighbors both in the homeland and in North America. We look forward to subsequent volumes.

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LETTER TO THE EDITORS

In Response to a Review by Professor Michael S. Flier

STEFANIA HNATEŇKO

One could regard the scholarly review by Professor Michael S. Flier in *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* (Vol. 16, No. 1/2, June 1992) of the popular text of the catalogue *Skarby davn'oho ukrajins'koho mystectva. Relihijne mystectvo XVI-XVIII stolit'. Treasures of Early Ukrainian Art. Religious Art of the XVI-XVIII Centuries* (New York: The Ukrainian Museum, 1989) as to the point, had the reviewer limited himself to descriptions of those iconostases that were included in the catalogue. Instead, he polemicizes with a text that the author of the catalogue had not written. Professor Flier describes an iconostasis not from the catalogue, but from a monograph by Volodymyr Ovsijčuk (*Ukrajins'ke mystectvo druhoji polovyny XVI- peršoji polovyny XVII st.* [Kiev, 1985]), from which, as the reviewer claims, I supposedly drew ideas without citing the source. Attempting to prove precisely this allegation, Professor Flier takes the liberty of inserting information into a passage of text that he cites from Ovsijčuk, which results in a series of misrepresentations.

Thus, on page 207 of his review Professor Flier corrects the date of the icons from the iconostasis of the village of Žovtanci, near L'viv: instead of 1648 he sets forth 1638, and in a footnote refers the reader to the above-mentioned monograph *Ukrajins'ke mystectvo druhoji polovyny XVI- peršoji polovyny XVII st.*, naming the author V. Osvijčuk (meaning, of course, V. Ovsijčuk).

There is no mention of the iconostasis from the village of Žovtanci in the monograph by Ovsijčuk. Professor Flier cites a footnote from page 137 of Ovsijčuk's book, which refers to the Church of the Assumption (or Volos'ka) in L'viv, and inserts the name "Žovtanci" into Ovsijčuk's text. I cite the texts of Ovsijčuk's footnote (left) and Flier's (right):

*В 1767 р. іконостас був вивезений зі Львова в с. Великі Грибовичі і розміщений спочатку в дерев'яній, згодом в новозбудованій кам'яній церкві (1897 р.).	1 In 1767 the Žovtanci iconostasis was transferred to the village of Velyki Hrybovyči, at first to a wooden church and then, in 1897, to a stone church (V.A. Osvijčuk, *Ukrajins'ke mystectvo druhoji polovyny XVI- peršoji polovyny XVII st. Humanistyčni ta vyzvol'ni ideji* [Kiev, 1985], p. 137).

This insertion of the name of a village that is not to be found in Ovsijčuk became the source of the reviewer's error, for the iconostasis described in the catalogue of the Ukrainian Museum in New York, and the iconostasis described in the monograph of Ovsijčuk, are two different iconostases. Only the name of the church, the Assumption, is common to both. While in the catalogue I described the iconostasis of the Church of the Assumption from the village of Žovtanci, Flier, paraphrasing Ovsijčuk, describes the iconostasis of the Church of the Assumption in L'viv and that in 1767 was transferred to the village of Velyki Hrybovyči, to the Church of SS. Cosmas and Damian. The latter

iconostasis has not yet been restored, except for the icons of St. John Chrysostom and St. Basil the Great (in the deacon's doors), which are found in the collection of the National Museum in L'viv, and the Passion cycle, the icons of which are situated on both sides of the new iconostasis in the church for which it had been originally made—the Church of the Assumption (Volos'ka) in L'viv. This Passion cycle was restored by my late husband, Valerij Hnatenko, and Jaroslav Movčan.

The New York catalogue contains reproductions of three restored icons from the iconostasis of the Church of the Assumption in the village of *Žovtanci.* Neither the Passion cycle, nor the icons from the deacon's doors are to be found among these icons, but only two icons from the botton (local) tier and the parish icon. The icons from the iconostasis of the village of Žovtanci are dated. The date of 1648 (and not 1638 or 1637, as Flier asserts on page 208 of the Harvard publication) was found during restoration of the parish icon of this iconostasis. This discovery also belongs to the restorers mentioned above: Valerij Hnatenko and Jaroslav Movčan. Had the reviewer looked attentively at the icons reproduced in the New York catalogue rather than basing his analysis on his own confusion of the L'viv iconostasis with that of Žovtanci, he would have found no basis for correcting the obvious dating of the iconostasis from the village of Žovtanci, or for including it in the exuberant Baroque, comparing the carving of the Žovtanci iconostasis to that of Bernini in St. Peter's Basilica in Rome (p. 207). The iconostasis from the village of Žovtanci does not have the attributes of the baroque; it still tends to the Byzantine style. The stylistic traits of the local icons of the Virgin *Hodegitria* and Christ *Pantocrator*, reproduced on pages 22–23 of the New York catalogue, indicate this clearly—the static quality of the images, the planar representation of the figures, the inverse perspective (the parish icon of the Assumption), etc. Incidentally, the iconostasis of the L'viv Church of the Assumption, too, is not fashioned in the style of the baroque, but is clear testimony to the Renaissance in Ukrainian painting, which is also stressed by Ovsijčuk.

Professor Flier feels that I have appropriated materials from contemporary art historians without proper attribution. As proof the reviewer compares my text with that of Hryhorij Lohvyn from his monograph *Ukrajins'kyj seredn'ovičnyj žyvopys* (Kiev, 1976) with regard to the technical aspects of icon painting (page 209 of the review). Anyone who has any familiarity with icons knows that the technique of icon painting remained unchanged almost to the eighteenth century. Before Hryhorij Lohvyn, this technology was described by Ilarion Svjencic'kyj in his *Ikonopys Halyc'koji Ukrajiny 15-16 vv.* (L'viv, 1928), page 81, as well as in *Istorija ukrajins'koho mystectva v šesty tomax,* vol. 2 (Kiev, 1967), page 211. Thus, everyone who describes the technique of executing icons can be accused of copying. The abbreviated version I offer in the catalogue became fixed in my memory like a poem from my experience in conducting tours through the icon exhibit rooms at the National Museum in L'viv.

As an example of my borrowing from the work of Volodymyr Ovsijčuk, Professor Flier compares a passage from page 13 of my text in the catalogue with a passage from page 6 of Ovsijčuk's monograph, and finds the same argument in both. But I cite the aforesaid work of Ovsijčuk in the bibliography. Furthermore, on page 209 Professor Flier remarks that my citations to Ovsijčuk are imprecise. Yet in the bibliography of the catalogue (page 42) not just one work of Ovsijčuk is listed, but two, in which precisely those monuments of art that the catalogue illustrates are described: *Ukrajins'ke mystectvo XIV–peršoji polovyny XVIII st. Narysy z istoriji ukrajins'koho mystectva*

(Kiev, 1983) and *Ukrajins'ke mystectvo druhoji polovyny XVI–peršoji polovyny XVII st.* (Kiev, 1985).

And finally, the author of the review accuses me of referring to the work of Mykola Holubec′ and not to the work of Ovsijčuk (page 210 of the review) in writing of the likelihood of the earlier date for the creation of the iconostasis of the Church of St. Paraskeva-P'jatnycja in L′viv. I do indeed refer to Holubec′, because he was the pioneer of the dating of this monument, and I would like to call attention precisely to this author, who without additional information (it came out only after the restoration—the icon had been burned on the back, etc.) was able to date the iconostasis so decisively to the earlier time. I see a defect of the catalogue in something different: in my text of the catalogue I made no mention of the work and discoveries of the restorers. Everyone who is familiar with the specifics of various discoveries related to icons knows that, as a rule, it is the restorers who make them. I failed to name them because, in giving me their slides of the icons, which they had prepared during the restoration, the restorers were afraid (this was 1988) to publish their names abroad. Indeed, the goal of this popular catalogue was to prompt the publication in Ukraine of a scholarly monograph about each one of these iconostases. Hence my reference not only to Volodymyr Antonovyč Ovsijčuk, but also to the group of L′viv art historians, which also includes the restorers responsible for discovering some of the facts presented in the catalogue (page 17 of the catalogue).

On page 210 Professor Flier notes that I give Ovsijčuk credit for additional argumentation regarding the dating of the P'jatnycja iconostasis, but refer the reader not to page 138 but to page 137 of his book *Ukrajins'ke mystectvo druhoji polovyny XVI–peršoji polovyny XVII st.*, and that in so doing I allegedly confuse the issue regarding dating. But it is precisely on page 137 that the development of the idea that interests both the author of the catalogue and the author of the review of this catalogue begins.

Commenting on my text about the authorship of the P'jatnycja iconostasis in L′viv and that of the Church of the Assumption in the village of Žovtanci, Michael Flier once again is in the wrong. Having read in Ovsijčuk's monograph about Fedir Sen′kovyč's joint authorship of the iconostasis of the P'jatnycja Church in L'viv and about another instance of Fedir Sen′kovyč's joint authorship, i.e., of the iconostasis of the Church of the Assumption in L′viv, which, as I have indicated before, Professor Flier confused with the Assumption Church in the village of Žovtanci, the reviewer writes that Fedir Sen′kovyč was one of the authors of the iconostasis from the village of Žovtanci, attributing this assertion to me, to Ovsijčuk, and to the L′viv art historian and restorer, Volodymyr Vujcyk. Yet neither in my catalogue nor in Ovsijčuk's work is it stated that Fedir Sen′kovyč was the author of the iconostasis from the village of Žovtanci. Nor did Vujcyk find the signature of this master there. Vujcyk did find the signature of Fedir Sen′kovyč on the deacon's doors of the iconostasis of the Church of the Assumption (Volos′ka) in L′viv and on the icon of the Virgin *Hodegitria* from the village of Ripniv. Only this was a different village and a different iconostasis. À propos, the Ripniv icon of the Virgin *Hodegitria* burned in 1988. The L′viv art historian Oleh Sydor mentions this on page 22 of his article, "Tradyciji i novatorstvo v ukrajins′komu maljarstvi XVII–XVIII stolit′" ("Traditions and innovation in Ukrainian painting of the 17th–18th

centuries"), in the book by V. I. Svjencicka and O. F. Sydor, *Spadščyna vikiv. Ukrajins'ke maliarstvo XIV–XVIII stolit' u muzejnyx kolekcijax L'vova* (L'viv, 1990).

Having confused two different iconostases, Professor Flier asks who originated the idea about the authorship of the iconostasis from the village of Žovtanci—Vujcyk, Ovsijčuk, or Hnatenko? By way of reply I cite an excerpt from my text on page 21 of the catalogue:

На виставці експонуються три ікони з намісного ряду іконостасу церкви Успіння в селі Жовтанці: "Богородиця-Одигітрія", "Христос Пантократор" та "Успіння". Автор—майстер Андрій. Іконостас датований 1648 роком. За часом виконання і за стилістичнимн ознаками, іконостас найблиΩчий до праць майстрів, що виконували іконостас церкви Успіння у Львові (1637 р.), тобто до праць Федора Сеньковича та Миколи Петрахновича. Майстер Андрій у 1596 році був учнем львівського маляра Лаврентія Пухали (Лавриша).

The exhibition includes three icons from the local tier of the iconostasis of thechurch of the Assumption in the village of Žovtanci: the Virgin *Hodigitria*, Christ *Pantocrator*, and the Assumption. The author is Master Andrij. The iconostasis is dated 1648. Chronologically and stylistically, the iconostasis is closest to the works of the masters who executed the iconostasis of the Church of the Assumption in L'viv (1637), that is, to the works of Fedir Sen'kovyč and Mykola Petraxnovyč. In 1596, Master Andrij was a pupil of the L'viv painter LavrentijPuxala (Lavryš).

The catalogue of the Ukrainian Museum is the first publication to describe the icons of the iconostasis from the village of Žovtanci. The date of the execution of the iconostasis and the name of the master who executed it were found by the restorers Valerij Hnatenko and Jaroslav Movčan. That the painter Andrij was a pupil of Lavrentij Puxala is my own supposition.

And now for some less fundamental observations in Professor Flier's review.

On page 206 the reviewer writes that there were objects at the exhibition that had been borrowed from private collections in the United States and Canada. In fact, the objects for the exhibition were borrowed only from private collections and institutions in the United States, which is shown by the list of exhibits on pages 39 and 41 of the catalogue, where there is no mention of any borrowed exhibits from Canada.

On page 206 the reviewer accuses me of disturbing the chronology of the exhibition because it included a fragment of a Gospel of the period of the Halyč principality, from the end of the twelfth century. In the introduction to the catalogue it is noted (page 7): "Оскіл'ки стародрукована книга успадкувала і продовΩила традиції рукописної книги, експозиція цього відділу нашої виставки починається зі зразків рукописних книг—фрагменту Євангелія—доби Галицького Князівства (кінець XII ст.)[Inasmuch as the early printed book inherited and continued the traditions of the manuscript, the exhibition begins with examples of manuscripts—a fragment of a Gospel from the period of the Halyč principality (end of the twelfth century)]..." Perhaps Professor Flier did not know that supplementary material had been prepared for the exhibition about the development of the manuscript book and icon painting, which was illustrated with slides with accompanying text, recorded on audio tape. Thus, the exhibited original of an early manuscript was logically connected with the subject of the exhibition.

On pages 207–208 Professor Flier remarks that on the icon of the Baptism of Christ from the Holy Feasts tier, Christ is depicted wrapped in a cloth, "a departure from the traditional naked Christ standing in the midst of the River Jordan." But which tradition

is being referred to—that of Byzantine iconography or that of West European painting? In Byzantine-style icons Christ was not depicted naked.

And finally it is strange that for all his pedantry, in the Harvard publication Professor Michael Flier misspells the name of the well-known art historian Volodymyr Ovsijčuk as Volodymyr Osvijčuk throughout the entire text, incorrectly renders the given name of the translator as Maria instead of Marta, gives his own transliteration of the surname with which the translator signs English-language publications (Professor Flier renders it "Skorups'ka" instead of "Skorupsky") and, arbitrarily inserting a word into someone else's text, confuses two different iconostases, which causes erroneous conclusions in a scholarly review, the text of which is almost as long as the text of the popular catalogue.

New York

Translated from the Ukrainian by Andrew Sorokowski

A Reply to Stefania Hnatenko

MICHAEL S. FLIER

My review of Stefania Hnatenko's exhibition catalogue *Skarby davn'oho ukrajins'koho mystectva...* (*Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 16, nos. 1–2 [1992]: 206–211) consists of two parts: (1) a brief overview of the exhibits and their interpretation, and (2) a critique of the author's scholarly technique. In her response to the review, Stefania Hnatenko devotes a considerable amount of attention to the former and is rather dismissive of the latter. It is important, as I will show below, to keep the two distinct and in balance.

A proper understanding of our quite distinct perspectives depends on a clarification of some basic facts about Ukrainian iconostases of the late sixteenth–mid-seventeenth centuries, the primary concern of her reply. Four iconostases are relevant for the discussion, listed chronologically according to their respective churches as follows:

1. Paraskeva-P'jatnycja in L'viv (end 16th c.–beg. 17th c.)

2. Assumption in L'viv (1638)

3. Assumption in Žovtanci near L'viv (1648)

4. Holy Spirit in Rohatyn (1650).

Iconostases (1), (2), and (4) have survived nearly intact; iconostasis (3) has not. Only individual icons from (3) are extant.

Almost half of Hnatenko's reply concerns the inadvertent conflation of iconostases (2) and (3) in my review. At first blush the misassigned name—(3) for (2)—is puzzling. The identity of the word "Assumption" in (3) and (2) is clear, but "Žovtanci near L'viv" is not "L'viv." How could such a conflation arise? Reviewing my notes and Hnatenko's text, I discovered that the confusion was traceable to the catalogue itself. In the introduction (pp. 6–7), the Ukrainian text appears to be defective (earlier version? accidental computer deletion?). It states that the exhibition acquaints visitors with icons from the iconostases of such churches as (1) and (4), but makes no mention of icons from iconostasis (3) (the Assumption in Žovtanci near L'viv). I noted two such omissions in the margin when verifying the English translation on the facing page, which does refer twice to iconostasis (3). Thus, confusion about the number of iconostases exhibited is raised right from the beginning. Of the two iconostases listed in the Ukrainian text—(1), (4)—only one (1) is dated; all three iconostases in the English text—(1), (3), (4)—are without individual dates. When the names of the three surviving iconostases are mentioned next (pp. 8–9), the list comprises (1), (2), and (4), all dated. Nowhere in the catalogue text are the four iconostases (or three and the remnants of the fourth) ever juxtaposed. It is not difficult to see how a reader faced with three different configurations of iconostases over the space of four introductory pages might assume (mistakenly) that the three undated iconostases mentioned on page 6 were the same as the three dated iconostases on pages 8–9, and that the Church of the Assumption in L'viv (no. 2) and Žovtanci near L'viv (no. 3) were actually one and the same. The possibility of free variation between "Žovtanci near L'viv" and "L'viv" was not to be excluded in a text that

dated iconostasis (2) to 1638 in one place (pp. 8–9) and 1637 in another (pp. 20–21), identified the apostle Simon as Samuel (p. 18), and assigned the oldest manuscript of the Tale of Bygone Years to the fifteenth rather than the fourteenth century (pp. 26–27). Had the catalogue contained at the beginning the much clearer account given in Hnatenko's reply, the ambiguity would have been avoided. Nonetheless, I am grateful for the clarification.

Hnatenko reasons that my identification of iconostases (2) and (3) as (3) is enough to render any criticism of her presentation invalid. This is faulty reasoning. If through miscommunication, ambiguity, or distraction I call a rose a primrose and go on to provide a detailed and accurate description of a rose, that description of the rose holds, after the inadvertent name transfer is revealed. My remarks about the de facto iconostasis (2)(pictured on p. 9 of the catalogue) retain their force, regardless of the inappropriate name of Žovtanci attached to them: the comments on style, the parallel with Bernini, the references to Ovsijčuk. Such validity extends equally to my footnote, problematic only for the unintentional identification of (2) and (3), not for any failure to acknowledge the source of information; Ovsijčuk does state that iconostasis (2)—my actual object of reference—was transferred to Velyki Hrybovyči in 1767. Hnatenko's attempt to redirect my statements from (2) to (3), a "strawman" iconostasis not analyzed by me at all, is a rhetorical diversion and irrelevant. To continue the analogy, my description of a rose under the label "primrose" cannot be used as evidence of a distorted description of primroses, if I had a rose in mind the whole time. Shakespeare would surely agree.

As for the proper citation of sources, Hnatenko presents a rather distorted picture. One, two, or several mentions of an author somewhere in the footnotes or the text or the bibliography at the end of the catalogue is not sufficient recognition at the point in a scholar's argument when a specific hypothesis, paraphrase, or direct quotation is given. The precise source must be cited. Hnatenko's characterization of the catalogue as "popular" or "popularizing" is no justification for lowering standards of scholarly attribution. The acknowledgment of Lohvyn et al. 1976 for a list of illustrations of icons that survived from Kievan Rus′ (plates 1–15), for example, does not carry over to a nearly verbatim account of the technical aspects of the icon from the same source (p. 5) three paragraphs later, regardless of the function that this bit of memorized text might have played in Hnatenko's biography. Other earlier sources are irrelevant to my point since they were not quoted. The juxtaposed passages in my review (p. 209) make the primary source of Hnatenko's unacknowledged description of the technical aspects of the icon patently clear.

Likewise, the statement concerning the influence of the European Renaissance on Ukrainian culture is not, as Hnatenko puts it, simply pursuing the same thought as that found in Ovsijčuk 1985 (p. 6); it is a close paraphrase using many of the same words and phrases and citing the same passage from Kopystens′kyj but without attribution.

In addition, Hnatenko misrepresents my statement regarding the dating of iconostasis (1). Her account of the contribution made by Holubec′ is clearly a reworked version of what appears in Ovsijčuk 1985 (p. 137), but only Holubec′ is mentioned in her footnote. Page 137 is cited two paragraphs later, in apparent reference to the discussion of the stylistic grounds for dating, but even here, the citation 137 means only "137," not "137ff." or "137–42." When the discussion switches to the much more interesting religious-political associations of the Passion cycle raised by Ovsijčuk on page 138, these are not credited, leaving the reader with the impression that they are the

contribution of Stefania Hnatenko. As for the remarks on authorship, once the name transfer noted above is taken into account, we are still left without proper documentation of Ovsijčuk's hypothesis (pp. 141–42), as demonstrated in my review (p. 210). In the last analysis, the evident conflation of two iconostases must not be used to divert our attention from obvious lapses of scholarly protocol.

Hnatenko has noted other, fairly minor points that I take this opportunity to address. First, the reference to Canada was based on the encolpion (Belz, 12th c.), which she identified with a donor from Toronto (pp. 40–41). Second, the metathesis of *vs* in Volodymyr Ovsijčuk's name was the unfortunate product of a global computer replacement of the abbreviation "O." with the typographically faulty surname before the final printout; it should have been caught in proofreading. Third, the translator's Ukrainian surname was used because the Ukrainian-language title was listed first in the entry.

Hnatenko's statement on Byzantine iconography is more serious, however, and merits a lengthier reply. She is puzzled at my reference to the traditional depiction of the Baptism with a naked Christ standing in the midst of the River Jordan (pp. 207–08). She states unequivocally that "in Byzantine-style icons, Christ was not depicted naked." She is apparently unaware that in the oldest Byzantine images of the Baptism that have survived, Christ stands naked in the River Jordan as he submits to baptism by Saint John the Forerunner. I have in mind the dome mosaic of the Baptism in the Orthodox baptistery in Ravenna (mid-5th c.), scenes from the life of Christ painted on a wooden pilgrim's box from Palestine (late 6th or early 7th c., Vatican Museo Sacro Cristiano), the *Menologion* of Basil II (c. 985), and the pendentive mosaics of the Baptism from the Church of Hosios Lukas at Phocas (c. 1000) and the Church of Daphni (c. 1100). The traditional Byzantine Baptism with a naked Christ is found as well in Cyprus, Mistra, Mount Athos, Sicily (Palermo, Monreale, Cefalù), the Holy Land (Jerusalem), Armenia, and Georgia. The "painter's manual" (*Hermeneia*) of the eighteenth-century Athonite monk Dionysius of Fourna, whether repeating earlier nonextant manuals or presenting the accumulated experience of his own observations, is quite clear on the representation:

> **The Baptism of Christ.** Christ standing naked in the midst of the Jordan; the Forerunner is on the bank of the river to the right of Christ, looking up, with his right hand resting on the head of Christ, and his left hand upraised....(p. 33)

The same image comes to the Balkan Slavs and ultimately to Rus'. Prominent East Slavic examples include the fresco of the Baptism in the MiroΩMonastery in Pskov (1156), a panel with the Baptism on the western Golden Gates of Suzdal''s Cathedral of the Nativity of the Mother of God (1230s), a Baptism panel on the old gilded icon cover (*oklad*) of the Vladimir Mother of God in Moscow (first third of the 15th c.), and the two-sided calendrical icon with the Baptism from Novgorod's Cathedral of the Holy Wisdom (late 15th–mid-16th c.). The traditional iconography of the Baptism is found in Russian iconostases in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries as well. Ukrainian icon painters show preference for a younger Byzantine iconography with Christ wrapped in a towel, a tradition apparently witnessed in Rus' as early as 1199 (the fresco of the Baptism at the Church of the Savior at Nereditsa). For Hnatenko to assert that Christ was always clothed in the Byzantine rendering of the Baptism is to overlook an interesting example of competing iconographical imagery in Rus', a topic worthy of further study.

Returning to the question of balance raised at the beginning, I wish to underscore a point overlooked by Hnatenko, namely, that my overall assessment of the Ukrainian Museum's exhibition on Ukrainian culture of the sixteenth-seventeenth centuries was a positive one. Aside from a list of corrections and additions provided, I praised the interesting exhibits of icons, books, and other cultural artifacts presented by the Museum. Where I part company with Hnatenko is on matters pertaining to the expression of ideas, one's own and those of other people. As writers we are all responsible for insuring that our readers have a clear idea about which are which. None of the issues raised by Hnatenko—the (unintentional) name transfer, her obviously close association with the restoration of the relevant iconostases, the precarious personal safety of the restorers, the popular nature of the catalogue—is relevant to her own use of sources. As reviewers it is our solemn but no less unpleasant duty to report to our readers those instances in which the standards of scholarly attribution are not upheld, whether intentionally or unintentionally. Despite Stefania Hnatenko's claim, this is not an arbitrary or capricious decision on our part; it is demanded by the profession we serve.

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